Updated March 14, 2024: The table listing subway restricted speed zones has been updated by addition of the TTC’s March 12 and 14 lists.

Updated March 22, 2024: The table of restricted speed zones has been updated with the TTC’s March 21 list.

In July 2023, the Scarborough RT met its unexpected end with a derailment south of Ellesmere Station. The underlying cause was a loose segment of reaction rail struck by the train. The last car separated from the train and the rear truck lifted completely off of the tracks. A major issue raised by the investigation was poor track inspection and maintenance procedures, possibly influenced by a combination of badly trained junior staff and the assumption that the line would close soon and did not require much ongoing work.

Fortunately, the location was an at-grade segment where there was little danger of the car falling far. Had the accident happened on the elevated stretch from Midland to McCowan, this could have been a very different story.

For a detailed look at this accident and the investigation, see:

• The Scarborough RT Derailment Technical Reports
• The Unhappy State of SRT Track

The SRT would never re-open. Subsequent inspections found other problem locations including some with similar faults to the one causing the derailment.

This might be regarded as poor management choices and bad luck for a line that would soon close, but only half a year later, the subway was beset with widespread slow orders that hampered service. These arose from an annual track geometry inspection performed by a contracted service using a test rig that is run through the entire subway system. The equipment looks for problems a visual inspection will not spot including rails out of gauge and potential failures due to metal defects and fatigue.

At the January 2024 TTC Board meeting, management claimed that this was a normal outcome of the annual inspection. However, a month later in February, management admitted that the number of defects was higher than usual. Unfortunately, for unknown technical reasons, the video record of the February meeting is not available on YouTube to provide an exact quote.

An obvious, but unasked question is why there was such a jump in defects. Have past inspections missed problems or been too infrequent? Have their findings been ignored? Have repairs been less than adequate?

Quite recently, on March 1, 2024, a broken switch blade was discovered north of Museum Station. This defect was so serious it required service to be suspended from early morning until mid-afternoon when repairs were complete.

Riders on the streetcar system know that there are slow orders everywhere. Any junction slows streetcars to a crawl, and any facing point switch has a mandatory stop-and-proceed so that the operator can verify the switch is correctly set. There is even a rule, not much observed except by junior operators, that streetcars should not pass at junctions lest one of them derail and strike the other. (This rule originated from just such a sideswipe collision several years ago.)

The attitude that poor track condition can be dealt with simply by going slow spread from the streetcar system outward, and now affects the key routes of the TTC’s network.

Somebody made decisions over the years that led to declining maintenance on the rail systems. This was never presented to the TTC Board or Council explicitly, but was the inevitable effect of making do year-by-year with cuts to the Operating and Capital budgets. Three decades ago during a recession and funding cuts, TTC management claimed that they could get by without compromising the system. The parallels are far too clear, and that era’s result was the Russell Hill subway crash.

The term “State of Good Repair” (aka “SOGR”) comes up a lot in TTC budgets as a key component – maintain what we already have, ensure that the system continues to provide safe, reliable service and only then worry about spending on shiny new projects.

A report making its way to Council’s March 20 meeting includes a rough prioritization list of many rapid transit proposals, but the first priority above all is to invest in SOGR. However, the backlog on that account is so big that were this priority taken seriously, Toronto would never have another penny to spend on anything else.

• The Priority of Transit Corridors

One problem in discussing SOGR is that there is much emphasis on the Capital Budget with big ticket projects like new subway cars and buses, automatic train control, electrification, and replacement of major items such as track, escalators and elevator. We rarely hear about the SOGR buried in the Operating Budget and the day-to-day work of keeping the system in good condition.

An important difference is that the Operating Budget is funded by fares and City subsidies, while the Capital Budget comes from taxes and borrowing at all levels of government. As an example, the cries for Line 2 subway car funding are familiar in recent years. This diverts attention from much-needed ongoing repairs, a very unglamourous part of transit operations.

Spending on operations means money goes out the door today, not in future years for a project that might only now be a line on a map. That money comes from current revenue, not from borrowing, and directly affects taxes and fares depending on which pocket we reach into. There is a lot of competition for whatever spare change we might find.

Any decision to limit tax increases for transit or to freeze fares has a direct effect on how much service the TTC can operate and how well it can maintain the system. Under the Ford and Tory administrations and their low tax policies, there was very strong political pressure to say “we can make do” with no detailed examination of the effects.

This might change under Mayor Chow, but there is no indication that the current TTC budget philosophy has shifted. Indeed, the big push is to restore service and freeze fares. Raising uncomfortable questions about maintenance shortfalls will not serve that agenda.

In this article, I will review the issues with subway and streetcar infrastructure, and then turn to the wider problem of whether “State of Good Repair” can stay as the City’s “priority 1” in the face of typical Council politics. The focus here is on track because that links many current events on the three rail networks, but the concern should be general for the adequacy of TTC maintenance and budgetary limits that are now baked in to overall system quality.

Subway Reduced Speed Zones

In January, riders noticed that the number of locations where trains slowed in anticipation of future rail repairs grew substantially. On the TTC’s Reduced Speed Zones Page there is a list of slow order locations, and the tables below show how this evolved over the past two months. Between mid-February and early March, the list became much shorter as TTC forces worked through many problem areas.

The list is dominated by areas with curves and/or with track mounted on ties and ballast rather than on a concrete slab. Curves are a concern because they wear more quickly than tangent (aka straight) rail, and any location with switches and crossings is particularly important.

The Yonge-University-Spadina Line (1) was hard hit.

Line 1	Jan 18	Feb 2	Feb 12	Mar 7	Mar 12	Mar 14	Mar 21
Hwy 407 to Vaughan			NB
Dupont to St. Clair W							NB
Spadina-St. George	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB & SB
St. George-Museum	NB	NB	NB
St. Andrew-Union	NB & SB	NB & SB	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB
Union-King	NB	NB & SB	NB	NB	NB	NB
College-Wellesley	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB & SB
Bloor-Rosedale	NB	NB	NB	NB
Summerhill-St. Clair	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB
St. Clair-Davisville	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB & SB	NB & SB	SB
Lawrence-York Mills		NB	NB
York Mills-Sheppard	NB	NB	NB	NB	NB	NB	NB
North York Centre-Finch			NB		NB

The Bloor-Danforth Line (2) had fewer reported locations.

Line 2	Jan 18	Feb 2	Feb 12	Mar 7	Mar 12	Mar 14	Mar 21
Royal York-Jane		EB & WB	EB & WB
Runnymede-High Park	WB
Keele-Dundas West							EB & WB
Sherbourne-Castle Frank	EB	EB
Castle Frank-Chester	EB	EB	EB	EB	EB	EB	EB
Chester-Broadview							WB
Victoria Park-Warden	EB		EB & WB
Warden-Kennedy		WB

From well-informed sources, I learned that there were several places with rails out-of-gauge (the spacing between the rails) beyond TTC and industry standards. This is not something that happens overnight, but can develop from a lack of regular inspection and/or deferred corrective action.

On the morning of March 1, 2024, a much more serious defect was discovered at the switch north of Museum Station northbound where the tracks leading west to upper St. George station, the normal Line 1 route, and east to lower Bay station diverge. The moving part of the switch has two pieces, one on each rail, that move back and forth to set the route for trains. The switch on the right hand track in the photo below has a complete break in the rail in the central foreground. The space where a train’s wheel flanges would have run was blocked by the broken rail that is completely misaligned with the rest of the switch.

Directly behind (north of) the photographer is the split between the WB and EB curves and a wall that, were a train to climb over the switch, would be struck by the train. How such an accident was avoided is had to say, but the slow order already in place might have allowed trains get past the misaligned rail without coming completely off of the track.

This defect was so serious that the University line was closed from about 4:15am to 2:20pm while the switch was repaired.

The photo below shows the broken switch north of Museum Station looking south on Friday, March 1, 2024. The image is from Megan Kinch’s Twitter/X feed (@meganysta) who in turn received it from a reliable source.

The primary method of track inspection on the TTC is performed by teams walking the line, and their schedule is such that this occurs regularly system-wide. The SRT investigation documented a three-day standard for this cycle. However, the work must either be done overnight when service is not running, or during the day with slow orders in affected sections for safety of the inspection teams. Weather conditions can make the job very uncomfortable. The SRT investigation noted the large number of junior staff as more experienced workers bid out to other jobs.

One problem is familiarity because much of the infrastructure will look the same from one inspection to the next, and small changes that could eventually grow into problems might not be obvious. Some problems are invisible, but can be detected with test equipment. Ideally such equipment should be able to move along the line at service speed so that more territory can be covered, and thorough inspections can occur frequently during regular service hours.

Another factor affecting track mounted on ties and ballast is that the ballast itself (the granular rock under the wooden ties in the photo above) must be monitored and refreshed from time to time. The structural function of ballast is not to be a hard base like a concrete slab, but to cushion and distribute the weight of trains and track onto the ground below.

Normal ballast is “springy” as anyone who has watched a heavy freight train pass will know. But even that has limits. Water and silt can accumulate in the ballast, and voids can open up below the track. This makes the ballast and tie structure either too inflexible or too soft.

The Subway Work Car Fleet

The TTC has a fleet of specialized cars used for various maintenance activities. Most of these are not regularly seen by riders as they operate overnight. Some are simple utility vehicles like flat cars, and others are highly specialized like the beam replacement car for work on the Prince Edward Viaduct.

In the 2018 Capital Budget, there were plans to acquire several new cars both in recognition of the growing extent of the subway and the need for TTC-owned vehicles that could perform work often and throughout the year. TTC leases equipment for track geometry tests and rail milling from time to time, but such vehicles must be adapted to TTC track gauge, and they are only available when not working in other cities. It is to the TTC’s advantage to have its own cars that can do work at any time. The larger the system, the more critical having an adequate fleet both in size and functionality.

The gallery below contains pages from the 2018 Capital Budget “blue books” which show all details of proposed vehicle construction and purchase projects. I include them here because they explain the purpose and need for the work car fleet thoroughly.

This shows a comprehensive program to address the need for a larger fleet to add capacity and reduce or eliminate conflicting requirements for work trains by various sections and projects.

These were public documents, but 2019 was the last year when they were made available. My request for the 2024 books has gone unanswered by the TTC.

This was the last budget prepared on former CEO Andy Byford’s watch, but this plan was subject to constant deferral under Rick Leary. Most of the new equipment described here was never purchased, and it exists only as a funding reservation in future years.

The table below shows how the spending allocated for non-revenue vehicle purchase was constantly shifted ahead year after year with major acquisitions always in the future.

What we do not know is the degree to which ongoing maintenance has been hampered or deferred simply because the TTC does not have the equipment necessary to support the work. A related “catch-22” issue is that staff numbers will be sized based on the work that can be achieved, and the amount of maintenance in turn can be limited by staff availability.

This is similar to the problem in regular service operation where the amount of service is limited by the number of operators, not by the size of the fleet. None of this is ever discussed by the TTC Board, especially when their focus is on shaving costs and head count to defend “precious taxpayer dollars”.

The proposed new vehicles in 2018 are listed below. Some provide net new functions such as the rail milling car, some are replacements for aging equipment, and some expand the fleet to reduce competition for equipment among various groups. For details, read the project details in the gallery. (The list below and detailed pages have been ordered to group similar vehicles.)

• A track geometry / non-destructive testing inspection car.
• A new diesel-electric locomotive to replace a (then) 20-year old diesel locomotive.
• Two new tunnel washing cars to replace existing 20-year old equipment.
• Two new electric flatcars to provide a dedicated vehicles for communications cable installation and for electrical work.
• Two tampers for ballast maintenance.
• Two new combo flatcars for use with enclosed crew quarters using repurposed H4 passenger cars for tunnel maintenance work.
• Replacements for four flatcars running on 45-year old H1 equipment.
• Two new work trains using retired H4 cars to replace existing 45-year old H1 cars. These trains are used for asbestos remediation work.
• A subway vacuum car to clean tunnels of debris which can lead to fires.
• Two additional vacuum excavator cars (adding to two existing) for ballast and drainage maintenance.
• Two additional crane cars (adding to four existing).
• Rail milling car.

Streetcars

The streetcar system has been beset by slow orders for many years. There is much talk of “transit priority”, but rarely of systemic issues that slow operations. Among the causes for slow orders are:

• All special work (switches and crossings) is operated at restricted speed because some intersections are in poor condition.
• Local bad rail issues, notably worn track awaiting repair.
• Intersections with left turn conflicts where non-transit traffic goes before transit. Even with signal controls, there are slow orders in some places such as The Queensway lest errant motorists make left turns in front of streetcars. How the TTC will operate the much higher-speed Eglinton and Finch routes remains to be seen.
• Old style trolley-pole overhead under bridges with low clearance (notably the King Street Atlantic Avenue underpass) will continue to have slow downs until all overhead is converted for pantograph operation.

The quality of track at intersections varies widely from nearly pristine new installations to aging track that has been patched together, sometimes repeatedly, awaiting complete reconstruction. King & Church is a prime example of the latter. Rather than flagging the problem locations for slow orders, the rule applies to the entire system.

As I have documented in several articles, when special work is rebuilt today, this is done with pre-assembled track panels and welded rail components. The rails are coated with an elastic substance to reduce noise and vibration in the track slab that can speed concrete deterioration. However, many intersections predate this technique because of the long replacement cycle for track work.

Even after the decision to retain streetcars in 1972, new track up to and including the original Harbourfront line in the late 1980s was laid on untreated wooden ties. Such track fell apart much faster than expected because track was built to a standard dating from an era when streetcars would be abandoned soon. Tangent track now is in better shape because the TTC switched to a mixture of treated wooden ties and steel ties in the early 1990s. Since then, almost all tangent rail has been rebuilt with steel ties and rubber sleeves around track to limit vibration.

Issues with electric track switches go back four decades to the introduction of the ALRVs. Because these cars were longer than PCCs and CLRVs, the existing system of switch control using overhead contactors had to be replaced. The new system used antennae under the cars and in the pavement, and it never worked reliably. This led to some accidents and a stop-and-proceed rule at all facing point switches whether they were electrified or not. This delays streetcars and can interfere with the logic behind green time extensions – cars take longer to enter intersections after stopping than some signals allow for. The worst example of slow operation is westbound on The Queensway at Roncesvalles where there are five switches between Roncesvalles Avenue and the entrance to Sunnyside Loop, each one requiring a stop.

A project to upgrade the switch electronics started years ago. The first of two budget extracts below from 2012 shows it as underway with completion over five years to 2017. The second extract from 2024 shows that it is still underway and only partly funded at substantially higher cost.

These are examples of how spending and design decisions can have implications for decades in the future and hobble the system until the replacement cycle comes fully around.

The State of Good Repair Backlog

Assuming that Council endorses the Executive Committee recommendation that SOGR should be top priority, this will create much difficulty in ranking any rapid transit schemes because there will be no money to build them. Here is the SOGR shortfall chart from the 2024 capital budget report. The accumulated total ten years out will be $8.2 billion, and it will only be worse in the years beyond. We might have several newly opened lines, but the existing system will crumble.

If SOGR really will take first place, Council has to drum up a lot of money very quickly either from City resources or from other governments. Saying “buy me a subway” when we claim to most need repair and re-equipment funding sends, at best, a mixed message. At worst it says that only photo ops really matter.

The nature of this backlog must be clearly understood because this is only a subset of the unfunded “needs”. I put that in quotation marks because projects get onto the transit funding shopping list without a full understanding of their cost or how they fit in overall plans. Are they truly “needs”, or are they on a wish list?

The full list is in a report grouping them by major portfolio within the system. I discussed this report, among others, in an earlier article.

• Report: TTC’s 2024-2038 Capital Investment Plan: A Review of Unfunded Capital Needs
• Article: TTC Board Meeting: December 20, 2023 – Part II

The grand total of unfunded projects is $35.5 billion, vastly more than the $8.2 billion SOGR shortfall listed above. There are important distinctions between the two lists:

• The SOGR shortfall chart runs to 2033, but the unmet needs list and price runs to 2038.
• There are some very large items in the unmet needs list that have never been prioritized including:
  • Full embrace of the 2050 Vision Zero plan including very substantial increase in transit service affecting fleet and facilities needs, as well as ongoing operational funding.
  • Capacity increases on Lines 1 and 2
  • Platform edge doors
  • Replacement and improvement of traction power supply systems to support more frequent service
  • Accessibility improvements beyond the current elevator program
  • A new Transit Control Centre
  • New maintenance and storage yards for Lines 1 and 2 to handle a larger fleet

Where do these and other proposals fit compared to the list of BRT, LRT and subway projects now before Council?

There is a tendency to confuse the two lists and speak of the big ticket items related to system growth and improvement in the same breath as SOGR. They are not the same.

This article was concerned primarily with infrastructure, but there is also the question of vehicles, drivers and mechanics. Promises of service improvements will ring hollow if we get a stand-pat budget and staffing plan. That is a topic for a separate essay.

The TTC Board and Council must put much more effort into understanding the current state of the transit system and their options for future renewal and growth. This will require hard decisions about spending and revenue that have been avoided for years.