A Grand Plan

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GO Transit RER/Electrification Plans Announced

The details of GO Transit’s service improvements and electrification leading to the rollout of the “RER” (Regional Express Rail) network were announced today by Minister of Transportation Steven Del Duca.

The plans will please some and disappoint others, but there is little to surprise anyone familiar with the details of GO Transit’s network and the constraints of the rail lines around the GTHA.

RER rollout by line

RER rollout details

If there are “winners and losers” in this announcement, the benefits clearly fall (a) on lines that are completely under Metrolinx ownership and control and (b) on lines that do not already have full service, that is to say, there is room for growth.

Electrification is planned for most corridors by 2022-2024 starting with the Kitchener and Stouffville routes in 2022-23, followed by Barrie and the Lakeshore in 2023-24. The announcement is silent on the UPX service on the Kitchener line and whether the inner portion of the corridor will be electrified as a first step for UPX before 2022. (I have a query out to Metrolinx on this topic.) These dates have implications for rolling stock plans including purchase of whatever new technology — electric locomotives or EMUs — will be used for electric services, and, by implication the eventual fate of the existing fleet.

The scope of electrification will be:

  • Kitchener line: Bramalea to Union
  • Stouffville line: Unionville to Union
  • Lakeshore East: Full corridor
  • Lakeshore West: Burlington to Union
  • Barrie: Full corridor

There are no plans to electrify either the Milton or Richmond Hill lines, nor to substantially improve service on them. In Milton’s case, this is a direct result of the line’s status as the CPR mainline. On Richmond Hill, significant flood protection works are needed in the Don Valley as well as a grade separation at Doncaster. Plans could change in coming years, but Queen’s Park has clearly decided where to concentrate its spending for the next decade – on the lines where improved service and electrification are comparatively easy to implement.

The limits of electrification correspond, for the most part, to the territory where all-day 15-minute service will be provided. This will be the core of the “RER” network with less frequent, diesel-hauled trains providing service running through to the non-electrified portions.

One important aspect of the line-by-line chart of service improvements is that there will be substantially more trips (most in the offpeak) before electrification is completed. This allows GO to “show the flag” as an all-day provider and build into a role as a regional rapid transit service, not just a collection of peak period commuter lines. This will also give local transit a chance to build up to improved GO service over time rather than a “big bang” with all of the changes awaiting electrification.

Over the five years 2015-2020, the Kitchener corridor will see the greatest increase in number of trains, although many of these will not actually run through all the way to Kitchener. The service build-up will finish in 2017.

The Barrie line will receive weekend service in 2016-17 with weekday off-peak service following in 2017-18. The Stouffville line also gets weekday service in 2017-18, while weekend service follows in 2018-19.

Minor off-peak improvements are planned for both Lakeshore corridors in 2018-19.

Peak service improvements relative to today vary depending on the corridor:

  • Lakeshore East: 4 more trains by 2018-19 on a base of 45 (9%)
  • Lakeshore West: 6 more trains by 2019-20 on a base of 47 (13%)
  • Stouffville: 4 more trains by 2018-19 on a base of 12 (33%)
  • Kitchener: 6 more trains by 2019-20 on a base of 15 (40%)
  • Milton: 6 more trains by 2019-20 on a base of 18 (33%)
  • Barrie: 2 more trains in 2019-20 on a base of 14 (14%)
  • Richmond Hill: 4 more trains by 2018-19 on a base of 8 (50%)
  • Total: 32 more trains by 2019-20 on a base of 159 (20%)

Other than making trains longer (where this has not already occurred), that’s the limitation of peak period growth for the next five years on GO Transit. This has important implications for projections of greater transit commuting along the GO corridors, and especially for the shoulder areas within Toronto itself that lie along GO routes, but also face capacity and travel time issues with the local transit system. Unlocking gridlock may be the goal, but the rate of service growth could not be described as “aggressive” especially against the background growth in population and jobs.

This will, or at least should, lead to renewed discussion both of rapid transit capacity within Toronto, and on how GO Transit will address growth beyond 2020. Where should new capacity be provided? What are the realistic upper bounds for various options? How will Toronto deal with demand for expanded suburban subway service to handle growth in the 905?

It is quite clear from the electrification dates that an electric SmartTrack is not going to start running soon, and with frequent all-day service to Bramalea, Aurora and Unionville using diesel-hauled trains operating well before electrification is completed, one might wonder just where SmartTrack as a separate “local” service will fit in.

Beyond these questions lie the more complex issues of travel that is not bound for Toronto’s core. “Gridlock” is commonly cited as the rational for transit spending, and yet this spending does little to improve travel anywhere beyond existing corridors to central Toronto. Demand in the GTHA is not conveniently focused on a few points, not even on Pearson Airport which is a major centre, and single-route improvements do not address the diverse travel patterns of GTHA commuters.

Ontario will spend billions on transit in the coming decade, and sticker-shock has already set in with the huge amount of infrastructure needed. Even this is only a start and the work to truly address travel requirements of the coming decades is only just starting.

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The Dubious Economics of the Union Pearson Express

In today’s Toronto Star, Tess Kalinowski writes about recently released Metrolinx reports concerning the Union Pearson Express (UPX).

The items of interest are down at the bottom of the Reports & Information page and they include ridership forecasts from December 2011 and May 2013. The latter report was cited as background to the Auditor General’s 2012 Report on Metrolinx [beginning on p. 6 of the pdf].

Given that the projection is almost two years old, one might be tempted to say “maybe things have improved”, but that’s a tad hard to believe in the absence of any newer studies from Metrolinx.

There are great hopes, and even greater hype, for the UPX, and getting some basic information on the table is certainly worthwhile. Continue reading →

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The Evolution of TTC Signaling Contracts (Updated)

Updated April 19, 2024 at 10:40 am: The links to TTC reports have been updated again to reflect the current URL structure of the TTC’s website.

Updated September 29, 2022 at 1:30 pm: Links to TTC reports have been updated to point to the “new” TTC website except in cases where the report is no longer online. In those cases, a copy from my archives is linked on this site.

Updated April 4, 2015 at 6:00 am: The review of options for consolidation of the signal contracts by Parsons is now available as part of the TTC’s report online. Comments have been added at the end of this article.

Recently much attention has focused on the runaway project to extend the Spadina Subway north to Vaughan with a flurry of questions about project management, scope creep and cost controls. Another of the TTC’s megaprojects, one that is actually far more critical to the subway as a whole, is the replacement and upgrading of the signal system controlling the movement of trains. This project has dragged on for years while riders endure service problems with antique equipment and line shutdowns for installation and testing of the replacement system.

At its recent meeting, the TTC Board approved a proposal to restructure existing contracts for new signal systems and to simplify the signaling technology that will emerge as the standard on Yonge-University (Line 1) by 2020 with the remainder of the subway system to follow.

In order to make sense of the evolving design for new TTC signals, this article will begin with a short history of the system as it existed and the limitations the new system is designed to remove.

Continue reading →
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TTC Board Meeting March 26, 2015 (Update 2)

The TTC Board met on March 26, and considered a meaty agenda that begins to address some important policy issues.

Updated March 29, 2015 at 3:45 pm: The presentation on One Person Train Operation (OPTO) given at the meeting has been added along with comments.

Updated March 24, 2015 at 8:10 am: After this was published, the TTC posted the CEO’s Report.

In a previous article, I wrote about the Spadina subway extension project update. This will undoubtedly be the main attraction both for board members and the media. Other items of interest include:

  • An overhaul of system key performance indicators (KPIs)
  • A door monitoring system for Toronto Rocket trains and one person train crews (Updated March 29)
  • Revision and consolidation of the resignalling contract for the Yonge-University line
  • A study of express bus routes
  • CEO’s Report

Continue reading →

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How Much Will The Spadina Extension Cost? (III) (Update 3)

Updated April 13, 2015:

The TTC has issued a press release regarding the management of the Spadina subway extension project:

The Toronto Transit Commission has entered into an agreement with Bechtel Canada Co. for project management of the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE) for up to $80 million.

The contract value to Bechtel is based on staffing costs, management fees and incentives to open the subway extension by Dec. 31, 2017. Bechtel staff begin work today and will form an integrated team with existing TTC personnel. The Bechtel contract will expire March 31, 2018. Bechtel’s project director will report directly to TTC CEO Andy Byford.

On March 26, the TTC board approved a report from staff that recommended TTC enter into a sole source agreement with a project manager with a proven track record of delivering similar-sized projects on time, and with experience working with multiple contractors, in order to have the TYSSE in service by Dec. 31, 2017.

Toronto City Council subsequently authorized the expenditure of $90 million, while the Regional Municipality of York authorized the expenditure of $60 million, for a total of $150 million (third party contractor, plus in-house project costs), to fully deliver TYSSE by the end of 2017.

The release is silent on the issue of what might be done with the remaining $70m of Toronto/York’s $160m authorization.

Original article of March 29, 2015:

In a previous article, I reviewed information from a media briefing by Andy Byford on the status of the Toronto York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE) project. At the TTC Board meeting on March 26, 2015, further information was made public both in Byford’s presentation, and in additional material appended to his report.

Updated March 30, 2015 at 1:30 pm: The slides from Byford’s presentation are now available starting at page 58 of the linked pdf.

Updated March 30, 2015 at 11:30 pm: A new report from the Toronto City Manager to Council advises that the interest earnings on the “Move Ontario Trust” (the repository for provincial contributions to the TYSSE project) have not achieved the target rate of 4% resulting in an $85m shortfall. Oliver Moore reports in the Globe that Ontario has refused to make up this amount as per the original agreement between the funding partners. Toronto and York Region are on the hook for this additional cost estimated at $51m for Toronto and $34m for York Region. This expense is over and above the cost overruns on various contracts, but at least Council cannot blame the TTC because the trust fund is not under TTC control.

Appendix F (beginning at page 33 of the linked PDF), is a presentation given to the Executive Task Force who oversee the project on behalf of the sponsoring governments on July 28, 2014. The presentation was given by Parsons Brinkerhoff who had been retained by the TTC to review the project.

Appendix G (beginning at page 56) is a two-page summary of Bechtel’s work reviewing PB’s original study and a subsequent APTA (American Public Transit Association) peer review. APTA concluded that an earlier completion date would be possible than PB had projected, but only with major changes to the project management structure. Bechtel concurred in these findings.

It is abundantly clear from this material that the TYSSE’s problems were known at the top level of the project in mid-2014 at the latest. At the time, their severity was so great that the project would still be incomplete by the time of the next municipal and provincial election cycles, and that considerable additional cost could be facing the funding partners. This very serious issue did not arise in public discussion until six months later, notably after Toronto’s 2015 budget cycle was complete.

Continue reading →

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How Much Will The Spadina Extension Cost (II)?

In a previous article, I reviewed the history of the Toronto York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE). This project has been widely reported to be both late and over budget, but details only began to emerge on March 20, 2015 when TTC CEO Andy Byford fired two senior members of the engineering staff.

On March 21, 2015, Byford presented a briefing to the media as a preview of a report to be discussed by the TTC Board on March 26, 2015. This report includes both current information on the project and an October 2012 update that was issued when the TYSSE deadline was shifted to fall 2016.

The key points of the briefing were:

  • The earliest possible opening date for the TYSSE to Vaughan is the end of 2017.
  • Relations between TTC project management and the various contractors working on the TYSSE are badly strained, and this cannot be remedied by those now in charge.
  • Byford recommends that the TTC “retain a third party project-management firm as an incentivized project manager” (the terms of the proposed arrangement are confidential pending execution of the agreement).
  • Alternate schemes for continuing the TYSSE project with TTC staff in part or all of this role will extend the period needed to resolve outstanding issues and reach project completion, and will increase total project costs.
  • Additional funding to keep the project active to the end of 2017 of $150-million is required with Toronto paying $90m and York Region paying $60m. Toronto’s share could come from a TTC operating surplus in 2015 (mistakenly cited as “2014” in the report), property sales and/or deferral of projects. There is no word on how York Region might fund its share of the extra costs.
  • The project is subject to many claims by contractors against the TTC, and some counterclaims on the TTC’s part. The eventual value of settling these is unknown, and this is a potential additional cost beyond the $150m. Whether this can be accommodated by the existing project budget remains to be seen.

Continue reading →

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How Much Will The Spadina Subway Extension Cost?

The Toronto York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE) to Vaughan has been much in the news lately thanks to its delayed opening and cost overruns. The line was originally expected to open in 2015, even in early rosy estimates before the Pan Am Games, but now will not be in service until 2017. The project was repeatedly cited (as recently as December 2014’s CEO Report) to be on its budget of approximately $2.6-billion. The exact final cost is not known but has been reported to be up to $400-million more.

To date, the TYSSE project is on budget with a total budget of $2,634 Million. The in-service date is targeted for the fall of 2016 however the project is facing a serious schedule challenge. [CEO’s Report for November-December 2014, p. 29]

The “on budget” statement, which had appeared in all previous CEO reports, vanished with the January 2015 report.

A peer review was conducted by an APTA panel in late 2014 largely to assess schedule and budget challenges. A report is expected at the end of January related to schedule and budget challenges and will make recommendations to mitigate these challenges.

Bechtel Ltd., a consulting firm, was also retained at the CEO’s specific direction to conduct a thorough in depth analysis of the project and likewise is expected to present its findings at the end of January. [CEO’s Report for January 2015, p. 30]

The results of these reviews are to be tabled at the March 26, 2015 TTC Board meeting.

There are two issues in play here. First and most obvious is the question of how a major project can suddenly be found to have budget problems, and why these were not discovered and reported sooner. How much oversight did the TTC Board actually have beyond the one-line monthly assurance that the project was “on budget”? Second is the more general question of the tracking of major projects, and why this is not regularly reported to the Board and through them to City Council and other funding governments.

To learn as much as I could from publicly available sources, I culled through TTC meeting reports going back to the early days of design work on the TYSSE. Tracking a project’s history this way can be challenging for various reasons:

  • Some agendas exist only as a PDF file without links to the underlying reports.
  • TTC procurement policy allows contracts of up to $5-million to be approved by management without a report to the TTC Board. (This is in line with the City of Toronto’s policy.)
  • A monthly report listing all expenditures authorized by management in the $1-5m range was discontinued in March 2012.
  • Changes in the total authorized spending on a line item only appear in public when there is an update involving a large contract change.
  • The CEO’s report tracks variations in capital spending, but this is only against the expected amount for the current year, not for a project overall. Because of various delays, the TYSSE tended to underspend versus plans even though the estimated total cost to completion might actually be rising.

Continue reading →

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City of Toronto Budget Amendments 2015 (Updated)

At its meeting of March 11 and 12, 2015, City Council passed a few budget amendments affecting the Toronto Transit Commission. Some of these reflect a sense that the TTC has not been “minding the store” quite as well as it claims, and a little belt tightening is good for any organization. Others address specific concerns that, quite frankly, should have been on the TTC’s agenda before now, but were buried under the rapid transit debates.

The motions address the following topics:

  • Additional Streetcars
  • Automatic Train Control
  • Waterfront West Transit
  • TTC Staffing and Project Management

Updated March 13, 2015 at 1:50 pm with further information about proposed staffing reductions.

Continue reading →

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Metrolinx Board Meeting Wrapup: March 3, 2015

The Metrolinx Board met on March 3 for its quarterly gathering. Although there were important issues on the agenda, the debate was as superficial as usual, and the message that “everything is just great” permeated the proceedings.

Things got off to a slow start. The meeting room is relentlessly beige, overlit and unadorned. Windows there are, but when we entered, they were already partly screened and the view, such as it is, simply looks across to rooms and the roof opposite. Not long into proceedings, a further set of screens blocking this view descended lest we be distracted from the worthies sitting at the board table. We might as well have been in the set of an existential play wondering if there actually was a world outside, not a fine, downtown historic building.

The first order of business was a goodbye to retiring director Nicholas Mutton, a genteel fellow who has headed up the Customer Service Committee. Sadly his reports are always pushed to the back of the agenda and are rushed for time, and his presentations rarely get beyond reading a few pages of a short PowerPoint.

Then we had a brief report from Bruce McCuaig, the Metrolinx President & CEO, reiterating events of note since the last board meeting in December. One might forgive the poor directors for being out of touch with recent news given that they meet so rarely and have so little to say. Surely they stay informed on Metrolinx activities and don’t need a recap beyond the most unusual events.

In the remainder of this article, I will discuss:

  • Back-Charging Toronto for Metrolinx Work
  • The Regional Express Rail (RER) Update
  • The Regional Fare Integration Study
  • The Study of the Pearson Airport Area

Continue reading →