In this final installment of the series, I will review proposals for improving customer service as they relate to payment of fares, the TTC’s role in the community and the responsibilities of the TTC and its customers.
Please note that some comments submitted to previous articles that dealt with primarily these issues have been moved to this thread.
In the first part of this series, I looked at the background of the TTC’s Customer Service Advisory Panel, and reviewed the first set of their recommendations dealing, broadly, with organizational issues.
In this second part, I will review the three sections dealing with communications: TTC to customers, customers to TTC and within the TTC itself.
Since 1954, the coat of arms of the Toronto Transit Commission has proclaimed the slogan “Service Courtesy Safety”. After the Russell Hill subway crash in 1995, safety and maintenance quality zoomed to the front of the pack. Years of neglect, of saying “we can get by” on inadequate budgets, finally took their toll.
Much work has been done to restore a safety culture at the TTC, to the point where other important aspects of the operation were eclipsed.
The TTC hasn’t had the best of times. Although last year’s civic workers strike was not a TTC affair, any municipal strike reminds voters of past job actions by transit workers. By late 2009. the media were in a feeding frenzy looking for any stories to discredit the Miller/Giambrone administration. The “sleeping collector” fell right into their laps, and became the lighting rod for a host of complaints about the TTC, its employees and its service.
In March 2010, the TTC created an independent “Customer Service Advisory Panel” to examine a range of issues, and that panel reported yesterday, August 23. The full report is available here.
Reading through it, I was struck by many quite reasonable items, but also by a sense that parts of the document were an attempt at face saving. Too many recommendations place the responsibility for change at the front line employee or even at the customer without acknowledging that the best employee cannot do a good job without proper support from the organization. Management must not regard good service (in many senses of that word) as something they can’t afford. Departments must not assume that “it’s someone else’s job” to deal with problems, or defend their turf against others while failing to provide good service.
To give TTC management credit, statements by Chief General Manager Gary Webster at the press conference, the Commission meeting and on an interview with CBC Radio were open in accepting the need for organizational change. Yes, there are some proposals with significant costs attached, but many structural and procedural problems require only the will to change how the TTC does business.
Early in the report, the panel tells us:
[W]e were pleasantly surprised to learn that all of the TTC stakeholders are passionate about their transit system. Everyone, from employees to management to customers, truly wants a TTC of which they can be proud. [p 2]
This should not be a surprise. The TTC was once (as they so often told us) the envy of transit systems world-wide, a system of which the city could justifiably be proud. But that was a long time ago. Years of mutual back-patting among the TTC brotherhood coupled with declining financial support from governments of all parties were a poisonous combination.
If you’re perfect, it’s hard to admit that some of the lights are burned out, that the stations are getting dirty, that the trains are not maintained to quite the standards of “the old days”. If you’re perfect, then your customer service must be ideal, a sterling example for others to follow. Pride in the system was replaced with self-congratulation, with a view bounded by the mirror on the wall.
That desire for pride is worth remembering through the entire process. We want to believe in the TTC, we want to show our friends (even those who think that the only way to get around is in a car) how good transit can be, we want people to say “have you heard what Toronto is doing”. We don’t want excuses.
Another surprise for the panel was the rider expectations for TTC frontline staff:
Operators are expected to act as a tour guide, policy enforcer, fare collector, and custodian, while providing information, directions, and special assistance. All of this and much more is expected while, at the same time, they are to operate the vehicle in a safe manner – Paying attention to the road at all times, adhere to the speed limit despite a tight schedule, and practice defensive driving. And, above all, they must ensure that passengers arrive at their final destination safe, and on time. [pp 2-3]
This is a surprise? The next paragraph gives a troubling clue about the underlying thoughts:
[I]t is apparent that customers do not often consider the complexity of the huge system that operates in the background, day in and day out, to keep the TTC running. [p 3]
Yes, the TTC is large and complex, but it is by no means the largest system on the planet. Many of them recognize the importance of good customer service despite their huge size. They don’t depend on customers cutting them slack because the transit system is so large. If anything, a big system should have a benefit of scale, of experience with complexity and change, that a small system might not encounter often.
Unfortunately, all the customers see is that the bus is late, or the operator did not effectively answer their questions. [p 3]
Exactly. It is the view from the customer that’s important. A guest in a hotel does not want to hear about the problems of repairing centuries-old plumbing, or of cooking huge dinner banquets, or of co-ordinating the unseen army of staff who keep the place running. They want a clean, well-maintained room, elevators that work and service that is almost magically there without being asked for.
The report’s 78 recommendations are divided into eight groups. A review of each of the 78 is not required to establish patterns, to see the underlying philosophy.
Continue readingFor all of my regular readers who probably wonder why the flow of posts has dribbled to a trickle …
A combination of factors including a comparative dearth of news, the heat, a few short vacations and family issues have kept me from working as hard and regularly on this site as I prefer to.
In the pipeline are:
There is also, of course, the small matter of the coming election.
The TTC’s operating and capital budgets are a major part of the City of Toronto’s overall budget, and a considerable amount of TTC spending is provided directly by Council.
In 2010, the operating subsidy will be paid entirely by the City with no contribution from Queen’s Park. This subsidy will be about $420-million, and in the absence of a fare increase, this will rise to $500-million in 2011. The final 2010 figure will not be known until the year-long effects of ridership growth and the 2010 fare increase are clear. Notwithstanding repeated statements from Queen’s Park and various mayoral candidates, no operating subsidy flows to the TTC from the Province.
The capital budget is complex because there are many sources of subsidy. Some of these are project-specific such as the contributions by Ottawa, Queen’s Park and York Region to the Spadina Subway Extension. Others are intended to support a specific class of project such as security upgrades or vehicle replacements. Still others are not earmarked, and these sources fund projects as needed.
In 2009, the capital subsidies totalled $742-million. Of this, $333-million came from the City, $195-million from Queen’s Park and $208-million from Ottawa. The remaining $6-million came from other sources such as Waterfront Toronto. Gas tax revenues from Ottawa and Queen’s Park amounted to about $320-million in 2009, and of this, slightly more than half of the Provincial money was used as an operating subsidy. In 2010, all of the gas taxes are going to the Capital Budget. (For details on subsidy arrangements, please refer to the TTC Financial Statements for 2009.)
Whatever is left over after all of the external subsidies is funded by the City. These monies are raised partly from debt and partly as “capital from current” in the City’s operating budget.
A critical problem going forward in capital planning for the City is that various funding programs at both senior levels are drying up, and Toronto will be left with only gas taxes and the cost sharing on Metrolinx projects. This leaves the City open to a greater call for TTC capital in future years, a problem compounded by the growth in planned capital spending. Recent announcements of Provincial funding for transit network expansion contribute nothing to ongoing capital requirements for system renewal.
In this context, proper control and oversight by the City over TTC budgeting is essential. However, the TTC has a long history of operating as an independent agency managing its own accounts. This may have been acceptable before the City was the TTC’s primary funder, but not today, especially considering the effect of unexpected changes in TTC financial results and requirements on the City’s books.
The Star reports that the Ontario NDP has asked the Provincial Auditor to review the contract with Accenture for the development of the Presto smart card system. An explanation of the background for this request is on the NDP’s website, and it goes into details of past contracts between Ontario and Accenture.
John Lorinc reports in the Globe that a system to be developed for Vancouver will use similar technology to that proposed by the TTC for its own smart card system, and come in at a fraction of the expected price for Presto.
Updated: Royson James weighs in on smart cards in the Star, and John Lorinc has an article on spacing.
In the case of the NDP request, the scope should look more widely than just Accenture which provides system development and operation. However, some of the capital and ongoing staffing costs for the Presto project are carried in other budgets. Any review needs to look at the whole picture, not just one contract.
Comparisons with Vancouver will be intriguing, but it will likewise be necessary to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison. For example, the new system is to be implemented as part of a conversion of the Skytrain rapid transit stations from their current barrier-free design to use turnstiles. This is intended to reduce fare evasion. One big cost in Toronto is for providing existing turnstiles with power and network links to handle Presto. It is entirely possible that some components of the Toronto smart card budget will be covered by Vancouver’s turnstile retrofit budget. (Similar burying of costs in multiple accounts occurs quite commonly in TTC budgets, notably for subway station renovations.)
Presto needs to be held to account for what it has produced and the expected cost of system expansion. The fog of “commercial confidentiality” used, for example, to prevent revelation of the cost of a new city’s rollout (Ottawa) means that we have no way predict long term spending requirements, or to compare these with projects in other cities.
Ontario has just, thankfully, ended its relationship with SNC Lavalin for the Air Rail Link to Pearson Airport, and with this change we should have greater transparency and accountability for the project.
The same openness must apply to Presto. If it is a demonstrably good and competitive system, then show us.
Recently, I commented on the gathering held by the Toronto City Summit Alliance at which Metrolinx’ President/CEO (soon to be Chair) Rob Prichard posed a series of questions about funding of transit construction and operations.
Subsequently, as an attendee, I was asked to respond to these questions online. Why write something for such limited distribution, I thought. Here are the eight questions and my answers, updated a bit from the “official” version I left of the consultant’s website.
The TTC now has a page within the Projects section of their website devoted to the Downtown Rapid Transit Study.
The study’s purpose is:
1. Assess the need for additional rapid transit capacity to serve the downtown core given the capacity improvements already planned by TTC and GO and recognizing forecast land use and ridership scenarios;
2. Assess alternative strategies to accommodate the forecast demand including the costs and benefits associated with various scenarios composed of the following elements:
(a) The construction of new rapid transit lines such as the previously-proposed Downtown Rapid Transit (DRT) line;
(b) Expanded GO Rail capacity (including additional GO stations in the City of Toronto);
(c) Improvements in streetcar services to enhance shorter-distance transit accessibility in the downtown; and
(d) Fare, service and other policy initiatives to increase downtown transit ridership that may be appropriate.
3. If necessary, undertake the appropriate functional design and environmental assessment studies required to obtain approval for the construction of the recommended facilities.
Information about public consultation will appear when available.
This study is important by comparison with many past efforts by both TTC and Metrolinx in its review of transit as an integration of long, medium and short distance trips, each of which has its own requirement for service. Too many studies look at only one aspect of this larger problem.
On July 30, Metrolinx announced that it will take over the Air Rail Link project — a premium fare service between Union Station and Pearson Airport — from SNC-Lavalin.
Metrolinx will build, own and operate the service through its GO Transit division.
While the province and the Union Pearson Air-Link Group (UPAG), a subsidiary of SNC-Lavalin, were able to make significant progress negotiating, financial market conditions prevented acceptable terms. The government will continue to work with UPAG to build on the design and development work that has been completed to date.
This long-overdue change in the ARL scheme should bring the project into public view where all aspects of its design, financing and operation will be subject to the same scrutiny and openness as other Metrolinx projects. Issues such as service levels, equipment provisioning and, most importantly, electrification will no longer hide behind the veil of “commercial confidentiality”.
Fares will be part of the overall Metrolinx/GO network scheme, and the amount of any “premium” surcharge over comparable GO fares will be a matter of public record. The current one-way GO fare to the airport from downtown is $5.55, far below the $22 figure touted as a possible charge for the SNC-Lavalin operation. As a matter of public policy, Metrolinx should decide whether the ARL should operate on a full cost recovery basis, or like other transit services, be subsidized for the larger benefits of moving travellers without autos.
This change will affect the design of infrastructure and operational planning. If the ARL is priced and operates more like a GO service, it will attract riders such as commuting airport workers, and integration with through Kitchener-Waterloo line will be much simpler. However, the size of facilities now proposed for the ARL may be inadequate to a role as a major airport link. There may even be an option to rethink the technology choice for this corridor and the details of its connection at Union Station.
Today all we have is a press release, but Metrolinx must truly integrate the ARL planning into The Big Move. The ARL will not be a separate, privately-owned service whose business might cloud planning and implementation of “competing” routes. There should be one plan for the airport with regional bus and LRT services including the Eglinton, Finch West and Hurontario/Brampton lines.
The airport is a vital regional hub in The Big Move, and transit service to it must be more than a few lines sketched on a map. Metrolinx should launch planning — including public participation — for its airport services immediately.
On July 28, Queen’s Park announced that Bruce McCuaig, the Deputy Minister of Transportation, would become the next President and CEO of Metrolinx effective September 4, 2010. Rob Prichard will move from this position to become Chair of the Metrolinx Board, and the present Chair, Rob MacIsaac, will leave Metrolinx to devote his time to the presidency of Mohawk College.
McCuaig is a career bureaucrat at Queen’s Park with 26 years’ experience in various posts in the Ministries of Municipal Affairs & Housing, and then Transportation. From his government bio page:
[Before becoming Deputy-Minister] Mr. McCuaig was Assistant Deputy Minister of Provincial Highways Management Division in MTO. He has also held the position of Assistant Deputy Minister of the ministry’s Policy, Planning and Standards Division, as well as a variety of other positions at MTO and at the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.
Mr. McCuaig has a Bachelor of Applied Arts degree in Urban and Regional Planning from Ryerson University in Toronto, Ontario and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario.
Media reports in the Star and Globe suggest that McCuaig will use and build on his relationships with transit agencies and managers, notably Gary Webster at the TTC.
Rob Prichard’s move to the Chair’s role and Rob MacIsaac’s departure complete a changing of the guard that began with “Metrolinx II”, the new politician-free Metrolinx Board created in early 2009. Prichard is better at glad-handing and advocating for transit than MacIsaac who tended to be distrustful of public input although that is a fundamental part of this high-profile agency’s work.
Both Prichard and McCuaig have big challenges. The first will be to determine “who’s on top” in setting policy and overall direction. Major policy announcements and funding come from Cabinet and the Ministry, and this puts a former Deputy Minister in a leading role. However, the Metrolinx Board, especially with the supposed benefit of private-sector input, should, like any Board, give overall direction and ensure that management is doing its job. That has a potential for conflict, if not outright abdication of the Board’s role.
Board members need to ask difficult questions, to challenge Metrolinx staff, to conduct a real debate about how the GTA’s transportation network will grow and be financed. Metrolinx makes recommendations to the Minister, but the Board should not be a rubber stamp for whatever the staff proposes.
The early days of Metrolinx were comparatively easy ones. Everybody loves to draw lines on maps, and The Big Move, the end product of that period, speaks of a bright transit future for the region. Reality is not quite so simple. Changes in funding schemes and land use, not to mention the vital role of local transit systems, require hard work, not simply the publication of a glossy plan.
The Big Move 2.0, an update process launched recently, will be driven mainly by staff, but a new plan must acknowledge and address shortcomings in the 1.0 version. These include:
If the Board is to earn its keep, it must ensure that TBM 2.0 isn’t simply a warmed-over-lightly repackaging of TBM 1.0.
Metrolinx is no longer just a planning agency, and the move into construction and operations changes its role from one of a talking shop to front line delivery of facilities and services. Although the recently merged GO Transit division has this background, The Big Move dwarfs current operations and will fundamentally change GO Transit itself. Old models won’t work any more.
Getting all of this financed and built requires long term commitment, a notoriously absent character in the political scene. Metrolinx must assume the role of advocate for transit and transportation expansion, but must do so with a credible base of plans and demonstrable benefits. Billions in new funding will come only if the public, and by extension the politicians, trust what Metrolinx tells them.
Bruce McCuaig and Rob Prichard have much work to do. I wish them well, but won’t hesitate to demand openness, quality and credibility from Metrolinx.
Steve Munro 