Finance

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Where’s My Streetcar? (Updated)

Today, TTC Chair Adam Giambrone gave a press conference at noon at 1900 Yonge Street about the Transit City Electronic Customer Communications Plan and the Next Bus Arrival Project.

A report on this subject will be discussed at tomorrow’s Commission meeting, and it went online this morning after the original version of this item was posted.

At the risk of prejudging the announcement, I can’t help thinking this is another wonderful example of millions of dollars worth of technology being used in place of the basics: running frequent, well-managed transit service.

The report addresses several related projects:

Next Bus Arrival

This system, to be integrated with both the City’s new standard street furniture program and with the TTC website, will provide estimated arrival times of approaching vehicles.  A critical part of such an undertaking will be accurate knowledge of a vehicle’s position and movement along a route, and in turn this depends on converting the antiquated vehicle monitoring system now in use (CIS) to use GPS data rather than “signposts”.  (For more information about how CIS works, please refer to this article.)

Also needed will be information about the alleged destination of the vehicle.  In the case of buses, this could be obtained if the code for the current route sign display were available to the monitoring system, although keeping CIS in sync with the frequent updates to the database in bus signs would be a challenge.   For streetcars, there is no way to know what sign is set by the operator, and drivers would have to key in a destination code to the CIS unit for each trip (and every time they are short turned).  I doubt that this information would be reliable and a next car display would proudly announce a car to Long Branch that was in fact turning at Shaw Street.

My real concern about this system, aside from the dubious value of building it at all when there are far worse problems with service quality and management, is that the TTC will undertake a typical design that works only when everything runs as it should.

The pilot will involve 12 bus stops, and I will bet that they will be on a sleepy route such as Bayview that was the testbed for the on board stop announcement system.  Figuring out when the next Queen car will show up and where it is going is a much bigger challenge.

The total project cost is $5.2-million, but it is not clear whether this is just for the central system and additional costs both for shelter-based equipment and on-vehicle system changes will be add-ons to the project.

E Commerce

The TTC is planning to contract with an external agency for online sale of passes.  This project has a budget of $1.2-million, but there is no detail about what this covers.

TTC Website

Evaluation of responses to the Request for Proposals is now underway and approval of a vendor is expected in January 2008.  The new site should be rolled out in “late spring 2008”.

Wheel-Trans Remote Trip Booking

The ability to make, inquire about and cancel bookings via the Internet should be available in February 2008.  It is unclear whether this is a real-time booking system, or simply a portal allowing users to queue up emails to Wheel Trans staff.  Further clarification is needed.

I will update this page based on whatever presentations or discussions occur at Wednesday’s TTC meeting.

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Toronto’s 2008 Capital Budget and the TTC (Updated)

Update November 2:   The Analyst Notes for many areas of the Capital Budget are available online on the City’s website.  Notable by its absence is anything about the TTC, the single largest component of the entire budget.

On Monday, October 29, the City Budget Committee had its first public look at the 2008 Capital Budget.  This covers all of the programs funded by the City, of which the single largest part is the TTC Capital Budget.

We won’t know the details of what the TTC is planning for a few weeks until the Commission meeting on November 14, but we can see some outlines in the preliminary material from the City.

Toronto has a huge problem financing the TTC, and as things stand, of the $1.249-billion in new capital debt the City will raise from 2008-2012, about 80% is due to the TTC.

For 2008, the TTC’s capital funding request is in line with the City’s target, but as in past years, this is achieved partly by deferal of spending to the out-years.  This is not sustainable, particularly with major capital projects coming down the pipeline.  In the current estimates, the TTC’s capital requirement for 2009-2012 is about $420-million greater than the City’s budgetary target.

In addition to this shortfall, the TTC has an accumulated and growing backlog of capital projects that will grow to $363-million by 2012.

The table on page 18 of the Budget Presentation shows the anticipated funding sources from Queen’s Park and Ottawa.  An important line in the Provincial section is called “Long Term Funding Requirement” — this doesn’t correspond to any announced program, but it grows especially in 2012.  If you omit this line, the level of committed Provincial funding declines substantially.  The Federal section contains a similar problem with assumptions about growth in future funding.  (The problems and assumptions are restated in text format on page 19.)

The usual problem is that funding schemes at both levels are typically announced for a four or five year window, just long enough to get past the next election, but they are not entrenched.  We have to hope that something will replace them, but if nothing comes along, we are left holding the bag for future spending.

A separate Highlights Report shows major transit projects on pages 10-11.  Note that the dollar values for these projects only cover the 2008 year, not the full cost to completion.  For example, the new streetcar project will only consume an estimated $55-million next year.  Those who are following the reconstruction of the streetcar track will note that many of the listed projects are on the “non-revenue” trackage (Dufferin, Church, Richmond, McCaul, Parliament and Wellington).  The other major projects, of course, will be completion of the St. Clair line and the remaining work on Bathurst.  By late 2009, we will finally be at the end of the heroic project to bring the TTC’s streetcar network back into good condition everywhere.

One troubling aspect of the TTC’s funding needs is “scope creep” and the arrival of previously unbudgeted projects in the five year plan.  The 2008-2012 budget exceeds the City’s affordable debt target by $420-million as I mentioned earlier, but this is up considerably from the $197-million shown in last year’s budget.

We don’t yet know which projects contribute to this, and there’s probably even worse lurking in the next five year period from 2013-2017 when many large projects will be in full swing.

One obvious issue is the Yonge subway resignalling project, the move to automatic train control and service increases to build capacity on the line.  The subway car order with Bombardier signed earlier this year does not come close to providing enough cars for the entire YUS line, even without the York extension, nor for any improvement in service frequency.  If the TTC hopes to reap the benefit of the new fleet, then they will have to add a follow-on order for more “Toronto Rockets”.  The additional cars would replace the remaining “H” series fleets used on the Yonge line, and the T-1’s would all move over to Bloor-Danforth.

For the new streetcar fleet, we still do not know the price per car, and each estimate is higher than the last.  Moreover, we don’t know whether wishful thinking on specifications will run headlong into technical reality regarding both the track geometry and the overhead power system.  Any retrofits will add to the overall cost of rolling out the new cars.

For the bus fleet, current plans call for only modest growth, and even Mayor Miller’s long-promised 100 extra buses will be partly eaten up by added ridership before they actually hit the streets, now likely in fall 2008, a year later than planned.

The TTC has a long history of springing new projects and large-scale changes to existing ones because, somehow, the capital is always found to deal with these problems.  Once we see the details in the budget papers, I will likely have more to say on this subject.

The recent federal budget announcement shows quite clearly that Toronto cannot expect relief of its funding problems from Ottawa, and it’s time that both the City and Queen’s Park stopped waiting for that solution.  Yes, one or both levels will have to generate new revenue to invest in the transit system, and readers here know that my preference already lies with Queen’s Park. 

Toronto’s transit system is a regional resource and it should receive solid, sustained funding from the Province.

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How Ottawa Just Raised Your Metropass by 50 Cents

While you are all out spending your hard-won cut in the GST, one little note:

The after-tax cost of the Metropass just went up from $84.50 to $85.00.  Why, you ask?

The tax credit for passes is tied to the tax rate on the lowest income tier, and this will go back to 15% from 15.5% according to today’s announcement.  This means that the rebate per $100 Metropass just went down by 50 cents, or $6 over the course of the year.

Also, of course, this has always been a non-refundable credit, and so those who have no taxable income pay full value for a pass while people like me get the subsidy.

It’s no secret to regulars here that I don’t believe in tax-based incentives and prefer that funding go directly to agencies that deliver service.  If the tax rebates for all of the roughly 250,000 Metropasses sold each month came to the TTC as a subsidy, they would receive about $45-million annually from Ottawa.  This would contribute to better service for everyone, whether they used a pass or not.

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Private or Public?

Ian Folkhard wrote recently with this question:

Is there a website that objectively lays out the effects of privatization on formerly publicly controlled operations?

It would be very interesting to see if any of the savings and efficiencies that the supporters of privatization claim will result have actually been passed back to any group of taxpayers. Something that referred to the British experience with public transit and the railways would be really interesting reading.

I hunted around on the net and, alas, there are lots of papers written extolling the virtues of individual projects, but very little by way of an objective overview.  One paper was written for the OECD as a 30-year retrospective in January 2007.  The information in it is reasonably current, although the recent meltdown in London is not included.

[Note that this is a long paper with 35 pages of text, 14 pages of citations and 72 footnotes.  Be sure to read the footnotes as many of them contain important additional information.]

The author proceeds from the premise that some degree of private operation of public transit is becoming the norm rather than the exception, and that privatization is an attempt by the transit industry to become more competitive with the rising use of the automobile.  I don’t agree with that premise for reasons that will become obvious, but the presentation covers the subject and is not unduly doctrinaire about the wonders of free enterprise.  Continue reading →

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The Mythology of “Poor Performing Routes” (Updated)

[This article has been linked from torontoist.com where there is another thread of comments.] 

Whenever there is a budget crisis, the TTC trots out its annual report in which they claim to show the costs and revenues associated with each route in the system.  By implication, the routes at the bottom of the barrel are “poor performers” and candidates for service cuts if not outright extinction.  The calculations in this table can be charitably described as creative writing.

Why?

In a flat fare system, it is impossible to allocate fare revenue in any way that makes sense and produces meaningful comparisons between routes.  Continue reading →

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Ride The Dundas Bus While You Can

Track construction on Dundas Street, a long overdue project to replace decrepit rails and roadbed, has diverted the Dundas car for much of its length up to the Carlton route.

One particularly hard-hit area is Regent Park where streetcar service was removed long before road work actually started, and where streetcars will not return until late fall after completion of work on the bridge at the Don River.

In early May, at ward Councillor McConnell’s request, the TTC approved a shuttle bus to provide a clockwise loop via Broadview, Queen, River, Dundas, Parliament and Gerrard.  The problem with this scheme is that the bus runs every 15 minutes, and there is not much point in waiting for it unless you happen to be at the stop when the bus comes by.  Walking from a nearby route on Queen, Broadview, Gerrard or Parliament is generally faster and these routes, unlike the shuttle, actually go to real destinations like the subway or downtown.

The bus was implemented at a projected, unbudgeted cost of $350,000 to run through to November when the bridge will re-open and streetcars will return to Dundas between Parliament and Broadview. 

According to the staff report, this bus has carried an average of two passengers per trip and often runs empty.  The most I have ever seen is one.

Today, despite an attempt by Chair Giambrone to advocate on behalf of Councillor McConnell, the Commission had the good sense to kill off this waste of service.  The last day of operation will be Sunday, July 15. 

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Analysis of Transit Route Operations

Over the next month or so, I will be posting a series of articles here about the operation of surface routes and will concentrate on lines in the King and Queen corridors.  This analysis will look at the way the line actually operates — how the vehicles move around (or not) — as opposed to the question of whether service is adequate to demand.  These topics are related by the long-standing question of why service is so bad:  congestion, number of vehicles, operational screwups, or some other factors.

This work arises from the TTC’s oft-cited claim that they can only improve transit service with exclusive lanes.  That is a self-defeating position because the TTC will never get reserved lanes on most transit routes.  Rather than figuring out how a route might be improved, the TTC claims its hands are tied.  This is not a useful stance, but it’s sadly typical of an organization whose first response to criticism is (a) you’re wrong and (b)  someone else is responsible.

I remember the initial reaction to the Transit’s Lost Decade report that I did with Gord Perks (then at TEA).  The TTC huffed and puffed and said that service had not been cut so badly and how dare we say things like that … then there was a little pause … and finally they realized that this was just the ammunition they needed to beat the drum for better funding.  Suddenly then-CGM Rick Ducharme was quoting our figures as an example of how badly the system had deteriorated.

Service on major routes was cut through the 1990s by from 25 to 40 percent, and only recently have we seen some of this restored despite ongoing ridership growth.  One major constraint is the size of bus and streetcar fleets that declined to match the lower levels of service.  This only affects peak service capabilities.  Another change has been in the operator workforce through a combination of re-sizing to current service levels and of work rules restricting the length of the work day.  (This is due both to Provincial labour standards and revisions to the collective agreement.)

Traffic congestion is a problem in many areas, and the length of the peak period has definitely grown longer over past decades.  However, is congestion the only reason service is bad, or are other factors at work?  Are there problems with regularity of service and line management?  How often is scheduled service cancelled?  How often are there major blockages (especially a problem for streetcars) as opposed to random events, delays at busy stops for overcrowded vehicles and general congestion?

How effective is the TTC’s current vehicle monitoring system, CIS (Communications & Information System), in tracking vehicles and how well is the service managed?  The TTC is seeking information for a possible “next bus” announcement system.  Will this be compromised by an attempt to recycle decades-old CIS technology?  Will it include features needed to properly manage and report on actual service and operations?

In Setember 2006, I asked the TTC for sample data from CIS in an attempt to learn how vehicles actually behaved on various routes with the hope of identifying problem areas both for congestion, where it really exists, and in line management.  CIS is incapable of reporting on vehicle loads, and its data are not fine-grained enough to allow reporting on stop service times in most cases.  Therefore, my analysis has to concentrate on vehicle movements.

Through the fall, I worked through various sample sets of data refining the process of converting it to various usable formats, and by the end of the year had a workable version.  Based on this, I have obtained CIS data for all streetcar routes plus a number of major bus routes for December 2006.  This month contains a variety of days with good and bad weather, pre-Christmas shopping and a holiday week.

The King route received the first detailed analysis, and I will present excerpts from this here over the next few weeks.  I have begun work on the Queen line (and related routes Lake Shore, Downtowner and Kingston Road) and will comment on these as well.

All of the posts will be linked via their own topic “Service Analysis”.

Please stay tuned.

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A Strange View of Transit Priority

At last night’s Community Liaison Committee meeting on the West Don LRT project (aka Cherry Street streetcar), I heard a rather bizarre definition for “transit priority” that will be used to evaluate various design options:

“Transit Priority” means that transit will get at least as much green time as the through auto traffic at an intersection.

Hmmm.  Let’s compare this with what we have today.

On the Harbourfront line, the streetcar has to wait for its own green cycle which is much shorter than the green time for traffic, and is so short that it sometimes prevents more than one car from getting through on a cycle.  Clearly not a model for transit priority.

On St. Clair, the detectors don’t seem to be working everywhere, and there are left turn phases blocking the streetcars (and through traffic) even when there is nothing waiting to make the turn.  If this blockage occurs in only one direction, then one of the through road movements gets more green time than the streetcar.

On Spadina, the detectors actually work, and if there is traffic waiting in the queue only for one direction, the other one gets a green for the cars before the green for the streetcar.  If there are left turns both ways, the streetcar and other traffic get the same green time.

On a regular street in mixed traffic, everybody gets the same green time although left turns can block the movement of both through traffic and streetcars equally.

Nowhere in this list is there a model where the streetcar pre-empts the left-turning movements and is able to cross the intersection for the majority of the cycle.  Instead, the emerging standard appears to be that left turns pre-empt everything in their path.

Maybe we should call it “left turn priority” since these are the only moves that really benefit from this scheme.

“Transit priority” means “transit first”, not transit in the five seconds we grudgingly spare from everyone else.