Stop Spacing Math

In response to the “Toronto has the world’s slowest streetcars” meme floating around on line and among some transit advocates, various proposals were floated to speed up our system.

One of these is the idea that there are too many streetcar stops, and if only cars didn’t pause so often for passengers, we could have faster streetcar service. The TTC’s euphemism for this is “stop balancing”.

A chart accompanying the TTC report shows the speed and stop spacing values for several transit systems. Toronto is down in the left bottom corner with the closes stops and the slowest speed. However, Melbourne’s trams are in the same range as Toronto for stop spacing, but they operate faster. Nowhere does the TTC examine what differences might apply to Melbourne lines, nor for the other systems that are both faster and with wider stop spacing.

Although there are some outliers, the bulk of the data points are in the 400-500m range, but this does not examine route characteristics. The original study of slow Melbourne streetcars by Dr. Jan Scheurer commented about Toronto that “CBD-typical speeds seem to extend across the entire city” [p. 8]. Riders who sit in traffic jams on King or Queen Street West, or on Queen Street in the Beach are quite familiar with this problem. Toronto streetcars do not emerge from the core to fly into nearby suburbs.

There is also the issue that Toronto streetcars used to move faster both with the CLRV fleet and the PCCs that preceded them. Something beyond stop spacing is at work even on routes with dedicates rights-of-way. It is easy to go after stops as a source of delay because this would not require an examination of TTC operating practices and the City’s lack of aggressive transit signal priority. Indeed, during the last round of major works on St. Clair, it was discovered that TSP was not actually working in many locations.

Source: TTC

For the sake of argument, assume that the delays to TTC streetcars come from closely spaced stops. Any rider knows that there are other factors including slow operation through junctions, traffic signals that do not give streetcars priority and congestion both in the core and the outer parts of many routes.

The premise is that fewer stops will speed service benefiting those already on streetcars at the expense of those who have to walk further to a stop. This is a bogus argument regardless of stop spacing. There will almost always be more riders passing any individual stop who would “benefit” from its elimination than riders who use the stop. The same argument could be made for some subway stations.

Here are the TTC’s Board-approved stop spacing standards. The target range of 300-400m for local surface routes implies an average stop spacing of 350m giving some leeway to adjust to conditions.

(To give readers a sense of distance, a subway station platform is about 150m long, and so a 300m walk is from one end of a station platform to the other and return.)

Streetcar route averages lie roughly in the 250m-325m range below the standard’s midpoint of 350m. Some stop trimming has already occurred to eliminate very closely spaced stops.

Note that 508 Lake Shore shows the same average as 507 Long Branch even though the 508 travels into the core. The reason is that the stop spacing between Humber Loop and Roncesvalles is quite wide, and this offsets the closer spacing on King Street in the average.

RouteTerminiStop Spacing (m)
501 QueenNeville-Roncesvalles (*)241
Roncesvalles-Humber448
503 Kingston RoadVictoria Park-York284
504 KingDundas West Stn-Distillery (*)283
Dufferin Loop-Broadview Stn (*)280
505 DundasDundas West Stn-Broadview Stn (*)278
506 CarltonHigh Park-Main Station (*)260
507 Long BranchLong Branch Loop-Humber Loop312
508 Lake ShoreLong Branch Loop-Distillery306
509 HarbourfrontExhibition-Union Station373
510 SpadinaSpadina Station-Queens Quay293
511 BathurstBathurst Station-Exhibition Loop328
512 St. ClairGunns Loop-St. Clair Station270
Source: Calculated from TTC GTFS Schedule Data

Notes:

  • 501 Queen stop data are taken from the pre-Ontario Line construction with service running directly across Queen from Church to York.
  • Stops near Dundas West and Broadview Stations that are used primarily by overnight services have not been included in the stop counts for 504 King and 505 Dundas.
  • 506 Carlton stop data are taken from the through route before construction diversion around Bay & College.

Some Basic Math

If one wants to achieve a major saving from stop time, many stops have to be cut on a route. One or two will annoy their regular users, but the change in travel time, if any, will be quite small and disappear into the background noise of other variations.

The basic calculation is simple: if a route now has an average spacing of 300m, and you want to raise this to 400m, then one quarter of the stops must vanish. The bigger the change in stop spacing, the more stops must be eliminated.

The numbers of stops for various spacings per 1km are shown below:

  • 250m: 4.0
  • 300m: 3.3
  • 350m: 2.9
  • 400m: 2.5
  • 450m: 2.2
  • 500m: 2.0

With the TTC standard of 300-400m, 350m falls half way along, or 2.9 stops/km. Just to bring routes now at a 250m spacing (4.0/km) to that level would require a reduction of about 1.1 stop/km, or about 12 stops each way on a route the length of 505 Dundas (11km).

If the goal is to move to a 400-500m standard, this means the new target average would be 450m. A route whose average is now 250m would lose almost half its stops. This would be extremely difficult as routes do not have that many “unimportant” closely-space stops to begin with.

The effect would not be on a few riders at a few minor stops, but on many riders all along the routes. They would face extra walking distance lengthening overall travel times, not to mention accessibility issues for those with mobility challenges.

A simple, but important, number is not the space between adjacent stops, but the space that would result if any stop were removed. (In other words, the space between stop N and stop N±2.) In some cases, the existing TTC standard would still be met, but in many the gap between stops would be well outside the standard. For example, if three stops are each 300m apart, getting rid of the middle one creates a 600m gap, well above the standard.

Stops cannot simply be re-spaced to maintain uniformity or iron out problems with stop elimination. For pedestrian safety, stops are almost always at signaled intersections or at least at pedestrian crosswalks so that riders can cross safely to/from stops on the opposite side of the street. The existing street layout, signal patterns and major destinations such as transfer points determine where stops might go. Toronto, unlike Manhattan, does not have a repeating grid as a base for designing standards.

In the sections that follow, I will turn to a few sample routes. There are occasional closely-spaced stops, some with good reason, but not many are ripe for plucking without adopting a considerable increase in the standard and substantial cut to the number of stops. This should be a conscious policy debate, not a change buried in a wider review of Service Standards without a clear indication of the effects on routes across the city.

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Ups and Downs on the TTC

Anyone requiring a “lift” on the TTC on the morning of April 20 will face a challenge: the passenger intercoms have failed for the entire subway network, and without them the elevators cannot run. TTC updated their alert on this to note that with assistance of station staff, people can use the elevators.

The Passenger Assistance Intercom in subway stations are not working. As a safety precaution, all elevators are out of service until this issue is resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 05:58:55

The advice changed somewhat later to recognize that elevators could be used with assistance:

Passenger Assistance Intercoms are temporarily out of service. Elevators remain in service, and TTC staff are available at all stations to help. Customers needing elevator access should speak with staff. Customers with accessibility needs can also use Wheel Trans or nearby surface routes. We’re urgently working to restore PAI service.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 10:35:53

The problem remains at 1:20pm as I write this article.

The practice is imposed by the provincial Technical Safety and Standards Authority (TSSA) who require a working intercom for any elevator for rider safety in case the device fails.

For riders, unless the elevators have a permanent attendant, finding someone to assist in a journey can be challenging, especially in large stations with many elevators and lots of places staff might be found.

A total outage like this is very unusual, and begs the question of how there is a single point of failure that hobbles the entire subway system.

This situation prompted me to look at the TTC’s website where the landing page includes information about elevator and escalator outages. Here is the overview of status by line:

There is also an “On Time Performance” chart that includes tracking of elevator and escalator status:

Those 90%+ values for vertical transport are impressive compared to the surface route stats, but they are below targets only slightly below100%. They do not give a feel for what is going on at the station level. That shows up in details available by opening line-specific folders. Note that the information here does not reflect the system-wide elevator outage. Even when the intercoms come back online and normal service is restored, there will be eight inaccessible stations on Lines 1 and 2 thanks to elevator outages, and many more where at least one escalator is not working.

Lines 4, 5 and 6 stats are below. Note that Metrolinx through their P3 partners, Mosaic and Crosslinx, are responsible for Lines 6 and 5 respectively. The two out-of-service elevators at Sheppard-Yonge are in private buildings and are not maintained by the TTC.

A key part of TTC accessibility planning is to shift riders from Wheel-Trans van trips to, in part, trips on the so-called conventional system. However, without reliable station accessibility this is impossible. Furthermore, many people who are not WT users, but whose mobility is less than ideal, depend on escalators and elevators without which they cannot access the subway. This is not a trivial number of riders.

We hear a lot about TTC State of Good Repair, but this applies more to vehicles, track, signals, and power supplies. Trains that move are obviously a key part of the system, but for riders who cannot get to and from platforms, the subway does not really exist.

Subway Work Car Hydraulic Fluid Spills Update

TTC’s Line 2 Bloor-Danforth subway service suffered two major interruptions on Tuesday, April 7 and Friday April 10 due to work cars developng leaks in their hydraulic systems and fouling rails for normal revenue service.

At its April 16 meeting, the TTC Board received a preliminary report from Hatch, the consulting engineers who also reviewed a similar incident in 2024. The images in this article are taken from the Hatch presentation deck.

RT-6:

RT-6 is a vacuum excavation car that is about 7 years old. The failure was caused by an incorrectly installed part during recent maintenance (date unspecified) by TTC.

The recommended next steps are:

  • Review the installation process for areas of potential incorrect assembly and develop improvement steps and protocols.
  • Inspect other work cars with similar fittings repaired over the last 3 to 4 weeks and recertify work performed as a containment measure.
  • Send the failed O-ring for analyses to confirm failure mode, chemical composition and mechanical properties. [p. 4]

RT-17

This car is close to 30 years old. The fault lay in a defective valve on the car. The report does not state how recently this valve was installed. The valve was defective as supplied, but this was not caught by TTC before it was installed.

Next steps:

  • Immediately identify and quarantine all similar manifold assemblies, including on-car and in-stock inventory.
  • Supplier to perform failure analyses on RT17 manifold assembly including inspection of the FCV mounting geometry and analyse of the O-ring (material, mechanical properties)
  • Supplier to develop and implement a quality control policy that assures specification compliant assembly of the units and a pre-ship inspection process
  • Review TTC’s incoming inspection process for vendor supplied hydraulic components where there is a concern and ensure they are compliant to the manufacturing specifications before they are assembled into work cars. [p. 6]

The Hatch review states that these incidents are:

  • Random in nature
  • Could not have been predicted.
  • Do not appear to be atypical
  • Not uncommon for a similar sized transit authority such as the TTC. [p. 2]

These findings do not entirely line up with the details cited above. In both cases, there were failures waiting to happen. For RT-6, the significant factor appears to be incorrect maintenance. For RT-17, the shortcoming lies with a combination of the manufacturer and incoming parts inspection by TTC.

The events were “random” and unpredictable in that the time to failure after parts were installed could not be known. However, shortcomings in maintenance and parts inspection are both generic issues that could affect other parts of the fleet. Saying these are “not uncommon” in effect excuses these shortcomings.

Failing Parts Are Not The Only Issue

A common source of extended delays on Line 2 is failures of the signal system. Much of this dates from the original Bloor-Danforth subway built in the 1960s, and it has been overdue for replacement for several years. An original plan to implement Automatic Train Control with new signals was on the books in Andy Byford’s day as TTC CEO, but it was delayed by his successor to trim the capital budget. The project is back on the books, but the new system will not enter service until 2037 once new trains for line 2 (another delayed project) are delivered.

TTC management claims to have a plan to keep the existing signals working for another decade, but there are no details of what this entails. The Board asked no questions about signals even though there have been failures recently, notably one on April 9 in the week of the two hydraulic failures.

Thanks to bad planning under a previous regime at the TTC, Toronto faces a decade with aging trains and signals on Line 2, and this will no doubt undermine attempts to provide reliable service.

TTC Major Capital Projects: 2025 Year-End Update

The TTC Board agenda for its April 16 meeting includes a pair of reports giving the year-end status for the Operating and Capital budgets, as well as a detailed update on major capital projects.

In this article, I will review the status of major projects to summarize info for readers. In a separate article, I will turn to the 2025 operating results. Those wishing more detail should refer to the full reports.

An important factor with many projects is that they are multi-year efforts, and some of them are not fully funded. This has different implications for various types of projects such as:

  • A project might still not have full funding, but a portion can proceed with the hope of additional moneys appearing along the way.
  • A project might have stages, but only be funded for some of them. A new vehicle purchases might have money for part of an order, but not for a sustained rollout.
  • Projects could be interrelated in that full exploitation of benefits cannot be achieved without completion of both. For example, a new Automatic Train Control cannot work without a fleet that can “talk” to the new signal system. Larger fleets cannot be accommodated without new storage and maintenance facilities.

Although these are large and in some cases quite expensive projects, this is not an exhaustive list. Some parts of TTC State Of Good Repair budget involve areas with many smaller projects (for example, building and structures maintenance) that are quite large in the aggregate. Vehicle overhaul is an ongoing cost, but it is not listed as a “major project” because it is routine work. These items do not appear in the Major Projects report although they comprise a large portion of the capital budget.

The projects discussed here are:

  • Subway Work Car Fleet and Maintenance
  • Station Easier Access, Second Exits and Fire Ventilation
  • New Subway Cars for Lines 1 and 2
  • ATC Signals for Line 2
  • Rogers 5G Rollout
  • Capacity Enhancements for Lines 1 and 2
  • Bloor-Yonge Capacity
  • Scarborough Busway Project
  • New Buses for Conventional and Wheel-Trans Service
  • eBus Charging Systems
  • Facilities for the Expanded Streetcar Fleet
  • New TTC Operations Centre
  • VISION (Vehicle Tracking System) Implementation
  • SAP Enterprise IT System Implementation
  • PRESTO System Upgrade
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Faster Streetcars, Someday, Maybe

At its meeting of April 16, the TTC Board will consider a report on various ways in which streetcars and “LRT” lines can be sped up.

Updated April 13 at 10pm: Comments added about line management practices.

Various tactics are proposed including priority measures and a review of operating practices that can hobble streetcar service. A problem with some of the analysis is a poor or forgotten history of how current arrangements evolved. In some cases, there is a confusion of cause and effect, of equating co-incidence with causality. Some potential solutions have extremely long lead times that will doom riders to slow operation for years if not decades.

A thread running through some issues is slow operation at junctions where streetcar tracks diverge and cross. TTC has a lot of these thanks to its network descending from a dense grid of streetcar lines over a century old. Recently, operating practices from this “legacy” system were exported to the new LRT lines 5 Eglinton and 6 Finch giving these routes, and the technology generally, a black eye. The bad reputation is so severe that new “LRT” proposals face stiff criticism and outright “we told you so” hostility.

The blame for this rests squarely with TTC, Toronto Transportation Services, and Metrolinx who collectively accepted a much-diluted version of “priority” compared to what was promised during project development. This has been partly remedied, but should never have been allowed in the first place. Imagine if a new subway line opened with permanent slow orders. This would have been laughable and unacceptable, but for a “streetcar line”, it’s just fine.

Six areas are proposed for review on the timelines shown below. The troubling part of the chart is the section labelled “2027+” which reaches into the indefinite future.

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TTC Grounds Subway Work Car Fleet

On April 7 and 10 two major outages on Line 2 Bloor-Danforth were caused by hydraulic fluid spills from work cars. The TTC has sidelined its entire fleet of work cars pending inspection and repair. This has placed much subway infrastructure work on hold at a time when there is already a backlog.

A previous leak incident in 2024 led to TTC Board reports, and the findings were not impressive. Some work cars were beyond their useful lives, and there were ongoing issues with inspection and maintenance of equipment.

A common thread in these delays has been a car leaking fluid onto the rails over an extended distance before this problem is discovered. That leads to extensive, manual cleanup work to ensure that revenue service trains can accelerate and brake without slipping.

Problems with these cars are not the only source of major disruptions, and failing signal systems requiring service suspensions are common.

The TTC has not published a list of signal failure incidents to give a sense of their frequency and severity, let alone any plan to improve reliability over the decade before a new ATC system can take over.

It is rather comical that TTC Board meetings can include extensive discussion of a new enterprise asset management system, but little info on actual condition, maintenance and plans for what we have. We should not have to wait for a large IT project to know what the issues are today.

Behind both the fleet and signals problems lie bad capital budget planning by TTC management in response to political pressure to trim spending. In past years, key interrelated projects were downplayed or sidelined including:

  • The need to refresh and expand the subway work car fleet
  • The need to convert Line 2 to Automatic Train Control
  • The need for a new Line 2 fleet

Under former CEO Rick Leary, in his early days, there was a sense that existing infrastructure and fleet could be stretched out to about 2040, fully ten years longer than the then-current target of 2030. In time, the ATC and new trains projects were restarted, but with much later delivery dates. According to the December 31, 2025 Major Projects Update Report, the delivery of 55 new trains will not complete until 2035, and the final cutover of ATC will not occur until 2037. Existing systems will have to last another decade.

Another factor is the timing of the Scarborough and North Yonge subway extensions which are planned to open in the early 2030s and will need new trains before the existing Line 2 fleet is retired. This is further complicated by demand projections showing the need for growth trains in the mid 2030s. Trains for new lines and extra service require production capacity that would otherwise go to a replacement fleet.

With ATC for Line 2 a decade away, the Scarborough extension will have to be built with conventional signals to tide it over until an ATC-capable fleet is running.

The TTC has not published a fleet plan showing how the various proposed deliveries of new trains will be staged. There is also the small matter of storage and maintenance space for the expanded fleets, and projects for new yards are not yet funded. The Province is happy to announce new subway lines, but conveniently omits the very large cost of the maintenance facilities.

This ties back to the work car reliability and fleet size issues because the volume of subway work will not decline, but will actually increase both thanks to aging infrastructure and system expansion. There are already severe scheduling problems for the work plans due to conflicting requirements for this fleet.

The focus at an upcoming TTC Board meeting will no doubt be on recent failures, but there are much larger issues affecting subway reliability for the coming decade and more. 2027 might seem a long time (and an election) away, but planning for that budget is already underway. The Board should demand a detailed review and plan to address the situation, and this should not be another “we’ll get back to you next year” report.

Two LRT Announcements, But What About Bus Service?

Two new lines on Toronto’s transit map suddenly sprang back to life this week with announced funding for the Waterfront East route by the City, Province and Federal governments. Days later, both Mayor Chow and her competitor, Councillor Bradford, came out with competing support for the Eglinton East LRT, now rebranded by Chow as the Scarborough East Rapid Transit, or “SERT”. “LRT” has become a dirty word thanks to the botched implementation on Finch, and a less than steller launch on Eglinton.

I will leave discussion of the details of SERT for another post once there is a better sense of just what technology and infrastructure options are actually on the table.

It’s important to remember that whoever is Mayor after the 2026 elections, there’s a good chance they will not be in office to see SERT, whatever it might be, open for service.

Meanwhile, long-suffering Scarborough transit riders will have only buses to ferry them around. The same can be said for other parts of the city waiting for transit improvements, and large parts of Toronto will never see anything more than a few RapidTO red lanes.

This raises two fundamental issues about TTC service:

  • How much service should there be on TTC routes, and
  • How much can crowding and convenience issues be addressed with existing services?

TTC Service Standards set out crowding levels for various types of vehicle, service and periods of operation.

TTC Service Standards, Table 4, p. 14

Although the TTC reports that overall ridership has not returned to 2019 levels, they also acknowledge that some routes are crowded beyond the standards. They do not list specifics of routes and time periods, and so it is hard to know the scope of the problem or the affected locations.

This situation is not corrected thanks to budget limitations. The TTC owns buses and streetcars, but they cannot afford to run all of them.

From a rider’s point of view there is more to service quality than the number of buses on the road. These vehicles should also show up reliably so that loads are evenly distributed between them, and wait times are predictable. TTC loves to blame all problems on traffic congestion, but a fundamental issue is that service does not run on even spacing, and little is done to improve this. One difficulty is the acceptance in standards of being off schedule up to 5 minutes, and this only applies leaving a terminus. This allows buses to run together on frequent routes and still be “on time” while giving poorer service than advertised.

Back in the early days of debates on a Scarborough LRT or subway replacement for the former Line 3 SRT, important research from UofT showed that in the off-peak period, the majority of trips in Scarborough stay in Scarborough. A transit network designed to get people downtown does not necessarily address local travel unless it happens to lie along well-used commuter routes. Such a network can also miss travel patterns to and from major suburban work and academic locations both inside Toronto and in the 905 beyond. Off-peak service is important, but it must be more than a line on the map representing a bus that will appear sometime, maybe.

Later in this article, I will detail service frequency on routes across Toronto. In some quarters it is common to say “Scarborough gets the dregs”, but in fact the problem of infrequent and irregular service extends well beyond Scarborough borders. If there is to be advocacy for better transit, this will be more productive with all affected neighbourhoods.

The view ahead to the 2027 budget is not hopeful. Increased spending on service falls in various categories:

  • Inflationary and cost-of-living effects
  • Service added to address growth
  • Service hours added to address congestion
  • Service added to promote growth

The budget focus is on the first three, and growth for its own sake gets little attention. The TTC might produce a ridership growth strategy, but it will not affect the 2027 budget.

There has been no discussion of the level of service possible with existing infrastructure and fleet, as opposed to changes that would require more vehicles and, possibly, more garage space. Any added service will, of course, require more operators to drive it and that drives up the budget and subsidy requirement.

TTC planning in recent years focused on making changes within existing financial resources, and the funding shortfall to improve service overall is never presented for public debate. Meanwhile, the politicians do not want to talk about anything that would increase operating costs and lead inevitably to proposals for new revenues including fares and subsidies.

Better service both in quantity and quality is key to the TTC’s growth. Drawing lines on maps keeps the announcement machinery turning and fuels endless social media debates, but it does nothing for service today.

Any politician or advocate claiming to serve their community needs to address service and how it can be improved to serve everyone now, not just in the decade to come.

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Travel Times on 510 Spadina: Jan/2024 to Mar/2026

This post continues a series of articles reviewing travel times for streetcar and bus operations on 510 Spadina. Recent events include winter storms, temporary bus substitution for one week in February 2026 due to power supply issues, and implementation of better transit priority at three intersections.

This article includes data from January 2024 through March 2026 showing travel times on Spadina. Also included are comparisons of speeds and dwell times along the route from October 2025 and March 2026.

For an extended period in 2024-25, the 510 route operated with buses and was, for a time, diverted to St. George Station. Comparisons between streetcar and bus travel times varied through this period depending on the location, time of day, traffic conditions and the degree of priority given to buses, if any.

In February 2026, signals at College, Queen Dundas and King were modified to give streetcars a clear signal before allowing left turns. In the data to March 31, the effect of this change is small. At the level of an individual intersection, this is hard to measure because the change in wait time for a signal is comparable to the frequency with which streetcars report their location. This problem is discussed in more detail at the end of the article. [Corrected at 5:45pm, April 6]

Although signals may clear for streetcars more quickly, there is no change in TTC operating practices that force vehicles to crawl through intersections. The results were not as good as I had hoped, and there are areas on 510 Spadina that need priority far more than the three intersections modified so far.

At this point, confirmation of the benefit of signal changes awaits more data as well as possible expansion of the program.

More generally, the three modified intersections are only part of a larger route, and not necessarily the primary source of delay. Any attempt to improve 510 Spadina travel times must look at the whole route, and at the many locations where streetcars can be delayed.

One point of interest is that streetcar travel times rose slightly after the period of bus operation compared to before (Spring 2025 vs Spring 2024). The change is small but noticeable. What made the difference?

The City and TTC must address why it is possible for buses in mixed traffic to outrun streetcars on reserved lanes during periods when traffic is not congested. A mixture of signalling, stop location and TTC operating practices make this possible.

My apologies to readers who say “oh no, not more charts” and move on to something else. I have deliberately included a lot of them here so that those who are interested can see how the data behave. Any suggestions for changes in presentation or analysis are welcome.

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Line 5 Eglinton Hours Extended

The hours of service on Line 5 will be extended effective April 5, 2026. Trains will run later into the evening with buses covering the route at other times.

Service now ends just before 11pm inbound from the terminals, but will be extended to 1:20am weekdays and Sundays, 12:30am on Saturdays.

Bus services on Eglinton remain the same:

  • 34 Eglinton provides local bus service every 20 minutes from 6:00am to 1:30am (8:00am start on Sundays).
  • The Line 5 shuttle bus will continue to run between 10:00pm and 1:00am stopping only at Line 5 stops.
  • The 334 Eglinton night bus runs from 1:00am to 5:30am (7:30am on Sundays).

Whether the Line 5 shuttle late night operation will continue beyond the next schedule change remains to be seen as it duplicates the extended LRT service.

TTC Strategic Planning Committee: March 31, 2026

This article is a follow-up to my previous reviews of items on the March 31 Strategic Planning Committee agenda:

Also included are comments on the Fare Alignment and Seamless Transit Act, 2026 introduced in the Ontario Legislature on March 30.

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