A Grand Plan

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Ups and Downs on the TTC

Anyone requiring a “lift” on the TTC on the morning of April 20 will face a challenge: the passenger intercoms have failed for the entire subway network, and without them the elevators cannot run. TTC updated their alert on this to note that with assistance of station staff, people can use the elevators.

The Passenger Assistance Intercom in subway stations are not working. As a safety precaution, all elevators are out of service until this issue is resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 05:58:55

The advice changed somewhat later to recognize that elevators could be used with assistance:

Passenger Assistance Intercoms are temporarily out of service. Elevators remain in service, and TTC staff are available at all stations to help. Customers needing elevator access should speak with staff. Customers with accessibility needs can also use Wheel Trans or nearby surface routes. We’re urgently working to restore PAI service.

Last updated Apr 20, 2026 10:35:53

The problem remains at 1:20pm as I write this article.

The practice is imposed by the provincial Technical Safety and Standards Authority (TSSA) who require a working intercom for any elevator for rider safety in case the device fails.

For riders, unless the elevators have a permanent attendant, finding someone to assist in a journey can be challenging, especially in large stations with many elevators and lots of places staff might be found.

A total outage like this is very unusual, and begs the question of how there is a single point of failure that hobbles the entire subway system.

This situation prompted me to look at the TTC’s website where the landing page includes information about elevator and escalator outages. Here is the overview of status by line:

There is also an “On Time Performance” chart that includes tracking of elevator and escalator status:

Those 90%+ values for vertical transport are impressive compared to the surface route stats, but they are below targets only slightly below100%. They do not give a feel for what is going on at the station level. That shows up in details available by opening line-specific folders. Note that the information here does not reflect the system-wide elevator outage. Even when the intercoms come back online and normal service is restored, there will be eight inaccessible stations on Lines 1 and 2 thanks to elevator outages, and many more where at least one escalator is not working.

Lines 4, 5 and 6 stats are below. Note that Metrolinx through their P3 partners, Mosaic and Crosslinx, are responsible for Lines 6 and 5 respectively. The two out-of-service elevators at Sheppard-Yonge are in private buildings and are not maintained by the TTC.

A key part of TTC accessibility planning is to shift riders from Wheel-Trans van trips to, in part, trips on the so-called conventional system. However, without reliable station accessibility this is impossible. Furthermore, many people who are not WT users, but whose mobility is less than ideal, depend on escalators and elevators without which they cannot access the subway. This is not a trivial number of riders.

We hear a lot about TTC State of Good Repair, but this applies more to vehicles, track, signals, and power supplies. Trains that move are obviously a key part of the system, but for riders who cannot get to and from platforms, the subway does not really exist.

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Subway Work Car Hydraulic Fluid Spills Update

TTC’s Line 2 Bloor-Danforth subway service suffered two major interruptions on Tuesday, April 7 and Friday April 10 due to work cars developng leaks in their hydraulic systems and fouling rails for normal revenue service.

At its April 16 meeting, the TTC Board received a preliminary report from Hatch, the consulting engineers who also reviewed a similar incident in 2024. The images in this article are taken from the Hatch presentation deck.

RT-6:

RT-6 is a vacuum excavation car that is about 7 years old. The failure was caused by an incorrectly installed part during recent maintenance (date unspecified) by TTC.

The recommended next steps are:

  • Review the installation process for areas of potential incorrect assembly and develop improvement steps and protocols.
  • Inspect other work cars with similar fittings repaired over the last 3 to 4 weeks and recertify work performed as a containment measure.
  • Send the failed O-ring for analyses to confirm failure mode, chemical composition and mechanical properties. [p. 4]

RT-17

This car is close to 30 years old. The fault lay in a defective valve on the car. The report does not state how recently this valve was installed. The valve was defective as supplied, but this was not caught by TTC before it was installed.

Next steps:

  • Immediately identify and quarantine all similar manifold assemblies, including on-car and in-stock inventory.
  • Supplier to perform failure analyses on RT17 manifold assembly including inspection of the FCV mounting geometry and analyse of the O-ring (material, mechanical properties)
  • Supplier to develop and implement a quality control policy that assures specification compliant assembly of the units and a pre-ship inspection process
  • Review TTC’s incoming inspection process for vendor supplied hydraulic components where there is a concern and ensure they are compliant to the manufacturing specifications before they are assembled into work cars. [p. 6]

The Hatch review states that these incidents are:

  • Random in nature
  • Could not have been predicted.
  • Do not appear to be atypical
  • Not uncommon for a similar sized transit authority such as the TTC. [p. 2]

These findings do not entirely line up with the details cited above. In both cases, there were failures waiting to happen. For RT-6, the significant factor appears to be incorrect maintenance. For RT-17, the shortcoming lies with a combination of the manufacturer and incoming parts inspection by TTC.

The events were “random” and unpredictable in that the time to failure after parts were installed could not be known. However, shortcomings in maintenance and parts inspection are both generic issues that could affect other parts of the fleet. Saying these are “not uncommon” in effect excuses these shortcomings.

Failing Parts Are Not The Only Issue

A common source of extended delays on Line 2 is failures of the signal system. Much of this dates from the original Bloor-Danforth subway built in the 1960s, and it has been overdue for replacement for several years. An original plan to implement Automatic Train Control with new signals was on the books in Andy Byford’s day as TTC CEO, but it was delayed by his successor to trim the capital budget. The project is back on the books, but the new system will not enter service until 2037 once new trains for line 2 (another delayed project) are delivered.

TTC management claims to have a plan to keep the existing signals working for another decade, but there are no details of what this entails. The Board asked no questions about signals even though there have been failures recently, notably one on April 9 in the week of the two hydraulic failures.

Thanks to bad planning under a previous regime at the TTC, Toronto faces a decade with aging trains and signals on Line 2, and this will no doubt undermine attempts to provide reliable service.

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TTC Major Capital Projects: 2025 Year-End Update

The TTC Board agenda for its April 16 meeting includes a pair of reports giving the year-end status for the Operating and Capital budgets, as well as a detailed update on major capital projects.

In this article, I will review the status of major projects to summarize info for readers. In a separate article, I will turn to the 2025 operating results. Those wishing more detail should refer to the full reports.

An important factor with many projects is that they are multi-year efforts, and some of them are not fully funded. This has different implications for various types of projects such as:

  • A project might still not have full funding, but a portion can proceed with the hope of additional moneys appearing along the way.
  • A project might have stages, but only be funded for some of them. A new vehicle purchases might have money for part of an order, but not for a sustained rollout.
  • Projects could be interrelated in that full exploitation of benefits cannot be achieved without completion of both. For example, a new Automatic Train Control cannot work without a fleet that can “talk” to the new signal system. Larger fleets cannot be accommodated without new storage and maintenance facilities.

Although these are large and in some cases quite expensive projects, this is not an exhaustive list. Some parts of TTC State Of Good Repair budget involve areas with many smaller projects (for example, building and structures maintenance) that are quite large in the aggregate. Vehicle overhaul is an ongoing cost, but it is not listed as a “major project” because it is routine work. These items do not appear in the Major Projects report although they comprise a large portion of the capital budget.

The projects discussed here are:

  • Subway Work Car Fleet and Maintenance
  • Station Easier Access, Second Exits and Fire Ventilation
  • New Subway Cars for Lines 1 and 2
  • ATC Signals for Line 2
  • Rogers 5G Rollout
  • Capacity Enhancements for Lines 1 and 2
  • Bloor-Yonge Capacity
  • Scarborough Busway Project
  • New Buses for Conventional and Wheel-Trans Service
  • eBus Charging Systems
  • Facilities for the Expanded Streetcar Fleet
  • New TTC Operations Centre
  • VISION (Vehicle Tracking System) Implementation
  • SAP Enterprise IT System Implementation
  • PRESTO System Upgrade
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TTC Grounds Subway Work Car Fleet

On April 7 and 10 two major outages on Line 2 Bloor-Danforth were caused by hydraulic fluid spills from work cars. The TTC has sidelined its entire fleet of work cars pending inspection and repair. This has placed much subway infrastructure work on hold at a time when there is already a backlog.

A previous leak incident in 2024 led to TTC Board reports, and the findings were not impressive. Some work cars were beyond their useful lives, and there were ongoing issues with inspection and maintenance of equipment.

A common thread in these delays has been a car leaking fluid onto the rails over an extended distance before this problem is discovered. That leads to extensive, manual cleanup work to ensure that revenue service trains can accelerate and brake without slipping.

Problems with these cars are not the only source of major disruptions, and failing signal systems requiring service suspensions are common.

The TTC has not published a list of signal failure incidents to give a sense of their frequency and severity, let alone any plan to improve reliability over the decade before a new ATC system can take over.

It is rather comical that TTC Board meetings can include extensive discussion of a new enterprise asset management system, but little info on actual condition, maintenance and plans for what we have. We should not have to wait for a large IT project to know what the issues are today.

Behind both the fleet and signals problems lie bad capital budget planning by TTC management in response to political pressure to trim spending. In past years, key interrelated projects were downplayed or sidelined including:

  • The need to refresh and expand the subway work car fleet
  • The need to convert Line 2 to Automatic Train Control
  • The need for a new Line 2 fleet

Under former CEO Rick Leary, in his early days, there was a sense that existing infrastructure and fleet could be stretched out to about 2040, fully ten years longer than the then-current target of 2030. In time, the ATC and new trains projects were restarted, but with much later delivery dates. According to the December 31, 2025 Major Projects Update Report, the delivery of 55 new trains will not complete until 2035, and the final cutover of ATC will not occur until 2037. Existing systems will have to last another decade.

Another factor is the timing of the Scarborough and North Yonge subway extensions which are planned to open in the early 2030s and will need new trains before the existing Line 2 fleet is retired. This is further complicated by demand projections showing the need for growth trains in the mid 2030s. Trains for new lines and extra service require production capacity that would otherwise go to a replacement fleet.

With ATC for Line 2 a decade away, the Scarborough extension will have to be built with conventional signals to tide it over until an ATC-capable fleet is running.

The TTC has not published a fleet plan showing how the various proposed deliveries of new trains will be staged. There is also the small matter of storage and maintenance space for the expanded fleets, and projects for new yards are not yet funded. The Province is happy to announce new subway lines, but conveniently omits the very large cost of the maintenance facilities.

This ties back to the work car reliability and fleet size issues because the volume of subway work will not decline, but will actually increase both thanks to aging infrastructure and system expansion. There are already severe scheduling problems for the work plans due to conflicting requirements for this fleet.

The focus at an upcoming TTC Board meeting will no doubt be on recent failures, but there are much larger issues affecting subway reliability for the coming decade and more. 2027 might seem a long time (and an election) away, but planning for that budget is already underway. The Board should demand a detailed review and plan to address the situation, and this should not be another “we’ll get back to you next year” report.

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Ridership or Budget: What Should Drive TTC Strategy?

Long range strategic planning is not a common sight at the TTC. Yes, we see maps, we see service plans, we even have some nominally “bold” projects like RapidTO’s red lanes. But what we do not see is a focused debate about where Toronto and its transit system should be going, and how we will get there.

Pre-pandemic, the system was bulging with riders. Among other things, this launched the Bloor-Yonge station expansion project and deferred the Richmond Hill subway extension until we could be sure of having capacity to handle new riders from York Region.

Things changed in the early 20s with widespread ridership loss, especially downtown commuters. GO Transit was hit hard by this thanks to their long-standing commuter driven business model. On the TTC, although commuter traffic remains below 2019 levels, weekend demand has built higher. Demand does exist, although not always on the old model, but provided that there is service to handle the rides.

Since 2020, the overwhelming question has been where the money will come from to keep service running. A mixture of provincial and federal contributions got us through the worst of those years, and some special provincial subsidies still flow. The dollar value of the City’s share roughly doubled from 2019 (actual) to 2026 (budget) with the City now paying 49% of total operating costs (including WheelTrans). The Provincial share in 2026 is about 9% of the total of which about 3% is from gas tax and the rest from special subsidies which will soon end unless they are renegotiated.

Fare freezes under both the Tory and Chow administrations coupled with lost ridership limited revenue growth. Because fares now make up a much lower proportion of total revenue, a large fare increase would be required to restore the historic fares:subsidy ratio if that were the target.

The Capital Budget has an even worse situation with a long list of unfunded projects and no clear indication how much the Provincial or Federal governments have any appetite to fund them. In the short to medium term, the substantial Provincial spending will go to works in progress including Toronto subways and GO expansion.

With all of the focus on just finding money to keep the lights on, there has been little attention to service beyond preserving as much as can be afforded. TTC claims of service recovery use a metric, service hours, that appears to show recovery to 2019 levels, but does not allow for the effects of congestion. Actual service frequencies are down on many lines.

Back in 2018, the Ridership Growth Strategy proposed a tiered set of changes to drive growth at 1%, 2% or 5% annually. This was not pursued in any detail, and the pandemic overtook any thoughts of aggressive growth. The RGS was replaced by the Five Year Service Plan which, in its current version, covers years 2024-2028. It aims at modest growth, and yet even those goals are not fully funded.

What is needed to drive growth beyond business as usual levels? Is there a latent, unserved market for travel because transit is too inconvenient or simply not serving trips people need to make? Where is this market? Does the current network serve it well? Some growth can be achieved by making transit easier to use by existing riders, but what is needed for net new travel made by choice, not necessity?

Within this gloomy setting, the question of “where are we going” can turn into debates about funding without much thought to what might be possible, or what will be needed to encourage annual growth well above a few percent.

TTC’s Strategic Planning Committee meets on March 31. This will be their last chance to launch any discussion and study that can affect the 2027 budget cycle, and provide the basis for any post-election discussion of transit policy for 2028 and beyond.

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TTC Subway Reduced Speed Zone Update March 2026

This post continues previous reviews of the map and lists of reduced speed zones (RSZ) on the TTC subway with snapshots of the status of Lines 1 and 2 from mid-October 2025 to mid-March 2026.

The charts below are adapted from maps that are updated regularly on the TTC’s Reduced Speed Zone page.

The total number of zones sits persistently at about a dozen. Although some disappear fairly quickly, others replace them. Some are long-standing zones that are more challenging to repair in winter weather.

In the coloured boxes, the arrows indicate the affected direction of travel with “<>” meaning both ways.

The TTC is working hard, I understand, to get the system in the best shape possible for the World Cup events from mid June to early July. Whether they will achieve this remains to be seen.

One issue is the timing of the usual Spring system inspection of rail condition and track geometry. Will the results of this inform current slow orders, or will this be carefully “parked” so that new slow orders do not appear until after the big event?

The current orders have target repair dates in March and April, with 4 of 14 showing “TBA” I will return to this topic in early June.

Updated March 20, 2026: Following the “more” break are comparisons of the detailed explanation of RSZs in effect at the start of this period (Oct 17) and end (Mar 18).

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Tracking Metrolinx Project Costs

Tracking the costs of Metrolinx projects with publicly available data is not an easy task. They are a secretive organization, and present ongoing costs in a way that hides the eventual total cost of construction and operations. When anyone talks about “on budget”, there is no way to verify the claim because no overall budget figure is given for any project.

Instead, what we see are the cumulative value of contracts that have been awarded as well as spending to date. The rest, assuming that there even is a “budget”, is hidden on the grounds that telling would-be bidders how much money might be on the table will only encourage them to bid to that level. This is nonsense because, except for a few huge P3s, most projects are broken into many smaller contracts and knowing that there are billions available across a project’s allocation gives no hint of how much is earmarked for each component.

The situation is even more opaque in the case of contracts that mix design and construction (a finite capital cost) with operations and maintenance (an ongoing operating cost) over an extended period. Comparison with projects elsewhere is difficult because the components are not segregated.

With the Eglinton and Finch projects now shifting from construction to operation, there is a chance to see what the split would be with the building largely complete. There will be some ongoing capital costs for project cleanup, but costs to date should largely represent the amount spent on the construction phase.

Many other projects are also in flight and there is no way to know if all of their components have been awarded and the values included in the “baseline” cost shown in financial reports.

This article consolidates the reported budgets, later renamed as “baselines”, as well as actual spending in the quarterly Metrolinx Capital Projects reports.

Some projects actually had projected in-service dates, at least in the early years, but these vanished long ago. Metrolinx promised big things once upon a time, but has been much slower to deliver, and at much greater cost than anticipated.

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Metrolinx Board Meeting: February 12, 2026

The Metrolinx Board met on February 12 with an extensive agenda, but as usual almost none of it was discussed in public. Of particular interest was an explanation of the derailment at Union Station that snarled GO Transit operations for much of the past week. Although a detailed review continues and a full report is promised, Metrolinx was unusually forthcoming with a description of the event.

The public portion of the meeting began with a “safety moment” that focused on problems with pedestrian, cyclist and auto intrusions into the Eglinton and Finch rights-of-way. This was discussed in a tone reminiscent of GO mainline rail corridors which the new LRT lines definitely are not. In the case of Finch, the right-of-way has less physical protection than on Eglinton, and no areas of open track or grass to signal that this is not part of the overall roadway.

The very nature of a surface route, regardless of technology, is that people and vehicles will cross the tracks. They have been doing it for over a century on the streetcar system, and it is odd that Metrolinx finds this an unusual behaviour. It is not clear, other than the presence of two separate P3s on these projects, why the Eglinton and Finch designs are so different. This also contributed to the switching problems on Finch because of inadequate heaters and drainage.

Reviewing the operation of Finch, Metrolinx CEO Michael Lindsay made no mention of equipment reliability, a major problem on that line compared to Eglinton. As revealed in TTC delay logs, at times there were not enough working cars to operate the scheduled service. Delays due to “mechanical problems” continue to appear in Line 6 service alerts. The logs in the City’s Open Data website do not yet include January 2026, but when they do, I will publish a review.

Speaking of Finch, Lindsay spoke of recent improvements. At Metrolinx’ urging, the P3 partner, Mosaic, took steps to improve infrastructure maintenance. The line is now into a stage of “perfection” of operations and maintenance protocols as opposed to building issues. The issue is the readiness of private sector partners to deal with climate effects, and more generally to bring their supposed expertise from other systems to Toronto. Only recently has Mosaic hired someone with expertise in cold weather operations.

Lindsay reported that all 55 switch heaters on Finch have been checked, and drainage at 40 sites is improving. Performance stats are better since the record snowstorm of January 25 with 95% availability, and TTC on time performance is 70-80% over past couple of weeks. This may sound impressive, but any stats are bound to look better as weather improved. As for OTP, TTC standards allow for erratic service as discussed here many times.

In all the celebration of Eglinton’s recent opening, Lindsay made no mention of accessibility issues with several elevators out of service including at key interchanges like Don Valley, Eglinton and Mount Dennis. Further problems include long walks to transfer between routes and less than adequate signage. Metrolinx is supposed to have design standards, but if these lines are any indication, they desperately need review. In many ways, this was the usual Metrolinx “good news” presentation which skated around problems, or presented them as past events no longer of concern.

On the subject of “lessons learned”, Lindsay claimed that private sector partners underestimated complexity, risk, and challenge of the projects, but gave no indication that Metrolinx or Infrastructure Ontario bore responsibility for assuming more expertise within the P3s than might actually have existed. There was a hint that things might have gone better. Lindsay noted that Metrolinx has changed processes, a reference to the shift to an “alliance” model where the P3 are treated as collaborators.

Lindsay hinted at problems with the Metrolinx regime and its confrontational nature saying that all parties need to remain focused on project completion, not commercial claims. They must do the right things for the good of a project even if this compromises legal or commercial strategies. Design review and acceptance must be much more efficient and less bureaucratic in all hands. When unexpected issues such as cavities in the original 1950s Eglinton Station box are encountered, a quick regulatory process to respond is needed.

Lindsay noted that there must be an early and insistent focus on systems integration — bricks and mortar are only one milestone. More important are testing, commissioning and interoperability. This should be no surprise to anyone with transit experience. Construction is a large and impressive part of a project, but without well integrated, reliable systems and vehicles, billions of dollars worth of tunnels are useless.

He remarked on another aspect of P3s that is rarely discussed: procurement must ensure that joint ventures have a collaborative relationship without their own contentious internal issues.

Better public communications on construction, cost estimates and timelines are needed.

These remarks, for those reading between the lines, are not a ringing endorsement of how Metrolinx operated on two major projects. They might have learned lessons from the experience, but the proof will show in how work now underway actually proceeds.

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Elevators at Museum and Greenwood Stations

In the Toronto Star of February 10, columnist Jack Lakey wrote about the long-delayed completion of renovations at Museum Station including the installation of an elevator. The original target date for this work was mid-2025, but this has been pushed to Q3 2026 which could be as late as September 30.

The problem as described by the TTC is quoted in Lakey’s piece:

“In addition to installing elevators at Museum Station, the project involves rebuilding and expanding the concourse level, as well as relocating existing stairs and escalators.

“Throughout this work, the TTC must maintain the structural integrity of the original subway building while completing full-depth excavation directly adjacent to it.

“Work is done in stages so that stations remain open to the public. TTC elevator installation is also typically bundled in with other necessary work, in this case, significant repairs and adding waterproofing to Museum Station’s roof.”

What the TTC neglects to mention is that the delay arose from two other factors:

  • Underestimation of the complexity of the project.
  • The need to replace the elevator subcontractor for non-performance.

The same subcontractor was responsible for the delayed completion of elevators at Greenwood Station, and had to be replaced. Moreover, their work damaged a nearby house. Greenwood Station has just resumed normal operation including its new elevators.

The evolving situation at Museum is described in various TTC reports. It is a shame that TTC spokespeople don’t appear to have read them.

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TTC Board Meeting: February 3, 2026

The TTC Board will meet on Tuesday, February 3, 2026 at 9:30am in North York Council Chamber. The agenda is rather thin, and there are several confidential issues that will trigger an in camera session. There is no formal item regarding Line 5 Eglinton, although one never knows what might come up in debate.

Of interest are the following items:

Updated February 2 at 10:10am: Slide decks for the invited presentations have been posted on the TTC site. Links to them are added below.

  • CEO’s Report
  • Invited presentations from:
    • Narayan Donaldson on “Opportunities to improve Transit Signal Priority in Toronto”. According to the covering report “This presentation will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Transit Signal Priority (TSP) system used on Toronto’s streetcar, bus and LRT systems, compare it to a TSP system commonly used in the Netherlands, and suggest areas of improvement.”
    • Jonathan English on “Developing a Surface Transit Revitalization Plan” According to the covering report “This presentation will discuss steps that can be taken to improve speed and reliability of the streetcar network, as well as new LRT lines.”

After the meeting, I will write up the presentations in an update to this article.

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