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The Unhappy State of SRT Track

On July 24, 2023, at about 6:43 pm, a southbound SRT train derailed south of Ellesmere Station after snagging the reaction rail. This event lifted the rear truck of the car off of the track and also caused it to break away from the rest of the train.

The detailed investigation reports were quietly posted on the TTC’s website, and I wrote a summary of them at the end of January:

I filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) request with the TTC at the beginning of 2024 for “track inspection reports and work orders” for the SRT between June 1 and August 31, 2023. The reason for the extended cutoff date was to pick up any inspections and repairs that took place after the derailment.

In due course, the TTC responded with extracts from its MAXIMO database listing the track inspection reports, but only work orders that initiated the inspections, not any separate WO’s for repairs. According to the TTC:

The inspection work order spreadsheet only contains inspections scheduled and completed and the defects found during these inspections are entered into MAXIMO which becomes a defect item listed in the defect spreadsheet.

A defect is “cancelled” when it has been reviewed by a staff employee in the office and assessed as a duplicate of a previous already reported defect.

The information in each line item of the defect sheet are the work orders and come directly from the MAXIMO database that stores these work orders.

The date a defect is discovered is listed under report date (column v); when the work on the defect is completed the status (column i) is changed to resolved; and the status date (column x) + change date (column ab) are updated sometime after the actual repair work is completed to reflect the date the defect was marked as resolved. No other records exist that provide additional detail on the work performed.

Email from TTC Legal Department, Feb. 2. 2024

Note the last sentence. There is no record of the work performed to correct any defect, and there is only a “resolved” status to indicate that the defect was corrected. The table below (which is also available as a PDF) is an edited version of the information provided by the TTC. The following changes were made for compactness and privacy:

  • Columns that were blank, contained redundant information, or contained employee identification have been hidden.
  • Rows for cancelled defects (i.e. duplicates) have been hidden.
  • Rows are sorted in Report Date sequence.
  • Two defects are highlighted for easy location. They are discussed later in the article.

A few notes about the information:

  • The “From” and “To” columns identify the “chainage” where the defect was reported. This is a measure in kilometres+metres.
  • As stated by the TTC, items listed as “Resolved” were reported and corrected. Items listed as “confirmed” are outstanding.
  • There are many reports of “top cap polished” indicating friction between the linear induction motor face on passing trains and the reaction rail.
  • A variety of other problems are shown notably missing or loose bolts.
    • See the article on the technical review of the derailment for further information on these issues.

The first item flagged in red, defect number 580346, is shown at chainage 13+512. The Gannett Fleming report cites the derailment as 135+10 which is really the same place with the “+” sign shifted.

This defect shows that the reaction rail was raised 1/2 inch on the approach end, a serious condition, but it was filed with a priority 4 (the scale runs from 1 to 5, high to low) on July 9, two weeks before the derailment. The status is “confirmed” indicating that no repair has been logged.

This is the last defect reported before the July 24 derailment. I have asked the TTC to clarify why there is a gap from July 9 to 25 in reported defects.

Following the derailment, there is a flurry of defect reports, one of which, 580789, is filed as priority 1 with “IMMEDIATE REPAIR REQUIRED Loose reaction rail” on July 28. The location is between Ellesmere and Midland northbound.

It is clear from the many defects reported after the derailment that inspection of the line found many problems that had not been previously reported. Most of these are listed as priority 4. A problem identified in the technical reports was that the importance of defects was poorly understood, and the priority of defects might have been understated.

With such a long defect list covering many locations along the SRT, it is clear that re-opening the line was not in the cards. The amount of work needed to bring the infrastructure to a trusted, safe level would have been substantial.

A further issue lies with information in the Network Rail consultant’s report on the derailment. It contains lists of work orders pulled from the same MAXIMO database related to Restricted Speed Zones. Note that the first of these is dated July 14, 2023, during the period when there are no defect reports in the FOI response. Note also that this lists the work order number, not the related defect number.

This may be only one row in a table in a consultant’s report, but it suggests that the TTC has not looked hard enough in responding to my FOI.

There are three key questions here:

  • Why are there no defects reported after July 9 until July 25, the day after the derailment?
  • Why does Network Rail show a problem with loose/broken reaction rail anchor bolts on July 14 that was not included in the FOI response?
  • How many defects reported before July 24 were, in fact, still unresolved? Is the problem that repairs were not made or that the defect reports were not updated?

There is an obvious shortcoming in the TTC’s database in that it simply has “resolved” defects with no indication of the repair work to correct problems. This makes it impossible to audit whether the repairs were appropriate and durable.

The SRT may be closed, but the larger issue is the overall quality of TTC track inspection, maintenance and record keeping. This type of problem was raised in the City Auditor General’s review of the TTC streetcar overhead section.

For a few months, riders have lived with many “restricted speed zones” on Lines 1 and 2. TTC management claims that this is a routine situation after an annual review of track condition.

That explanation is very hard to believe because there have never been this many speed restrictions at the same time on the subway. My understanding of the problem was that track in many locations was found to be out of gauge beyond TTC and industry standards. This does not happen overnight. I am contemplating an FOI request for subway inspection and maintenance records.

Safety is a fundamental issue. The TTC prides itself for this, and “Safety” is one third of the corporate motto along with “Courtesy” and “Service”.

We know from experience what happens when maintenance standards fall be it from poor training, poor oversight or budget cuts. Much remains to be learned about the real state of TTC infrastructure. The TTC Board has important questions to ask and answers to demand.

12 thoughts on “The Unhappy State of SRT Track”

  1. I have not worked in MAXIMO (but I might someday, it’s being rolled out where I work), however every problem tracking system I have worked with requires a note of some kind before it can be closed as resolved. I am skeptical that the TTC would so mis-implement a tracking system that did not require notes. Often, these notes are the key to understanding what was done, sometimes invaluable for follow-up or if a similar problem recurs.

    Steve: I concur. I am taking what the TTC Legal Department tells me at face value as they’re just passing on what they have been told. Either TTC is not tracking problem resolutions, or staff are telling porkies to Legal as part of the FOI response. I am not sure which is worse.

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  2. Lol. So pretty close to 100% preventable.

    Go look up the US NTSB video presentation on the bridge collapse in Pittsburgh, Penna, that happened 2 years ago (video dropped on YT recently). 

    Same thing – plenty of defect reports but minimal attempts at repair.

    I’m not sure if “it’s not just TTC” is bad or good. Bad, probably. 

    Once Doug Ford’s Circlejerx steps in and shows those city losers how to run a proper transit system, I’m sure this will all be cleared up and heads will roll. Timetable TBD.

    Yuck.

    Steve: Metrolinx would contract out the work, and we would never have accountability because it was all under a blanket of “confidentiality”.

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  3. Whoa!

    I’ve only had time to scan through this (I’ve read it all but not digested it) but this is an absolute bombshell! And that’s based just on what’s divulged. My sixth sense tells me there’s details not been released, more than what Steve is alluding to.

    Here’s a conjecture: Intrepid reporters read this and do some more digging, publish a piece in TorStar et al, and eventually, questions are asked at City Hall and at Queen’s Park.

    Gotta leave it there…for now.

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  4. Maybe the exposure of flaws/problems in media like the Star does change a situation, but the Star did a Lot of muckraking on the entire Suspect Subway Extension and misinformation at Council, and ‘we’ are still burying the billions in the area, and more! ie. all of the other Ford projects are suspect in my view and not good enough value for cost, etc. Federal level shouldn’t be going in on these projects either; and here’s an idea – halt all works on everything in the beginning/mid phases like SSE/OL, until the Eglinton LRT is up and running for three months.

    Despite this, THANK you Steve for pursuing details.

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  6. I highly doubt something like repairs and refurbishments aren’t documented properly. It sounds like a serious liability, especially for public infrastructure.

    Surely there’s a paper trail somewhere; I think you may need to write up another FOI for Subway & Streetcar maintenance for the years of 2023. Maybe it might give us an insight on what work had been done, and how far it extends. If there’s issues with the subway, is it safe to assume that there’s issues with the streetcar rails?

    Thanks again, Steve. I cannot imagine the stress you have to go through when informing the public. It is very much appreciated, thank you for your hard work.

    Steve: Thanks. The City’s audit of the Streetcar Overhead section revealed that a lot of the records were on paper and the Auditor had to do a lot of work to reconcile information. I would not be surprised if the diligence of recording info for other sections also has problems, but all I can hope to do is spark further attention and review.

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  7. As predicted, TorStar has a story on it today. I’ve still not had time to absorb what’s written here and in the Star other than quick reads, but this immediately jumped off the Star page to me:

    TTC spokesperson Stuart Green said in an email that the agency hasn’t determined why the defect numbers fell so dramatically. But he said safety is the agency’s “paramount concern,” and it maintained the RT “to the same standard as the other subway lines” until its last run. That included annual weekend closures until 2021 to conduct repairs.

    “to the same standard as the other subway lines”. Ben Spurr was careful to provide an exact quote….not only for accuracy of what reporting the story demands, but for *projection* of the claim of what Green states. It can be flipped over to state the inverse as per safety on the subway.

    Further, TorStar article states:

    At the September meeting, the board heard that the cause of the derailment was related to the RT’s unique propulsion system. Instead of the electric third rail that powers subways, the RT trains operated using linear induction motors on the bottom of their cars. The devices pushed the trains forward by exerting a magnetic force on the reaction rail embedded between the tracks below.

    Technically, that’s as incorrect as “suck” or “blow” for sudden decompression in an airplane. Understanding the physics at play is an essential point in exacerbating the slack state of repair and one of the massive drawbacks to *attractive* linear motion propulsion.

    Ontario bought into a technology that KraussMaffei was walking away from (pun totally unintended) at the time. K-M abandoned the attractive technique for the *repulsive* one in part due to exactly what has happened here.

    I was just looking for a link to reference, only to find that many are technically incorrect too! Suffice to say that Vancouver got this right!

    I’ll have to reference one of my own warnings as published on urbantoronto in 2017:

    Scroll down to “steveintoronto”

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  8. On second thought, there are many report formats for issue management items. It seems that you got a summary table of issues applying the filters that you requested (SRT, dates).

    You could request ticket details for the specific tickets you highlighted. I suspect that you will get each ticket printed with a lot more detail, including notes and investigations.

    It’s also been my experience that sometimes your selection criteria for a summary report doesn’t actually get the information that you think you are requesting. Then it’s a case of understanding the software and its quirks.

    Steve: The point is that the TTC has, I believe, deliberately restricted the search parameters to limit what I get.

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  10. Do you think this will be the nail in the coffin for Leary at the TTC, Steve?

    Steve: Leary is already positioning himself as getting out in front of the problem and vowing to report to the Board on what happened. That way he looks to be the solution rather than the reason, even if others might have to be “thrown under the bus” in the process.

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  11. @ Stephen Saines;

    I thought that the attractive part was the Levitation Magnets in KM’s MagLev, not the induction motors. I did a lot of research into this when I was ion University but that was over 50 years ago so the memories might be a little faded. I also thought that the reason why the system could not use the running rail for a ground return was that the induction motor would push the wheels up a bit and make a poor ground connection.

    “This defect shows that the reaction rail was raised 1/2 inch on the approach end, a serious condition, but it was filed with a priority 4 (the scale runs from 1 to 5, high to low) on July 9“

    What is the normal clearance between the reaction rail and the LIM? A misalignment of 1/2 inch seems like it should be a level 1, not level 4 priority.

    Steve: According to the Hatch Report (at p88) the standard for LIM height above the reaction rail is between 12.5 and 13.5mm. If the reaction rail itself is half an inch (12.7mm) above its correct location this brings it into the tolerance range, and that is without any further movement caused by passing trains. Yes, definitely a severity 1 problem, but not reported nor acted on that way.

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  12. Steve posts:

    The point is that the TTC has, I believe, deliberately restricted the search parameters to limit what I get.

    And this crucial point is not getting lost in the print media stories that I’ve read so far.

    The technology itself had many things stacked against it, almost all of which, along with the already established awful state of repair, meant that oversight should have been greater, not less, in lieu of the imminent retirement.

    Once distilled down, the most obvious course of action required by logic was to brick the line completely and immediately with what was known. That of course, was politically unsavoury.

    I wonder what questions are being asked in the regulatory agencies? I’m just Googling now, and perhaps it’s one of those days where you just don’t have the right search parameter, but I’m coming up empty, and my time is limited right now.

    What I have tripped across is this:

    Ontario government needs to do more to keep railways safe, federal agency says:

    An independent federal agency is raising concerns about Ontario’s management and surveillance of provincially regulated railways after an investigation into a 2019 tragedy revealed several gaps in the Ministry of Transportation’s current systems.

    In February, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released the findings of its investigation into an accident in Kitchener when a GO Transit commuter train struck an adult and a child at a public crossing in 2019. The investigation raised serious concerns about the Ontario government’s ongoing processes for monitoring its railways.]

    As to whether the SRT fits the definition of “Railway” or not is an interesting question? I can’t even find who the regulator is for the TTC, albeit the Feds have intervened on the wireless provision issue and Ontario railways, specifically GO, are regulated under Fed jurisdiction by their own request.

    I’ll dig later on this, must run now.

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