Recently, Metrolinx released a “Deep Dive” report into a derailment at Union Station that severely disrupted GO Transit operations.

As public Metrolinx documents go, this one is refreshingly candid about the events of February 2, 2026, although there are issues not mentioned that deserve both further study and public review.

In brief, a GO train was leaving Union Station westbound when a wheel on the last coach of the train derailed on out-of-gauge track. This affected both the coach and the locomotive which was at the rear (east end) of the train with the engineer in a cab car at the front (west end). The derailment was noticed by a passing UPX train whose crew sounded an emergency alarm, and the GO train stopped shortly thereafter.

Many issues were revealed by the subsequent investigation, and some bear an uncanny resemblance to the TTC’s investigation of its own SRT derailment in July 2023.

The severity of underlying problems with inspection and maintenance on GO’s Union Station Corridor were downplayed at a recent Board meeting by CEO Michael Lindsay who, in best Metrolinx tradition, put as positive a spin on the incident as possible. Only those who read the full report or the detailed media coverage based on it would know the full story. None of the Metrolinx Board members, a group who can be counted on for silence or only the softest of softball question, raised any issues in the public meeting.

An important finding in the report was that although Metrolinx had updated and tightened its standards for track fastening, there was no program to review existing infrastructure nor to bring it up to the new standard. Only if track were undergoing significant maintenance or renewal would the new standards kick in.

A further problem lies with inspection protocols that could detect the type of failure that led to the derailment. Most of this work is done by manual inspection, is repetitive, and problems with track fastenings might not be immediately obvious especially under the snowy conditions in early February. A post-incident review of the USRC (Union Station Rail Corridor) found a large number of similar failures in track fastening, almost one quarter of the areas checked. This is obviously not a problem that developed overnight or after one snow storm. Moreover, the report is silent on a review of the full GO network for compliance with current track standards.

The TTC parallel shows up first in their review of the SRT which revealed previously undetected failures similar to the one at the TTC’s derailment site where loose track fasteners went undetected. In turn this led to greater attention to subway track conditions and public reporting of Restricted Speed Zones (RSZs) that have bedeviled subway operation in past years.

Both the TTC and Metrolinx derailments raise serious questions about the integrity, accuracy and frequency of track inspections and corrective maintenance.

Another section of the report deals with the post-incident response and handling of complex needs for train and station operations, passenger information, and co-ordination of the entire process through various parts of the Metrolinx/GO organization. Processes that were adequate for day-to-day failed under the stress of many concurrent, urgent activities and the need for communication both among bodies responsible for various parts of the operation, and with passengers who needed to know where and when their trains would show up.

Because most of Metrolinx service operates on provincially-owned track, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada was not involved in this review, although they were notified of the incident.

Causes and Recommendations

There is a long section summarizing the causes, findings and recommendations of this report on pp 46-51 which I leave to readers to peruse rather than copying all of that text here.

Among the actions already taken are:

• Bi-annual inspections of the USRC.
• Autonomous track geometry testing technology to be operational in January 2027.
• A $15-million program to address track surface conditions and make localized repairs in the USRC.
• Additional Metrolinx Track Inspectors have been hired.

Several additional recommendations are in the report [p. 50].

Every Metrolinx meeting begins with a “Safety Moment”, but one cannot help asking how strong a connection to safety exists between this pro forma exercise and actual conditions on the ground. The response to this derailment showed a strong desire by staff to support passengers even, at times, in the face of inadequate supporting command and communication structures. However the derailment itself should not have occurred, and the question remains of just how strong a safety culture extends down to maintenance of critical infrastructure.

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