On the TTC Board agenda for April 11, 2024, a long report describes the TTC’s 2024 Asset Management Plan. This document has been in the works for some time. It arises from an Ontario Regulation in 2017 and a City Council Corporate Asset Management Policy adopted in 2019 whose intent is that there is long term sustainability and accountability for City assets. The TTC as a local Board of the City is subject to this policy.

This is a long article reviewing an even longer document. For a general overview, some readers may prefer to stop at the break just before the chart of “condition scores”. The remainder of the article reviews some of the detail in the Plan, its strengths and shortcomings.

General Observations

Although the document gives a unified impression in its design, it was produced with information from many sources in the TTC. Some of these, notably for the streetcar system, betray unfamiliarity with various assets, or a sloppiness in editing. Some information is dated and reflects conditions a year or more ago with little or no mention of works in progress and how they would affect the review. Any future budget planning must be based on current, accurate data.

As with so much information reported by the TTC, far too many data are reported as overall averages without the granularity needed to flag key problems. Some projects risks are described as if no work has been done when in fact they might be well on the way to completion. Was it just too much trouble to accurately portray the state of some assets? That is troubling in the context of other events throwing the TTC’s ongoing maintenance practices into question.

One section of the Plan deals with “systems” which, in many cases, are networks of devices. A failure within a system does not necessarily affect just one part, but can have a farther reach as seen in the recent fire near Islington Station. Moving up a level from that, the Plan is divided into major topic areas, and several of these are related although the plan treats them as separate entities. This subdivision is, in part, dictated by Provincial Regulation.

Trains need cars, but they also need track and power, not to mention stations. It is important to see the transit network both as a complex collection but also at the detailed level. One thing the Plan does is provide a tutorial for those who only know part of the system, notably the politicians responsible for funding transit and choosing its goals.

An important part of any asset plan is the recognition of alternate futures depending on what is done, or more critically not done, in the short-to-medium term. The cumulative effect of deferred work during economic downturns is not immediately apparent, but can create a backlog requiring significant effort and spending just to get back to “normal” conditions. If deferrals last long enough, they affect corporate culture and become the accepted way of doing business. An organization can forget what proper asset management and maintenance look like after years of aiming for a too-low target.

Funding partners grouse about above-inflation cost growth when their own penny-pinching, coupled with management making the best of a bad situation, created the situation in the first place. It is important to recognize the difference between higher costs through factors like materials and labour, and higher spending required to reverse a backlog of overdue work and restore the system to good, steady-state condition.

An issue that appears in several parts of the Plan is the effect of vehicle electrification. This touches the bus fleet and related maintenance and charging facilities, and the non-revenue fleet. The change in propulsion and control technology affects maintenance workers who must adapt and be trained, as well as the equipment needed to support an electric fleet. Electrification is not just a matter of buying a new style of bus, but a pervasive change in a large part of TTC operations that will extend over a decade.

We may reach a point where diesel-hybrids are regarded as a minor “legacy” fleet from days gone by, but that time is a long way off. Co-existence of two modes will continue for many years.

The City has contemplated but not yet adopted a long-range goal not just to fully electrify transit operations, but to very substantially increase service levels. This would have a pervasive effect on the entire asset base, staffing and future budgets. The Plan includes an overview of proposed rapid transit expansion, but there is no discussion of the service increase scheme.

Overview

The 2024 Plan sets out the TTC’s many classes of assets, their condition, ongoing maintenance and replacement cycle and some information on cost. This leans heavily to the Capital side of TTC budgeting and the large known shortfall in committed and likely funding over the next 15 years. Some information is incomplete because the TTC data collection is still underway.

While this Asset Management Plan meets the requirements of the Regulation for 2024, the next phase of compliance, due on July 1, 2025, requires the TTC to have a financial plan that identifies the funding needs to ensure all assets the funding to ensure all assets are maintained in a state of good repair to meet future levels of service. The 2025 Asset Management Plan will also further inform the preparation of the TTC’s Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The TTC’s 2024-2038 CIP has identified a total of $47.855 billion in base capital needs over a 15-year period, of which $12.398 billion is funded, leaving $35.457 billion in unfunded capital needs.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 7

That paragraph does not break out “State of Good Repair” (SOGR) items from the overall budget, and yet that will be essential in deciding where to allocate available money. Moreover, the focus here is on Capital with no mention of day-to-day maintenance funded from the Operating budget.

A sense of the TTC’s scale is given early in the Plan:

The scope of assets that the TTC owns and manages is large and varied, and comprises of the vehicles, infrastructure, facilities and support systems necessary to operate and maintain the TTC’s bus, subway and streetcar services. The asset inventory changes regularly as new assets are commissioned and older assets are decommissioned at the end of life.

The vehicle fleet consists of 2,572 accessible buses (including 250 paratransit Wheel-Trans buses), 204 streetcars and 143 subway trains, with the fleet and other asset classes supported by more than 900 non-revenue vehicles. There are a further 6,400 small and 1,900 large items of industrial equipment, which support the maintenance of TTC assets.

The TTC maintains more than 70 kilometres of mainline subway track across three active lines (following the decommissioning of Line 3 in 2023) and 388 kilometres of Streetcar Way. Streetcars are powered by 454 kilometres of overhead/traction power feeders and 368 kilometres of overhead contact system.

Across the subway and streetcar network, the TTC is responsible for the maintenance of 77 box structures, 43 bored tunnels, 75 bridges, four culverts, 170 retaining walls and 474 miscellaneous structures. In addition there are 38 overhead structures that are maintained by the City. The Prince Edward Viaduct is jointly maintained by the TTC and the City.

The vehicle fleet is stored, maintained and operated from 22 separate facilities located across the TTC network, which include garages, carhouses, yards, and shops. There are also 58 substations to support movement of fleet and provide power to the facilities. Across the subway network (including the now decommissioned Line 3), there are 75 subway stations with 164 elevators and 329 escalators moving both passengers and freight. The TTC also maintains more than 9,500 bus and streetcar stops/shelters, alongside two bus terminals and nine Wheel-Trans hubs.

Corporate and professional services also operate from five administrative buildings across the city, and the TTC maintains 29 other buildings, including emergency service buildings, operator convenience and waiting rooms, as well as a number of parking lots.

Operation of transit services across all three transportation modes is facilitated and supported by communication, signalling, electrical and mechanical systems. These systems are made up of many thousands of individual assets, with further details contained in the relevant sections of this Plan.

TTC Asset Management Plan 2024 at p. 7

Assets are divided into five classes as specified by the Regulation, and their total replacement cost is $25.1 billion. They vary quite substantially in age with some being over a century old (early streetcar facilities) to quite recent. The condition of each class also varies.

Considering the known cost of projects now planned and in progress, to the degree these are revealed, these numbers could well understate the true replacement costs. A related complication is the ownership of some assets by Metrolinx, but their operation as part of the TTC network.

Some assets are consolidated in this table in part because the source data are in insurance reports organized for that purpose. For example, IT Systems are included under the contents of Facilities, not under Systems. However, there is no detailed review in the Plan of IT systems, their age and technology, nor of their need for “state of good repair”.

Class		Replacement Cost ($ billion)	Condition
Fleet	Revenue vehicles (buses, streetcars, subway trains), non-revenue vehicles, and the industrial equipment used to service those vehicles.	$7.1	2.1 (Good) to 3.7 (Adequate)
Linear Infrastructure	Subway track, Streetcar track and overhead power.	$2.8	1.0 (Excellent) to 4.0 (Marginal)
Facilities	Storage and Maintenance facilities, subway stations, administrative buildings; bus and streetcar stops.	$5.0	Unknown – Not enough data exists to provide a rating.
Systems	Communications systems, signals, electrical systems, and mechanical systems.	$1.1	1.0 (Excellent) to 5.0 (Critical/Poor)
Structures	Box structures, bored tunnels, stations, bridges, Prince Edward Viaduct (track beams and sidewalks), culverts, retaining walls, and miscellaneous structures.	$9.1	Very Good to Very Poor
Total		$25.1

Of particular interest in this list is the group Structures which holds over one third of the replacement value for the system. This is rarely mentioned in funding and priority debates, in part because much in this category has a very long lifespan. However, as the subway ages, proportionately more structures enter a period where preventative maintenance is essential, and in some cases major reconstruction is needed. (This is a separate systemic issue from basic problems of new subways with water penetration and other faults from the day they open.)

A second group, Facilities, includes the above ground part of the system and, like Structures comprises many assets with long lifespans such as buildings. These too have ongoing preventative maintenance needs but with a lower profile than new trains or signals, let alone new lines, for funding.

Much recent discussion of State of Good Repair focused on the Capital Budget and shortfall, but substantial day-to-day work is required to keep various assets in good shape. A shortfall in the Plan is a sense of the cost, adequacy or funding of this work even though it is integral to preventing a decline in asset quality. This ties into recent discussions about system maintenance.

Life cycle activities and the point at which they occur vary between assets according to their inherent nature, the required level of service, their operating context, use and condition. As assets approach the end of their serviceable life, life extension programs may also be implemented to prolong service life ahead of replacement or renewal. However, it should be noted that as assets near the end of service life, the maintenance cost will increase significantly. Details of the life cycle activities applicable to each asset class and the sub-assets within each class are contained in the relevant sections of the attached plan.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 6

Under each subclass of assets, there is a discussion of related risks. These show how some aspects of any Plan and Budget are related, although generally at a time frame where effects are not immediately obvious. For example, if the average age of a fleet rises, then more running maintenance is needed plus a life extension program. This affects both the Capital and Operating Budgets.

Because subsidy arrangements for these budgets differ, avoidance of Capital spending might trigger a rise in Operating spending at a higher rate for the City (or higher fares) because a lower proportion of the Operating Budget comes from other governments. However, at the local level, the temptation to “make do” can lead to declining maintenance, reliability and service.

The 2024 AMP, prepared in accordance with the requirements of O. Reg. 588/17, affirms that an estimated 50% or $12.6 billion of TTC assets are entering, or in some cases, are well into their twilight years.

If half of the assets are “well into their twilight years”, this is not an overnight change, but rather the effect of many years of deferred maintenance and replacement. This is particularly true of the subway network which was once brand new and required less maintenance, let alone replacement of major components. However, as infrastructure ages, it can move “into the twilight” with ongoing plans and budgets based on earlier years.

Proper funding should not just maintain the existing rate but grow to reduce and keep overall asset ages within a range of reliable service.

Particular concern over the lack of funding for state of good repair applies currently to:

1. Line 2 Bloor-Danforth subway elements (power, signals, communications systems, and vehicles) that are at/or approaching end of life.
2. Facilities maintenance of garages, yards, carhouses and various other buildings (HVAC, roofs, structures, elevators, escalators, and plumbing).
3. Bus fleet with the majority now over halfway through its lifecycle.

The streetcar network will predictably be at risk within five to 10 years without capital funding commitments for rehabilitation.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 7

Overall funding, of course, must respond to both the existing system and service as well as growth. Discussions of “growth” focus politically on major new rapid transit lines, but this can sideline plans and funding for general increase in service quantity and quality across the network.

An important part of any Asset Management Plan will be recognition of future costs that will be triggered by system expansion of both rapid transit and surface networks. Only two years ago, Toronto agreed to take on the operating and non-lifecycle costs of the Eglinton line, but that did not last. In the short term, the Toronto-Ontario “new deal” includes funding for operation and maintenance of Lines 5 and 6, but not for expansion of the existing service.

The TTC has many plans, but several of these tie back to the Annual and 5-Year Service Plans. After all, it is mobility and hence service that the TTC provides, and medium to long range aspirations for service affect the entire organization. Service might sit an the heart of the chart below, but one would be hard-pressed to see this in a typical debate at the TTC Board or Council.

Over the years, a troubling aspect of TTC debates is that “service” comes last in the discussions and is always “subject to budget availability”. Rarely is there an aspirational view of the transit network and its future. A desire for more service can run headlong into the currently planned level of fleet and facilities growth.

Attempts to engage in such discussions trigger rounds of “we can’t afford it” or “not now, maybe later” that hamper a strategic approach to all TTC planning. The lead times to scale up parts of the system require sustained commitment. It is ironic that we are willing to wait a decade and more to get a new rapid transit line, but will not invest in the short term to enhance and expand the existing system.

The Plan’s primary function is asset management. It is not a forward planning document to pursue “what if” questions about possible transit futures, although it does acknowledge that current plans have implications. Only recently did Council grasp the effect of getting many new rapid transit lines built by Ontario, but with the expectation of local funding for operations. The Ontario-Toronto “new deal” delayed, but did not eliminate this problem. Running more service and maintaining more infrastructure costs money that fares will not cover.

Level of Service

In 2013, the TTC introduced its first 5-Year Corporate Plan with the vision: To be a transit system that makes Toronto proud. The next 5-Year Corporate Plan is due to be published in 2024 and forms part of an integrated planning and performance framework the TTC utilizes. This framework demonstrates how the goals, objectives and intended outcomes of the TTC can be achieved through the alignment of key business planning activities. In addition, the 5-Year Service Plan & 10-Year Outlook (2020-2024) identifies service-related improvements to public transit service in the city of Toronto. An updated version (2024-2028) is expected to be published in 2024.

The Service Plan also identify [sic] how the TTC is responding to growth requirements, meeting the challenges of changing ridership demands and meeting the financial challenges of maintaining existing service levels and upholding the state of good repair. Given the significant pending growth in the size of the transit portfolio, it should be noted that there will be an increase in funding pressure to sustain the existing level of service for the asset portfolio.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 5

Condition Scores

Assets are ranked on a scale from 1 (excellent) to 5 (critical/poor).

Buildings are measured on a different scale, and condition estimates, even building ages, are not available in parts of the Plan. This suggests that the TTC has a lot of work to do collecting facility condition reports, and by implication does not fully know the state of a good deal of its infrastructure.

In the following sections, numbers on the headings correspond to sections in the Plan.

4. Fleet

4.1 Bus Fleet

According to the Plan, the TTC owns 2,322 buses of various types, not including WheelTrans. This is substantially more than the 2,174 claimed in the most recent CEO’s Report and the 2,066 buses shown in the February 2024 Scheduled Service Summary. (Note that the quantities shown below include only buses delivered as per the Summary, not the total order. Groups containing buses that are being retired include only buses considered active. These are TTC numbers with my only consolidation being by vehicle type.)

The hybrid/diesel split in the Plan is also off showing far more hybrids than actual. It is possible that the Plan is counting a large number of hybrids in current orders still in delivery. These will replace older buses still included in the total.

An obvious requirement of asset management is to be able to count, reliably.

The average of the hybrid fleet is shown as 13.5 years compared to 10.5 for diesels. This only makes sense when one considers that there are many elderly hybrids about to be replaced by new buses, but also a large batch of diesels acquired in 2015-18 because of bad experiences with the earlier hybrids.

The condition scores for various parts of the fleet are generally “2” or “good”, but the older Orion VII diesels and hybrids are “3” or “adequate”.

The life cycle description for buses includes major overhauls every 3 years including at the 12-year mark with disposal at 12-18 years. The TTC plans on a 12-year replacement cycle, but it is not clear whether there will be sufficient funding for this rate, let alone for the conversion to electric buses. Moreover, current plans make only minimal provision for fleet growth. Service growth in the short term will have to come from having a refreshed fleet of buses with fewer spares for maintenance or inactive pools, as well as from buses released by route conversion to rail modes.

Notable by its absence is any discussion of the spare ratio – the number of vehicles required as a spare pool for maintenance to support service on the road. A typical industry figure is 20%, in other words for every 100 scheduled buses, there are an additional 20 in the garage. The TTC’s spare ratio was higher than this before the pandemic, and has grown thanks to service cuts.

The Plan does not explore the question of how many buses sit idle rarely leaving the garage due to unreliability, or are underused because the spare pool is so large. This affects plans for future service growth and related operating expenses. With new vehicle deliveries over 2024-25, the oldest of the fleet should be retired, but where will all the new buses be used? Who will drive and maintain them?

Several risks are linked to the technology conversion that will eventually wind up with an all-electric fleet:

• Delayed funding for eBus procurement leading to life extension of older buses.
• Limited funding for overhauls.
• Organizational change with a shift to maintaining an electric fleet.
• Modernization of bus subsystems affecting skills needed to maintain buses.
• Supply chain delays both from covid and from the shift to eBus components.
• Fleet complexity from co-existence of several generations and technologies of buses.

This is not likely to settle down for the coming decade, and that assumes a stabilization of the eBus procurement and conversion plans.

4.2 Streetcars

Unlike the bus fleet, the streetcar fleet is uniform with only one vehicle type, although there is a supplementary order now being delivered. There are 204 cars in the initial order with a further 60 to come. As I write this on April 28, 13 of the new cars are reporting their location with tracking data.

The average condition of the fleet is given as 2.06 or “good”.

The “risks” section of the Plan includes text that would be more appropriate to the now-retired CLRV/ALRV fleet rather than to new vehicles, notably:

• Obsolete components. Some of the equipment on streetcars currently has components that are now obsolete. This results in equipment failure with no possibility of replacement of the appropriate component.
• Workforce availability. Due to increasing obsolescence and single-source suppliers there is a need to increase the technical workforce, but there is a risk that these technical resources will not be readily available.

If the TTC has, in fact, bought new streetcars with obsolete components, this would be a huge design blunder. More likely, these statements arise from old text that has been copied without review into the new document.

Like the bus fleet, the streetcar fleet has a high spare ratio, and this grows as new vehicles are delivered. There is no sign of any plan to improve service and fleet utilization. Conversely, with many spares, the pressure for good and prompt maintenance is lowered, and this leads to a laissez-faire attitude to keeping the entire fleet available for service.

4.3 Subway Cars

There are two fleets of subway cars. The T1 cars are about 25 years old, and they will be replaced whenever funding is in place. A life extension program was considered for this fleet, and will still be required to tide the older trains over until replacements arrive now planned to begin in 2029.

The TR cars are about 10 years old. Both fleets have a condition score of about 2 (good).

Risks related to the subway fleet include a lack of funding for both maintenance and replacement (T1s) which in turn would reduce reliability and drive up spare requirements. There are also issues with obsolete or hard-to-source replacement parts on the older trains, and recruiting issues for maintenance staff.

An important question not addressed here is the actual count of T1 trains that will be required for service on Line 2, the timing of new train deliveries, and the point when the Scarborough extension opens.

Delay in delivery of new trains has also pushed out the date when Line 2 can convert to Automatic Train Control to the mid 2030s (see Signals section).

(One can see that this document has been in preparation for some time as it refers to the Line 3 SRT fleet as being retired in the future, not as an event that occurred some months ago.)

4.4 Heritage Fleet

The TTC has a small heritage fleet mainly of streetcars. Text in the report speaks of vehicles being used for spare parts, although this does not make sense given that there are no longer any spare cars in the fleet. Although the “TTC is committed to preserving these non-service assets”, actual operation of the streetcars is constrained by the absence of pantographs compatible with the updated overhead contact wire system. There is no indication when or if such a retrofit would occur.

4.5 Surface Non-Revenue Vehicles and Equipment

The TTC has a fleet of over 900 non-revenue vehicles used for a variety of purposes notably infrastructure maintenance. Two risks are flagged for this fleet:

• The average age of vehicles is higher than “mid-life”, and funding does not keep up with replacement cycles. This drives up maintenance costs and affects reliability.
• As the TTC moves to an all-electric fleet, charging and maintenance facilities are needed to support the new technology.

4.6 Rail Non-Revenue Vehicles

The TTC owns a large fleet of work cars used to maintain the rapid transit network. I wrote about this recently in The State of Disrepair noting that a plan to refresh and expand this fleet first proposed under Andy Byford’s tenure as CEO has slipped year after year under Rick Leary to push capital costs into future year budgets. As the system grows, more crews are performing maintenance at the same time, and more work cars are required to support their efforts. There is never any provision for expanding the work fleet in the capital budget for new subways.

Some work cars are general purpose such as locomotives and flatcars, while others are built for special purposes such as tunnel cleaning, asbestos removal, and maintenance of the Prince Edward Viaduct.

Like the non-revenue automotive vehicles discussed above, the work fleet is aging and the condition score for parts of it is dropping below level 3 (“adequate”).

Model	Fleet	Average Age (yrs)	Condition Score
Locomotives	3	21	3.7
Trailers	16	23	3.2
Snow Clearing	6	25	3.0
Self-Propelled Electric	39	11	2.8
Self-Propelled Diesel/Hybrid	13	11	2.4

4.7 Industrial Equipment

“Industrial Equipment” covers a broad range of items in carhouses and shops from hand-held devices up to train washers and wheel lathes. Specialized equipment is not purchased “off the shelf”, and has its own design, procurement and maintenance requirements. This category includes items critical to service delivery and maintenance, and yet it is not well understood or funded.

5. Linear Infrastructure

5.1 Subway Track

As in some other sections, information for subway track betrays an unfamiliarity with the system by whoever compiled the data. Table 5-1 claims that the average age of mainline rail and switches is 31 years, and that on Line 1 it is 69 years. This is complete rubbish as the TTC replaces track throughout the system quite regularly to the dismay of riders who endure late evening and weekend shutdowns for the work.

The original part of Line 1 opened in 1954, and so it was 69 years old in 2023 when this report was compiled. Many parts of the line are much younger and it is numerically impossible for the track, even if it was from the original install, to have such a high average age. As a mechanism for “asset management” this information is completely useless.

A related issue is that “track” has many components with different lifespans all the way up from the foundation slab (if any), through ballast and ties (where used), mounting components, and the track itself. For switches, there are also the switch machines that operate them, although I suspect these are counted under “signals”. This is all explained in the Plan, but for asset management the treatment as a single item is meaningless.

Both Lines 1 and 2 include track built on ties and ballast, with or without a foundation slab, as well as track mounted directly to the tunnel floor, or to large “floating” ties sitting on rubber pads. Note that the condition scores below are based on rail wear, but there can be other problems with track alignment. Rail geometry testing has recently been upgraded from once to twice a year, and the recent spate of slow orders was a direct result of problems found late in 2023.

This information would be much more meaningful if presented as a map showing areas of incipient concern, and with the actual age of the infrastructure.

Some of the items listed under “Risks” do not make sense:

• New subway trains: The text here talks about the need for new Line 2 trains. This has nothing to do with track.
• Aging infrastructure: The Plan claims that the rate of wear has gone up thanks to the Automatic Train Control system and more frequent service. However, the TTC has never operated service more frequently than in pre-ATC days, and since the pandemic, service is well below former levels. This will be an issue in the future, but only when the TTC has enough trains and budget headroom to operate more service. Otherwise this claim is completely bogus. Moreover, it only applies to Line 1 where ATC is installed.
• Decommissioning of Line 3: What this has to do with ongoing track maintenance and risk is a mystery. The outstanding question is the quality of pre-shutdown preventative maintenance which the TTC has recently acknowledged was not sufficient. This has no bearing on future risks, although it certainly was a wake-up call for the frequency and quality of work on the rail network generally.

Another flagged risk is the short time window for maintenance. This is an ongoing problem, and is the reason that the TTC more often takes early and weekend closings of parts of the network. A related problem, however, is the amount of work to be done if infrastructure maintenance declines, combined with the growing extent of the rapid transit network. This affects the need for crews and for the specialized trains integral to their work.

5.2 Streetcar Way

The Plan shows the average age for all streetcar track components as 15 years. This information gives no indication of the range of ages, nor of the location of key sections requiring imminent attention. It is almost certainly based on an assumed replacement cycle of 30 years even though the TTC itself notes that the cycle is actually shorter.

There was a period after the decision in 1972 to retain streetcars where track construction methods did not change to reflect a lengthy future life (welded track, treated wood or steel ties, vibration isolation of track from concrete). This resulted in premature failure of much track and a burst of reconstruction in the late 1980s and 1990s. Intersections fared even worse, and the modern method of using pre-welded “panels” of track is recent enough that some intersections still contain “old style” track, some of which is in very poor condition. The absence of a detailed inventory in the Plan gives no indication of the varying conditions.

A related problem is with the electric track switch systems. The Plan includes an illustration showing, roughly, how they work, but does not discuss the ongoing program to replace the electronics which have been unreliable for decades. (These units are actually discussed elsewhere under “Overhead Power”.)

This situation, coupled with poor track at some intersections, led to the standing slow orders for all junctions regardless of their condition.

The condition scores for track do not reflect a system with maintenance problems that should limit operating speeds. Again the issue lies in use of overall averages rather than site-by-site reports.

The Plan speaks of improved rail condition monitoring. This is nice to know, but begs the question of the adequacy of past practices and problems that might have been missed.

“Real-time condition assessments: Since 2022, the TTC has been making investments and collaborating with industry partners in the field of railway inspection technology and condition monitoring to develop the TTC’s ability to monitor asset condition and better forecast replacement needs for Streetcar Way. Real-time monitoring exercises (i.e. track vibration monitoring) and automated geometry line scans (by a third-party service provider) will be a greater part of the quantitative data that the TTC will take advantage of when evaluating renewal priority.” [p. 49]

The list of risks for streetcar track suggests that the TTC might be looking toward an era of reduced streetcar operation even while taking delivery of more cars and contemplating network expansion in the eastern waterfront.

• Aging infrastructure poses risks: The TTC claims that the infrastructure is only 15 years old on average and in at least “good” condition over most of the network. The issue is to preserve maintenance quality.
• Reduced asset life: The claim is that track is not lasting as long as expected due in part to loads from other road traffic, 7×24 service (which has existed on the streetcar system for over a century), and increased passenger loads. There is no mention of a backlog of track dating from a period when it was not built for long life, nor of the benefits of construction techniques now used.
• Lack of funding: If track maintenance is not funded, the TTC might have to prioritize which parts of the network to keep in operation.
• Lack of manufacturers for special track castings: The TTC has a single supplier of castings, although it is impossible to believe that there are not others who could do the work. This is not the only street railway in North America or the world.
• Right-of-way access: Coordination with other agencies and utilities can restrict TTC access to perform major repairs. One might well turn this around to say that these agencies, not to mention contractors hired for the job, have contributed many delays to projects that used to proceed fairly quickly.

5.3 Overhead Power

The description of the power system that feeds streetcars has a fundamental error claiming that the negative power feed is through the overhead wire. The text has been copied from the preceding paragraph talking about the positive feed which does come through the wire. This shows sloppy editing, and is the sort of error that undermines the credibility of the whole.

The negative return is via the rails and an associated set of cables buried in the pavement to provide a return circuit. An important aspect of track construction, electrically, is the prevention of stray ground currents and electrolysis of underground utilities.

Oddly enough, the “Risks” section for Overhead correctly describes the function of the negative return.

Enhancing and isolating the negative return systems of streetcar traction power

Without additional funding for effective control measures, underground metallic infrastructure will deteriorate, leading to shorter service life and potential damage to neighbouring facilities. Public and worker safety is also at risk. [pp. 59-60]

The average age cited for the overhead feeder system is 55 years. This is not credible as the TTC has an ongoing program to replace feeders as part of the support for the new streetcars. The 55 year figure is much higher than the replacement cycle cited later in the report.

With respect to overhead maintenance and conversion for pantograph operation, the plan is out of date and reads as if there is still a mix of trolley pole and pan-equipped cars on the system. In fact all cars now run with pans, and substantial portions of the network cannot be operated by trolley-pole cars such as the legacy fleet. The map showing conversion progress is out of date.

Under “Risks”, there is a claim of

“Difficulty in procuring legacy parts for pole operation. This may result in longer and costlier intersection downtime and higher materials costs.” [p. 60]

Also:

“Changing nature of the asset: Various asset types, such as pantographs and trolley poles, consist of numerous complex and inter-related components. While transitioning from trolley and pole to pantograph, the overhead asset shifts to a hybrid model, the condition profile of which is not as well-understood. This makes interventions to maintain condition and service harder to plan. This hybrid scenario also impacts both personnel and parts. The longer the hybrid mode is retained, the harder it is to obtain the parts for the older assets. This can also lead to supply chain issues driving up costs as suppliers raise prices due to scarcity.” [p. 61]

These excerpts refer to an outdated view of the streetcar overhead system as pole operation is no longer supported. In a worst case situation where an existing “hybrid” section fails and no parts are available, it could be converted to pan-only operation.

Other parts of the “Risks” section describe projects such as traction pole replacement as if they have not started. This text was probably copied from the original project description when the work was launched some years ago. Proper asset management should show and track the progress to completion.

Switch controllers, although they are technically part of the track infrastructure, are listed under “overhead” because historically they involved contactors on the overhead wires, and the switching infrastructure is maintained by the overhead section.

Failing track switch controllers: Although rare, issues with the switches could lead to streetcar derailment or collisions. Without funding beyond 2032, route closures or diversions may be necessary. These interventions would result in revenue loss and customer inconvenience. Neglecting the replacement of Streetcar Track Switches and Controllers compromises worker safety, and the risk of accidents for the public also increases. [p. 61]

This replacement is well underway, although not as fast as one might hope for a safety-critical part of the system. The Plan gives no indication of progress or of the remaining work to be done. Unreliable track switches led to the imposition of slow orders which hobble streetcar operation at all intersections.

Staffing shortage in the overhead department is a key issue, and there is competition for skilled workers in this field. However, we also know from the City Auditor General’s review of record keeping by this section that it has been poor and paper-based. This begs the question of overall management as an aspect of staffing, although that topic is beyond the scope of an asset management plan.

Employee turnover and retaining experienced staff can significantly impact an organization’s performance. There is a risk of shortage of workers, affecting critical roles and organization. Given the highly competitive job market, the inability to attract and retain skilled talent poses a significant risk. This also affects our ability to maintain sufficient training for staff and monitoring activities for assurance. The AG recently reported that a lack of formalized processes and procedures in the department results in variability in the performance and documentation of preventative inspections. An adequate workforce allows time to be spent on improving asset management maturity in this area. [p. 61]

Not included in the discussion of overhead is a major part of the power distribution system: substations. This is discussed under the topics of Buildings and of Systems. The Plan does not include a unified view of power distribution as an entity, but rather subdivides it and possibly misses relationships between the parts.

6. Facilities

6.1 Maintenance and Administrative Buildings

This section gives an overview of major buildings housing bus, streetcar, subway and rail maintenance. An important distinction is between a physical building which in most cases is decades old and the facilities within the building which are generally younger. For example, a bus garage might date to the 1950s, but equipment such as bus hoists has been replaced one or more times since the original construction.

It is not clear how the Plan will subdivide these components.

6.2 Passenger Facilities

As with maintenance depots, rapid transit station structures are much older in most cases than key components within them such as escalators, lighting, ventillation and fare equipment.

The Plan gives average ages for various types of elevators and escalators, but there is no indication of whether these are collectively aging into a period where replacement rates must increase. For example, the average age of escalators is 21 years, and this is only 4 years less than the point where major overhaul of replacement is required.

Ongoing significant capital investment is required to address the current SOGR for elevators and escalators that are past their designed life expectancy. Current levels of funding fall well short of the steady state SOGR requirements, which has increased the SOGR backlog. Across the 15-Year CIP, $348 million is required to ensure these assets are renewed on a consistent basis and the SOGR backlog is addressed. Failure to address the funding requirements could have the following consequences:

• Aging components requiring additional maintenance, adding pressure to the operating budget.
• Parts will become obsolete, which may lead to decreased reliability and increased asset downtime.
• Potential non-compliance with the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act.
• Crowding in stations and platforms causing a safety concerns and negatively impacting service delivery and customer experience. [p. 72]

Other passenger facilities include loops, shelters and terminals, although some of these are included under “other facilities” below.

6.3 Other Facilities

This section includes primarily office space which is scattered around the city although there are a few key locations. The City has an office consolidation plan in progress that will in time consolidate TTC offices, but this is not mentioned in the Plan.

Other space includes industrial space related to maintenance work, subway emergency exist buildings and parking lots.

6.4 Facilities Data

As mentioned above, a “facility” has many components and an overall condition score would be meaningless. The information is subdivided into major systems, and the Plan shows some examples of these, but does not include any condition scores.

Considering the scope of risks identified for this group of assets, one would hope for more specific details.

6.4.4 Risks

The list of risks for TTC facilities is considerable, and includes many items that do not get much attention in discussions of funding and state of good repair.

• The need to adapt garages for electric bus operation is an essential part of the fleet conversion. It is not enough to simply buy the buses.
• Physical condition of buildings poses issues of building integrity and in turn for health and safety.
• Elevator and escalator conditions will require increased maintenance causing reduction of station capacity and accessibility.
• Plumbing layouts in stations should be revised to avoid the possibility of elevator flooding and extended outages.
• Building retrofits can improve their efficiency (e.g. heat loss) and reduce unwanted emissions.
• There is a serious backlog in roof maintenance. This is essential to preserving both the structures and any equipment contained within them.

7. Systems

A fundamental difference between many items under this grouping is that they are distributed widely across the system, and are interdependent in the sense that a failure can have effects well beyond its location. A broken escalator affects only the station it is in, but failure in a networked system can be far reaching. Operation of whole systems is essential, not just individual parts.

7.1 Communications Systems

There are many communication systems within the TTC including various internets, radio systems, the emergency trip system for power cuts, supervisory control systems to monitor station and tunnel equipment, CCTV and train door monitoring, public address and passenger intercoms, remote escalator and elevator monitoring, and fire signal systems. All of these are tied together with miles of cable, and the nature of cable installations is such that an event damaging one will probably affect others at the same time because they share paths through the system. (Such an incident occurred recently near Islington Station.)

Asset ages vary on average up to 20 years and the condition scores are mostly “2” (good) although there are some over “3” (adequate) and a few “5”s (critical/poor) which indicate they require immediate attention. (See the Plan at pp 74-75 for details.)

Significant risks include the age and condition of fire alarm and supervisory control (SCADA) system, and parts of the internal internet.

7.2 Signal Systems

There are broadly two classes of assets in this group due to the relatively recent installation of automatic train control (ATC) on Line 1 and the continued use of the elderly fixed block, relay-based system on Line 2. (Line 4 also uses block signals, but is considerably younger.) To no surprise, the condition index for the newer infrastructure is slightly better than the old, but nothing rates a score worse than 3 (“adequate”).

The primary signal system risk lies on Line 2 whose infrastructure dates to the original mid-60s construction for most of the line. Even the Kipling and Kennedy extensions are over 40 years old. Depending on the timing of an ATC project, this infrastructure might be stretched to 2035 or even 2040, and there is no guarantee that it will reliably last that long. Replacement of existing signals is, together with the need for a new Line 2 ATC-capable fleet, essential and this should drive spending priorities in the near-to-medium term.

It is far from clear that politicians at many levels understand how critical this issue can become, and delays today will have far-reaching effects that cannot be quickly corrected. Other politically attractive plans will have to take a back seat for funding even though years of behind-the-scenes installation and testing, together with inevitable line closures, are not the sexiest, photo-op-ready prospect.

1. Monitoring Performance and Allocating Funds: Keeping signal assets and systems in a fail-safe operating condition and in a state of good repair is critical to reducing duration and frequency of occasional impacts on overall subway corridor availability. Crucial data regarding the performance of the signalling system and status changes will be unavailable or limited due to the absence of adequate recording of essential events, performance monitoring, and preventative diagnostic of signal assets failures – this results in increased troubleshooting time due to the lack of data to pinpoint the root cause of malfunctioning system as well as the lack of data available for analysis at a remote location prior to intervention crews being dispatched to the field. This information is a critical need to maintain adequate capital reserves to fund the Signals State of Good Repair Program. Failing to secure required funding will result in further assets deterioration and unmanageable backlog of Capital work.

2. Modernization and Obsolescence: Legacy and CBI signalling equipment has been discontinued by their original manufacturer – their replacement requires engineering and manufacturing efforts to design, test and certify they are safe to use for their application and to secure an adequate quantity of spares until the signalling system gets decommissioned. This will result in higher operating and maintenance costs, and could result in a drop off in performance of the subway line through delays and line closures. [p. 81]

7.3 Electrical Systems

The TTC operates a large electrical distribution system with two major components: AC power for its many facilities and DC traction power for its subway and streetcar networks. They are Toronto Hydro’s largest customer, and TTC demand will grow with electrification of the bus fleet.

Many subsystems range in average age from 20-40 years, although their condition scores are between “2” and “3”. The life cycle for these assets can range up to 50 years, although some components may be older. Collectively, this is an example of a group of assets that were acquired in a large block for the initial subway lines and which are now aging into a period requiring replacement. Provision of electrical power is essential to the system’s operation.

While these assets have ongoing funding in the Capital Plan, the present levels are insufficient given the rate at which the assets require replacement. Critical SOGR projects with funding shortfalls of $319 million in the CIP include, but are not limited to, Substation Electrical Rebuild, Cable Replacement, Subway Station Breaker Replacement, and Uninterruptible Power Supply Replacement.

The TTC operates multiple substations that have outdoor electrical switchgear enclosures. The reliability of the substation equipment is critical for daily operations and revenue service. Some of this equipment was originally installed in the 1950s and 1960s. The Cable Replacement program is designed to replace deteriorated or damaged cabling throughout the tunnels to ensure safe and continuous delivery of power to the network. Subway station breakers control various station equipment, such as communication systems, escalators, elevators, fans, lighting, and critical emergency lighting. These breakers are becoming unreliable due to age, wear and tear. Backup power systems (UPS, Inverters, Motor Alternator/DC) that provide emergency power to stations, shops, carhouses, and buildings during power outages typically have a lifecycle of 10-to-15 years. However, many of the existing units are 20-plus years old and are becoming unreliable.

The maintenance and repair of this equipment is difficult as the necessary spare parts are often not available. In addition, due to recent inflation in pricing of parts, equipment is not being replaced at the appropriate pace in relation to its age and condition. As the assets deteriorate, so too does the reliability of the network. The pressure on the operating budget also rises as maintenance activities increase in the absence of a fully funded capital replacement program. [p. 85]

7.4 Mechanical Systems

This class includes HVAC (heating, ventillation and air conditioning) systems, building automation controls, boilers, and various fire prevention systems. The average age of many of these is over 25 years with some approaching 40, and their condition scores are poor ranging as high as 4.5 for boilers. Failure of these systems can render a building unusable, and could present safety concerns for employees and riders. Loss of use of a building would affect the TTC’s ability to deliver full service.

7.5 Other Systems

“Other systems” include groups of assets to be incorporated into future versions of the Plan for which “insufficient information” is currently available. Notably these include IT and Financial systems.

8. Structures

By comparison with other parts of the Plan, the Structures section is quite detailed.

One peculiarity of the plan is that “structures” refers mainly to things that are underground while “facilities” deals with the surface. This is part of the arbitrary structure of the Provincial Regulation as well as the TTC’s own internal organization splitting major aspects of subway infrastructure across two separate sections.

The categorization of miscellaneous structures may evolve over time as the TTC conducts thorough inspections and integrates them into station facilities, necessitating periodic updates to asset records and management strategies.

Table 8-1 provides a summary of the structures maintained by TTC Structure Maintenance teams.

Other structures (i.e. the above grade portions of subway stations, all structures inside yards as well other complexes) are included within the Facilities section of this Plan.

In Table 8-2 below, the non-subway structures are all the same age. This is not due to averaging, but because this asset group is actually the Harbourfront line’s tunnel and stations.

In an otherwise detailed section, there is an odd omission.

Five TTC stations are classified as exchange stations where the public can transfer from one subway line to another. These are Sheppard-Yonge, Bloor-Yonge, St George, Spadina, and until recently, Kennedy. A further three stations enable transfers directly from a subway line to a streetcar line; Broadview, St Clair and St Clair West. Union Station enables transfers to a variety of other transportation providers as well as the TTC streetcar network via Queens Quay station. As new subway lines are constructed, more stations are planned to be modified to become exchange stations (i.e. Eglinton West and Eglinton). [p. 92]

The list of streetcar interchanges oddly omits Bathurst, Spadina, Dundas West and Main Street stations, and there is no mention of the many interchanges with the bus network that are key parts of the system’s design.

Overall, this section contains much information about TTC structures, their extent and variation, and the potential implications of poor maintenance. I will not repeat all of the detail here.

Expansion Plans and Background Information

The remainder of the document contains much information recycled from other reports including various plans, budgets and the CEO’s Report. I will not comment on them here both because the article is very long already, but also because the topics are reviewed elsewhere.

Postscript

If you have read this far, my congratulations. I certainly did not write the entire article in one sitting.

There is far more information in the Plan than I have included here, and I hope that future editions will iron out problems with obsolete or confusing references. It is useful to have a consolidated view of the transit system as background to funding debates, although I suspect some subway advocates will be unhappy that there is so much competition for funding they desire for their own “deserving” wards.