The SSE itself is not on the agenda, but it has been the subject of much recent debate over when the projected cost and schedule for the extension will be released.
In the November 2017 CEO’s Report, the project scorecard included a schedule showing that 30% design would be complete in the second quarter of 2018, and an RFP [Request for Proposals] would be issued in the third quarter. Even when this report came out, former CEO Andy Byford was hedging his bets about a spring 2018 date saying that more work would be needed to verify and finalize the figures. A key note in this scorecard states:
EFC [Estimated Final Cost] was approved in 2013 based on 0% design. With the alignment/bus terminal now confirmed by City Council, the project budget and schedule will be confirmed as design is developed to the 30% stage, factoring in delivery strategy and risk. The performance scorecard will continue to report relative to the project’s original scope, budget and schedule, as approved by Council in 2013, until the project is rebaselined at the 30% stage in late 2018.
In other words, neither the schedule nor the projected cost reflected the evolving and expanding design of this project.
Jennifer Pagliaro in the Star wrote about the result of a Freedom of Information Request that revealed a briefing to Mayor Tory in September 2017. That briefing included a statement that the cost estimate for a Stage 3, 30% design, would be available in September 2018.
Because Council will not meet until 2019, numbers that might have been available before the election would not be released until after the new Council takes office. After the story appeared, City staff replied:
The cost information referenced in page 9 of the October TTC briefing deck refers to the planned timing for initial cost inputs from TTC engineering staff. These are not the full cost estimates necessary for consideration by Council. Further work will be required to appropriately account for financing, procurement model, market assessment and other critical factors. The final cost estimate, subject to the variability ranges noted below, will include these inputs.
This additional work will be undertaken by various TTC staff as well as city officials from corporate finance, financial planning, city planning and other divisions. [Tweet from Jennifer Pagliaro, February 7, 2018]
I wrote to the TTC’s Brad Ross about this conflicting information, and particularly about the question of how an RFP could be issued in 3Q18 when Council would not be approving that the project pass beyond “stage gate 3” until 2019. He replied:
No RFP will be issued until after Council approval. You will note in the Key Issues and Risks section of the scorecard from November reads, “The performance scorecard will continue to report relative to the project’s original scope, budget and schedule, as approved by Council in 2013, until the project is rebaselined at the 30% stage in late 2018.”
To be consistent with the report to Council in March 2017, only the revenue service date was revised in the scorecard (from Q4 2023 to Q2 2026). The TTC recognizes and acknowledges that this has led to confusion. The TTC will be taking steps to ensure greater clarity in its next CEO Report in March 2018. [Email of February 9, 2018]
The February CEO’s report states:
Work continues to progress design towards Stage Gate 3, expected in fall of 2018. At this time, the project will provide initial cost inputs from the TTC team (includes detailed costs for the Scarborough Centre station, tunnel, Kennedy station, systems, property and utilities). Further work is underway by the new Chief Project Manager with key stakeholders within TTC and the City to define the activities, approval process and timelines to arrive at the final Class 3 Cost Estimate, Level 3 Project Schedule, and associated Risk Analysis.
As requested by City Council, a report will be presented at the first opportunity to the Executive Committee, TTC Board and City Council, which is expected to be Q1 of 2019. [pp 15-16]
The debate, as it now stands, is about releasing whatever material will be available in September 2018 so that it can inform the election debates. Additional costs as cited by the city would sit on top of the September numbers, but at least voters and politicians would know whether the SSE’s cost has gone up just for the basic construction, let alone factors related to financing and procurement that would be added later.
Meanwhile, SSE promoter Councillor Glenn De Baeremaeker speaking on CBC’s Metro Morning said:
I don’t think it matters what the costs are.
This has been taken to read that money is no object, and that well may be the political reality in Scarborough – there is no way the many politicians who have so deeply committed to the subway project can back out. De Baeremaeker continued:
Whether the costs go up or the costs go down, people who have tried to sabotage the subway and stop the subway, will continue to try to sabotage it, they’ll continue to try to stop it, and they will never vote for it. So I would challenge the Councillors who say “I want to see the cost”. My response is and if it’s a reasonable cost, will you support the subway? Well, no. [At 3:26 in the linked clip]
What De Baeremaeker does not address is whether he has an upper limit beyond which even his enthusiasm might be dimmed. Also, on the question of a “reasonable cost”, what has been lost here is the fact that the subway “deal” was sold on the basis that the $3.5 billion included the Eglinton LRT extension to UTSC Campus. What had been a $2 billion-plus subway when it was approved as a compromise by Council, quickly grew to $3 billion-plus, and the LRT extension is left to find alternate funding. One could reasonably ask whether the LRT was ever really part of the deal, or was simply there as a sweetener that pulled in wavering supporters who now see just how gullible they were.
A related issue that has not yet surfaced is the question of whether building the SSE for a 2026 opening will require concurrent changes in timing and/or scope for the planned renewal of the Bloor-Danforth subway including a new signalling system and fleet. A report on the renewal is expected in April 2018, although this date has changed a few times over past months. The TTC/City capital budget and ten year plan do not reflect this project, at least with respect to timing, and probably with respect to total cost.
With recent events of major subway delays and discussions at the TTC Board about a “Ridership Growth Strategy”, the whole question of “what can we do” is swirling through the Toronto media and online. This article is an attempt to pull together threads from several reports and discussions.
This is a very long read and I salute those who stay the course to the end.
In brief, there is a capacity crisis on every part of the TTC system that is the product of years of pretending the problem is not as bad as it looks, and that a few magic bullets can solve everything. This is compounded by underinvestment in the bus network, by Bombardier’s sluggish delivery of new streetcars, and by subway planning that leaves major components either unfunded or missing from the long range capital plans.
There is no easy fix to any of this, but that is no reason to throw up our hands in hopeless resignation to further decline of our transit network. Recovery has to start somewhere even though the benefits will take time to appear. Politicians are afraid of spending money and driving up taxes. Staff act as enablers by concocting budgets that fit within available funding. The numbers “come out right” only because we ignore the full scope of our needs and how badly we have deferred addressing them.
This article does not propose specific remedies, but sets out the history of what has been done (or not done) over past years. Reading through all of it, I cannot help thinking that “Ridership Growth” is a laughable goal considering how hard Toronto has tried to stifle transit’s capacity and attractiveness. But at least the TTC Board is talking about trying to build more demand on its system. To do that, they must first acknowledge the accumulated shortfall between transit we think we would like and transit that is actually on the street.
For convenience, the documents referenced are all linked here:
Metrolinx Yonge Network Relief Study (June 25, 2015) Presentation
Amended 2012-2016 Capital Program and 10 Year Forecast – Shortfall Reduction Plans (September 16, 2011) Report
2003 Ridership Growth Strategy
Although the 2003 RGS was recently dismissed by current TTC Chair Josh Colle as if it were yesterday’s answer to transit problems, the context in which it was written is as fresh today as it was 15 years ago.
There is a growing expectation that transit in general, and the TTC in particular, must take on an increased role in providing travel for people in Toronto if the City is to grow and thrive economically and in an environmentally-sustainable way. Each level of government has recently announced plans and policy initiatives, that highlight the need for greater use of transit in urban areas – the City with its Official Plan, the Province of Ontario with its “Smart Growth Council” and “Gridlock Subcommittee”, and the Government of Canada with its approval of the Kyoto Accord. Achieving these policy objectives will require a fundamental shift in transit’s role in Toronto and the relative importance of automobile travel.
Unfortunately, these initiatives follow on the heels of a consistent lack of government support for the TTC in the past decade. Provincial funding was reduced a number of times in the mid-1990’s and is only now being partly restored. The TTC’s ridership and market share has fallen significantly during this period, to a large extent because of lack of government support. While there is no simple “magic answer” that will reverse this trend, government support for the TTC must be real and pronounced if the current widespread public and government expectations for improved transit are to be met.
The TTC’s mandate is to operate and maintain transit services that provide safe, fast, reliable, convenient, and comfortable travel in a cost-effective way. The TTC’s highest priorities are to our current passengers, and to maintain the existing system in a state-of- good-repair. The TTC needs a substantial, ongoing, funding commitment to meet these basic priorities and fulfill its role of providing transportation services to a large proportion of Toronto’s population. Once these needs are met, the TTC could attract more people out of their automobiles and onto transit with a stable source of increased funding and a commitment on the part of the City to implement policies that support efficient transit operations and transit-oriented development in Toronto. [Executive Summary, p. E-1]
Two points here cannot be made too strongly:
There is no magic answer, and
Looking after the system and riders we have today is essential to attracting new riders.
Investing in improved transit service makes sense for many reasons, but it must be done in a way that provides significant, measurable, and real returns on investment. If taxpayers’ funds are to be used to improve transit services, there needs to be a strong business case to prove that the money is well spent, and that any funding provided will generate significant additional ridership. There is no simple, low-cost solution to achieving increased transit ridership, or to reduce congestion and pollution. Attracting new riders to transit will require substantial increases in government policy commitments and subsidy, on a consistent basis, over a number of years. One-time funding arrangements and individual mega-projects will not result in significant changes in overall travel patterns over the long term or over a wide area. A consistent, long-term, staged program of providing priorities for, and investing in, expanded existing transit services, using proven technologies and operating strategies, provides the best opportunity to achieve sustained increases in transit ridership.
The underlying issue will continue to be the extent to which the City and senior levels of government will be willing to take the steps necessary to invest in transit to achieve their broader objectives. [p. 3]
There is a section titled “Why people choose to use transit” that is too long for me to quote in full here [see pp. 5-6], but a few excerpts are worth including:
The key factors governing mode choice are speed, reliability, comfort, convenience, and cost. Different segments of the market put differing values on these factors, and an understanding of market segments is critical to determining the potential for attracting transit riders. In addition, some modes of travel are simply not available or practical for some trips – few people will make very long walking trips for example – and people do not necessarily have an automobile available for any given trip. The availability and attractiveness of various modes is also very dependent on the location of both the origin and the destination of the trip being made.
…
The situations where transit can compete effectively with automobile travel are those where there is good pedestrian access to transit at both ends of the trip, and where transit can provide comparable speed to automobile travel when all factors are considered. Under these conditions, transit travel becomes attractive to many potential users. These conditions exist for travel to and from downtown Toronto in peak periods, where the roads are congested and rail lines (GO and subway) provide a comparable travel speed to automobile travel. There is also excellent pedestrian access from the downtown rail stations to destinations in the downtown. Transit achieves a 60%-to-70% mode split to transit in these favourable circumstances.
There is an obvious problem with this observation, and it applied even in 2003: much GTHA travel is not oriented to downtown and its concentrated destinations, and riders will not fall into transit’s lap simply because this is the obvious way to travel. Indeed, in many cases transit will be the last, not the first, choice. This begs the question of whether there are some trips for which making transit even grudgingly acceptable simply is not economic, but at the same time whether there are trips that are poorly served by a downtown focus on travel. This question is not new to transit debates.
If we abandon trips that are harder (or more expensive) to serve, or provide only minimal service to “show the flag” with a route map whose many lines hide less-than-ideal service, do we risk alienating potential riders especially in an era of population and density growth? Market conditions could evolve to give transit a greater role provided that it is there to establish credibility and a base of demand. This is not just an issue for the far suburbs in the 905, but for areas in both the outer 416 and in more central, redeveloping industrial neighbourhoods.
My thoughts on the TTC’s 2018 Ridership Growth Strategy were originally published on the Torontoist website on January 23, 2018. That publication is defunct, and the text is here for reference.
Why ridership has plateaued and what can be done about it?
After many years of growing demand, the Toronto Transit Commission’s system hit a plateau of 535 million rides in 2014. Give or take a few million, the TTC has been stuck there ever since. Toronto may be the envy of other cities with a great economy and a highly-touted transit network, but that system has been losing the travel market share. Even before 2014, the growth rate was falling, but this went unnoticed.
No transit growth in a booming city whose population rises every year is a red flag–the TTC is in trouble. This is not the message managers and politicians celebrating a fresh award as “2017 Transit System of the Year” want to hear.
How did the TTC lose its momentum, and what can they do about it?
A History of Strangled Growth
Both the subway and streetcar systems have been capacity-constrained for years. On the subway, signalling technology limits the number of trains per hour that can operate. Both Yonge-University (Line 1) and Bloor-Danforth (Line 2) have run the most scheduled service that will fit for many years. The streetcar system has a declining fleet of 30-to-40 year old cars, with the recent addition, well behind schedule, of Bombardier’s new Flexitys. The SRT fleet, itself over three decades old, runs below full capacity while trains are rebuilt for service into the mid 2020s when the Scarborough Subway will open.
Only the bus fleet has been free to grow, but even that has its limits thanks to budget cuts.
Date
Era
AM Peak Buses
January 2006
2nd Miller term begins
1,328
October 2010
2nd Miller term ends
1,468
March 2011
Start of Ford cuts
1,478
January 2015
Start of Tory term
1,504
January 2018
Today
1,528
Very little bus service was added to the system during the Ford years, and not much more during Tory’s either despite claims that more buses were funded. Yes, they were purchased, but the extra vehicles went mainly to increasing the maintenance pool and to back-filling on the streetcar system.
Because the TTC had some leeway in its service capacity, the Ford and Tory constraints did not hurt ridership in the short term, although growth when it came tended to be more in the off-peak periods when vehicles had more room than during the peak. As off-peak demand grew, the TTC burned through its spare capacity, and little was added to peak periods.
Recent gains in ridership have masked an underlying problem in the bundling of statistics. Increases in student, senior and (free) children’s riding has been offset by a loss of adult and other riders (mainly day passes).
Even when the totals were rising, the TTC was losing its primary rider type, adults. There are now about 20 million fewer adult rides, about 4.5%, than in 2014. [Source: TTC Ridership Analysis 1985-2017]
Fare Type
2014
2017
Change
Adult
437.3
417.6
-19.7
Student/Senior
69.0
78.0
9.0
Children
10.8
25.0
14.2
Other
17.7
12.5
-5.2
Total
534.8
533.2
-1.6
Waiting for a Strategy
In March 2016, Councillor and TTC Board Member Shelley Carroll moved:
That TTC staff report back to the Commission by the third quarter of 2016 with a development plan for a comprehensive multi-year strategy to address current ridership stagnation and to achieve a steady rate of ridership growth annually thereafter.
Despite former CEO Andy Byford’s focus on customer service, TTC management did not rush to complete the report. Fall 2016 came and went, as did all of 2017. Eventually a preliminary report appeared in December. The delay was so long that some events overtook the “strategy” with a TTC/GO co-fare announced by Queen’s Park, and the TTC Board and Mayor Tory embracing the two-hour transfer, subject to Council approval.
During this long wait, TTC concentrated on the APTA Transit System of the Year award.
The last five years have seen significant improvements and modernization efforts in all areas of the TTC. This transformation has been acknowledged by customers, who report a significantly improved satisfaction score, and the organization’s American Public Transportation Association peers who awarded the Outstanding Public Transit System of the Year Award to the TTC in 2017. [p. 4]
This award’s primary focus was on organizational turnaround through Byford’s five-year plan, work that was needed to position the TTC to move forward. However, during this period, the budget marching orders from City Hall were to keep down expenses and limit the demand for greater subsidy. This continues into 2018 when any improvements will come by shifting resources between routes, but with no overall service growth.
2018 Ridership Growth Strategy
The Ridership Growth Strategy (RGS) flags three strategic objectives for the TTC’s future.
1. Retain current customers 2. Increase transit rides per current customer 3. Attract new customers to the system [p. 4]
None of these is surprising, but the challenge will be to decide which approaches will yield the greatest effect. Although the RGS contains many proposals, it is not clear on the benefits these will bring to each of the objectives.
Past studies have shown that retaining existing customers and encouraging more trips by them is cheaper than wooing new riders to transit. Current riders have already decided to use the TTC, while new face the biggest change in their travel style moving from a personal vehicle. If the TTC can lure them in, new riders have the potential to generate lots of new rides, but how much will it cost to get them?
The subway extension to York University and Vaughan was a big event, especially for those directly served by the new line. There is no question that the quality of transit service has improved for those who use the extension, but much of the city receives no benefit. Riders far from the subway corridor can only look on with envy at the new service. As for ridership growth, that will be limited to net new riders, and demand projections indicate that most riding on the extended subway will be by people who were already on the TTC.
Rapid transit projects have a role in transforming how transit is perceived in the newly served areas, but they cannot address demand issues across the city, especially in the short term. The TTC might have high customer satisfaction scores, but more is needed to shift auto users to transit.
The TTC’s five year plan includes rapid transit changes–Eglinton Crosstown and Finch West LRTs–but these are actually Metrolinx projects and they will not contribute new ridership in the short term. Many other projects are planned further out–Waterfront, Scarborough, SmartTrack, Richmond Hill, Relief line–but all of these lie outside of the planning horizon. Even the Bloor-Danforth renewal project gets only a passing reference in the plan even though it is critical to rejuvenate and improve Line 2 service and operations.
Census data shows that more people in Toronto are commuting via transit, but that growth is not reflected in TTC statistics. The King Street Pilot shows that there is a latent demand for better transit service even when the measured change appears to be less than what riders perceive. King cars are packed, and the TTC is caught flat-footed with limited additional capacity. For system-wide growth, there must be system-wide change, and this will not be easy in a climate where higher spending does not fit the prevailing political mindset.
A key chart in the RGS report shows the factors affecting customer satisfaction.
Riders-specific items address system usage from the point of view of someone who is already a customer, while non-users factors affect speed and the absence of boundaries that are invisible to auto users. Any proposed improvement must be measured against the common transit basics–total trip time, comfort and cost. The relative importance and benefits must be considered too. Real time information and fare discounts are “good to haves”, but without service people can and want to use, they are window dressing.
The first big challenge will be to know and understand existing ridership. For decades, the TTC counted riders on its vehicles infrequently, and a major route like 501 Queen could go years between updates of riding data. Published route-by-route counts are now four years old. Recent technology can change this.
PRESTO’s data will provide the TTC with insights into travel behaviour that will assist in transit planning and budgeting, while the implementation of automatic passenger counters on the TTC’s surface fleet will increase the frequency of ridership counts. Thereby allowing the TTC to respond more quickly to changes in demand. [p. 6]
One might ask whether City Council is prepared to fund better service if actual demand today and potential demand tomorrow are greater than the TTC can handle by shifting a few buses between routes.
An issue for TTC and Council is that there are two ways of looking at “ridership”. This was evident during staff responses in a recent TTC Board meeting debate. For Service Planning, ridership is “bums in seats”–real riders counted either by hand (the old way) or with new technology (automatic passenger counters and Presto). For the financial folks, ridership is really a revenue question, but it is this measure that is commonly reported. Revenue figures drive budget debates about service levels, not actual counts of passengers.
The problem will grow with the move to two-hour fares where a “ride” as we know it ceases to exist, replaced by a limited time pass. Passengers might take more “trips” on the TTC, but the link between “trips” and “fares” will be tenuous. Reporting of actual demand on routes will be vital to understanding where there are shortfalls in service.
The split between claims of flat ridership while actual rider experience is of growing crowding clouds the funding debates, and out of date counts have masked growth. The TTC quite recently updated its ridership estimate for the King Street corridor from 65,000 to 71,000 daily even without the effect of the transit priority pilot. How many other routes suffer from out of date counts, and what latent demand would push these even higher if only service were improved? Riding counts see only passengers on vehicles, not would-be customers who give up waiting.
What’s In Store for 2018?
The focus for 2018 is on consultation, and this kicks major decisions on transit improvement beyond the election. However, some pending reports will inform debate.
On fares, the principal changes are already in the works–the co-fare with GO Transit and the two-hour transfer. A report is planned in the first quarter of 2018 on a “framework” for implementation of a post-secondary student “UPass”. The RGS is silent on the “Fair Fare” proposal within the city’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, but the TTC advises:
As the report indicates, the RGS is a live document subject to further stakeholder consultation. The Fair Pass is very much part of the strategy and will be added in. [Email from Stuart Green, TTC Communications, January 23, 2018]
A potential landmine in the regional fare debate is the Metrolinx Fare Integration Strategy which is expected in February 2018. With a provincial election in the offing, Queen’s Park might prefer that substantial changes be left for the future. A big step to “integration” would be a funding scheme to allow cross-border recognition of two-hour transfer privileges between the TTC and the transit systems in the 905. This would have obvious benefits for TTC ridership, and the TTC plans to work on its development and implementation this year. However, budget considerations put this option in 2019 or beyond, according to the TTC’s Stuart Green.
On service, a report in the second quarter will analyze the RGS initiatives including changes to the crowding and wait time standards, and a review of weekend service.
Aside from the operating cost, this will take the TTC into thorny debates about increasing the bus fleet and providing a new garage. With current facilities already overcrowded, this has been put off for too long, and the ability to run more service is limited by the space available to store and maintain buses.
The TTC will open the new McNicoll Bus Garage in 2020. The new total design capacity of for the eight garages will be 1881 and the new total buses available, by design, for service will be 1554.
When McNicoll Bus Garage opens, the TTC will continue to operate above capacity with reduced spares ratio beyond 2020 to accommodate service requirements. The planned overcapacity will accommodate 2007 buses at the eight bus garages with 1673 buses available for service. The TTC is assessing locations and available properties for a ninth bus garage. [Briefing Note, p. 6]
The design capacity of 1,554, even with McNicoll Garage, will be only slightly higher than the current peak requirement of 1,528. This is not mentioned in the RGS.
The TTC also plans reports on area studies considering how routes in various parts of the city can be reorganized to better serve riders, but the RGS does not list the affected areas.
The streetcar system will gain some capacity from the continued delivery of new cars by Bombardier, but this will be partly offset by retirement of old ones. The TTC’s budget, keyed to staffing and vehicle hours of service, does not provide for a net increase in the total number of vehicles on the road.
The Briefing Note [p. 4] lists the routes where improvements are planned for fall 2018. Unless you are a customer of these routes, don’t hold your breath waiting for more service.
7 Bathurst
56 Leaside
113 Danforth
11 Bayview
72 Pape
122 Graydon Hall
23 Dawes
79 Scarlett Rd.
165 Weston Rd. North
25 Don Mills
88 South Leaside
185 Don Mills Rocket
26 Dupont
91 Woodbine
195 Jane Rocket
29 Dufferin
96 Wilson
199 Finch Rocket
36 Finch West
107 St. Regis
43 Kennedy
109 Ranee
Notable by their absence is the proposed expansion of the Express Bus Network. This is directly linked to the bus shortage, and the TTC does not expect to begin implementation until 2019.
Between 2019 and 2021, we’re planning new or enhanced Express Bus service on 13 routes, and other routes have been identified as candidates for our Express Bus Network in 2022 and beyond. [Five Year Corporate Plan, p. 67]
Advance the implementation of service enhancements that are currently planned in 2020 to induce ridership growth (i.e. express bus services, new services etc.) [Briefing Note, p. 6]
Transit Priority on Streets
An important part of any plan for the surface routes is a transit priority plan.
Create a Transit Surface Priority Plan in collaboration with City staff that allows buses and streetcars to operate more quickly and consistently on key corridors [RGS, Attachment II, p. 2].
Initiate plan development
Implement transit signal priority on key corridors
Implement up to three queue-jump lanes
This will also include “engagement” with the Toronto Parking Authority “to align parking strategies to support transit.” This will inevitably run headlong into protests from businesses and councillors about the removal or restriction of on-street parking along transit routes, a delicate issue in many wards.
Queue-jump lanes, bypass arrangements for buses at key locations, have been on the TTC’s wish list for years, but they address only local pinch points and require reconstruction of roadways.
How much Toronto will progress beyond having a plan remains to be seen. The proposed plan does not include any rights-of-way, only improved priority on existing streets. Changing the way streets worked was an integral part of the 2003 RGS, and that evolved into the Transit City LRT plan.
A main feature of the strategy is the construction of surface rapid transit rights-of-way on major roads and “Avenues” as identified in the City’s Official Plan. These partially-exclusive transit rights-of-way, in the centre of major roads, will allow surface transit services to be provided on key corridors at speeds and reliability comparable to the subway, and very competitive with the automobile. The strategy highlights the need for the City to act to improve transit operational efficiency on the street system. The City has identified this need, in its work on the Official Plan, and the City must now operationalize its Official Plan by implementing effective policies and regulations to improve surface transit operations. [2003 Ridership Growth Strategy]
Accessibility
Several projects are listed in the RGS although they already exist outside of it:
The Easier Access Program continues with completion of elevators at St. Patrick Station, and start of work at Wilson, Runnymede and Chester. Elevator retrofits are a multi-year plan stretching into the mid 2020s.
A study of subway platform gap reduction and a wayfinding pilot involving electronic beacons for the blind will begin.
The Wheel-Trans “Family of Services” roll out will continue. This is a challenge for the TTC to execute because of variation in the levels of service and physical infrastructure around the system. Politically, the pressure is to cap the growth of expensive services and shift riders onto the “conventional” TTC network wherever possible.
Stop location and design will be reviewed.
As part of a comprehensive review and improvement effort for surface stops across Toronto:
With consultation and support from local councillors and communities, review and optimize stop spacing to improve safety, accessibility, and reliability at approximately 300 bus stops across the city.
Make additional stops on different routes accessible to meet AODA mandated standards.
Continue to support City staff in adding shelters and improving shelter amenities at transit stops across Toronto [Attachment I, p. 1].
Consultation, Communication, Commitment
The RGS includes an extensive consultation plan, although who will be included varies greatly from topic to topic. Councillors and communities are essential not just for advising on components that might go into the plan, but as key players who must understand what might be happening.
There will also be communication both about the studies and about changes already in the pipeline, notably Presto, but communication is no substitute for real change. Without that, there will not be much to tell would-be riders and lure them onto the transit system.
For 2018, there is not much on the table because the Mayor and Council decided in 2017 to continue on their tax-fighting ways. We do not yet know how many of the proposals for 2018, notably the fare changes and the limited amount of service expansion, Mayor Tory and his crew will support. The provincial election in June could bring further complications depending on whose view of transit funding, operations and importance rules at Queen’s Park for the next term.
Toronto is at a point where it must decide whether continued austerity in the quality of municipal services will bring the future city we see in announcements and photo ops.
The core of a Ridership Growth Strategy is not simply to have a document, but to integrate advocacy for better transit throughout the organizational and political debates. Just getting by should not be an acceptable way to run the transit system. Those who tout cutbacks by whatever name should be called out for their true role in undermining the network’s future.
Why We Need Ridership Growth
Transit is an essential part of moving many, many people around the city. Without it, they would be forced into the extra expense of driving, or face much more limited choices of where to travel. Congestion, already bad, would be intolerable.
The change would not be overnight, but a deliberate decision for “business as usual” would bring a gradual decline in transit use, and a concentration on two markets: those who live and work along major corridors and will support whatever service remains to bursting, and those who have no option but to use transit no matter how bad it is.
This would skew political support and hamper the ability to build a network of services beyond high capacity, commuter oriented lines. For someone who is not a transit user, the primary desire would be “to get those (expletives deleted) streetcars/buses out of my way”. They might support a new subway if they would use it, or if they perceive that it would reduce congestion on their commute, but there is no guarantee. Indeed, many who live in Toronto work in the 905, and new subway proposals offer little incentive for them to support transit spending.
In a regional context, if transit cannot work in a city where the population and travel demand is growing, why hope that it can make a difference outside of Toronto?
The more people who use transit not from necessity but because it truly is “the better way”, the more political support there will be to build on that success.
In my reporting of the September 2017 Metrolinx Board Meeting, I reviewed a presentation on Regional Fare Integration. At the time of writing, only the summary presentation to the Board was available, but the full Draft Business Case appeared some time later. This is the sort of timing problem that Metrolinx has vowed to correct.
A basic problem with such a delay is that one must take at face value the claims made by staff to the Board without recourse to the original document. This will mask the shortcomings of the study itself, not to mention any selective reinterpretation of its findings to support a staff position.
In the case of the Regional Fare Integration study, this is of particular concern because Metrolinx planners clearly prefer that the entire GTHA transit structure move to Fare By Distance. However, they keep running into problems that are a mix of organizational, technical and financial issues, not to mention the basic politics involved in setting fares and subsidies. If FBD is presented as the best possible outcome, this could help overcome some objections by “proving” that this is the ideal to which all systems should move.
At the outset, I should be clear about my own position here. The word “Bogus” is in the article’s title not just because it makes a nice literary device, but because I believe that the Fare Integration Study is an example where Metrolinx attempts to justify a predetermined position with a formal study, and even then only selectively reports on information from that study to buttress their preferred policy. The study itself is “professional” in the sense that it examines a range of options by an established methodology, but this does not automatically mean that it is thorough nor that it fully presents the implications of what is proposed.
The supposed economic benefit of a new fare scheme depends largely on replacement of home-to-station auto trips with some form of local transit (conventional, ride share, etc) whose cost is not included in the analysis. This fundamentally misrepresents the “benefit” of a revised fare structure that depends on absorption of new costs by entities outside of the study’s consideration (riders, local municipalities).
The set of possible fare structures Metrolinx has studied has not changed over the past two years, and notably the potential benefits of a two-hour universal fare are not considered at all. On previous occasions Metrolinx has treated this as a “local policy” rather than a potential regional option, not to mention the larger benefits of such fares for riders whose travel involves “trip chaining” of multiple short hops.
One must read well into the report to learn that the best case ridership improvement from any of the fare schemes is 2.15% over the long term to 2031, and this assumes investment in fare subsidies. Roughly the same investment would achieve two thirds of the same ridership gain simply by providing a 416/905 co-fare without tearing apart the entire regional tariff. In either case, this is a trivial change in ridership over such a long period suggesting that other factors beyond fare structure are more important in encouragement or limitation of new ridership. Moreover, it is self-evident that such a small change in ridership cannot make a large economic contribution to the regional economy.
Specifics of the Board Presentation
The Board Presentation gives a very high level overview of the draft study.
On page 2:
The consultant’s findings in the Draft Preliminary Business Case include:
All fare structure concepts examined perform better than the current state, offering significant economic value to the region
Making use of fare by distance on additional types of transit service better achieves the transformational strategic vision than just adding modifications to the existing structure, but implementation requires more change for customers and transit agencies
More limited modifications to the status quo have good potential over the short term
“Significant” is the key word here, and this is not supported by the study itself. Ridership gains due to any of the new fare structures, with or without added subsidies, are small, a few percent over the period to 2031. The primary economic benefit is, as the draft study itself explains, the imputed value of converting park-and-ride trips to home based transit trips thanks to the lower “integrated” fare for such services, encouraged possibly by charging for what is now free parking.
A large portion of automobile travel reduction benefits come from shift from park and ride trips to using transit for the whole trip – highlighting the importance of exploring paid parking to also encourage a shift from automobile for transit access. (p. xiv)
However, local transit (be it a conventional bus, a demand-responsive ride sharing service, or even a fleet of autonomous vehicles) does not now exist at the scale and quality needed, and this represents a substantial capital and operating cost that is not included to offset the notional savings from car trips.
Fare by distance does perform “better” than the alternatives, but none of them does much to affect ridership. Moreover, the fare structure, to the limited extent that the study gives us any information on this, remains strongly biased in favour of cheaper travel for longer trips. An unasked (and hence unanswered) question is whether true fare by distance and the sheer scale of the GTHA network can exist while attracting long-haul riders and replacing their auto trips with transit.
On page 3, the presentation includes recommendations for a step-by-step strategy:
Discounts on double fares (GO-TTC)
Discounts on double fares (905-TTC)
Adjustments to GO’s fare structure
Fare Policy Harmonization
This is only a modest set of goals compared to a wholesale restructuring of the regional tariff, and it includes much of what is proposed by “Concept 1” in the study – elimination of the remaining inter-operator fare boundaries, restructuring GO fares (especially those for short trips) to better reflect the distance travelled, and harmonization of policies such as concession fare structures and transfer rules.
Further consultation is to follow, although as we now know, the first of the four steps has already been approved by TTC and Metrolinx.
On page 6:
Without more co-ordinated inclusive decision making, agencies’ fare systems are continuing to evolve independently of one another leading to greater inconsistency and divergence.
This statement is not entirely true.
The GO-TTC co-fare is an indication of movement toward fare unification, although the level of discount offered on TTC fares is considerably smaller than the discount for 905-GO trips. That distinction is one made by the provincial government as a budget issue, and it cannot be pinned on foot-dragging at the local level.
Assuming that Toronto implements a two-hour transfer policy later in 2018 (and the constraint on its start date is a function of Presto, not TTC policy), there will be a common time-based approach to fares across the GTHA. All that remains is the will to fund cross-border acceptance of fares (actually Presto tap-ons) regardless of where a trip begins.
Without question, there should be a catalog of inconsistencies across the region, and agreement on how these might be addressed, but that will involve some hard political decisions. Would Toronto eliminate free children’s fares? Would low-cost rides to seniors and/or the poor now offered in parts of the 905 be extended across the system? Will GO Transit insist on playing by separate rules from every other operator as a “premium” service? These questions are independent of whether fares are flat, by distance, or by some other scheme as they reflect discount structures, not basic fare calculations.
Pages 6 and 7 rehash what has come before on pp. 2-3, but the emphasis on fare by distance remains:
Fare by distance should be a consideration in defining the long-term fare structure for the GTHA. [p. 7]
“A consideration” is less strong language than saying that FBD should be the target framework. If this is to be, then Metrolinx owes everyone with whom they will “consult” a much more thorough explanation of just how the tariff would work and how it would affect travel costs. The draft report is quite threadbare in that respect with only one “reference” tariff used as the basis for a few fare comparisons, along with a caveat that this should not be considered as definitive. That is hardly a thorough public airing of the effects of a new fare structure.
No convincing rationale has been advanced for moving to a full fare by distance system, including for all local travel, and it persists mainly because Metrolinx planners are like a dog unwilling to give up a favourite, long-chewed bone. At least the draft study recognizes that there are significant costs, complexities and disruptions involved with FBD, begging the question of why it should be the preferred end state.
On page 8:
Amend [GO Transit fares] to address short/medium trips and create a more logical fare by distance structure based on actual distance travelled instead of current system to encourage more ridership.
This is an odd statement on two counts:
Lowering fares for short trips will encourage demand on a part of the GO system that overlaps the local TTC system, and will require capacity on GO that might not be available, especially in the short term before full RER service builds out.
True FBD will increase long trip fares on GO and discourage the very long haul riders whose auto-based trips GO extensions were intended to capture. The reference tariff implied by sample fares in the draft report is most decidedly not FBD with short haul fares at a rate about four times that of long hauls.
In other words, the goal as presented to the Board does not match the actual sample fare structure used in the draft study.
On page 14:
GO/UP uses tap on/off, other agencies are tap on only. Emerging technological solutions may allow tap on-only customer experience while maintaining compatibility with fare-by-distance or –zone structures.
The technology in question, as described in the study, would require all Presto users to carry a GPS enabled device that could detect their exit from vehicles automatically without the need to physically tap off. This requires a naïve belief that all riders will carry smart mobile devices to eliminate the congestion caused by a physical tap on/off for all trip segments, and is is a middle-class, commuter-centric view of the transit market.
On page 15:
Completely missing from the discussion is any consideration of loyalty programs such as monthly passes or other “bulk buy” ways of paying fares. Already on the TTC, over half of all rides (as opposed to riders) are paid for in bulk, primarily through Metropasses. GO Transit itself has a monthly capping system which limits the number of fares charged per month, and software to implement the equivalent of a TTC Day Pass through fare capping is already in place on Presto. (It has not been turned on because of the possible hit to TTC revenues if riders were to start receiving capped fares without having to buy a pass up front.)
Several issues are listed here that reflect the complexity of a system where the lines between local and regional service have already started to blur, and where simplistic segmentation of classes of service simply do not work. The argument implicit in this is that only a zonal or distance based fare will eliminate many of the problems, but there is no discussion of the benefits obtained simply by a cross-boundary co-fare plus time-based transfer rules to benefit multiple short-hop trips. This demonstrates the blinkered vision at Metrolinx and a predisposition to distance-based “solutions”.
For those who will not read to the end of the detailed review, my concluding thoughts:
There are major gaps in the analysis and presentation of the Draft Report. By the end of the study, it is abundantly clear that the target scheme is FBD and future work will aim in that direction. Metrolinx’ FBD goal has not changed, and this begs the question of how any sort of “consultation” can or will affect the outcome.
The remainder of this article examines the 189-page Draft Report and highlights issues in the analysis.
Two months ago, I wrote about the Regional Transportation Plan that Metrolinx had put out for public comment, and that period for online feedback has now closed. In the interim, I had hoped to see more details in the new plan, more analysis that could inform debate and feedback, but very little has appeared on the website where one might expect to see a wealth of background. Instead, there are three studies:
The last of these drew my attention first both because of its size and because this would be the place one would expect to learn how the draft network came to be, and what the benefits are expected from its components. Alas, that information is not just missing, it is not even hinted at as if it might exist in some deeper background study. Metrolinx provides a very general overview of the anticipated effect of their network, but little sense of the relative value of its components.
The purpose of the regional network study is quite clear:
This will serve as one of several technical background reports that will provide a foundation for the RTP Update.
The purpose of this Phase 1 report is to describe the preliminary recommendations for a 2041 strategic transit network for the RTP Update. This includes the identification, analysis and evaluation of potential transit projects and the development of a regional transit network to effectively meet existing and future transit needs across the region. Together, these activities comprise Phase 1 of the Regional Transit Network Planning Study.
Phase 2 of the study will support the RTP implementation plan, and will include the preparation of refined alternatives, specific recommendations, potential roles for various service providers, and a preliminary phasing strategy for the proposed strategic transit network. [p. 1]
In other words, don’t look for specifics here because they’re still working on the details.
Only one paragraph later comes a vital comment under the heading of “Regionally Significant Transit”:
While the provision of effective transit is dependent upon a fully integrated system with local transit supporting regional routes, this study focuses on transit projects
that are considered regionally significant. The resulting regional network is intended to link seamlessly with municipal transit services that are planned and operated
by GTHA municipalities. [p. 2]
Local municipally-provided services are an integral part of any network, but they are assumed to “be there” and are not the focus of this study. However, the funding and expansion of local transit is essential to the “last mile” problem where most regional network users access it via park-and-ride lots, a mode that is not sustainable for an expanded system. This is particularly important for trips that are not anchored at one end by a major destination node, or very good local transit. There is no point in making a trip through a “regional” station if there is no “local” service to complete the journey.
Metrolinx held a Board meeting on December 7, followed on December 12 by a Town Hall.
Public questions to the Town Hall were submitted in advance and in real time during the Town Hall online, and in person by attendees. Metrolinx plans to put answers to all questions, including those that could not be handled during the Town Hall itself online in coming weeks. That record is now available at MetrolinxEngage.
My interest in both events was as much to see how the new CEO Phil Verster would handle himself especially during an open Q&A session which has not, to be kind, been part of the corporate culture at Metrolinx.
The TTC Budget Committee met today and considered the draft 2018 Operating Budget. Between the original release (described later in this article) and today’s meeting, Mayor Tory and two members of the TTC Board endorsed the concept of a two-hour fare to replace the complex transfer rules now in place.
Although this was listed as the second item on the revised meeting agenda, Commissioner Mary Fragedakis moved that it be considered first. This re-ordering was a procedural move to forestall a standard tactic used at City Council where a motion setting the next year’s tax increase is introduced and passed before the budget which it will fund. The result is that any proposed budget changes must fit within the already-approved tax level rather than having taxes set after the budget is finalized. In this case, the motion regarding a two-hour fare was only a report request, and the order was less critical. That request passed by a vote of 3-1 with Budget Chair John Campbell in the negative as he opposes the two-hour fare scheme.
The meeting then turned to a series of deputations which, as these things tend to do, fell on largely hostile ears. A favourite tactic is to challenge members of the public to explain “how would you do it”, despite the fact that the issues are complex and do not fit within an answer of a few sentences. The Budget Committee itself cancels more of its meetings than it holds, and opportunities for an open debate about transit policy options and the budget rarely occur.
Beyond information already in the budget report, there were a few additional items of note in the staff presentation.
The Cost of the Vaughan Extension
This comes up from time to time, and it is clear that the Committee did not fully understand the costs and revenues associated with the extension.
For some time, a cost increase of $30 million annually has been cited for the TYSSE. However, the 2018 Budget only includes a $25 million bump because $5 million had already been included for start-up costs and operation in the 2017 Budget.
The $25 million comes from a combination of new costs, and revised revenues. The TTC now receives $8 million for bus services operated on contract for York Region, but those services will be assumed by the Region when the subway extension opens. The TTC will continue to operate the vehicles, but now at their own cost and so this is a net increase in costs because of the lost revenue. That amount is partly offset by a combination of $3 million in new fare revenue and $1 million in parking revenue.
Ridership
The projected ridership for 2018 is 539 million, a growth of 3 million over the probable results for 2017, but below the originally budgeted target of 543.8 million. The change from 2017 to 2018 arises from several factors:
Increases:
4.8 million rides due to economic growth
2.1 million rides due to service improvements and the GO Transit co-fare
1.5 million more rides by children (who travel free of charge)
1.2 million new rides from the TYSSE
0.5 million additional rides counted due to improved reliability of Presto readers
Total: 10.1 million
Note that most of the expected ridership on the TYSSE will be by existing riders changing travel patterns, not by net new riders. This is further constrained because York Region Transit will continue to serve York University directly thanks to a lack of agreement on a co-fare between YRT and TTC. Riders who were anticipated to show up as YRT-TYSSE-YorkU trips will not be using the subway. It is ironic that there will be more new rides by children on the system as a whole than by riders on the subway extension.
Half a million rides were estimated to have not been counted in 2017 because failing Presto readers were unable to charge these fares. The TTC’s Brad Ross advises that these are
“rides not counted, assuming they still rode but couldn’t pay. The TTC is in the process of accounting for all lost revenue due to out-of-service Presto readers.”
Reductions:
0.5 million rides due to increased subway closures
0.7 million rides due to the elimination of the Public Transit Tax Credit
2.8 million rides due to decreasing sales of Metropasses and Day Passes
3.1 million rides due to a reduction in the average number of trips taken on each Metropass
Total: 7.1 million
This provides the net increase of 3 million over 2017 probable results.
Expense Risks
The budget has been drawn up on a conservative basis and leaves several areas where the outcomes in 2018 could be different than projected. The $14 million now sitting in the Transit Stabilization Reserve could be used to offset some of this risk, provided that Council does not scoop the reserve simply to hold down the subsidy increase.
Some of the items below refer to savings that allowed 2017 to show a “surplus” (actually a reduced requirement for subsidy), and these might not all continue into 2018.
The budget contains a provision for $4.1 million in extra costs through the provincially mandated payment for two emergency leave days per year. This has been estimated conservatively, and TTC staff advised the Committee that the worst case cost could be $18 million.
The History of TTC Budget Variances and Subsidies
For many years, the TTC has consistently come in under budget for the annual subsidy requirement. In the table below, the amounts are for the subsidies, not for the overall operating costs. This always leaves the TTC in a position for its next year estimates that a budget-to-budget subsidy flat-line actually represents an increase over actual requirements in the current year.
The subsidy per rider will go up in 2018 because of the fare freeze. Although this takes Toronto back to the level of 2010, that does not allow for cost inflation over that period which has been well above the CPI.
The Metrolinx Board met on October 26 with an agenda that was largely discussed in private. This article is a follow-up to the preview published before the meeting.
A major item on the confidential agenda concerned “Benefits Management and Realization”. Why this was handled at such great length in private is a mystery, and I attempted without success to clarify the topic of discussion with Metrolinx.
I asked:
Is this the issue of identifying, encouraging and capturing some of the benefits of transit expansion?
In a thoroughly opaque reply, Metrolinx stated:
Benefits management is a process to help us maximize project value as Metrolinx plans, builds, operates and connects transit projects in order to provide benefits to the region. [Email of Oct. 23 from Scott Money in Metrolinx Communications]
A major problem for Metrolinx and for the Regional Plan in general is the propensity to build stations surrounded by parking lots and structures (GO) or free-standing architectural sculptures that make integration with future development quite difficult. On a smaller scale, Metrolinx will have to get used to thinking smaller, in the sense that stops on BRT and LRT lines should not be planned around massive growth but depend on medium density locally plus intersecting feeder routes.
Metrolinx has committed to publishing information about its private sessions in the future, and it will be interesting to see how much we actually learn about evolving thoughts on this issue. After all, this meeting was billed as a “strategy session”.
The New CEO Introduces Himself
Metrolinx’ new CEO, Phil Verster, made a few remarks most of which were predictable as so much at Metrolinx meetings can be.
His focus since joining the agency has been on talking to customers and front line staff, especially those who do the invisible tasks that keep the system running. He has also been consulting with Metrolinx staff and management about the importance of positioning the agency to get the most out of the investment in the RER (Regional Express Rail) program over the coming years.
Among many projects, Verster spoke of the Kipling mobility hub (recently announced with a media event by sundry politicians), a project that has been brewing for over a decade.
Fare integration was another topic Verster focused on with the recently announced GO-TTC co-fare arrangement being the first step to region-wide integration. This will affect business case analyses, travel behaviours and patterns. New travel, of course, will depend not only on fares, but also on service, a topic on which Verster was silent.
In a telling comment, Verster observed that while Metrolinx has a lot of capital improvements underway, it is important to remember “the soft stuff” of organizational improvement, transparency to the community, and becoming an organization that represents transit in an objective and positive manner.
Being “objective” is a topic that returned in other discussions as the meeting went on.
Antoine Belaieff presented an overview of the RTP consultations to date. He reported that reception to the draft plan as been generally positive, but that there is continued impatience for system improvements. Riders want seamless fares and service, have diverse opinions on parking and station access, and are interested in seeing how the plan will be staged and implemented. At the municipal level there were few surprises because local planners have been involved in developing the draft, although there is some interest in adding projects to the plan. Stakeholders want clarity about the first/last mile problem and how the growth in travel with RER will affect station access. There is continued interest in long and short haul goods movement by truck and rail.
There have been “fairly technical” discussions about roles and responsibilities for Metrolinx vs the provincial government, especially with respect to the provincial Growth Plan, and a desire for “crisp and concrete” language.
Phil Verster observed that the plan should not be “final” but should be open to changes. It should not be an “event” but an ongoing process.
Board member Upkar Arora asked whether people have been flagging omissions in the plan, have concerns about the environment and sustainability, or are split between an urban/suburban view of the plan.
Belaieff replied that, if anything, people are having to digest a “rich” plan that has a great deal to absorb. Feedback on environment issues has been supportive because of the plan’s “call to action”. Suburban areas tend to focus on how the plan will support growth both through new stations and with expansion that is timely relative to development.
Board member Rahul Bhardwaj asked whether “we hearing from the right people” or just those who are usually engaged, and using an unfortunate phrase, referred to the “silent majority”. Belaieff replied that he was pleased to see audiences not just of his planning friends, but that there was genuine input from “everyday” people. Getting attendees to meetings is hard, and Metrolinx is counting on local networks to help with this, but both “planning intellectuals” and “real people” were present. Leslie Woo, Chief Planning Officer, noted the need to reach marginalized communities.
Woo advised that there will be a report in December on the feedback Metrolinx has received and how it will affect the next version of the document. In parallel staff are working on economic information and will propose “a way forward” with the plan and its implementation. She proposed that the plan not be considered as finite, but as a generator of more specific studies.
One statement caught my ear, namely that this is a plan for ten years, after which there will be a new plan. That is technically correct, in that there is a legal mandate to review the plan every decade (the current review is triggered by that), but the RTP is intended to look forward a quarter century and given the lead time for the most complex projects, a ten year outlook simply won’t do.
As for the comments about “real people” at meetings, this cuts two ways. On one hand, it is vital that the plan be shaped by genuine public opinion as opposed to the “usual suspects” be they those of us who always comment on anything, or politicians who warp transit plans to suit their electoral goals. On the other hand, public opinion can be skewed by biased presentations, and some of the activism so familiar in transit circles arises directly from the need to provide contrary views to the official versions. Being “engaged” should not disqualify one from providing input to a vital plan, and engagement does not necessarily translate to agreement.
The finality of a plan, or its openness to change, is always a tug of war at the planning and political levels. Plans that are open to constant change can leave us with a situation where changing priorities and limited funding guarantee that nothing actually happens. On the other hand, the lack of published details behind many parts of the plan, specifically ridership projections, land use assumptions, project costs and priorities leave us with a full network for 2041 but no sense of how we will get there, or how subsets of the plan would perform.
Phil Verster introduced this report as an examination of an alternative “green” way to implement non-diesel propulsion for GO saying that there will be a very important feasibility study of the technology this fall. Mark Ciavarro, VP of RER Implementation, took the Board through the presentation (linked above) together with Peter Zuk, Chief Capital Officer.
Ciavarro noted that interest in hydrogen as a fuel goes back to 2012 when it was still a relatively new technology and, at the time, not worth further pursuit. In September 2016, Alstom unveiled a pilot and the vehicle is now in testing, although in a different, much smaller form than trains GO would use. The test train reaches a maximum speed of 140 km/h, and 60 trains are on order. Chief Operating Officer Greg Percy noted that GO’s top speed now is 90m/h or 150km/h. Greg Verster stated that speeds of 180-200km/h and up lie in High Speed Rail territory.
Chair Rob Prichard noted that there is a terminology issue in that all locomotives are electric, but the question is where the energy comes from. [Diesel locos generate their power on board while “electric” locos obtain power from an overhead wire. In both cases the actual propulsion is provided by an electric motor. However, truly electric trains give the option of powering all cars, not just the locomotive, and this changes a train’s performance.]
Zuk stated that GO is electrifying its network and the question is how this would be done. They are doing a feasibility study of hydrogen and other potential technologies. In Germany, commercial uses of hydrogen goes back to 2002, but there is a question here of the scale and applicability to large commuter rail operations.
Verster observed that the application of hydrogen trains in Germany would be to rural lines where electrification infrastructure is not cost effective. The train is small, and the issue is whether the technology can be scaled up. There will be challenges and that is why Metrolinx is conducting the feasibility study. There are hydrogen fuel cell applications in LRT and buses, but this is the first train. Surplus electricity can be used to create hydrogen, and that first stage is always expensive. This is a key part of the study.
Board member Carl Zehr asked whether the study will look at the transition to and integration of hydrogen technology. Verster replied only the technical feasibility is being studied in the immediate future. His main objective is to deliver RER at the best cost and time. With respect to using the technology on track that GO does not own [portions of some corridors are owned by CN and CP which operate freight traffic over them], hydrogen trains could avoid the need for overhead contact systems (OCS) on non-GO trackage but there is no regulatory framework for this yet in Canada.
Zuk noted that each component of hydrogen fuel cell technology has been around for years. What is new is their integration into a rail system. Metrolinx needs to determine if and how fuel delivery will work, and how the technology would fit into EMU (electric multiple unit) trains.
There will be a symposium to assess the state of the technology on November 16, 2017 (see p. 13 in the presentation deck) and this will be open to outside parties. Whether this means media and the general public is as yet uncertain.
Rob Prichard wondered whether GO Transit would be the last system to build an overhead based system. The obvious rejoinder is that the whole world is building these systems. Verster replied that Metrolinx should not engage in delivering a program that is dependent on research and development.
The study will likely be done by the end of 2017 with a report for the February 2018 Board meeting.
During the press scrum after the meeting, the Star’s Ben Spurr asked Chair Prichard and CEO Phil Verster what made them think hydrogen technology is even possible. Verster replied unambiguously that there are significant community ridership benefits in RER, and Metrolinx will not jeopardize this based on a technology that is not ready to market. He observed that the study will affect RER procurement – under a DBFOM scheme (where a bidder does everything from designing to operating and maintaining the system) there is a question of what technologies a provide might bid.
Spurr also asked about Metrolinx attempting to position Ontario as a global leader, and whether this is a transit agency’s role. Verster replied that Metrolinx should “scan the horizon” to know what is available.
The DBFOM reference raises the question of whether Metrolinx is planning to outsource its RER operations completely on a turnkey basis. I attempted to obtain clarification of this from Metrolinx later on (the scrum ran out of time), but replies yielded no information at all. As for hydrogen itself, it is clear that there is a tension between the basic action of getting an update on the technology, and a political stance that would provide Ontario (and its politicians) with yet another chance to show off advanced technology. Our experience in that regard is less than stellar.
This report is substantially the same as the one presented at the recent TTC Board meeting. It deals with the proposed agreement between Metrolinx and the City of Toronto/TTC to implement the first stage in a planned four-stage evolution of regional fares:
a) Discounts on double fares (GO-TTC)
b) Discounts on double fares (905-TTC)
c) Adjustments to GO’s fare structure
d) Fare Policy Harmonization
Leslie Woo expects to report to the December Board meeting on all of these.
During the scrum, Rob Prichard observed that although the GO-TTC co-fare is a three year agreement, he feels that unwinding it is unlikely because it is so clearly the right policy direction. If anything, it will be rolled into a more extensive set of integrated fares.
We can only hope that Metrolinx has moved beyond regarding the matter of time-based fares (the two-hour transfer) as a matter of local policy rather than as a potential key part of regional integration for non-GO services. All systems outside of Toronto now use this scheme, and York Region recently eliminated its zone fares. Only the TTC remains as an exception, and there will be a proposal in the coming Ridership Growth Strategy that Toronto move to the two-hour transfer.
This could leave Metrolinx in the position of trying to foist fare by distance, their long-favoured scheme, on local systems that have already standardized on a flat, time-based fare.
Governance
The agenda included a private session item on governance which will be public at the December meeting. This may deal with the issue of which items and reports are dealt with in private session, and which are made public, especially before rather than after they are massaged to fit political reaction.
Rob Prichard, after much prodding in the media scrum, allowed that the controversy over Kirby and Lawrence East Stations was a “catalyst for discussion”. Phil Verster took a shot at the issue by saying that there are four phases to the benefits case process and the station review is at stage 1. There will be more information later in the cycle. Ben Spurr challenged him on the sequence of a Ministerial announcement that appears to seal the decision. Verster replied that communities should get a sense of direction, but that Metrolinx has a long way to go in the maturity of how they work with benefits cases. These are not an absolute science but have strategic overlays leading to a policy decision.
The Globe’s Oliver Moore asked if the Ministerial intervention was appropriate. Verster replied that he cannot comment, but wants to look forward. Metrolinx will give informed advice and options, but it is up to the politicians to make decisions.
These statements dip and dive around the issue, and the comments about the uncertain nature of benefits cases beg the question of the value of the degree to which Metrolinx has relied on these in the past as definitive studies. Either they can hide behind studies as the work of “experts”, or they can recognize them as works in progress that might not be “mature”.
Correction: The original version of this article claimed that the Board was meeting in private today to discuss matters that will be on the agenda tomorrow. The Tweet from Metrolinx about today’s is a Stakeholder meeting, not a Board meeting. Thanks to Ben Spurr at the Star for catching this.
The Metrolinx Board will gather on Thursday, October 26 for what is described in the media release as its “annual strategy meeting”. Much of the agenda will be discussed in camera, and if the agency has a strategy, we won’t learn much about how the board members feel on the subject.
The meeting announcement tells us that the Board will discuss “transit expansion progress”. Maybe, but that hardly sounds like “strategy” with the Draft Regional Transit Plan already out to the public for comment. The draft ignores many issues, and the plan does not improve the regional modal split for transit beyond current levels. Moreover, the transit growth is disproportionately focused on Toronto’s core, but transit loses ground (not that it has much to start with) the further from the centre one gets.
Hard discussions about how road space will be used – transit, multi-occupancy vehicles, freight, cycling, pedestrians – need to happen at the regional level, not just on a few “transit streets” downtown. This is a debate both for the 905 and for Toronto’s suburbs where the combination of built form and transit density work against a strong transit market share.
In any event, the public agenda item is a small update on consultation, not a review of any significant policy issues, and it is scheduled for only 15 minutes.
About a month ago, I published a review of the draft plan, and plan to return to the subject in another article soon. My intent had been to make a “deep dive” into the draft, beyond its introductory chapter, but I quickly found how little of substance is actually there.
Other items on the Metrolinx agenda include:
In Private
Benefits Management and Realization (90 minutes)
The title might suggest a discussion of the knotty problem of actually capturing some of the value created by transit investments. I asked Metrolinx to explain just what this was about, and they replied:
Benefits management is a process to help us maximize project value as Metrolinx plans, builds, operates and connects transit projects in order to provide benefits to the region. [Email from Scott Money at Metrolinx, Oct. 23, 2017]
Why, exactly, this should be a matter of confidential discussion is a mystery. This is quite clearly an important part of transit network building, but it has been sidelined when political considerations take precedence over planning issues and “mobility hubs” are little more than enormous parking lots.
Board Governance (15 minutes)
Given recent discussions about political interference in transit decision-making, I cannot help wondering if the Board is aware of its irrelevance, real or perceived. The rare public meetings, the superficial level of debate, and the blizzard of press releases and photo ops from the Minister of Transportation’s office don’t help the situation one bit.
Much of the real debate appears to take place in committee meetings which are so private they are not even advertised and there are is no public record of them.
Metrolinx’ new CEO, Phil Verster, has spoken of the need for “transparency” at Metrolinx, but the problem begins above his level at the Board itself.
Regional Express Rail (60 minutes)
This includes two items: the procurement of a new network operator, and an update on the capital program. Metrolinx has disqualified the current operator, Bombardier, from bidding, a strange move that might raise more eyebrows if Bombardier were not so late on its LRV deliveries. As for the capital programs generally, the only part of this that belongs in a private session would be information on contract issues.
A preliminary discussion of risk issues (30 minutes)
Risk management is an important topic for any Board, and some aspects rightly belong in a private session. That this is “preliminary” and is included in a “strategy” meeting begs the question of what new risks the organization faces, including political fallout from the coming election.
2018/19 Budget Submission (30 minutes)
Unlike budgets at the City of Toronto and TTC, provincial budgets are dark secrets until the moment they are unveiled in the legislature. This puts the public debate of “strategy” for Metrolinx in a difficult position because any spending proposals could embarrass the government by showing what could be if funding were available, or if projects face financial difficulties that could upset spending or delivery plans. The budget could also include new revenue generating strategies including mandated contributions from so-called “municipal partners” or changes to fare schemes.
These are important issues, but we will never hear about them from Metrolinx because of the way Provincial budgets work.
In Public
I will update these sections if there is anything substantive presented at the meeting.
The Minister of Transportation is hot to trot on hydrogen as an alternative fuel, and so of course, Metrolinx must be as well. This report is a review of the current status of the Hydrail project in Germany and an overview of the study work needed to assess its implications for Ontario and GO/RER.
This is simply a repeat of the information in the report about the planned co-fare with TTC that has already been dealt with at that agency and is now working its way to City Council.
The December schedules bring the opening of the Spadina subway extension to Vaughan Metropolitan Centre Station and a major reorganization of bus routes along the subway corridor.
Bus routes will be reorganized to serve the subway stations, and in some cases services will be split at the subway corridor. The map below is taken from the TTC’s project page for the line.
Services north of Steeles Avenue that were formerly operated by the TTC on behalf of York Region under contract will now be run by their own transit agency. Fares on the subway have yet to be integrated with YRT, and so a TTC fare will apply to subway journeys while a local YRT fare will apply to the bus feeder network. This is the subject of ongoing discussion, and as usual the issue is who will pay to subsidize a lower co-fare between the two agencies.
The subway will continue the same hours of service it now provides, and the new first/last train times are shown in the table below.
The first train of the day inbound from Vaughan will be at about 5:50 am except on Sundays when service begins at 7:50.
The late night schedule is driven by the long-standing meet at Bloor-Yonge between outbound trains to Finch, Kennedy and Kipling stations at 1:54 am. The last inbound train from Vaughan will leave just after 1 am, and the last outbound train will arrive at about 2:30.
Service on the bus routes affected by the subway is generally at levels similar to what operates today with only a few exceptions.
York Region Transit will take over service north of Steeles Avenue now provided by the following routes:
35 Jane
105 Dufferin North
107 Keele North
165 Weston Road North
Route changes:
35 Jane and 195 Jane Rocket: Extended to Pioneer Village Station (Steeles).
36 Finch West: Route split at Finch West Station (Keele & Finch) during most operating periods. Peak service west of Keele Street improved. Service east of Keele will be reduced in many periods recognizing that many riders will not ride east of the station.
41 Keele: Local service extended to Pioneer Village Station. Express service terminated at Finch West Station.
60 Steeles West: Service reorganized to focus on Pioneer Village Station rather than York University.
84 Sheppard West: Peak period Oakdale service extended to Pioneer Village Station. 84E express from Yonge to Sheppard West Station replaces 196B York University Rocket.
106 Sentinel: Formerly named 106 York University. Extended to Pioneer Village Station.
107 St. Regis: Formerly named 107 Keele North. York U service rerouted and extended to Pioneer Village Station.
108 Driftwood: Formerly named 108 Downsview. Extended to Pioneer Village Station.
117 Alness-Chesswood: Formerly named 117 Alness. Rerouted to better serve the area west of Dufferin Street.
196 York U Rocket: Replaced by the subway extension.
199 Finch Rocket: York U branch cut back to Finch West Station.
Night service will be provided to the York U ring road by 335 Jane, 341 Keele and 353 Steeles. The 336 Finch bus will not serve Finch West Station.
Holiday Period Service
The summary of the schedule changes linked at the top of this article includes a page outlining the service to be provided through the December-January holidays. The highlights are:
Service on many surface routes and on Line 2 Bloor-Danforth will operate with summer schedules from Monday, December 18 to Friday, January 5. Extra school trips will not operate.
Christmas and New Year’s Days will operate with Sunday service including the 8:00 am opening time for the subway.
New Year’s Eve service will be extended on many routes until roughly 4:00 am with extra service on the subway.
Regular service resume on Monday, January 8, 2018.
New Year’s Eve services include:
Service is expected to operate free after 7:00 pm as in past years, but the details have not yet been announced.
The last train meet at Bloor-Yonge for outbound service will occur at 3:37 am rather than the usual 1:54 am. The last trains on 4 Sheppard and 3 SRT will wait for the last trains on 1 Yonge and 2 Bloor-Danforth respectively.
501 Queen will divert via Church, King and Spadina after 11:00 pm for festivities at City Hall.
509 Harbourfront will have extra service every 9 minutes until 2:00 am and every 15 minutes thereafter.
510/310 Spadina will have extra service every 6 minutes until 1:30 am, every 8 minutes until 3:00 and every 12 minutes thereafter.
Gap and standby buses will be provided downtown and at other locations to provide extra service as needed.
Contract service outside of Toronto on 52 Lawrence West, 129 McCowan North and 68 Warden will be extended to 4:00 am. Service on 160 Bathurst North, 17 Birchmount and 102 Markham Rd will end at the usual time.
Steve Munro 