Updated July 24, 2011 at 11:00 pm: Links to archival photos of Roncesvalles Avenue from the City Archives have been added to the end of this article.
Apologies to those who expected to find the PCCs running on Ronces. In turned out that one car had already been hired out for another event, and the second PCC was in the shop for repairs. Two CLRVs don’t have quite the same effect.
The Toronto Star and Globe & Mail report that TTC Chief General Manager Gary Webster’s days may be numbered thanks to his failure to support the Sheppard Subway proposal. Not only might we lose Webster, but we might gain a Ford cohort, a politician with no real transit experience, as his replacement.
I will leave readers to peruse the full articles, but here is a key section in the Star:
The plan to get rid of Webster “is in play now,” said former TTC vice-chair Joe Mihevc.
“(The Fords) are so committed to Sheppard they are actively contemplating getting rid of the entire streetcar system in Toronto,” he said, adding that the cost of the new streetcars could be applied to the subway.
“If Doug Ford bullies his way through on this, it truly will be the victory of extreme authoritarian ideology over good public transit policy and good business management,” Mihevc said.
Elsewhere, we learn that TTC Chair Karen Stintz who, as recently as yesterday morning praised Mayor Ford’s support for TTC customer service initiatives, is actually frustrated with the speed of implementation of changes. The fact that there isn’t a penny for this program in the budget, and that the TTC faces a 10% cut in city funding for 2012, shows what the real level of commitment is in Toronto.
Meanwhile, the only project of any importance to the Brothers Ford is the Sheppard Subway whose “private sector” financing is a bubble of their imagination that burst months ago. Every penny that can be scrounged from other projects, plus tax revenue from developments miles away on Eglinton, would be used to finance Sheppard and minimize the level of private sector participation needed to top up the budget. This is financial trickery of the worst kind.
According to the Globe’s story, Stintz appears to be splitting from Ford’s all-or-nothing approach to the Sheppard line preferring instead to build to Victoria Park as a first step using money originally earmarked for the Sheppard LRT.
Queen’s Park struck a deal with the devil to preserve the Eglinton LRT as a subway while leaving Ford free to work his financial magic on Sheppard. The streetcar system appeared safe if only because replacing it would be a long-term, difficult proposal. However, the Liberals’ hold on power is tenuous, and a Ford-favouring Tory government would no doubt be happy to cancel the streetcar order (and probably the LRVs for Eglinton as well) with Bombardier, and the voters of Thunder Bay be damned.
In ten years, we would have a much reduced quality of transit service in the central city, we would choke streets with clouds of buses and limit the growth of major areas served by the present and proposed streetcar system. In return, Sheppard Avenue would have its subway, and what started as Lastman’s folly and a Liberal campaign promise by former Premier David Peterson would become a full-blown monument to the stupidity of transit planning and politics in Toronto.
Has any of Rob Ford’s transit scheme gone to Council for review? No. Council, especially its “mushy middle”, is too busy currying favour with the Mayor to rein in his actions, leaving the Fords to dictate policy on the transit file and so many others.
This morning, while TTC Chair Karen Stintz, Mayor Ford and other luminaries were dedicating the inaugural run in service of a Toronto Rocket subway train, the agenda for the July 28th Toronto Executive came out. The city’s “core services review” has reached its agencies, including the TTC, and the consultant’s findings can be found starting on pdf page 161 of their report.
The premise of the city-wide review is that there is some sort of “standard” above or below which services are provided. In some cases, reference is made to other cities, but in the case of the TTC, the “standards” appear to be pre- and post- David Miller’s mayoralty. If something was done in the “Ridership Growth Strategy”, it is by definition “above standard” and up for elimination.
This is a strange way to evaluate services especially in the North American city lauded for the quality of its transit system and the economic benefits this brings. Never does the consultant address the value of good service, only its cost.
The consultant, KPMG, show their colours on the title page with the double-entendre corporate motto “cutting through complexity”. Continue reading
[See also Part 2 of this discussion.]
In a previous article and its long comment thread, readers and I have discussed the question of demand for the Eglinton-Crosstown LRT subway. After the Metrolinx board meeting in June that started all this, I asked Metrolinx for more information about their projected ridership for the underground line. In particular, I was interested in the numbers behind not just Eglinton, but the other routes on the demand map below.
Here is Metrolinx’ reply:
Under the previous Transit City plan, most morning Scarborough RT passengers arriving at Kennedy would transfer to the Bloor-Danforth subway. However, a small number of them would transfer to the Eglinton LRT, and bus riders would also transfer to the Eglinton LRT
Under the current Toronto transit plan agreement, many morning Eglinton – Scarborough Crosstown passengers arriving at Kennedy are not expected to transfer to the Bloor-Danforth line. Instead, we expect those passengers to stay on board the Eglinton – Scarborough Crosstown and continue west along Eglinton Ave.
It is important to note that the Eglinton – Scarborough Crosstown
morningmorning peak hour westbound ridership leaving from Kennedy station is roughly 6,500 higher than the Transit City plan forecast. In the Transit City plan, the forecasted behaviour of these 6,500 new Eglinton-Scarborough Crosstown passengers was as follows:
- 60% rode the Bloor-Danforth subway out of Kennedy station.
- 40% rode parallel bus routes or used different modes
We also expect an increase of ridership at the other stations along the
Bloor-DanforthEglinton-Scarborough line, but passenger behaviour at Kennedy is the dominant factor distinguishing the two plans.Finally, below is a comparison of the anticipated 2031 morning peak demand points for the two plans:
SRT section (southbound into Kennedy)
- Transit City (5 in 10 plan): 10,000 pphpd
- Eglinton-Crosstown: 11,000 pphpd
Eglinton section:
- Transit City: 5,000 pphpd eastbound into Eglinton West
- Eglinton-Crosstown: 12,000 pphpd westbound into Eglinton/Yonge
[Corrections to the original text provided by Metrolinx July 26, 2011]
This is the entire reply, and there is no information on the following issues:
My ongoing complaint about regional planning, both by the TTC and by Metrolinx, is that we talk a good line about networks, but we plan lines in isolation. It is trivially simple to produce a huge demand on a new route simply by making it the only addition to an existing network — that’s how the TTC “justified” the Sheppard subway.
Ontario is spending $8-billion keeping Rob Ford happy by burying the Eglinton line, and they desperately need to justify this investment. A 12k demand at the peak point is just the ticket! Where else might the extra $4b have been spent to better overall effect? We don’t know because Metrolinx has reverted from network planning to the traditional one-at-a-time methodology it was set up to avoid.
Metrolinx needs to be much more transparent about the way it projects ridership and the underlying assumptions of its models. What routes are in the model network? What frequency of service operates on them? What is the fare structure? What is the presumed future cost or practicality of using an automobile? Where are the capacity constraints in the road and transit neworks? How do these factors interact to shift projected demands?
This is the heart of regional planning, and Metrolinx is utterly silent on these issues. Instead, they prefer to show us fully built-out networks decades in the future, networks we already know will be different thanks to various short-term changes and likely funding constraints, networks we will never see in actual operation. We see simulations of the impossible, not the practical or the likely conditions we will have to live with.
This may serve short-term political needs, but the approach evades, no ignores, the vital debate we must have about what we might (or might not) build with the limited funding that our parsimonious, if not bankrupt, governments are likely to devote to transit.
During the Metrolinx Electrification Study, those of us who attended various workshops became aware that there was a parallel study of capacity issues at Union Station. The electrification plans are, among other things, in support of operating better service on GO generally, but if that service won’t physically fit through Union Station and its approach corridors, there’s a big problem.
That problem is independent of electrification per se because The Big Move from Metrolinx depends on substantially improved commuter rail service. No capacity, no additional service.
At the recent Metrolinx Board meeting, GO’s President, Gary McNeil, presented an update on GO operations and construction activity.
GO President’s Report & Presentation Deck
The report includes a reference to Union Station capacity:
… Retaining wall construction is well underway to allow for an additional track in this corridor. The Union Station capacity study has been completed, with the result that in the near term, there is capacity at this station to meet needs. With the start of design of double berthing and new south platform, this will provide access required for service expansions. This work is anticipated to be completed in the next five years. [Page 8]
After the meeting, I requested a copy of the study to learn what conclusions it might have reached. Various working papers from the study had been leaked, but they were neither definitive nor entirely coherent on how to deal with the problem.
Metrolinx has now replied that:
At this time, a detailed public component of the Union Station study is premature as we are undertaking on-going research. Specific information will most likely be available for the public when future potential projects develop from this study.
The purpose of the study is to assess the Union Station Rail Corridor (USRC) train capacity at four time points:
In doing so, we hope to identify opportunities to increase capacity by making more effective use of existing and planned infrastructure. We also hope to identify the infrastructure needed to address any capacity shortfalls. This study provided only a technical analysis, and Metrolinx will consider its opportunities after further assessment.
However, there is a good deal of material to get started on.
In my article about David Gunn’s opinion of what’s wrong with the TTC, I mentioned the 1991 Budget introduced as the TTC was having its record year of ridership in 1990, but was on the brink of a recession and unprecedented cutbacks.
The major objective of the proposed TTC operating budget for 1991 is to provide a better product and thereby to attract more riders to the TTC. This will not be an easy task at a time when other demands on the taxpayers’ dollars are escalating, and with the economy headed into a recession. The proposed budget is best summarized in one word: balance — a balance among the needs of TTC riders and the taxpayers of Metro Toronto and the Province of Ontario.
[From Proposed 1991 Operating Budget, November 14, 1990]
This budget was introduced by TTC Chair Lois Griffin, a Councillor from the then Rexdale-Thistletown ward of Etobicoke which took in the northwest corner of the city down to Highway 401. The south half of this ward is Mayor Ford’s home turf. Al Leach, who would later preside over the amalgamation of Toronto as part of the Harris government, was Chief General Manager. Neither of them could be called radicals.
David Miller was not yet a member of Council having lost on his first try to the incumbent in 1991. He was successful on a second try in 1994. Adam Giambrone was 13 years old and had not yet become active in the NDP.
In the face of economic difficulties, a conservative Commission was advocating service improvements as the best way to gain and hold ridership, and none of the ills that might have afflicted transit could be blamed on a previous administration’s misguided policies.
November 1990 Proposal For 1991 Operating Budget
By March 26, 1991, staff recommended that the budget be trimmed to compensate for falling ridership and for flatlining of the Metro Toronto subsidy contribution. This flatline was relative to the budget submission, but the drop in riding was hitting revenue and would have triggered a greater subsidy need without offsetting changes. This led to proposals for service and staffing cuts, although some additions stayed in the budget for safety and reliability reasons.
In reading the 1991 proposal, it’s notable that even before the heart of the recession, there were concerns that some TTC practices needed improvement. In the years to follow, we would see just how badly the cumulative effect of putting off repairs would hit the TTC.
By July 1991, the projected budget, including cuts requested by Council, was back at the TTC. Total expenses had dropped from the original $686.1-million proposed in November 1990 to $675.1m.
A few excerpts from my deputation at the time:
Transit riders expect a lot more from the TTC than their counterparts in New York, Philadelphia or Chicago, and we must work to meet Toronto’s expectations. Simply being better than everyone else is not good enough.
…
No matter how good the subway service, if someone cannot get to and from the subway reliably, they will not use it. If someone’s trip is not served by the subway, they will not attempt it by an unreliable or overcrowded surface route. … The fine-grained surface network will never be duplicated by the subway network.
…
The common complaints about crowding suggest that the average rider does not see the “average” loading conditions which may meet the service standards. The empty space in buses at the back of a platoon is of little use to the riders crammed into the first vehicle. … providing better service with your existing fleet improves your productivity, makes your service more attractive and defers the need for additional vehicles.
…
I have often spoken of the need for the Commission to be advocates for the transit system. … Cities become “world class” because people living there care about all the parts that make up the whole. Your job is to care about the transit system and to tell all of us how we can get it back not merely to “the better way”, but “the best way”.
[Letter to the TTC, November 20, 1990]
The TTC’s decline in the early 90s was so severe that the proposed budget for 1996 was $673.5-million, almost the same as the approved budget in 1991, and ridership was projected at 376-million. When David Gunn talks of Toronto achieving only a 15% increase in riding, he forgets those dark days and the system he inherited when he joined the TTC in 1995.
In the July 5th Globe and Mail, Stephen Wickens has a full-page article in which David Gunn slams the TTC, Metrolinx, and just about anyone else in sight for the looming disaster that passes for transit planning in Toronto. I agree with much he says, although we will obviously differ on the future of the streetcar system which Gunn would replace with a fleet of articulated buses.
What most interests me about this article will be the fallout, the debate, if any, at City Hall, and the degree to which Gunn’s advice is cherry-picked to support whatever argument anyone wants to make.
It’s also rather sad that this much-needed broadside against the state of planning in the GTA has taken so long to appear. Many of the issues have been debated on this blog and others, whatever our opinions on individual topics, while critical coverage in the mainstream press is hard to find.
Updated July 10, 2011 a 8:00 am:
While I concur with some of David Gunn’s comments, there are issues where he misses the mark, sometimes quite badly. Many have already weighed in through the comments thread, and here’s my take.
The presentation from the Spadina update given at the TTC meeting on July 6 is now available online.
There’s nothing very surprising, but a few points are worth noting:
Station Names (p 3): There are still discussions in progress about station names. The ones in the presentation are the working names that have been used for the project, but the final selection will occur probably in October. Among the proposals in various stages of consideration are:
Whatever names stations do eventually get, I hope that the major street names survive with a local neighbourhood name as a subtitle rather like “Bay Yorkville”. Of course if we sell the station names to the highest bidder, neighbourhood and street names might vanish completely.
Budget (pp 4-5): The project is “fully funded”, but this has to be taken with a grain or two of salt. First off, all of the project contingency has already been consumed in the design phase, and we still have four years of construction to get through. The TTC hopes to make up any deficiencies through a combination of cost controls and the interest earned on the trust fund holding the provincial contribution to the project.
The project has repeatedly been described as “on time and on budget”, but whether this condition will hold through the remaining 4.5 years to opening remains to be seen.
Construction Schedule (pp 10-13): The schedule shows that the line will open at the end of 2015 taking us beyond one municipal election and two provincial elections. Who knows which politicians will actually get to cut the ribbon. Although the physical construction will finish in early 2015, commissioning of the line will take several months. There has been no discussion of an early opening to York U or to Steeles West to serve the Pan Am Games.
Just as with the budget contingency, all of the “float” time in the project has already been consumed.
Automatic Train Control (p 14): When this project started, the TTC had not yet launched into an ATC conversion project, and the extra cost of ATC over a conventional signal system was not included in the approved, shared budget. Strictly speaking, this is not required to open the line provided that a headway shorter than a conventional system can handle is not operated into non-ATC territory.
Earlier in the design stage, the TTC dropped Platform Edge Doors from the extension to save money. At one station, this triggered a redesign because the wall containing the doors was planned as a structural element holding up the roof.
Updated July 8, 2011 at 10:20 am:
Updates on the disposition of various items previewed in the original version of this item have been added through the post under each topic.
Updated July 8, 2011 at 10:00 am:
[Readers new to this item should read the original post, and then come back to the top of the item for the update.]
At the Commission meeting, I presented this deputation.
In the discussion that followed, it became clear that there are aspects of the deal between the TTC and Presto that the parties would prefer to hide from public view. Some of the details are up to Metrolinx to release, not the TTC.
On the matter of the recapture of the provincial loan for the cost overrun on the project, TTC’s Chief General Manager Gary Webster explained that Metrolinx had agreed to “hold the TTC harmless”, to use the legal phrase, against extra costs beyond what fare collection now costs the system. Apparently the payback of capital is very similar to the proposed arrangement with the proponent of the Open Payment system.
There would be no payment to Presto before savings in fare collection costs begin to accrue, although the detail on these payments remains to be worked out. The intent is that the sum of the cost of Presto service and the loan repayment will not exceed current costs.
Questions remaining unanswered include:
During the debate, Chair Karen Stintz stated that any regional integration would not occur until after 2015, presumably when Presto was fully rolled out. Indeed, it is not practical to restructure fares before the fare collection system can handle whatever new tariff is in place. Again, this begs the question of the status of the bus fleet which handles a great deal of cross-border travel.
Commissioner Minnan-Wong, unsatisfied with the level of detail in the discussion, moved deferral of the item, but this was voted down with only him in favour.
A update report on the status of negotiations with Presto will come back to the Commission in October or November 2011.
Steve Munro 