* City Council Transmittal – CC15.1 Budget Implementation Including Property Tax Rates, User Fees and Related Matters
* Financial and Major Projects Update for the Year Ended December 31, 2023
* Easier Access Phase III – Project Status Update April 2024
Approval of Public Art Concepts for the Bay, Castle Frank, Christie, Donlands and Lansdowne Stations
I have already written about the SRT report, and here will discuss only the deputations and discussion at the Board meeting.
(*) Part II will review the Asset Management Plan, and Part III will cover updates on TTC finances, Major Projects and Easier Access.
A Draft Report on the TTC’s “Innovation and Sustainability Framework” was deferred to the May Board meeting, and I will comment on that when it reappears.
Among the reports on the TTC Board agenda for April 11 is a recap of the SRT investigation. I have already written about shortcomings and contradictions in this report and will not belabour that here.
The fundamental question is whether management are being entirely transparent in their presentation. If there is someone on the Board bold enough to challenge them, here are a few key questions:
Ten days before the derailment, a high reaction rail was reported at the site, but this was logged as a low priority problem. The misalignment, reported as 1/2 inch, is on a par with the normal clearance between the LIM motor under SRT cars and the reaction rail. What repairs, if any, were made to correct this problem, and were the bolts holding the reaction rail checked for their integrity?
At the site, joins in both the reaction rail cap and the main reaction rail were at the same position. This weakens the structure because the two sections cannot reinforce each other against deflection by magnetic forces as trains pass. The sections are supposed to be staggered to prevent this type of failure. Why weren’t they, and how many other locations on the SRT shared the same problem?
How recently installed were the bolts that failed at the derailment site?
Consultant reports state that the manufacturer, Hilti, did not intend its anchors to be used in a situation where the bolts would flex under load as on the SRT. Why was this not reported to the Board in the September 2023 briefing?
New bolts on the SRT were not those supplied by Hilti, but were substituted by the TTC. The replacement bolts were longer and they used a different thread profile than the originals. Were these approved by Hilti?
What portions of the SRT were reviewed by the consultants, and did they find other defects similar to those at the derailment site?
Have all the reports, either internal or produced by consultants, about the derailment been made public? If not, why not, and when will they be made available?
TTC management claims that they did not reduce the level of maintenance on the SRT even though it was to close in fall 2023. However, the consultants point out that capital repairs (as opposed to routine inspections) were discontinued, and that only that type of work would have detected loose reaction rail bolts. How does TTC management reconcile these claims?
At the September 2023 Board meeting, TTC staff stated that the consultant’s recommendations for work to inspect and restore the SRT to safe operation would take longer then the planned remaining life of the line. How can the need to do so much work be reconciled with claims of regular inspection and repair?
Why were the consultant reports posted to the TTC’s website in November and December 2023 with no notice to the public nor to the Board?
The TTC would like to put the derailment behind them and focus on improvements going forward. However, one must ask how long the practices leading to the SRT crash were used, and whether shortfalls were the result of budgetary “efficiencies” rather than good engineering. By extension, what other parts of the TTC might be compromised, and what is needed to correct this situation.
On April 3, 2024, the advocacy group TTCriders submitted a request to the City of Toronto Auditor General for a review of TTC maintenance practices. This arose both from the July 2023 SRT derailment and other recent events on the subway including a broken switch and a flurry of slow orders.
Full disclosure: I was asked to review a draft of the TTCriders letter and suggested minor edits, but am not a party to their request.
Both in the staff presentation at the TTC’s September 26, 2023 Board Meeting and in comments responding to TTCriders, the TTC has been quite clear that it regards the root cause of the SRT derailment to be loose mounting bolts for the reaction rail. This does not tell the full story, especially in light of consultant reports that were published well after the September 26 meeting.
The published version of the Network Rail report is dated August 23. The Hatch report is Sept 28. Gannett-Fleming’s is Oct 12. Systra’s is Nov 30. For an extensive review of these, see my previous article:
A common thread in the consultant reports was that inspection and maintenance practices were inadequate, staff were not trained in the potential danger of defects that they discovered, and many staff were juniors who had not fully qualified as track inspectors. At the time, this was treated as a problem limited to the SRT. Recent events suggest that poor practices extend beyond to the rail network generally, and this is a more pervasive problem than originally reported.
The staff presentation in September was part of a larger review of the SRT replacement service, and the report title gives no hint that the derailment is part of this. Elsewhere in the same agenda, the CEO’s report celebrates the “Farewell to the SRT” event but makes no mention of the derailment reviews.
In the TTC’s review of these reports, presented in the April 11 Board meeting agenda, these suppositions are countered, although not entirely convincingly. It is fair to assume that most people will not be familiar with the detailed reports and will take the TTC’s rebuttal at face value. [The April 11 report is discussed later in this article.]
TTC spokesperson Stuart Green said CEO Rick Leary ordered the external reports the night of the derailment to get answers on what happened while including links to the reports posted on the TTC website. He also said the matter was discussed at the Sept. 26 TTC board meeting.
“TTCriders was represented at this same meeting so presumably they heard the same information and are fully aware what the root cause was,” he wrote.
Certainly TTCriders and anyone else attending the September 26 meeting or playing the video later “heard the same information”. The problem lies in being “fully aware” of the root cause which was not the loose bolts, but the failure to detect and correct the problem, and more generally the state of inspection work and staff training. A related problem identified by the consultants was that previous repairs at the derailment site had created a weakness in the reaction rail which, combined with loose bolts, made the failure causing the derailment more likely.
The September presentation noted the difficulty of inspecting the reaction rail supports which required hands-and-knees posture to peer under the track in all manner of weather and lighting conditions. In practice, this level of inspection was rare because it was so difficult. Oddly enough, the Vancouver SkyTrain system uses a separate test, striking the support bolts with a tool, and listening for a dull “thud” instead of a clear “ping”. The “thud” indicates a loose bolt requiring closer inspection.
A common indication that there were problems is scuffing of the reaction rail. This was noted at several locations on the line. One does not have to peer under the track to see this early indicator of a developing problem. However, scuffing could also result from minor clearance problems with specific cars and this would not necessarily be interpreted as a location warranting detailed reaction rail review, especially if the marks had been seen repeatedly.
The most damning item is in the TTC’s own Maximo defect tracking system as reported by an inspection team two weeks before the derailment (July 9, 2023). The item highlighted below shows the reaction rail was “raised 1/2 inch on the approach end”. This was a defect serious enough to be visible without the usual difficulty of inspecting under the reaction rail. A related oddity is a two-week gap in reporting of any further problems leading up to the derailment.
In summarizing the investigation at the September meeting, TTC staff stated that the “immediate cause” of the derailment was the failed anchor bolts. Further, the consultants had recommended that if the SRT were to resume operation through November, then all of the newer bolts installed from 2016 onward should be tested and retrofitted as necessary. This work would have required “time well beyond the planned closure date”, and so the line remained closed. (See meeting recording.)
The estimated scope of this work implies a pervasive problem that was either undetected or whose potential severity was not understood, or worse ignored.
An important distinction here is that the term “immediate cause” has morphed into “root cause”. No matter the frequency of track inspections, the loose bolt problems would not be detected because they were not visible.
A further concern is the manner in which consultant reports were quietly posted on the TTC’s website with no announcement in November and December 2023. My coverage of them was the first that some TTC Board members I have spoken with knew about them.
The documents are posted under the Projects page for the future of Line 3 SRT replacement service, hardly a location one would look for technical info on the derailment. Three of the reports were posted in mid November and one in December. It is easy to verify that they were not there earlier by looking at Internet archives for the page on October 2 and December 7, 2023. The first three reports went up almost two months after the Board meeting, not “a few weeks” as expected. However, there was no media release about them nor were they brought to the Board’s attention.
At the September meeting, Councillor Matlow asked whether there could have been a reduction in maintenance or negligence due to the anticipated shutdown of the line. The Gannett-Fleming consultant replied that there were multiple possible causes for the bolts coming loose, but did not address the frequency of inspections.
Staff and consultants reiterated that inspections for problems of loose bolts were very difficult and they would generally not be spotted. It would not matter how often a walking inspection passed potentially defective reaction rail mounts because these were not visible. Indeed, there was an inspection on the morning of the derailment that found no issues.
The Network Rail consultant mentioned marks on the reaction rail surface in passing, but then talked about the impossibility of seeing bolt problems because they are under the reaction rail, and movement was seen only with a train passing. He also said that issues were being reported and fixed, but this is contradicted by the Maximo logs which show a reaction rail lifted 1/2 inch at the site two weeks before the derailment (see above).
One major problem with the Maximo records is that there is no explicit log of repairs made in response to problem reports. Moreover, the consultants noted that almost all issues were logged with a relatively low priority for repairs. I attempted to FOI the repair work orders. However, the TTC advised that the only record was that a defect report was closed, and that there was no information on the actual repair work. If true, this makes post-incident review of the nature of repairs, if any, impossible.
In September, Matlow asks whether there was an increase in maintenance on the aging system. Staff replied about the 2016 plan to replace the anchors which was well-intentioned, but as we know from the reports there were design and installation issues that eventually caused the failure.
Councillor Holyday pursued the anchor design issue. The replies mentioned that there were other locations with scuff marks but mostly from different causes. There was no mention of a problem, flagged by consultants, of repairs that created a weak spot due to cuts in both layers of the reaction rail at various points including the derailment site.
Matlow asked CEO Leary about how the TTC will prevent another accident, and Leary talked briefly about changes already underway and lessons learned. He then mentioned a planned November report, but this was the unfunded capital projects report, not a more detailed SRT report.
Leary pivoted to the Line 2 trains and signal system, and funding problems that could lead to shutdowns. He explicitly mentioned avoiding having old vehicles in service in the future. This ignored his original support for rebuilding Line 2 trains for a 40-year lifespan, and of keeping conventional signals because ATC would have been incompatible with these trains. Now he has changed his position.
City Council reaffirm the policy that maintaining the existing system in a state of good repair is the first priority for investment in transportation.
Despite the State of Good Repair (SOGR) ranking first, some Councillors pursued their subway dreams. Amending motions included the Finch West LRT extension to Pearson Airport, the Bloor subway extension to Sherway, and the Sheppard subway western and eastern extensions. All of these are long-term projects that will have no effect on the transit system for a decade at least.
(Two lines, the Eglinton East and Waterfront East LRTs, were not under discussion as they are already City “priority” projects, although what benefit this status confers remains to be seen.)
The TTC’s Capital Plan includes a very long list of projects for which there is only partial committed funding, or none at all. Meanwhile, the backlog in SOGR work will climb to about $8 billion over the coming decade in spite of $13 billion in spending. In other words, the 10-year budget should be $21 billion, but is actually only 60% of that figure.
Even this pales by comparison with the 15-year total which now stands at almost $48 billion of which only 25% is funded. This number does not include many proposals including the rapid transit projects favoured by Council.
SOGR is seen by some as getting in the way of their preferred system expansion projects, and that a way forward might be paved (so to speak) with a focus on a short list of the most important SOGR items. This is absolute folly, but typical of the priorities that created the problem in the first place.
This misses the key question about our transit system: what do we want it to be? This includes choices not just for capital repairs and/or expansion, but for the overall scope and quality of service transit will provide.
Will the TTC always be a second class service except in a handful of rapid transit corridors, will transit play a much larger role in moving people around the entire city, or will it decline for want of resources to an unattractive last choice for travel? Only after we decide on the goal can we address the question of where to spend, and how much we need.
The 15-year Capital Plan grew substantially from 2023 to 2024 with the principal additions in the bus fleet and a provision for added capacity under the TransformTO Net Zero program. The big jump in bus costs reflects the higher unit cost of battery buses now assumed to be the standard. (Facility Maintenance and Network Wide Assets are new categories in 2024, but they simply replace the “Other” group from previous years with a comparatively small increase.)
Portfolio
2022-2036 ($m)
2023-2037 ($m)
2024-2038 ($m)
Subways
$25,400.0
$25,343.0
$27,613.0
Buses
$6,300.0
$6,948.0
$8,705.2
TransformTO
$5,339.8
Streetcars
$2,230.0
$2,277.0
$2,307.4
Facility Maintenance
$2,415.1
Network Wide Assets
$1,474.8
Other Infrastructure
$3,300.0
$3,478.0
Grand Total
$37,230.0
$38,046.0
$47,855.3
Even the $5.3 billion TransformTO line is an understatement because it accounts only for bus fleet expansion, not for the other modes, and there is no discussion of the related operating cost and competing funding needs.
A quick-and-dirty way to approach the budget is to pick a “top five” project list as if, by implication, all of the rest can wait their turn behind Councillors’ aims for their “deserving” wards. A top five list is a simplistic approach that does not recognize the complexity of TTC’s maintenance needs. Even worse, it implies that if the worst of the backlog is addressed, we can sleep soundly.
I challenge anyone to pick only five lines from the tables below as the subset we could pay for while downplaying the rest.
Another challenge lies in project linkages (you cannot buy more buses without some place to store and maintain them), and in deciding which items should be stripped of priority, in effect relegated to a “bottom five” group. That will be a hard fight.
Updated March 14, 2024: The table listing subway restricted speed zones has been updated by addition of the TTC’s March 12 and 14 lists.
Updated March 22, 2024: The table of restricted speed zones has been updated with the TTC’s March 21 list.
In July 2023, the Scarborough RT met its unexpected end with a derailment south of Ellesmere Station. The underlying cause was a loose segment of reaction rail struck by the train. The last car separated from the train and the rear truck lifted completely off of the tracks. A major issue raised by the investigation was poor track inspection and maintenance procedures, possibly influenced by a combination of badly trained junior staff and the assumption that the line would close soon and did not require much ongoing work.
Fortunately, the location was an at-grade segment where there was little danger of the car falling far. Had the accident happened on the elevated stretch from Midland to McCowan, this could have been a very different story.
For a detailed look at this accident and the investigation, see:
The SRT would never re-open. Subsequent inspections found other problem locations including some with similar faults to the one causing the derailment.
This might be regarded as poor management choices and bad luck for a line that would soon close, but only half a year later, the subway was beset with widespread slow orders that hampered service. These arose from an annual track geometry inspection performed by a contracted service using a test rig that is run through the entire subway system. The equipment looks for problems a visual inspection will not spot including rails out of gauge and potential failures due to metal defects and fatigue.
At the January 2024 TTC Board meeting, management claimed that this was a normal outcome of the annual inspection. However, a month later in February, management admitted that the number of defects was higher than usual. Unfortunately, for unknown technical reasons, the video record of the February meeting is not available on YouTube to provide an exact quote.
An obvious, but unasked question is why there was such a jump in defects. Have past inspections missed problems or been too infrequent? Have their findings been ignored? Have repairs been less than adequate?
Quite recently, on March 1, 2024, a broken switch blade was discovered north of Museum Station. This defect was so serious it required service to be suspended from early morning until mid-afternoon when repairs were complete.
Riders on the streetcar system know that there are slow orders everywhere. Any junction slows streetcars to a crawl, and any facing point switch has a mandatory stop-and-proceed so that the operator can verify the switch is correctly set. There is even a rule, not much observed except by junior operators, that streetcars should not pass at junctions lest one of them derail and strike the other. (This rule originated from just such a sideswipe collision several years ago.)
The attitude that poor track condition can be dealt with simply by going slow spread from the streetcar system outward, and now affects the key routes of the TTC’s network.
Somebody made decisions over the years that led to declining maintenance on the rail systems. This was never presented to the TTC Board or Council explicitly, but was the inevitable effect of making do year-by-year with cuts to the Operating and Capital budgets. Three decades ago during a recession and funding cuts, TTC management claimed that they could get by without compromising the system. The parallels are far too clear, and that era’s result was the Russell Hill subway crash.
The term “State of Good Repair” (aka “SOGR”) comes up a lot in TTC budgets as a key component – maintain what we already have, ensure that the system continues to provide safe, reliable service and only then worry about spending on shiny new projects.
A report making its way to Council’s March 20 meeting includes a rough prioritization list of many rapid transit proposals, but the first priority above all is to invest in SOGR. However, the backlog on that account is so big that were this priority taken seriously, Toronto would never have another penny to spend on anything else.
One problem in discussing SOGR is that there is much emphasis on the Capital Budget with big ticket projects like new subway cars and buses, automatic train control, electrification, and replacement of major items such as track, escalators and elevator. We rarely hear about the SOGR buried in the Operating Budget and the day-to-day work of keeping the system in good condition.
An important difference is that the Operating Budget is funded by fares and City subsidies, while the Capital Budget comes from taxes and borrowing at all levels of government. As an example, the cries for Line 2 subway car funding are familiar in recent years. This diverts attention from much-needed ongoing repairs, a very unglamourous part of transit operations.
Spending on operations means money goes out the door today, not in future years for a project that might only now be a line on a map. That money comes from current revenue, not from borrowing, and directly affects taxes and fares depending on which pocket we reach into. There is a lot of competition for whatever spare change we might find.
Any decision to limit tax increases for transit or to freeze fares has a direct effect on how much service the TTC can operate and how well it can maintain the system. Under the Ford and Tory administrations and their low tax policies, there was very strong political pressure to say “we can make do” with no detailed examination of the effects.
This might change under Mayor Chow, but there is no indication that the current TTC budget philosophy has shifted. Indeed, the big push is to restore service and freeze fares. Raising uncomfortable questions about maintenance shortfalls will not serve that agenda.
In this article, I will review the issues with subway and streetcar infrastructure, and then turn to the wider problem of whether “State of Good Repair” can stay as the City’s “priority 1” in the face of typical Council politics. The focus here is on track because that links many current events on the three rail networks, but the concern should be general for the adequacy of TTC maintenance and budgetary limits that are now baked in to overall system quality.
Anyone who has watched the transit “planning” debates at Council or at the TTC will know that various schemes for higher order transit pop up from time to time, but they are rarely considered as a set, let alone compared to each other. The basic premise is “my ward deserves …” and there ends the detailed evaluation.
In the context of the Fords first at City Hall, and now at Queen’s Park, we got a whole map that was, at least allegedly, the Mayor’s or Premier’s own creation. Tunnels figured prominently regardless of the vehicle that might run through them.
The big plan may take some major projects out of discussion, but this leaves many more ideas competing for funding and attention. Which should be retained, added to or removed from the Official Plan (OP)?
A report at Toronto’s Executive Committee on February 29 makes a first, very rough attempt at answering this question.
Twenty four projects were evaluated to measure their contribution to the City’s various goals for transit spending, city improvement and equity. The actual scoring system attempts to provide a fair, if early, comparison, but the level of abstraction in the process will confuse more than it enlightens. (I will go into this in more detail later in the article.)
The list of projects was compiled from the existing OP, schemes that Councillors have promoted over the years, and a few busy bus corridors. An important product of the exercise will be to update the OP to match current priorities, and to adjust the map of target road widths to protect corridors where a surface right-of-way might be needed.
After the scores were brewed, the projects were sorted into quintiles with the highest being the most promising and the lowest likely to remain on the shelf. The report stresses that the rankings are relative and that a low score does not necessarily mean a project has no value, merely that others perform better.
This will not please advocates of the lower-ranked projects such as the Sheppard subway extensions east from Don Mills and west from Yonge, the Ontario Line extension to Dundas West, the Line 2 Sherway extension, and the Waterfront West LRT. Whether the affected Councillors will attempt to have the priorities, and hence the focus of further study, shuffled, and whether Council will approve, remains to be seen.
It is easy to vote for a request to look at a single project in isolation, some day, maybe. Much more difficult is to try juggling a priority list when the City has finite resources to study or build anything. Another problem is that development does not necessarily follow transit plans, and can be affected by access to expressways.
This map shows the location and status of the projects, and shows those that are not already in the OP:
On July 24, 2023, at about 6:43 pm, a southbound SRT train derailed south of Ellesmere Station after snagging the reaction rail. This event lifted the rear truck of the car off of the track and also caused it to break away from the rest of the train.
The detailed investigation reports were quietly posted on the TTC’s website, and I wrote a summary of them at the end of January:
I filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) request with the TTC at the beginning of 2024 for “track inspection reports and work orders” for the SRT between June 1 and August 31, 2023. The reason for the extended cutoff date was to pick up any inspections and repairs that took place after the derailment.
Introduction: Regular readers of this site will recognize threads and arguments from past articles here. Indeed some recent posts were intended as background to this overall article on our city’s transit direction. There is a new Mayor with Council support for change. However, we risk that momentum will be lost and content ourselves with “full service restoration” and a handful of RapidTO projects.
This is not exactly a manifesto, but we have been here before with hopes for new and improved transit seeking progress beyond “business as usual”. Will this round be any different?
Thanks to readers for tweaks in the text. This is a long article, and I have broken it into segments with hotlinks here so that you can jump to specific chapters.
Anyone who deals with Metrolinx from the outside knows that getting information can be a real struggle, but every so often the veil of secrecy lifts, although not always intentionally.
The implementation of “regional fares” is supposed to happen in March 2024, but this will be on a fairly limited scale, at least according to anything published so far. The TTC will come into the same arrangement as the 905 systems with recognition of each other’s fares across the 416/905 boundary, and the reinstatement of a GO Transit cofare.
Like the elusive Toronto sun of recent weeks, a report appeared, and then disappeared on the Metrolinx website called Regional Fare Structure Initial Business Case Final April 2023. This is not a draft, but gives a sense of Metrolinx thinking on the subject and how little some of their fare objectives have changed over the years.
To be blunt, fare planning at Metrolinx has always eyed the Toronto subway as a “regional” facility and its riders as potential cash cows who will help fund other parts of the system. I wrote about this back in 2017-18.
A major problem with earlier proposals was that the Toronto subway was treated as a premium service, like GO, where riders should pay more for the speed and comfort compared to the surface system. This utterly ignored the fact that the TTC system is designed as a single network with subway lines as the backbone and feeder/distributor surface lines. The underlying reason for pushing up subway fares was to make the model revenue-neutral, in effect, to subsidize the elimination of extra fares for cross-border trips with more expensive subway rides.
That scheme would have seen any trip longer than 10km charged an extra fare, and that would have affected the vast majority of suburban commuters who already complained of long bus+subway trips to get to work and school. This idea appeared to die off, and with the ascension of the Ford government in 2018, nothing more was heard. Ford concentrated on large-scale capital projects, not on tinkering with fares.
In the Final version of the business case, the subway fare proposal has changed so that it would only apply to cross-border trips of 10km or more. This would have the effect of undoing part of the supposed benefit of the pending 905/416 fare boundary elimination where riders will not face an extra fare for the subway portion of their journey.
Future Richmond Hill riders look forward to a single fare to central Toronto, but this scheme might not be attractive as a 10km ride will only get them to roughly Yonge and Sheppard (8km for the Yonge extension, plus 2km on the existing subway). In the tariff modelled in the Final Report, the fare to Union Station would be $7.50. Similar issues face trips in other parts of the future rapid transit network.
Removing of the 416/905 fare boundary so that the TTC’s relationship with systems in the 905 and with GO becomes the same as every other system remains an option, but it is presented as the least attractive choice. The clear intent is to pave the way for higher subway fares for “regional” travellers while preserving the flat fare, for now, within Toronto. The political considerations are obvious, but so is Metrolinx’ intent to move forward in their implacable way. Both the Draft and Final versions of the report speak of a path from the current fare arrangements to a totally “integrated” future, albeit one that is not clearly defined.
Options with further levels of “integration” perform well as riding stimulants because they involve significant reduction in GO fares at a time when service will be increased through the GO Expansion program.
A major barrier to fare-by-distance on the subway is the need to “tap out” from the subway fare zone. This is not simply a question of putting Presto readers on the “inside” face of every fare gate, but of establishing fare lines between the surface and subway portions of stations. This has a substantial cost and creates a barrier to free flow for the vast majority of trips that would still pay a flat TTC fare, Moreover it would be a Trojan horse making future conversion of the subway within Toronto to a separate fare zone much simpler.
This is not a “fare integration” scheme, but rather a plan to increase GO rider subsidies while also setting the stage for subway fare increases. The idea of a revenue neutral change in the tariff has been abandoned, at least for now. The historic pattern emphasizing GO capacity for longer trips has been turned on its head to give GO rail a larger part in local travel within Toronto.
In order to sell this concept, Metrolinx now includes rebalancing the GO fare structure under the “integration” rubric. This is a completely separate issue and it should have been addressed years ago on GO independently from the cross border fare problems.
An intriguing caveat in all of this is that the Ministry of Transportation is listed as a “partner” in the study, and its conclusions will be referred to MTO for review. One has the sense of Metrolinx being on a short leash.
It is not surprising that this report was pulled from public view, but it is worth discussing because it reveals Metrolinx’ thinking. A document does not become a “Final” report, even if it is only a “Final Initial” version, without a lot of policy signoffs along the way.
Note: In this article, I use Draft and Final (capitalized) to refer to the two versions of the Initial Business Case.
On February 1, 2024, Mayor Olivia Chow announced her version of Toronto’s 2024 operating and capital budgets at Scarborough Town Centre Station. There are many parts to this budget, including a slight reduction in the proposed tax rate, but the location of the event was no accident.
After much hand-wringing, political gesturing and activism by would-be users, the uncertainty over the busway in the former Scarborough RT right-of-way is gone. Toronto will pay for the project, and the delaying tactic of waiting for provincial funding is over. The text below is from the Mayor’s proposed budget at pages 35-36.
This is a fairly common shuffle of funding allocations between projects, something that is relatively easy because:
the amounts involved are small on the scale of the overall capital budget,
some of the spending is beyond 2024, and
the primary source is a placeholder for future as-yet uncommitted work.
What is needed now is a sense of urgency by the TTC to make every possible change in their project timetable to get things moving now. This could include:
Identifying work that can proceed without the mini Environmental Assessment known as a “TPAP” that will consume six unexpected months. Obvious candidates for this are the removal of existing SRT infrastructure – track, power, lighting – and demolition work at Lawrence East Station so that buses can pass through the station.
Examining whether the project can be split into south and north stages with the Lawrence to Eglinton section opening first. This would give some of the busway’s benefit including direct access to Kennedy Station as early as possible.
A change in focus is needed from delay, a common tactic in the Tory era to sweep budget problems under the rug, to creating the most expeditious project plan.
Transit planning should be about ambition and what we can achieve, not endless excuses and the deadly words “Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow …”.
Steve Munro 