The TTC has not published the presentation on their website, and in the interest of having the material in view, I am transcribing it here.  Few pages involve diagrams, and so for the most part I will simply transcribe the text.

Where I comment on the material, I will do so in italics to distinguish my words from the TTC’s.

The pages with diagrams are linked to scanned images.

Update 1 (August 30):  In the post below, I originally said that the chronology did not mention the change from a 70% low floor spec to 100%.  A quibble has been raised on this point.

The original spec had both 70% and 100%, and the change was to remove the 70% option.  The net effect was the same:  any 70% low floor car that might have been proposed was eliminated from consideration.  It remains to be seen whether, in fact, any builder can adapt their designs to Toronto’s track geometry.

Update 2 (September 16):  The full presentation is now available on the TTC’s website.  The links in the post below take you to scanned images on my site.  If you want better resolution, use the TTC copies.

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Updated August 29:

At the Commission meeting on August 27, various deputations spoke to the issue of the streetcar contract.  I am not going to attempt to reproduce their presentations and, in some cases, the extensive Q&A sessions that followed, but will give an overview.

The TTC has not yet posted the staff presentation on their website.  If it has not appeared by this evening, I will scan and post my copy along with comments in a second update.

Mario Péloquin spoke for Siemens Canada with a brief presentation.  Siemens, for internal reasons related to their corporate reorganization, had chosen not to bid but is now interested in the streetcar contract.  Péloquin was slightly apologetic for Siemens’ not having emphasized their long-standing presence in Canada and Ontario.  Obviously this is not as a rail car builder, but in the many other aspects of Siemens operations.

An Alstom representative, who did not expect to be called on, and who has only about half a year’s experience with the company, spoke briefly indicating his company’s interest in the contract.  It would be useful if Alstom can find someone with more depth and credibility the next time they show up.

Skoda was not present, and TTC CGM Gary Webster said that because they chose not to respond after the RFP cancellation, they are no longer at the table.   Whether Skoda accepts this situation remains to be seen.

Representatives of the Toronto Labour Council and of the Canadian Auto Workers (who represent the Bombardier Thunder Bay plant) spoke of the importance of Canadian content in any contract.  This is a difficult issue because so many subsystems for rapid transit cars are built offshore, and even the carbodies would likely be fabricated in existing foreign plants and shipped to Canada for final assembly.

The TTC and Ontario already have a 25% Canadian content rule, and the Commission passed a motion indicating that they would like prospective builders to work toward a higher goal of 50% if this contract progresses to include the 350 cars needed for Transit City.  A proposal to ask for sliding scale bids based on various levels of Canadian content was not adopted.

Bombardier’s representative, Mike Hardt, spoke about his company’s unhappiness with the process.  Bombardier feels that their bid was disqualified on a technical ground that was not justified, and they are concerned about now being placed in a different, unstructured bidding situation.  Bombardier claims that the mismatch between their cars and the TTC’s existing track system can be remedied by $10.4-million worth of work, but it is unclear of the time period this would cover nor the validity of the estimate. 

The work would involve grinding and filling track mainly at intersections to fit the Bombardier equipment’s wheel profile.  The TTC disputes this scheme and is concerned, legitimately I believe, that this would impose an ongoing requirement to maintain all track to a special standard to avoid safety problems with the new cars.  Ironically, Hardt also stated a few times during the Q&A that Bombardier could meet the TTC spec if they had to, but disputes the requirement.  The positions are contradictory:  either Bombardier could bid a car that met the spec, or they have strong objections to doing so and prefer that the TTC adapt their infrastructure.

Hardt said that if Bombardier’s cars wouldn’t work on the TTC system after delivery, they would be repaired at the vendor’s cost.  Commissioner Perruzza told Hardt to put that in writing.  However, we already know that Bombardier’s idea of “working” includes having the TTC make track changes, and there would doubtless be endless wrangling over whether a derailment was the TTC’s or Bombardier’s fault.  It’s easy to claim you will pay to fix something when you have an escape clause of blaming the client.

Most striking about Hardt’s deputation was the arrogance he displayed toward the TTC.  I was fascinated to watch the faces as one Commissioner after another could not believe the way they were being treated.  If I had presented a deputation half as contemptuous of staff, I would have been at best given my five minutes and at worst told to shut up and sit down.  Even Commissioners of a left-wing bent who support the Thunder Bay workers were driven to far more aggressive questioning than Hardt might otherwise have received.  He did Bombardier and its workers no favours and has likely alienated the very “friends at court” Bombardier might need if the debate comes down to a close decision between proponents.

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News comes to me that Škoda, one of the streetcar manufacturers who declined to bid on the recent TTC request for proposals, plans to re-enter discussions with the TTC.

At this point, I have no information on what vehicle(s) they might suggest, but a look at their website shows an interesting mix of possibilities.

Tramcar product page

This page shows a range of Škoda’s streetcar products, but does not include their latest 100% low floor model.

Model T15 low floor car

An order for these cars was recently placed for Riga, Latvia according to a press release.  Although the T15 is officially standard gauge (1435mm), the Riga cars will be a wider gauge (1524mm, or 5 feet) leaving Toronto in the middle of the range.

More news on this as and when it develops.

Updated July 20, 10:00 pm:

TTC Chair Adam Giambrone now admits that his statements about information in Bombardier’s bid referred to TTC staff remarks, not Bombardier’s submission itself. 

See coverage in the Globe and Star.

I can’t help finding this situation very embarrassing for the bid process, and distressing because of the potentail for delay in procurement of cars for both the “city” streetcar system and for Transit City.

Updated July 18, 4:10 pm:

Additional media reports in the Globe Report on Business and in the Sun.

Updated July 18, 6:30 am:

Media reports on this issue appear in the Star, Globe and National Post.

Updated July 17, 10:10 pm:

When a story this big lands at 4:30 in the afternoon via a press release, there is usually a flurry of interest and followup information, but so far things have been fairly quiet.  In the absence of specific comments, here are a bunch of questions for everyone involved:

• Why did Bombardier tell us throughout the RFP process that they had a car for Toronto, and happily let the CAW shill for them to keep jobs in Thunder Bay, only to turn around and bid a non-compliant car.  Did they think that the TTC would automatically turn to them for an alternate design without widening the field?
• The TTC press release states that they can sort out the problems with some manufacturer over the next four weeks.  How is this possible unless Bombardier already has a “plan B” ready to go? 
• Why was the TTC so confident, when they changed their spec midway through the process to require 100% low floor vehicles, that this would not compromise bidders’ ability to propose a compatible vehicle?
• What parts of the spec, beyond the tight curves on our street railway system, are impediments to other vendors, or are they just tired of all orders going to Bombardier and not bothering to waste their time on a bid?
• Has the TTC considered whether other operators of “legacy” street railway systems in North America might also have a need for cars that fit on older systems where PCCs had no problem operating for decades?
• What is the future of our streetcar system with an aging fleet of CLRVs and ALRVs rumoured to be less than 100% available?  Will the TTC at least commit the resources needed to get all of its current fleet back on the road?
• How will a delay in acquiring new “city” cars affect plans for Transit City?

Inevitably, opponents of the TTC and of LRT in general will seize on this foul-up to show how the TTC can’t plan properly (as if we had any sterling examples elsewhere in these parts), and how an all subway, BRT and maybe even RT network is just the ticket.  They would be wrong, and any agency or politician who attempts such an attack will get no quarter from me.

Yes, this is a bad situation.  Toronto dithered for years about new versus rebuilt streetcars, finally opted for all new, then changed their spec to all low-floor, and now faces a delay for which there really wasn’t any room in the schedule.  Moreover, they still don’t know who will pay for the new fleet.

Metrolinx for its part is still pulling together a regional transportation plan, but seems to be pricing themselves out of the market.  Their plan has a huge capital and operating cost, and does nothing to improve local transit service, an essential part of any regional scheme.  Any move by Metrolinx to slip into a perceived vacuum at the TTC would be complete folly.

Indeed, Metrolinx was specifically set up not to be a local transit operator for fear of alienating the 905 municipalities forming the heart of its Board.  The last thing Metrolinx needs is having to explain what passes for service on the Queen Car.

The TTC needs to be upfront about the problems, about why so few bids were received and about what can be done to get real competition.  They need to re-establish Toronto as a credible city in which any vendor other than Bombardier actually has a chance of winning business. Continue reading →

According to the TTC’s Materials & Procurement website late on the evening of July 1, there was only one bidder, Bombardier, for Toronto’s new generation of streetcars and, by extension, the cars that will be used for the Transit City network.

There are no details about the bid, and an announcement from the TTC is expected soon.  I will add to this post as information becomes available.

Updated July 2, 12:30pm:  The TTC amended its site to indicate that there was a second bidder, Tram Power of the UK.  This is a company that has never built a production run of vehicles for anyone, and I cannot see them being in any condition to support a bid of this size.  One other issue with their car (as described on their website) is that it is 70% low floor, not 100% as required by the TTC.

Matthew Campbell writes about this in today’s Globe and Mail.

Updated Dec. 19 at midnight:

At the Dec. 18th TTC meeting, the reports linked below were discussed along with a technical report and appendix from Booz Allen.  Note that these links point to the National Post’s site where they are linked from this article.  As and when the TTC puts them on its own website, I will alter this link to point to the TTC’s copies.

Thanks to Mark Dowling for alerting me to the documents on the Post’s site.

From a friend who attended the meeting, I learned that organized labour made a strong showing arguing for Canadian content and, of course, for the contract to go to Bombardier in Thunder Bay.  Some members of the Commission echoed this position.  I can’t help thinking that they are overplaying their hands on this one.

First off, Bombardier is the only potential bidder with a Canadian rail car manufacturing facility, and this gives them a leg up on costs against any other contender.  Second, the TTC’s decision to opt for a 100% low-floor specification narrows the field of potential suppliers.  At this point, I would be extremely surprised to see more than two bids for this contract, and given the obvious inside track Bombardier has, why Siemens would waste their money bidding against them is a difficult question. 

This gives us the impression of an open proposal call, but there is clear evidence of a desired outcome, and we’re back at the Toronto Rocket subway car order mess all over again.  Light Rail has enough problems in Toronto, not to mention an uphill battle to secure funding from Queen’s Park and Ottawa, without the odour of a predetermined contract.  The last thing we need is for Ottawa to say “you didn’t run the bid properly” as an excuse to back away.

Booz Allen is a major consulting firm for Light Rail projects, among others, and has participated in many studies and designs for new and expanded systems.  The material in their report is drawn from  experience on other systems, and they are vendor-independent.

The information here is no surprise to anyone familiar with the component costs of rapid transit vehicles.  A very large proportion of the new LRVs will be sourced offshore because that’s where components are manufactured.  Half of the cost per car comes from components that are not manufactured in Canada, and this order of LRVs isn’t remotely close to the quantity that would justify anyone setting up a local plant.

Because any 100% low floor car will be based on a European design, the engineering and fabrication work will be done overseas since the expertise and facilities already exist. 

Best case, Booz Allen estimates that 25% of the value of the car order can be provided in Canada, and of this, a goodly chunk is not going to be the work of the folks at Thunder Bay.

If the TTC were to insist on a higher Canadian content, this would effectively lock out every bidder except Bombardier, and even then Toronto would pay a premium to have overseas manufacturing capability duplicated in Canada.  Indeed, if the Can-Con level is set too high, nobody will bid.

Whoever gets this order will be building light rail equipment for the Toronto area for decades.  As I have said before, I have no brief for any would-be supplier, but want only that Toronto gets an excellent car at a good price. 

This contract, plus the Transit City add-ons, will give us Toronto’s streetcar/LRV fleet well into this century.  This is our last chance, after all the years wasted on alternatives, to get LRT right, for it to be a credible form of transit in the GTA.  The last thing we need is a lemon, or “the Edsel of streetcars” as a former TTC Chief General Manager described the CLRVs.

The Request for Proposals will be issued in early 2008.  The next moves are up to the potential bidders and transit’s “funding partners” to prove how serious they are about the future of rail transit in Toronto. Continue reading →

Updated November 9, 2007:  Today’s Globe and Mail contains an article by Jeff Gray describing the objections by one potential bidder, Vossloh Kiepe, to the 100% low floor specification in the soon-to-be-released Request For Proposals for new cars.

My original post and reader comments follow below.

Continue reading →