On Monday, July 24 at 6:45, a southbound SRT train was leaving Ellesmere Station when its rear car derailed. This was not simply a case of slipping off of the tracks, but a more complex incident in which:
The rear car of the train broke away from the other three cars.
The truck (or bogie, the undercarriage holding the wheels and motor) at the rear of this car was detached from the car.
A section of the reaction rail which is part of the propulsion system broke away from the guideway.
The car came to rest with one end leaning against the guideway’s fence and a low sidewall. Fortunately, this is a location where a derailed car could not fall any distance.
Five passengers were taken to hospital with minor injuries.
The line remains closed with shuttle buses ferrying riders, and the TTC has announced that the line will remain closed for at least three weeks pending an investigation of the cause of this accident. That will take us until at least mid-August.
It is not certain if the line, which was planned to shut down permanently in mid-November, will ever re-open depending on the cause of the derailment, the amount and cost of work to remediate it, and the limited time during which this expense would have any benefit.
Updated July 27 at 10:20pm: The proposed schedule for the SRT right-of-way conversion to a busway has been added to the article to clarify that “Winter 2025” really means the end, not the beginning, of 2025.
For the convenience of readers, especially those out of town who might not have followed this event in detail, here are links to many articles which include a wealth of photos.
Technical Difficulties: The Scarborough RT accident was absolutely predictable as policy-makers and riders have been aware of it’s deterioration for almost 20 years
The Toronto Region Board of Trade recently published a review of municipal transit systems against an overall set of targets. Intriguingly, this document goes by two names:
Needs Improvement: Toronto Region Transit Report Cards is the title cited on the main announcement page for this report.
Needs Improvement: Getting to World-Class Transit is the actual title on page 1 of the report itself.
To little surprise, the most mature among the municipal systems received the highest grades: Toronto, Mississauga, Hamilton and Waterloo Region. The challenge with any grading system, assuming that it is uniformly applied, is the structure and goals used in any evaluation.
Updated July 12 at 11:10pm: Comments by Darwin O’Connor of TransSee.ca regarding reliability metrics are now reflected in the text of this article.
Updated July 10, 2023 at 3:00 pm: The City of Guelph had their grade upped from a D+ in the original rankings to a C+ based on service reliability which is quite high on that system. This raises a few key questions:
Was the “reliability” metric cited by Guelph the same as the one used by the Board of Trade for other systems? Just what does Guelph’s claimed reliability score of 88% mean?
(Updated) Darwin O’Connor, who calculated the reliability metrics for the Board of Trade Report, advises that he also provided the Guelph score and used the same methodology as for other cities where tracking data were available.
Reliability counts for 35% of the total mark. Was Guelph scored zero on this simply because the Board of Trade didn’t have service tracking data for them?
Reliability data are also listed as “Not Available” for Oakville and Milton. Considering that neither of them has a 15 minute service area, awarding them substantial marks for being “on time” with what they do run would be boost that might not be fairly earned.
(Updated) O’Connor replies: “TransSee is unable to provide reliability data for Oakville because their API doesn’t have a method to get all vehicle locations at once. I also didn’t have tracking data for Milton because my data source is unofficial. I expect if it was included they would get a better mark like Guelph did.”
If anything, this gaffe reveals sloppiness in the Board’s methodology and the typical problem of looking only at the high level summary without poking “under the covers” to verify the results. The Board of Trade should try harder for accuracy and completeness on their next transit outing.
The Board regards the ability to move workers, students and residents as an important economic goal, and the absence of good transit as a drag on the region’s economy.
“Improving transit is critical to addressing our reputation as North America’s third-most congested city – a key barrier to the economic competitiveness of our region,” said Jan De Silva, President & CEO of the Toronto Region Board of Trade. “These report cards highlight where we’re falling short and, as a result, what we can look to as we seek to provide a world class transit network that will better-connect workers to jobs, students to school, and residents to their lives.”
TRBOT Media Release, July 5, 2023
There is a fundamental difference between a mere evaluation of our transit systems versus each other, and one that would qualify systems as “world class”. That term sets a much higher threshold, and there is no sense that the Board of Trade took this into account when constructing its grading system.
Updated July 10, 2023 at 3pm: The chart below is the revised version showing Guelph with a C+ grade.
“Getting to an A” is the premise behind the review, but much less clear is whether that “A” will actually bring the type of transit network and service to be truly competitive, to be “world class”.
The Board acknowledges the limitations of its review and notes that some conditions “are the result of a historical lack of investment and operational resources”. That is a delicate way of saying that transit has not been a priority at the political and social level. As population and travel growth shift the emphasis toward transit, “… suburban cities now find themselves pressured to stand up an urban-quality transit system that helps residents move within and throughout the region …”.
Key findings include:
The combination of network coverage (where there are routes close to people and destinations) and service is poor in most of the region.
Service reliability is particularly bad in Toronto with only 58% of trips meeting an “on time” standard.
Another important factor is that a line on a map does not guarantee good service, or service at the time and to the destination a rider might require. GO Transit, a system notably absent from the Board’s analysis, looks good on a map, but not quite so good on the timetable.
For an organization like the Board of Trade, this is a rare recognition that transit is more than a handful of high profile construction projects. A dominant car-oriented culture led directly to the congestion that bedevils the region. Cars enable travel throughout the region, but a corresponding web of transit service never developed. Our collective focus on big ticket projects to support commuting traffic primarily to Toronto’s core left other travel to lower-quality bus service, if that.
In all the hoopla about billions in “transit investment” we forget that over a decade ago the Metrolinx regional plan clearly showed that their proposed network would at best keep congestion from worsening, but would not relieve the underlying problem.
In this article, I will review the scoring system and the goals it seeks to achieve, what the Board considers worthy of an “A” grade. Are we aiming high, or is our definition of “world class” merely good enough to remove some of the more embarrassing gaps in our region’s transit network?
For those wanting the answer up front, no, I believe that the Board, and by extension the political voices they represent, are aiming low. Either they would give everyone an “A” grade for middling improvements, or they would be forced to admit that “world class” is out of reach.
The target for “frequent” transit service is not exactly high. If we were evaluating a road network on a similar basis, we would be happy with two lane roads on a roughly 1.6km grid. That would be a square from roughly Bloor to Dundas, and from Yonge to a bit west of Spadina. The roads would only require capacity for 200 people/hour each way equivalent to four full buses on a 15 minute headway. Some roads would close every evening and all weekend.
That is hardly a “World Class” transit service. The target coverage and service level befit a rural area with cows and sheep grazing by the roadside, not an urban transit system. This target understates the true shortfall in transit as a viable travel alternative.
On June 27, I was one of several guests on CBC’s Metro Morning doing “where do we go from here” pieces about newly elected Olivia Chow’s challenges as Mayor of Toronto.
The item was not posted on the show’s website, and so here for those who missed it is my own recording.
The TTC is part way through production of its 2024 Service Plan as well as a 5-Year Service Plan and Customer Experience Action Plan. In Round Two, consultation will focus on plans for service changes triggered by major construction projects. Five pop-up sessions are planned at Flemingdon Park, Union Station, Liberty Village, Finch Terminal, and Pape Station between June 29 and July 12, 2023. Details are available here.
Also available on that page is a link to a survey seeking feedback on various proposals. Please note that my site is not an official TTC conduit for feedback, although it is no secret that many at the TTC do read articles and comments here. Any specific feedback for the TTC should be submitted through their own survey.
Round Three in August-September will present draft concepts for the 5-Year Plan and Customer Experience Action Plan, and these will be refined into final drafts for Round Four in October-November.
The remainder of this article presents an overview of the survey and proposals for construction-related service changes.
There are no proposals for new routes nor of overall service levels in this round. The election of Olivia Chow as Mayor will no doubt bring a review of existing services, but that is not in the scope of this round.
An important issue left over from the 2023 Budget process and the recent service cuts is the question of Service Standards. These are described as “Board Approved”, but in fact the 2023 changes were implemented by management as part of the budget with only retroactive consent from the Board. Moreover, the actual effect of the changes was withheld from the Board and Council until well after the budget was approved.
Transparency in budgets and service planning will be an important change looking ahead to 2024. With a new Mayor I hope to see a much improved process.
A Request for Proposals for new subway trains has been cancelled due to lack of funding. The following notice was sent to all vendors on Friday, June 23:
The Toronto Transit Commission issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) on October 13, 2022 for the procurement of New Subway Trains.
The RFP indicated that the TTC was in the process of actively pursuing additional funding from other orders of government (Provincial and Federal), and that contract award was subject to receiving full funding commitments by early 2023. As detailed in item 1.2.2 – Funding Status of Part 1 – Invitation and Submission Instructions of the RFP document: “Timelines associated with this RFP have been communicated to potential funding partners, and a request for confirmation of funding by early 2023 has been requested. In order to receive the NST deliveries in time for the legacy fleet replacement and to meet growth needs, the TTC has elected to commence the procurement at this time, however, contract award is subject to receiving full funding commitments.”
Unfortunately, the additional funding required has not been secured and as such, TTC is cancelling the RFP effective immediately, and the Bonfire Portal will be closed.
The TTC will continue to have discussions with the Provincial and Federal governments on funding requirements for New Subway Trains and evaluate the requirements for issuance of a future Request for Pre-Qualification and Request for Proposals in the future.
Where this leaves future projects for enhancement of Line 2 Bloor-Danforth, conversion to Automatic Train Control and provision of full service on the Scarborough Subway Extension is anyone’s guess.
This is a project which was initially delayed by CEO Rick Leary in favour of a fleet rebuild, then reactivated as his attitude to the worth of ATC warmed with the success of the Line 1 conversion, a project very much the work of his predecessor Andy Byford and his team. The focus on spending for new lines has left major state of good repair such as fleet renewal high and dry, and this RFP cancellation show where that shortsighted policy has brought us.
I have reached out to TTC Media Relations for comment. This post will be updated as more information becomes available.
Updated June 26, 2023 at 3:45 pm
The TTC replied to my query for comment with the following:
As the posting says (or should), the purchase of the cars is contingent on funding being secured.
That has not yet happened, although discussions are ongoing.
This was about being transparent with bidders and letting them know that once funding is secure, we would re-post.
It is worth noting that as recently as the TTC Board meeting of June 12, 2023, there was no mention in the public session that this action was imminent. Here are the relevant pages from the Major Projects Update.
Updated June 26, 2023 at 5:00 pm
How many trains will the Scarborough Subway Extension require?
The TTC owns 370 cars in the T1 fleet which operates Line 2. That is equivalent to 61 6-car trains plus four spare cars.
The scheduled AM peak round trip time on the existing Line 2 is 105 minutes. For the maximum service possible with the existing signal and train control system, one train every 140 seconds, requires 45 trains. That was the AM Peak scheduled service in January 2020 before the pandemic-related service cuts. One additional train was on standby as a “gap” train for a total of 46. Allowing for spares at 20%, this requires a fleet of about 55 trains leaving only 6 spare for expansion.
The Scarborough extension is only marginally longer than the Line 1 extension from Eglinton to Finch with similar station spacing. A one-way trip on that part of Line 1 takes about 12 minutes, or 24 for the round trip. By analogy, that would make the round trip on the extended Line 2 about 129 minutes, and would required 55 trains with nothing left over for extras. Including spares at 20% would require a fleet larger than the TTC now owns.
Alternately, if every second train short turns at Kennedy Station leaving a 280 second service (4’40”) to Sheppard East, the line could probably operate with 50 trains which just fits within what is available.
One might argue that with a new fleet and the benefits of Automatic Train Control, overall speed could be improved and with that the fleet needed for full service to Sheppard could be reduced. But that is moot if TTC maintains the existing fleet.
When the SSE was planned, it had a pocket track east of Kennedy Station, but this was cut to save money, then it was restored. I wonder if someone is counting trains, or just hedging their bets on service levels beyond the existing terminus?
In any event, a failure to buy new trains has the double effect that it will condemn Line 2 to manual operation with an aging signal system for the foreseeable future, and will prevent the operation of full service beyond Kennedy in peak periods unless the Bloor-Danforth line never returns to the pre-pandemic peak service level.
This article reviews the Major Projects Update and more generally the TTC’s Capital Program and funding shortfall. In future articles, I will turn to the Operating Budget, subsidies and the changing environment for transit in 2024 and beyond.
A related report from a past meeting presents the entire Capital Plan, not just the “major projects”, and I have consolidated information from it to provide a complete view.
TTC Capital Plans are presented with three separate timelines:
The current year,
A ten year window, and
Fifteen years and beyond.
The fifteen year view is comparatively recent, but it was a vital addition to the transit outlook. Until this version was introduced, a growing list of needed projects simply did not exist in the published TTC plans nor, more importantly, in the minds of Councillors and financial planners at all three levels of government. Magically, the ten year view always managed to fit within money the City had available from its own revenues or provincial and federal commitments.
That fifteen year view was a huge shock to the City, but it was no secret to anyone who looked through the budget and found gaping holes. This situation was a financial convenience to make future City capital needs appear smaller than they actually were. Funding problems were “fixed” year after year by failing to acknowledge key projects, or by pushing them beyond the City’s ten year capital planning window.
Doug Ford arrived on the scene with his subway plans and billions in provincial spending, but much of this was for projects that were not already part of the City’s plans, or at least not at the scale the City contemplated. The province gave the impression of taking a load off of Toronto, but much of the planned provincial spending was never in Toronto’s plans to start with.
Then came the pandemic and severe doubts about the sustainability of the City’s spending.
For his part, former Mayor Tory’s SmartTrack brand was still on the books, even if it was a shadow of its original plan. Despite going over budget, it lives on as five new GO stations thanks to an infusion of $226 million by the provincial government.
At the TTC, CEO Rick Leary was initially distrustful of Automatic Train Control and the new Line 2 fleet it would require. For a time, the projects to resignal the Bloor-Danforth line, buy a new fleet and build a carhouse at Kipling were put on hold. The TTC would make do through another decade with “life extended” trains which would be at least 40 years old by their retirement. Leary has since changed his tune, but this brought the cost of ATC, new trains and, possibly, the carhouse back onto the table.
The situation is complicated by the Scarborough Subway Extension which would require more trains to provide full peak service to Sheppard than the existing fleet. Half of the peak service would short turn at Kennedy to fit the service within the existing Line 2 fleet.
The already-expensive extension does not include ATC signalling because Metrolinx does not know whether the TTC will have an ATC-capable fleet by the opening date. Only the construction delays due to Ford’s intervention in the project give the TTC enough time, and then only barely, to bring Line 2 up to modern standards.
Another related issue is the emerging demand for Platform Edge Doors (PEDs) for which ATC is a pre-requisite. Without new trains and signals, there will be no PEDs on Line 2.
Toronto is in the unhappy position that we are building miles of tunnels, but may not have trains to run in them when they are finished. The self-contained Ontario Line has a fleet, and the Crosstown has its LRVs, but the subway extensions and planned service improvements are another matter. Moreover, if the Line 2 fleet’s life is pushed out to 40 years, there is no guarantee it will provide reliable service.
Award of the contract for new subway cars has already been delayed into 2024 and costs rise thanks to inflation while we await a funding decision. The Major Projects Report notes that:
Delays in securing the required funding for the procurement of new trains will result in declining reliability, longer wait times between trains, increased crowding, and higher maintenance costs. The TTC is actively engaged with its Federal and Provincial partners.
The operation of new trains is interdependent with the planned resignalling on Line 2 (ATC). All T1 trains on Line 2 need to be replaced with new subway trains to operationalize ATC on Line 2. As a result, any delay in the funding decision for the procurement of the new trains will have an impact on the ATC requirements as well as the cost and schedule for both projects.
Recent increases in escalation will potentially result in an increase in overall cost. The TTC will continue to monitor producer’s price indices, update escalation projections and identify potential offsets to the greatest extent possible.
Award Contract in 2024, subject to partner funding. Should the partner funding be delayed or not available, the TTC will commence planning for the T1 Life Extension Overhaul (LEO) program to ensure service continuity.
Meanwhile, on Line 1 Yonge-University, the fleet is in its youth, but more trains are needed to increase service and to provide for the Richmond Hill extension. A new maintenance facility will be required to hold the larger fleet, and it will most likely be built north of the new extension. There has been no word on whether York Region will contribute to any of the cost their subway extension will add to the TTC’s budget woes.
The Major Projects Report notes:
This program includes the accommodation of train storage and maintenance requirements, and other infrastructure enhancements, to expand capacity and improve circulation on Line 1, reduce overcrowding, increase the frequency of trains and reduce travel times, which will result in improved customer service.
[…]
Train Maintenance and Storage Facility (TMSF), which includes:
Storage for 34 trains, including a test track, and access track to the site;
Carhouse with five Bays for Preventative and Corrective Maintenance to support daily service;
Operations and Infrastructure (O&I) facility to support maintenance activities (small shop building, outdoor and indoor storage tracks for work cars, material storage, and staging area);
Ancillary facilities (Traction Power Substation (TPSS), Hostler platform).
More service adds to the electrical draw and in turn that will trigger upgrades to the subway’s power distribution system.
Without going into the many details, this illustrates how subway planning is not simply a question of drawing lines on a map and cutting ribbons when the tunnel boring machines arrive.
John Tory might be gone as Mayor, but SmartTrack clings on like grim death even in his absence. A report before an upcoming meeting of Toronto’s Executive Committee shows that the total cost of the five remaining stations is estimated by Metrolinx at $1.697 billion, yes that’s with a “b”, or $234 million higher than the City’s $1.463 billion budget for this work.
Federal funding of $585 million has already been committed, but the remaining $1.112 billion is on the City’s dime. The City’s share will come from “development charges, tax increment financing and the City Building Fund” [CBF] according to the report. The CBF is an extra levy on the City Property Tax (recently extended to compensate for increased borrowing costs) that will help to pay for one of John Tory’s legacies.
Metrolinx seeks full reimbursement for this amount, but the City in March directed “the City Manager to negotiate with the Province of Ontario for the Province to commit to paying all amounts above the original Program Budget”. Negotiations are ongoing and a supplementary report will follow at an unspecified date.
The station locations are shown below, and they include a key station a East Harbour that will be the interchange between GO Transit, the Ontario Line and a possible future Broadview Avenue streetcar extension into the Port Lands. Why the City is paying for a major regional interchange is something of a mystery, but even worse is the fact that we now face a per-station cost of about $340 million for surface rail stations. The exact numbers are shrouded in the usual Metrolinx secrecy.
This is a sad story where too much political capital has been expended for anyone to ask just why we are building these stations, and especially why the SmartTrack moniker survives. With all of the hand-wringing over City budgets, the survival of at least some of these stations as City-funded projects should be reconsidered.
Effective Monday, May 8, the TTC has restored late night service on Lines 1 Yonge-University-Spadina and 2 Bloor-Danforth to every six minutes, seven days/week. This will be done with extra trains to supplement the scheduled service. The change will be formally scheduled in a future update.
Also, with the disappearance of the 503 Kingston Road car and its temporary replacement by the 505 Dundas, the TTC is now operating a supplementary bus service from Queen & Kingston Road to downtown via Queen and King from 7am to 7pm weekdays.
A direct streetcar service will not be possible until work on the Queen Street Don Bridge finishes sometime this summer, but there is another wrinkle. In the summer, Queen east of Broadview will close for Metrolinx bridge work at the future Riverside Station on the Lake Shore East Rail Corridor forcing all streetcars to operate via Gerrard. In turn that cannot begin until water main and track work at Coxwell & Lower Gerrard completes.
The additional subway service is made possible by an unexpectedly lower absentee rate among operators compared to budget. The TTC made a larger provision for covid-related sickness and finds itself with more available staff.
Two months from now, on June 26, Toronto will elect a new Mayor thanks to John Tory’s unexpected departure. There will be at least fifty candidates on the ballot, although most of them will garner only a handful of votes.
I am not one of them, and have no ambitions to high office. That said, I certainly have hopes that our new Mayor will have a strong pro-transit agenda and will actually care about the City rather than brown-nosing their way to small favours from Queen’s Park.
For those who are interested, here is the campaign-sized version of my advice and platform were I running:
Service is key. Run as much as possible, everywhere, and run it well.
Build budgets based on what you want to see, not on what you think you can afford. Just getting by is not a recipe for recovery and growth. If the money doesn’t come, then look to “Plan B” but aim for “Plan A”.
Fares are a central part of our transit system, but the question is who should pay and how much. Strive for simplicity. Give discounts where they are truly needed. Make the transit system worth riding so that small, regular increases are acceptable.
Focus on ease of use among transit systems in the GTA, but do not equate “integration” with amalgamated governance.
Transit property: parking or housing?
Foster a culture of advocacy in management and on the TTC Board.
Beware of lines on maps. A “my map vs your map” debate focuses all effort on a handful of corridors while the rest of the network rots.
Plan for achievements in your current term and make sure they actually happen. Longer term is important, but the transit ship is sinking. You are running for office in 2023. Vague promises for the 2030s are cold comfort to voters who have heard it all before.
That’s more than will fit comfortably on a leaflet, but, hey, I am the blogger who writes long form articles about transit. As a commentator, my biggest worry lies with those who say “TL,DR”. In the following sections I will expand on the bullets above. Thanks for reading.
How much would all this cost? In many cases the answer depends on the scale and speed of implementation. Although I have a sense of at least order of magnitude costs, I am not going to be foolish enough to put specific dollar figures here. For too long, City policy has started with a budget rather than a philosophy, an aspiration to be great, and settled for just good enough. We almost certainly cannot afford everything today, but we need to know what tomorrow we strive for.
If the 2003 Ridership Growth Strategy taught us anything, it was that we should first talk about aspirations, about what the transit system might be, rather than precluding debate with the classic “we can’t afford it” response. It’s amazing what monies can be found once information is out in the open. We commit tens of billions to construction, but are terrified, at least politically, by far lower costs to improve transit for everybody today.
I have deliberately omitted a discussion of security and related social services here. These are not just transit issues, but part of a city-wide, society-wide problem that will not be solved with a simple show of force. Recent trends both in public opinion and official responses at the City and TTC show an emphasis on providing support for those who need it: the homeless and the mentally unwell. This should continue and expand.
An inevitable question is who will I endorse? That will come later in the campaign as candidates flesh out their programs. Some make their beds with the provincial Tories. As enemies of the city, collaborators, they deserve only contempt. For others, we are in promising early days.
The big items in the public portion of the agenda are the monthly CEO’s Report and an update on TTC’s finances and major capital projects to the end of 2022.
There are also two reports on collective agreements and non-union salaries. Although the details lie in confidential attachments, the public reports give an overview of the various labour contracts and salary drivers across the organization. I leave perusal of these to interested readers.
Finally there are a few references to the TTC’s eBus program scattered through reports. I will consolidate this info in its own section at the end of the article.
Correction April 18, 2023: It turns out that the size of the bus fleet shown in the graphic below is wrong. There are only 2041 buses, not 2114, in service as of March 2023. The article has been amended to reflect this.
Steve Munro 