TTC Chooses Hitachi for Line 2 Automatic Train Control

On July 15, the TTC announced that it would award the contract for implementation of Automatic Train Control (ATC) on subway Line 2 (Bloor-Danforth). This will include the Scarborough extension now under construction.

Updated July 17 at 8:30am: The value of the contract with Hitachi is $407.7-million according to the summary of contract awards (p. 2).

Between the New Subway Train (NST) contract already awarded to Alstom and the Hitachi signalling contract, both companies will be involved in supplying the TTC for a decade and more.

The NST contract includes trains for:

  • Replacement of the existing fleet of T-1 trains on Line 2 which are approaching end-of-life;
  • Supply of additional Line 2 trains both for the Scarborough extension and for future service improvements;
  • Supply of additional Line 1 trains both for the Richmond Hill extension and for future service improvements.

The ATC contract will cover replacement of the existing block signal system on Line 2. It is linked to the NST contract in the sense that the existing Line 2 fleet cannot be modified for ATC operation. New signalling requires new trains.

The choice of a different ATC technology has implications for the TTC’s fleets and operations:

  • The Line 1 and Line 2 fleets will not be able to operate in “foreign” territory where the signalling system does not match the on-train equipment. Line 1 uses Alstom’s Urbalis system, while Line 2 will use Hitachi’s Seltrac sytem. Any trains which would operate on both lines must have ATC gear for both technologies.
  • The TTC has no intention to interoperate Lines 1 and 2 (e.g. the short lived “integrated” service in 1966 or any variation of that), and regards “Crossline Train Operation” (CTO) as unneeded in the spec for reasons explained later in this article.
  • Any equipment which will operate regularly on both lines (e.g. work trains) will require interfaces to both systems for protection from other traffic.
  • Although “foreign” trains could be moved if needed (e.g. to take trains to another line’s carhouse), this would have to be done off hours under rules for unprotected, manual train operation. Trains could not be “borrowed” or rerouted off of their home lines.
  • Although the Line 2 trains will be fitted with Hitachi gear, the added trains for Line 1 will have to carry Alstom equipment. Moreover, the Line 1 trains will have to be managed as six-car sets because that is the configuration the Alstom system is designed to support. (See TTC report quote below.)
  • With a cutover date to ATC on Line 2, this also sets the earliest date for Platform Edge Doors (PEDs) assuming that the TTC regards ATC as a pre-requisite. Yonge Station on Line 2 might be rebuilt with provision for PEDs but it will be over a decade before the signal system is able to support them.

There is a somewhat surreal aspect to all of this given the timelines. Installation of Line 2 ATC will occur in phases up to 2037 based on the assumption that the existing Line 2 fleet will be retired soon before that. The line cannot be switched to automatic operation with a mix of old and new trains. By extension, any service improvements from ATC operation (closer train spacing, service more frequent than 2’20”) are a decade away, and even that depends on increasing the fleet beyond basic requirements to open the SSE.

Part of this extended timeline can be laid at the feet of former management who felt they could keep the existing trains and signals system running much longer than their planned retirement date. That attitude changed with the ongoing signalling problems on Line 1 before ATC conversion, but years were lost in procurement both of ATC equipment and new trains that could use it.

A September 2024 report on Line 2 modernization stated:

The RFP for Line 2 ATC does not include a Crossline Train Operation (CTO) feature for trains to move between Line 1 and Line 2. The requirement for CTO has been reviewed based on existing and future service plans, and operational needs assessment. It has been determined that CTO is not a requirement for day-to-day service for Line 1 and Line 2. There are also technical challenges that arise with CTO on the revenue fleet with one of the main constraints being that the trains on Line 1 are a permanent six car consist with a fixed ATC Train-Borne equipment configuration, whereas the expected new trains for Line 2 will consist of three married pair cars that will be dynamically configured. The dynamic configuration for the Line 2 ATC Train-Borne equipment is not supported by the ATC Line 1 system architecture. It should be noted that to support the CTO feature, additional funding would be required to redesign and upgrade the existing Line 1 ATC system to accommodate CTO. [pp16-17]

It is clear that the TTC would never return to integration of service between lines, but the need to move trains onto “foreign” territory has come up in the past as a way to deal with major disruptions. That option will be foreclosed. I have asked the TTC for clarification of their intent re emergency operations, carhouse moves and work cars, and will add their reply here when it comes in.

Replacing aging signals and trains is “good news”, but the benefits will not materialize soon for riders.

Construction Effects at Gerrard and Leslieville Stations

Over coming years, Metrolinx will build new stations on the Ontario Line at Gerrard (Gerrard & Carlaw) and Leslieville (Queen & De Grassi). These structures will span local streets including two streetcar lines. Various partial and total closures of affected streets are needed for this work to proceed. Much of this involves sidewalk and curb lane closures, but there will be a five month period for each station where streetcar service is removed to allow Ontario Line work without energized streetcar overhead.

The full transit changes have not yet been published, but in each case streetcars will divert to the parallel street (Gerrard or Queen) between Coxwell and Broadview. Replacement bus service will bridge the gap diverting around station construction as necessary.

Details including parking restrictions, pedestrian and cycling effects, are in a City of Toronto report on the July 8 agenda of Toronto & East York Community Council:

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TTC Plans Major Maintenance Work on Line 1

Regular users of the Spadina branch of Line 1 YUS will know that speed restrictions have been common in the open cut section of the line between Eglinton West and the north end of Wilson Yard. They appear on the map of reduced speed zones, vanish, and reappear a few weeks later.

Part of the problem is the temporary nature of some repairs, and partly due to underlying problems in the track support system. There are similar problems elsewhere on Line 1, and some of these go back years. A major issue in mounting a repair campaign is that closing a subway line for an extended period is a major upheaval especially over an extended distance or on a busy day.

A major project from June 1-8 will address:

  • Southbound Yorkdale to Wilson: Concrete slab repair to ensure long-term structural integrity, requiring two full days for concrete to cure.
  • Northbound Yorkdale to Wilson and Glencairn to Lawrence West: Installation of new rail.
  • Northbound Dupont to St Clair West: Replacement of track hardware

These areas correspond to some of the remaining RSZs on the current map.

In order to achieve this work, the Spadina branch between St. George and Sheppard West Stations will close early, at 11:59pm, Monday, June 1 to Thursday, June 4. On Friday evening, June 5-6, this section will not close until 12:30am to accommodate an event at the Rogers Stadium.

From Sunday, June 7 at 12:30am to Monday, June 8 at 6:00am, there will be no service over this section. A partial closure will continue through Monday until 6:00am on Tuesday, June 9 with single track operation on the northbound rail between Wilson and Lawrence West Stations. This will necessarily not be at the usual subway frequency.

Shuttle buses will run, but riders are encouraged to use the Yonge branch of the subway via bus and LRT services on Sheppard, Wilson, Lawrence and Eglinton.

This type of major repair is long overdue, and the proliferation of RSZs was a testament to the level of TTC maintenance for many years. This has been compounded recently by availability and reliability issues with the subway work car fleet. A proposal to rebuild Line 1 south of Eglinton Station goes back to the Byford era, but it has always been regarded as impossible due to the volume of riders there and the extent of the work involved.

What we do not know is whether there are additional major works yet to be announced, when and where they would occur. TTC owes it to riders to give a sense of what they actually plan, painful though some of this work may be.

The TTC’s move to a larger scale project is welcome, but is this is a temporary surge to remove as many problem areas as possible for the World Cup period, or will we see a continued effort to deal with and permanently repair track infrastructure problems as they occur. Riders next winter who are not football tourists are entitled to the same level of effort as our summer visitors.

TTC Board Meeting: June 3, 2026

The TTC Board will meet on June 3 with several items on the agenda.

The morning portion of the meeting will deal with various confidential items, and the meeting will move into public session in the afternoon, time to be announced.

Some items are forwarded from the Audit, Finance and Risk Management Committee meeting of May 26 How much debate they will get in the full Board’s public session remains to be seen.

Items of interest include:

  • CEO’s Report
  • Advancing Safety on the TTC: 2026 Focus Areas
  • Bloor-Yonge Capacity Improvements Project – Platform Edge Doors and Net Zero
  • Financial and Major Projects Update for the Period Ended April 26, 2026
  • Toronto Transit Commission – 2026 Follow-up – Status of Previous Auditor General’s Recommendations
  • Draft Consolidated Financial Statements of Toronto Transit Commission for the Year Ended December 31, 2025

Four items are administrative inquiries, or member motions including one forwarded from the recent Council meeting:

  • An inquiry about the usage and cost of Community Bus Routes from Chair Jamaal Myers
  • [From Council]: Safer Subways: Making Public Safety a Priority and Restoring Confidence to Toronto Transit Commission Riders Across Toronto
  • Review of Subway Capacity Constraints and Infrastructure Readiness for Protected/Major Transit Station Areas Compliance and Provincial Densification Mandates – by Commissioner Liane Kim, seconded by Commissioner Josh Matlow
  • Requesting a 7 Bathurst Express Bus – by Commissioner Josh Matlow, seconded by Commissioner Dianne Saxe

In this article I have grouped related items together.

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Ups and Downs on the TTC

Anyone requiring a “lift” on the TTC on the morning of April 20 will face a challenge: the passenger intercoms have failed for the entire subway network, and without them the elevators cannot run. TTC updated their alert on this to note that with assistance of station staff, people can use the elevators.

The Passenger Assistance Intercom in subway stations are not working. As a safety precaution, all elevators are out of service until this issue is resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 05:58:55

The advice changed somewhat later to recognize that elevators could be used with assistance:

Passenger Assistance Intercoms are temporarily out of service. Elevators remain in service, and TTC staff are available at all stations to help. Customers needing elevator access should speak with staff. Customers with accessibility needs can also use Wheel Trans or nearby surface routes. We’re urgently working to restore PAI service.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 10:35:53

The problem remains at 1:20pm as I write this article.

The practice is imposed by the provincial Technical Safety and Standards Authority (TSSA) who require a working intercom for any elevator for rider safety in case the device fails.

For riders, unless the elevators have a permanent attendant, finding someone to assist in a journey can be challenging, especially in large stations with many elevators and lots of places staff might be found.

A total outage like this is very unusual, and begs the question of how there is a single point of failure that hobbles the entire subway system.

This situation prompted me to look at the TTC’s website where the landing page includes information about elevator and escalator outages. Here is the overview of status by line:

There is also an “On Time Performance” chart that includes tracking of elevator and escalator status:

Those 90%+ values for vertical transport are impressive compared to the surface route stats, but they are below targets only slightly below100%. They do not give a feel for what is going on at the station level. That shows up in details available by opening line-specific folders. Note that the information here does not reflect the system-wide elevator outage. Even when the intercoms come back online and normal service is restored, there will be eight inaccessible stations on Lines 1 and 2 thanks to elevator outages, and many more where at least one escalator is not working.

Lines 4, 5 and 6 stats are below. Note that Metrolinx through their P3 partners, Mosaic and Crosslinx, are responsible for Lines 6 and 5 respectively. The two out-of-service elevators at Sheppard-Yonge are in private buildings and are not maintained by the TTC.

A key part of TTC accessibility planning is to shift riders from Wheel-Trans van trips to, in part, trips on the so-called conventional system. However, without reliable station accessibility this is impossible. Furthermore, many people who are not WT users, but whose mobility is less than ideal, depend on escalators and elevators without which they cannot access the subway. This is not a trivial number of riders.

We hear a lot about TTC State of Good Repair, but this applies more to vehicles, track, signals, and power supplies. Trains that move are obviously a key part of the system, but for riders who cannot get to and from platforms, the subway does not really exist.

Subway Work Car Hydraulic Fluid Spills Update

TTC’s Line 2 Bloor-Danforth subway service suffered two major interruptions on Tuesday, April 7 and Friday April 10 due to work cars developng leaks in their hydraulic systems and fouling rails for normal revenue service.

At its April 16 meeting, the TTC Board received a preliminary report from Hatch, the consulting engineers who also reviewed a similar incident in 2024. The images in this article are taken from the Hatch presentation deck.

RT-6:

RT-6 is a vacuum excavation car that is about 7 years old. The failure was caused by an incorrectly installed part during recent maintenance (date unspecified) by TTC.

The recommended next steps are:

  • Review the installation process for areas of potential incorrect assembly and develop improvement steps and protocols.
  • Inspect other work cars with similar fittings repaired over the last 3 to 4 weeks and recertify work performed as a containment measure.
  • Send the failed O-ring for analyses to confirm failure mode, chemical composition and mechanical properties. [p. 4]

RT-17

This car is close to 30 years old. The fault lay in a defective valve on the car. The report does not state how recently this valve was installed. The valve was defective as supplied, but this was not caught by TTC before it was installed.

Next steps:

  • Immediately identify and quarantine all similar manifold assemblies, including on-car and in-stock inventory.
  • Supplier to perform failure analyses on RT17 manifold assembly including inspection of the FCV mounting geometry and analyse of the O-ring (material, mechanical properties)
  • Supplier to develop and implement a quality control policy that assures specification compliant assembly of the units and a pre-ship inspection process
  • Review TTC’s incoming inspection process for vendor supplied hydraulic components where there is a concern and ensure they are compliant to the manufacturing specifications before they are assembled into work cars. [p. 6]

The Hatch review states that these incidents are:

  • Random in nature
  • Could not have been predicted.
  • Do not appear to be atypical
  • Not uncommon for a similar sized transit authority such as the TTC. [p. 2]

These findings do not entirely line up with the details cited above. In both cases, there were failures waiting to happen. For RT-6, the significant factor appears to be incorrect maintenance. For RT-17, the shortcoming lies with a combination of the manufacturer and incoming parts inspection by TTC.

The events were “random” and unpredictable in that the time to failure after parts were installed could not be known. However, shortcomings in maintenance and parts inspection are both generic issues that could affect other parts of the fleet. Saying these are “not uncommon” in effect excuses these shortcomings.

Failing Parts Are Not The Only Issue

A common source of extended delays on Line 2 is failures of the signal system. Much of this dates from the original Bloor-Danforth subway built in the 1960s, and it has been overdue for replacement for several years. An original plan to implement Automatic Train Control with new signals was on the books in Andy Byford’s day as TTC CEO, but it was delayed by his successor to trim the capital budget. The project is back on the books, but the new system will not enter service until 2037 once new trains for line 2 (another delayed project) are delivered.

TTC management claims to have a plan to keep the existing signals working for another decade, but there are no details of what this entails. The Board asked no questions about signals even though there have been failures recently, notably one on April 9 in the week of the two hydraulic failures.

Thanks to bad planning under a previous regime at the TTC, Toronto faces a decade with aging trains and signals on Line 2, and this will no doubt undermine attempts to provide reliable service.

TTC Major Capital Projects: 2025 Year-End Update

The TTC Board agenda for its April 16 meeting includes a pair of reports giving the year-end status for the Operating and Capital budgets, as well as a detailed update on major capital projects.

In this article, I will review the status of major projects to summarize info for readers. In a separate article, I will turn to the 2025 operating results. Those wishing more detail should refer to the full reports.

An important factor with many projects is that they are multi-year efforts, and some of them are not fully funded. This has different implications for various types of projects such as:

  • A project might still not have full funding, but a portion can proceed with the hope of additional moneys appearing along the way.
  • A project might have stages, but only be funded for some of them. A new vehicle purchases might have money for part of an order, but not for a sustained rollout.
  • Projects could be interrelated in that full exploitation of benefits cannot be achieved without completion of both. For example, a new Automatic Train Control cannot work without a fleet that can “talk” to the new signal system. Larger fleets cannot be accommodated without new storage and maintenance facilities.

Although these are large and in some cases quite expensive projects, this is not an exhaustive list. Some parts of TTC State Of Good Repair budget involve areas with many smaller projects (for example, building and structures maintenance) that are quite large in the aggregate. Vehicle overhaul is an ongoing cost, but it is not listed as a “major project” because it is routine work. These items do not appear in the Major Projects report although they comprise a large portion of the capital budget.

The projects discussed here are:

  • Subway Work Car Fleet and Maintenance
  • Station Easier Access, Second Exits and Fire Ventilation
  • New Subway Cars for Lines 1 and 2
  • ATC Signals for Line 2
  • Rogers 5G Rollout
  • Capacity Enhancements for Lines 1 and 2
  • Bloor-Yonge Capacity
  • Scarborough Busway Project
  • New Buses for Conventional and Wheel-Trans Service
  • eBus Charging Systems
  • Facilities for the Expanded Streetcar Fleet
  • New TTC Operations Centre
  • VISION (Vehicle Tracking System) Implementation
  • SAP Enterprise IT System Implementation
  • PRESTO System Upgrade
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TTC Grounds Subway Work Car Fleet

On April 7 and 10 two major outages on Line 2 Bloor-Danforth were caused by hydraulic fluid spills from work cars. The TTC has sidelined its entire fleet of work cars pending inspection and repair. This has placed much subway infrastructure work on hold at a time when there is already a backlog.

A previous leak incident in 2024 led to TTC Board reports, and the findings were not impressive. Some work cars were beyond their useful lives, and there were ongoing issues with inspection and maintenance of equipment.

A common thread in these delays has been a car leaking fluid onto the rails over an extended distance before this problem is discovered. That leads to extensive, manual cleanup work to ensure that revenue service trains can accelerate and brake without slipping.

Problems with these cars are not the only source of major disruptions, and failing signal systems requiring service suspensions are common.

The TTC has not published a list of signal failure incidents to give a sense of their frequency and severity, let alone any plan to improve reliability over the decade before a new ATC system can take over.

It is rather comical that TTC Board meetings can include extensive discussion of a new enterprise asset management system, but little info on actual condition, maintenance and plans for what we have. We should not have to wait for a large IT project to know what the issues are today.

Behind both the fleet and signals problems lie bad capital budget planning by TTC management in response to political pressure to trim spending. In past years, key interrelated projects were downplayed or sidelined including:

  • The need to refresh and expand the subway work car fleet
  • The need to convert Line 2 to Automatic Train Control
  • The need for a new Line 2 fleet

Under former CEO Rick Leary, in his early days, there was a sense that existing infrastructure and fleet could be stretched out to about 2040, fully ten years longer than the then-current target of 2030. In time, the ATC and new trains projects were restarted, but with much later delivery dates. According to the December 31, 2025 Major Projects Update Report, the delivery of 55 new trains will not complete until 2035, and the final cutover of ATC will not occur until 2037. Existing systems will have to last another decade.

Another factor is the timing of the Scarborough and North Yonge subway extensions which are planned to open in the early 2030s and will need new trains before the existing Line 2 fleet is retired. This is further complicated by demand projections showing the need for growth trains in the mid 2030s. Trains for new lines and extra service require production capacity that would otherwise go to a replacement fleet.

With ATC for Line 2 a decade away, the Scarborough extension will have to be built with conventional signals to tide it over until an ATC-capable fleet is running.

The TTC has not published a fleet plan showing how the various proposed deliveries of new trains will be staged. There is also the small matter of storage and maintenance space for the expanded fleets, and projects for new yards are not yet funded. The Province is happy to announce new subway lines, but conveniently omits the very large cost of the maintenance facilities.

This ties back to the work car reliability and fleet size issues because the volume of subway work will not decline, but will actually increase both thanks to aging infrastructure and system expansion. There are already severe scheduling problems for the work plans due to conflicting requirements for this fleet.

The focus at an upcoming TTC Board meeting will no doubt be on recent failures, but there are much larger issues affecting subway reliability for the coming decade and more. 2027 might seem a long time (and an election) away, but planning for that budget is already underway. The Board should demand a detailed review and plan to address the situation, and this should not be another “we’ll get back to you next year” report.

TTC Subway Reduced Speed Zone Update March 2026

This post continues previous reviews of the map and lists of reduced speed zones (RSZ) on the TTC subway with snapshots of the status of Lines 1 and 2 from mid-October 2025 to mid-March 2026.

The charts below are adapted from maps that are updated regularly on the TTC’s Reduced Speed Zone page.

The total number of zones sits persistently at about a dozen. Although some disappear fairly quickly, others replace them. Some are long-standing zones that are more challenging to repair in winter weather.

In the coloured boxes, the arrows indicate the affected direction of travel with “<>” meaning both ways.

The TTC is working hard, I understand, to get the system in the best shape possible for the World Cup events from mid June to early July. Whether they will achieve this remains to be seen.

One issue is the timing of the usual Spring system inspection of rail condition and track geometry. Will the results of this inform current slow orders, or will this be carefully “parked” so that new slow orders do not appear until after the big event?

The current orders have target repair dates in March and April, with 4 of 14 showing “TBA” I will return to this topic in early June.

Updated March 20, 2026: Following the “more” break are comparisons of the detailed explanation of RSZs in effect at the start of this period (Oct 17) and end (Mar 18).

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Tracking Metrolinx Project Costs

Tracking the costs of Metrolinx projects with publicly available data is not an easy task. They are a secretive organization, and present ongoing costs in a way that hides the eventual total cost of construction and operations. When anyone talks about “on budget”, there is no way to verify the claim because no overall budget figure is given for any project.

Instead, what we see are the cumulative value of contracts that have been awarded as well as spending to date. The rest, assuming that there even is a “budget”, is hidden on the grounds that telling would-be bidders how much money might be on the table will only encourage them to bid to that level. This is nonsense because, except for a few huge P3s, most projects are broken into many smaller contracts and knowing that there are billions available across a project’s allocation gives no hint of how much is earmarked for each component.

The situation is even more opaque in the case of contracts that mix design and construction (a finite capital cost) with operations and maintenance (an ongoing operating cost) over an extended period. Comparison with projects elsewhere is difficult because the components are not segregated.

With the Eglinton and Finch projects now shifting from construction to operation, there is a chance to see what the split would be with the building largely complete. There will be some ongoing capital costs for project cleanup, but costs to date should largely represent the amount spent on the construction phase.

Many other projects are also in flight and there is no way to know if all of their components have been awarded and the values included in the “baseline” cost shown in financial reports.

This article consolidates the reported budgets, later renamed as “baselines”, as well as actual spending in the quarterly Metrolinx Capital Projects reports.

Some projects actually had projected in-service dates, at least in the early years, but these vanished long ago. Metrolinx promised big things once upon a time, but has been much slower to deliver, and at much greater cost than anticipated.

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