Recently, I wrote about a very unsatisfactory online meeting of the Stakeholder Advisory Committee for waterfront east transit. Little came of that meeting beyond a sense that nothing will happen soon to improve transit in the area.

The big news, which was not “news” at all given the media coverage, was that $3-billion had been secured from the City, Province and Federal governments toward the project. Predictably, in the absence of any details, this produced a shower of questions about why such a sum would be spent on a short line and whether that amount would actually be enough to finish the project.

Planning for and development of the eastern waterfront dates from an era when new buildings could be sold as quickly as they were built. This extended all the way from Yonge Street out to the Don River and the massive plans for the East Harbour Station area. Transit demand projections originally assumed a mix of residential and commercial development particularly at East Harbour, but the commercial market collapsed and residential growth is at nowhere near projected rates and time frames.

Toronto always talked of the waterfront as a “transit first” development, but actual delivery falls way short of that goal. Queens Quay East has a mix of infrequent bus services, and access to the city north of the rail corridor is throttled by traffic on limited crossings. The proposed LRT corridor might exist on plans, but bus rapid transit (BRT) as an “interim” solution always lurked in the background. That might be credible if there were a clear transit corridor to the Union Station area, not to mention street capacity to handle buses and riders, but these problems have never been discussed in waterfront plans.

If we cannot get transit “right” in a brand new community, how can Toronto hope to shift existing neighbourhoods away from cars?

Those who have followed this project through many false starts and changes over the years know that this is not a straightforward “streetcar line” extending from Union Station into the planned community on the island now called Ookwemin Minising. Both through delays and added complexity in some components, the price tag keeps rising, but we have yet to see a consolidated budget or a description of just what it will pay for.

There are beautiful drawings of a future city on the water, but no clear transit plan.

This article reviews the major components of the waterfront east proposal, the many outstanding issues, and options such as there may be for getting better transit to an underserved area.

For those who just want the conclusion, here is my take on the current situation.

• Previous public consultation sessions gave the sense that plans were heading to a point where in early 2026 there would be construction staging options and a better handle on the project budget. Instead we seem to be going backwards with more uncertainty on the timing and scope of work, and exactly when there will be streetcar service to the eastern waterfront.
• Development proposals have consistently run ahead of the provision of frequent, reliable transit service.
• There is an undue focus on getting connectivity to the new developments from the west as a top priority causing the northern link (via Cherry to King) to be placed on the back burner.
• It is clear that the overall project is constrained by available funding and by the cost of rebuilding Union Station Loop. It is also possible that Union Loop will not reopen in time for first occupancy in the new Ookwemin Minising neighbourhood thereby providing less than ideal transit service to a new “transit first” neighbourhood.
• Transit ridership projections for the eastern waterfront date from the era when substantial commercial development was planned, and this boosted the expected peak demand.
• Development plans, and hence future demand, will be affected by proposals for a much-expanded Island Airport, but we do not know the scale of the effect.
• The continued lack of a staging plan makes discussion of interim service configurations over coming years almost impossible.

The project planners appear to have made up their mind on at least part of the staging plan without fully explaining how it will work, or the “why” behind options chosen. The momentum of 2025, the sense that real work was imminent, has been lost. We now have $3-billion “in the bank”, but with no clear idea of what it will buy, what elements will be missing on opening day and what future completion of the project will cost.

The rebranding of the “Waterfront East LRT” into the “Waterfront East Rapid Transit Line” speaks of desperation and a desire to avoid the “LRT” moniker now poisoned by botched implementations on Finch and Eglinton (Lines 6 and 5). This is most definitely not a “rapid transit line”, it is a streetcar on its own right-of-way. What Toronto needs is honesty about waterfront transit, leadership and real progress on construction.

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