The TTC has not published the presentation on their website, and in the interest of having the material in view, I am transcribing it here. Few pages involve diagrams, and so for the most part I will simply transcribe the text.
Where I comment on the material, I will do so in italics to distinguish my words from the TTC’s.
The pages with diagrams are linked to scanned images.
Update 1 (August 30): In the post below, I originally said that the chronology did not mention the change from a 70% low floor spec to 100%. A quibble has been raised on this point.
The original spec had both 70% and 100%, and the change was to remove the 70% option. The net effect was the same: any 70% low floor car that might have been proposed was eliminated from consideration. It remains to be seen whether, in fact, any builder can adapt their designs to Toronto’s track geometry.
Update 2 (September 16): The full presentation is now available on the TTC’s website. The links in the post below take you to scanned images on my site. If you want better resolution, use the TTC copies.
Pages 1-2: August 27, 2008 Commission Meeting
LF LRV Procurement Project
Cancellation of RFP & Way Forward
Stephen Lam, P. Eng; Superintendent, LRV Engineering; Rail Cars & Shops
Sandy MacDonald; Manager; Materials & Procurement
The Toronto Transit Commission operates one of the most unique streetcar systems in the world.
Page 3: Unique Toronto Operating Environment
Pages 4-5: Importance of Appreciating an Operating Authority’s Environment
Derailment of Boston’s No. 8 Cars (100-car order signed May 1995)
- Carbuilder was permitted to use “San Francisco track geometry” for vehicle design due to lack of complete inhouse engineering data
- Carbuilder was permitted to simulate derailment behaviour not based on vehicle being proposed
- 4 derailments between April and July 2000; fleet grounded
- Service resumed April 2001
- 3 derailments between June and August 2001; fleet grounded
- Changed wheel profile, upgraded track; service resumed in 2003
- Vehicle derailed onto station platform in August 2004
- Contract truncated at delivery of Car No. 85 at YE 2006
Massachusetts’ State Auditors’ Report Publicly Released February 16, 2007:
- The MBTA’s inability to ensure that the No. 8 low-floor Green Line cars were properly designed for the Green Line infrastructure will cost the Authority approximately $101 million in additional contract and track maintenance costs.
- The MBTA did not adequately plan andtest the No. 8 low-floor cars, thereby contributing to a derailment flaw that caused a significant delay servicing its disabled patrons.
Steve comments: The Type 8 cars were manufactured by Breda. The MBTA has a long history of purchasing less than successful cars from a succession of vendors. The TTC’s own experience with the CLRVs was far from perfect. Those cars also had problems with derailments and accelerated track wear due both to the choice of wheels and the excessive vehicle weight compared to their predecessors, the PCCs.
Pages 6-7: TTC’s Procurement Process to Meet Challenges
- Analyzed technical risks & identified best practices
- August 15, 2006 — Advertised & issued Request for Information (RFI) to known carbuilders — 7 responded
- Summer 2007 — Public consultation
- On-going discussions with industry and internal stakeholders
- TTC and its consultants conducted:
a) 3-D track geometry mapping to ensure compatibility of LRV with TTC infrastructure — data subsequently included in RFP
b) Simulated LFLRV behaviour — ground borne vibration, overhead power capacity
- May to June 2007 — In-depth technical discussions with various interested carbuilders
a) Safety Against Derailment — single point track switch & tight radius curves. Preliminary carbuilders’ analyses suggested requirements could be met with appropriate vehicle customization
b) Gradeability — all wheels poweredc) 100% low floord) Ground borne vibration
- August 14, 2007 — Released pre-RFP specification for industry comments. Suggested changes were incorporated while encouraging competition and protection the Commission’s interests
- December 2007 — Canadian Content requirements finalized
- January 17, 2008 — Issued Request for Proposal (RFP)
a) 13 addenda issued
b) no question was received during the 5 ½ month RFP period re: safety against derailment, wheel profile, coefficient of friction or allowable wheel climb
- February 11, 2008 — Pre-Bid Meeting
- June 30, 2008 — RFP Closed
Steve comments: Not mentioned in the chronology above was the decision to move from a 70% Low Floor to a 100% Low Floor car in the middle of the process. Although both 70% and 100% designs were originally acceptable, the 70% option was dropped. This changed the type of car vendors might bid.
Page 8: 5-Step RFP Evaluation Process
- Compliance of Proposals (Commercial)
- Pass/Fail Technical Requirements
- 25% Canadian Content Plan
- Qualitative Technical Evaluation Score
- Pricing including Life Cycle Cost
> Negotiate with preferred Proponent
- Proponent must meet all requirements of steps 1, 2 and 3 above to have its proposal qualitatively technically evaluated (Appendix C — Instructions to proponents, Part B)
- Evaluation process was structured, fair & transparent — all bidders evaluated on the same basis
- Evaluation process was overseen by Fairness Monitor
Page 9: Step 1. Compliance of Proposal
- Form of Proposal
- Bid bond
- Proposal submission requirements
Page 10: Step 2. Pass/Fail Technical Requirements:
- 13 criteria in 5 general categories
- Proponent must pass ALL of the 13 technical criteria
Page 11: RFP Submissions & Evaluation Summary
Two Submissions Received*:
- TRAM Power Ltd.
- Bombardier Transportation Canada Inc.
* Alstom Transportation Inc. and Siemens Canada Limited submitted “no-bid” letters prior to closing
- TTC Staff
- External Consulting Engineers provided advice
- TRAM Power’s Proposal failed at Step 1 — Compliance of Proposals (Commercial)
— Did not submit required documentation including Form of Proposal and Bid Bond
- Bombardier’s Proposal failed at Step 2 — Pass/Fail Technical Requirements
— Failed Safety Against Derailment analysis
Steve Comments: Note that the process has never progressed to Step 4, the detailed technical evaluation.
Pages 12-14: Simplified Derailment Theory
Steve comments: These diagrams show the geometry of the wheel-rail interaction. The TTC’s specification (see below) allows an angle up to 70° although the existing system runs at a lower value. Street railway systems and the cars that were designed for them, notably the PCC, assume that track and wheels will not be in perfect condition and the trucks are designed to work in poor-maintenance settings. The TTC’s track is in generally good shape thanks to years of reconstruction, but it is still challenging. Moreover, special work at intersections is replaced on a fairly long cycle based on the assumption that existing and future fleets can handle the track as it ages.
Pages 15-16: Step 2: Technical Evaluation
Input data for Safety Against Derailment simulation analysis requirements:
- TTC wheel profile and existing TTC track data
- Use Coefficient of Friction = 0.5
- No wheel climb
- Flange angle = 70° front and back, tapered bottom
- 10 km/h operation
- 70° front and back flange angle
14m End Loops
- 10 km/h operation
- 70° front and back flange angle
Single Point Trackswitch
- 10 km/h operation
- 70° front and back flange angle
High lateral force in the loops and curves causes:
- Increased risk of derailment
- Accelerated wheel flange wear and rail gauge wear (reducing wheel and rail life)
Conclusion: Modify existing system or modify a standard LFLRV
Pages 17-19: Modification to TTC Surface Rail Network
Infrastructure changes to expand approximately 90 tight radius curves and loops to 20m radius, including property acquisition, is not feasible.
- Cost prohibitive
- Service disruption
- Must have all curves and loops done to mitigate risk
- Existing carhouses present major problem with physical constraints to expand curvature
- Time line — 10 years to complete change
Steve comments: The track map above can be a bit confusing because it shows two sets of tight curves marked with a check (somewhat tight) or an X (very tight). The degree of the problem is obvious from the amount of the map flagged here.
The intersection diagram (King and Dufferin) shows how right turns built to a wider radius would overhand the sidewalk and would in some cases require building demolition.
Page 20: Adoption “Standard” LRV Wheel Profile
Impact of adopting a “standard” wheel profile without expanding curve and loop radii:
- Requires change of existing streetcar wheel flange angles
- Requires frequent wheel machining to maintain steeper wheel flange angles
- Still requires grinding of special track work
- Not practical; expensive and presents unacceptable risk of derailment
Page 21: Conclusions
The existing network or streetcars cannot be modified.
“Standard” LF LRV must be modified to be compatible with the TTC network.
Pages 22-23: RFP Cancellation Activities
Fairness Monitor reviewed and supported the decision
- “I am satisfied that both submissions were evaluated fairly and in a manner consistent with the RFP.”
- “The RFP establishes the rules of the game, and in that sense its provisions must control the evaluation process. In fairness to the two proponents who responded to the RFP, and to those who may have chosen not to respond to it, it would be wrong to treat the RFP as an invitation to negotiate. Rather the RFP is a document that triggers a competitive process where proposal submissions are subject to evaluation as prescribed with clarity in the RFP.”
Cancellation of RFP letters issued to TRAM Power and Bombardier — July 17, 2008
Pages 24-26: Developing Way Forward
TTC contacted carbuilders who responded to RFI or purchased a copy of RFP and asked a series of 5 questions
Results of 5 questions
4 Companies Considered:
- TRAM Power does not have proven 100% LFLRV
- 3 other proven Carbuilders have 100% LFLRV
Alstom, Bombardier, Siemens clearly indicated that they could provide 100% LFLRV that can operate on all of unique requirements of the TTC’s track system
Proceed with 3 proven carbuilders
Steve comments: At this point, Škoda does not have a 100% low floor car in production, but is about to unveil one at a transport fair in Berlin. The vehicle is designed for the Prague system.
Pages 27-29: Recommended Way Forward
Structured Multi-Phase Bid Process:
Phase 1 — Introduction
- Invite Alstom, Bombardier and Siemens to participate based on proven experience in manufacturing 100% LFLRVs
- Develop preliminary timeline
- Commitment to participate
Phase 2 — Technical
- Carbuilders to demonstrate ability to meet Pass/Fail requirements
- Carbuilders to demonstrat ability to meet other technical requirements
Phase 3 — Commercial
- Negotiate acceptable commercial conditions
Phase 4 — Competitive Bidding
- Formal process for submitting pricing and Canadian Content plan
Phase 5 — Commission Approval / Award
- Process structured & competitive
- 3 proven carbuilders — 100% Low Floor LRV
- Bidders engaged throughout process
- Address questions/concens (Technical/Commerial)
- Encourage participation/competitive bids
- Formal process: pricing & Canadian Content
- More likely to result in compliant bids
It is recommended that the Commission authorize staff to proceed with the Multi-Phase Bid Process to procure 100% Low Floor Light Rail Vehicles.