Author: Steve

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TTC Service Changes Effective October 12, 2025

Major Update October 10 at 12:50pm: Additional information on bus bay assignments at various stations, on street stop arrangements pending Line 5 opening, and service changes not mentioned in earlier versions of this post. Also added are various tables and charts of fleet allocations and other information.

Updated October 10 at 11:30pm: The spreadsheet showing detailed before and after service designs for affected routes is now available.

The service changes planned for October 12 include four major groups:

  • First stage of route reorganization for Line 5 Crosstown opening.
  • Construction begins on Queen Street between Broadview and the Don River.
  • Construction begins on College Street at McCaul.
  • Construction ends in November at King & Dufferin.

History of This Article

As I publish this on Thursday, October 9 at 10:45am, the TTC has still not issued its usual detailed memo of pending service changes although the information has been floating around for weeks in various sources.

On October 9, there was a press release accompanying Mayor Chow’s media appearances, but this release only gives a hint of what is happening beyond the headline announcement of improved Line 2 subway service. That release includes a link to a page with more details, although regular TTC site readers would never find it.

Updated 5 pm October 9: A separate press release has been issued with the details of changes omitted from the first one. There are now separate pages for each modified route linked from a common page regarding the Line 5 changes. Maps showing the revised routes have been added to the end of this article.

There is an “Updates” page, separate from the regular “Service Changes” page, which can be accessed through the “Riding the TTC” page assuming you know it exists. It includes a link to the service changes, but there is no link from the TTC home page to this information. The Service Changes page gives details, but only for a handful of routes. Automatic links from route schedule pages are generated only for Service Changes items, and so the information on the Updates page is not linked for riders looking at route schedules.

Updated 10:50am October 9: The TTC Home Page now includes a link to the Updates post.

Updated 9:30am October 10: There are now route-level pages detailing the changes on the “Service Changes” page

Updated October 10: The detailed memo of service changes was issued mid morning today.

The TTC recently trumpeted its proposed Wayfinding Strategy which includes a strong digital component given the many riders who access information through online channels. Their own website badly needs overhaul, but even in its current state, information is not published in a consistent location.

The article following the break is a compendium of information from various sources.

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TTC Board Meeting: October 6, 2025

The TTC Board met on October 6, 2025. Many items on the agenda were confidential in whole or in part, and the meeting immediately recessed into private session. Four hours later, the public session resumed.

Extended private sessions have been a “feature” of recent Board meetings, and this is a major inconvenience for people who have taken the trouble to travel to City Hall for deputations, or remained available online. In years long past, the Board scheduled an in camera session before the public session so that, usually, the public part started on time. They should reconsider this practice, or at a minimum advertise a long, planned private session in the agenda so that public attendees can plan accordingly.

Items of interested included:

  • The CEO’s monthly report including an updated format for bus fleet and route performance metrics
  • The Peer Review of asset management by the International Association of Public Transport (UITP)
  • The Wayfinding Strategy
  • Renaming of the Carhouse at Leslie Barns
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512 St. Clair: Mid-Point Route Management Update

In a previous article, I examined headway reliability on several routes that had been flagged for improved management by the TTC.

The 512 St. Clair car received improved service in September 2025, and this article updates the charts with headway stats to September 30 showing the combined effect of more service and route management.

Weekday service over the 2024-25 period has had three main levels: bus operation during a long-running construction project in 2024, followed by streetcar service with headways improving only in the last month.

EffectiveAM PeakMiddayPM PeakEarly EveLate Eve
5-Sep-23 (Bus)3′5′3’30”6′10′
24-June-24 (*)8′8′8′8′10′
2-Sept-256′6′6′8′10′

(*) For a period in Oct-Nov 2024, the route was split with streetcars operating from Gunn’s Loop (Keele) to Bathurst Station, and buses from Oakwood Loop to St. Clair Station. This was not shown in the published service summary, but does show up in the observed data for the portion of the route operated with buses.

Generally speaking, the range of headways at various points on St. Clair did drop in September 2025, although the effect is more pronounced early in the month than later. Whether this indicates a trend away from tighter headway management as the month wore on will not be clear until more data have accumulated.

During the period of bus operation, the median headway (50th percentile) did not move around much, but this is not the case with the streetcar periods. A reason for this is that with wider scheduled headways, it is more likely that within one hour the scheduled number of vehicles will be higher or lower by a more substantial amount than with the more frequent bus service. Conversely, with the shorter scheduled bus headways, it is much more likely that vehicles will run in pairs because it is much easier to catch up to the bus only a few minutes in front.

A long-standing problem on streetcar routes with larger and larger vehicles (PCC/CLRV, ALRV, Flexity) is that scheduled headways to provide comparable capacity widen, but the laissez-faire attitude to line management results in much worse swings in vehicle spacing. This is compounded by Service Standards that accept a wider range of headways for less frequent service. The issue of meaningful Standards is to be reviewed in coming months by the TTC, and this is an area where Standards should not be compromised just to preserve “good” performance stats for management.

As shown in many analyses published here, there is a general problem with headways becoming more erratic as vehicles move along the route. St. Clair is entirely on its own right-of-way, except for a short stretch at the western end. It also has a mid-point opportunity for headway regulation at St. Clair West Station. Data for departures from that point suggest that little or no headway management occurs there.

TTC Service Standards for terminal departures specify a range of 1 minute early to 5 minutes late, although recently the service metrics were change to eliminate early departures. In any event, a 5 minute window for being “on time” combined with a 6 minute scheduled service means that service can be badly bunched and still “on time” for reporting purposes.

Along the route, the Standards prescribe headway variations of ±50% so that for a 6 minute headway, an actual range of 3-to-9 minutes is permitted. For an 8 minute headway, the permitted range is 4-to-12 minutes. To compound credibility problems, this only has to be achieved on 60% of trips. [See TTC Service Standards at pp 15-16.]

Needless to say, when the TTC says that service meets their standards, the quality can vary quite widely from what riders might expect as “reliable” operation.

Following the “more” break, the first section looks at the evolution of headways along the route west from Yonge and east from Keele during various periods over the day. AM Peak values tend to be slightly more reliable, but even they worsen the further from the terminal one goes.

The second section presents the detailed headway data from September 2025 to show the actual scatter of headway values by day and week, and including weekend data.

There is some indication that the TTC has attempted better headway management on 512 St. Clair, but the results are uneven and there are clear signs of locations and time periods where service is not regulated at all. In turn, this shows what “normal” operations are like without active dispatching and spacing of cars along the route.

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TTC Freezes Non-Union Hiring

On Friday, September 26, the TTC issued an internal notice that there would be a freeze on all non-union hiring. This is in reaction to the need to find $141-million in savings to get the anticipated 2026 budget deficit down from $232-million to the Mayor’s target of $91-million.

All non-union requirement is subject to the CEO’s approval.

While, in theory, this does not directly affect service or maintenance levels, there is simply no way that the TTC can find $141-million without at least constraining the union side as well. In turn, this has implications for service growth in 2026 especially considering the ongoing loss of productive service hours to traffic congestion and changes in bus dispatching for the shorter range of eBuses. There is also the question of adequate staffing in various maintenance departments.

One current initiative to improve service is headway monitoring and management, and it is not yet clear whether this would be staffed with “management” or “union” positions.

More generally, the question must be asked whether “management” has been growing at a faster rate than other line positions (be they union or non-union) over past years. The TTC used to publish detailed staffing counts as part of the Operating Budget “Blue Books” up to 2019, but these no longer exist, at least not publicly.

A hiring freeze is only a first step in any review because it addresses vacancies that might or might not be in critical roles. Moreover, it does not address the larger question of whether management should be reorganized or downsized.

One hidden issue in staffing is the matter of consultants and outsourcing. Although the use of outside staff is not as severe an issue at TTC as at Metrolinx, this can be the source of much resentment by “in house” staff who are asked to do more with less while the taps continue to flow for outsiders. Indeed, I understand that a former TTC manager is acting as an advisor on contract to the senior team. This shows how careful an organization must be with double standards.

Recently, the TTC has consulted with interested parties including their Planning Advisory Committee, which I attend, on various service proposals and other matters going into the 2026 budget cycle. It is hard to see how such consultation can bear any fruit facing a constrained subsidy target from our “pro-transit” Mayor.

I asked the TTC to respond on this issue on Friday, September 26, and again today, September 29. As of 5:00pm, the only reply is a copy of the corporate notice that I already had from another source. Its text follows the “more” break below.

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Bus Reliability: TTC Reveals Uncapped Stats

For many years, the TTC reported bus reliability as a mean distance before failure (MDBF) as shown in the charts below.

A fundamental problem with these charts is that the values for Hybrid and Clean Diesel buses are capped at 30,000km and 20,000km respectively, although the actual values could be higher. This makes the values shown for eBuses which lie in the 15,000-30,000km range look similar by comparison.

In the October 2025 CEO’s Report, on the agenda for the TTC Board Meeting of October 6, 2025, the values are not capped. Indeed, the CEO comments on the particularly good results for diesel buses.

Industry-Leading Asset Performance

When it comes to vehicle reliability, our fleet continues to outperform expectations. Across all vehicle types, our buses are achieving Mean Distance Between Failures (MDBF) well above North-American standards. Clean Diesel, in particular, is showing exceptional results, demonstrating industry-leading reliability across our entire bus portfolio. [CEO’s Report at p. 2]

The numbers cited by the CEO for September 2024 to August 2025 are:

Mean Distance Between Failures

Ebus 117 buses 24,554km (12m rolling avg) Target 24,000
Diesel 1165 buses 46,336 km(12m rolling avg) Target 12,000
Hybrid 766 buses 36,218km (12m rolling avg) Target 24,000

[CEO’s Report at p. 5]

The MDBF values affect key aspects of service provision including the number of vehicles required for spares and the probability of a failure affecting service.

Not included in the stats is the mean time to repair which can have as severe an effect as MDBF. If the failures for one type of equipment are more complex putting a bus out of service for a longer period, this can compound the MDBF rate because each failure represents a longer outage. The TTC is somewhat insulated from this effect because it maintains a larger spare ratio than the industry average (see below).

I will review the new format of reported stats (only bus and subway are available so far, with streetcar to come in November) as part of my general write-up of the Board agenda.

The TTC appears to have been under-reporting the reliability of diesel and hybrid buses for many years, and this suggests that they wanted to make their eBus program appear as successful as possible. The historical stats should be restated with the caps removed so that the public can see just what the comparison over past years actually looked like.

Recently, operational issues regarding the deployment and charging for an eBus fleet have come to light, and it is clear that conversion to battery buses is not going to be as straightforward as thought when this program began.

Different fleet counts are cited in the August 31 Scheduled Service Summary and the CEO’s Report.

CEO’s Report
September 2025		Scheduled Service Summary
August 31, 2025
Diesel1,165 (56.9%)1,165 (55.3%)
Hybrid766 (37.4%)766 (36.3%)
eBus117 (5.7%)177 (8.4%)
Total2,0482,108
Peak Scheduled1,5881,588
Spare Ratio29%33%

Only 1,588 of these buses are scheduled in peak service [effective August 31, 2025] giving the TTC roughly a 29% spare ratio (three buses spare for every 10 scheduled), still above industry standards if the pilot eBus fleet is excluded. If they are included, the spare count is even higher, but that could be misleading depending on how many of the pilot buses actually remain in service.

How much of this is due to budget limits on service growth, and how much is due to keeping a high number of spares to offset poor reliability?

233 eBuses remain to be delivered on current orders, and the TTC proposes a further 200 hybrid buses to continue replacement of older vehicles while eBus technology matures. The portion of the fleet now being retired is not the diesels, but the earlier hybrids acquired in 2006-2008. [Source: TTC Scheduled Service Summary effective August 31, 2025 at p. 58]

A through review of the eBus program is needed to understand its effect on future operating and capital budgets without the rose-coloured lenses applied to “green” projects. Emission reductions are a key goal for Toronto, but they should not come at the expense of higher cost and reduced reliability for the transit fleet.

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The UITP Peer Review: What is the TTC Trying to Hide? (Updated)

At its September 22 meeting, the TTC’s Audit & Risk Management Committee passed a revised motion regarding this report. There are two effects:

  • A requirement that management report back to the Committee by the end of 2025 on various issues.
  • The report will be considered by the TTC Board at its next meeting (October 6, 2025) including a decision on which parts of the detailed UITP report will be made public.
Original RecommendationsRevised
Receive the International Association of Public Transport (UITP) Peer Review report and direct staff to evaluate the feasibility, cost, timing, and alignment of its recommendations with TTC’s mission and vision.Receive the International Association of Public Transport (UITP) Peer Review report and thank the participants for their assistance.
Direct staff to incorporate the recommendations deemed to be a strong strategic fit into the TTC Asset Management Maturity Roadmap.Direct management to report back to ARMC by the end of 2025 evaluating the importance, feasibility, cost, timing and alignment of the UITP recommendations with TTC’s mission, vision, and current plans, including the TTC Asset Management Maturity Roadmap. This report should prioritize the recommendations, and propose target dates and resource requirements for implementation of all high priority items that management recommends.
Authorize that the information in Attachment 2 remain confidential as it contains information related to the security of the property of the TTC.Forward this report and confidential attachment to the TTC Board.
Release Attachment 2 for public review after consideration by the TTC Board, except chapter 8, subject to approval of the Board, which shall remain confidential as it discusses sensitive details of the TTC’s signalling and control system.
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Toronto’s Ambling Streetcars

One year ago, the TTC’s Audit & Risk Management Committee endorsed management’s proposal of a peer review of subway and streetcar assets and maintenance programs by the International Association of Public Transport (UITP).

Much of the review concerned asset management, inventory of system components, condition tracking and planning for maintenance and replacement. There is also a concern that subway and streetcar maintenance could be better integrated due to common technologies. I will leave a full review of this until after the A&RM Committee considers the UITP report at its September 22, 2025 meeting.

One slide in the UITP’s presentation deck speaks to streetcar operations and notes the glacial pace of Toronto streetcars compared to other systems.

The gradual slowdown of streetcar speeds evolved over a long period, and some of the history is not well known by current TTC Board members nor, I suspect, by many in TTC management. Many readers will remember the sprightly operation of the previous generations of CLRV streetcars and of the PCCs before them. The slowing of streetcar operations is not just a question of traffic congestion, but of other factors including TTC policy decisions. Any move to speed up operations needs to address as many of these issues as possible.

These include:

  • Electric switch operation
  • Track condition at intersections and associated slow orders
  • Overhead condition notably at underpasses
  • Flexity door operations
  • Nearside vs farside stops
  • Transit priority at signals especially for turning movements
  • Reserved transit lanes

The full version of the UITP report is not available and it will be discussed in private session at the committee meeting.

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Pantographs for TTC Legacy Streetcars?

The TTC has a Request for Bid open on merx for the retrofit of pantographs on up to six legacy streetcars.

The base bid is for one car, with an option for five additional.

If this work goes forward, Toronto might still see its legacy fleet returned to occasionally active duty, but there is no further information in the request.

The legacy fleet is temporarily stored at the Halton County Radial Railway Museum.

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Service Analysis of 154 Curran Hall: July-August 2025

Route 154 Curran Hall was created in September 2024 in part by carving off the Orton Park branch of 54 Lawrence East. It operates from Kennedy Station to University of Toronto Scarborough Campus (UTSC) and uses the Midland/Kennedy red lanes between Eglinton and Lawrence. From there, the 154 runs east to Scarborough Golf Club Road and then dodges north to Ellesmere via Brimorton and Orton Park. The route continues east to Military Trail and then south into UTSC.

Service is not frequent with headways from 22-25 minutes. The schedule summary below is dated November 2024, but the headway pattern is the same as the original September 2024 version.

For services less frequent than every 10 minutes, TTC Service Standards dictate that buses should be no more than 1 minute early or 5 minutes late 60% of the time. This is a rather generous target, but as charts later in this article show, the 154 misses the maximum target by a very wide margin in many cases. However, that 60% is almost a “get out of jail free” card for service reporting and allows wider headways with no upper bound for 40% of the service.

A problem common to shorter routes with infrequent service is that headways can be quite erratic. This compounds the already wide gaps between buses with unpredictable arrivals. These arise from three sources:

  • Buses have adequate time for generous layovers at Kennedy Station, but do not leave reliably on time.
  • Later in the day, some buses run in pairs even on the very wide scheduled headway.
  • Occasionally, a bus will be missing, and there is no effort to dispatch the remaining vehicles on an even spacing leading to double headways of 45 minutes or more.

All of these point to an abdication of line management and a laissez-faire attitude to service quality.

There were no eAlerts issued for 154 Curran Hall during July and August and this suggests that nobody was “minding the store”.

In the detailed portion of this article, I will review headways at the terminals, travel times and the service operation on a few sample days. In future articles, I will turn to other short routes with similar problems.

A route like 154 Curran Hall might not seem important in the grand scheme of things by comparison with the Finch East or Dufferin corridors, but poor service is something riders can see. It is especially galling when a route is announced as “new and improved” but fails to deliver.

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Is TTC’s Subway Work Car Fleet Inadequate?

In the Major Projects Update on the TTC Board’s September 2025 agenda, there is a troubling reference under three subway maintenance projects in progress.

Rogers 5G Implementation

“The schedule may be impacted because of workcar and resource availability, which prioritizes state-of-good-repair activities. The TTC will co-ordinate with internal departments to prioritize Rogers work (where possible) so that workcars are available and assigned.” [p. 19]

Line 2 Capacity Expansion Program

“The unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars is a concern and is impacting the successful delivery of Line 2 Traction Power portfolio projects.” [p. 22]

Line 1 Capacity Expansion Program

“Negative reinforcing cables VMC to Sheppard West: Construction has slowed down due to the unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars … [p. 25]

“The unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars is a concern and is impacting the successful delivery of Line 1 Traction Power portfolio projects.” [p. 26]

Reading this, I could not help thinking back to the proposal for renewal and expansion of the TTC’s fleet in the latter years of Andy Byford’s term as CEO. Until 2019, the TTC published its Capital Plan in detail in two large binders commonly referred to as “the blue books”. This practice stopped in 2020, and it was not replaced by an electronic equivalent.

From the 2018 budget, I compiled a list of planned work car purchases. Also, I requested from the TTC a list of new vehicles since 2017. The table below merges this information.

Note 1: At the beginning of the work car plan, TTC owned two tie tampers, RT-21 and RT-41. Descriptions in the detailed plan speak of acquiring two additional units similar to RT-41. However, all that appears to have happened is that one unit, RT-21, was replaced. These units are essential to dealing with track problems that lead to slow orders.

Capital Project DescriptionPlanned YearPurchasesYear
Abestos Abatement Cars RT-34-352017
Geometric/Non-Destructive Testing
Track Inspection Workcar		2017-19Track Inspection Vehicle RT90-912019
Replace RT-7 locomotive 2020-21
Replace RT-16/17 tunnel washer2021-22
Electric combo flat cars (2)2019-20Combo Unit Flatcars
RT-30-31 & RT-32-33		2021
2024
Paper Vacuum Car2015-18Vacuum Car Debris/Paper RT-892017
Vacuum Excavator (2)2018Vacuum Excavator
RT-6 & RT-46		2019
2020
Multi-purpose Tamper
Production Tamper (Note 1)		2018-20
2019		Production Tie Tamper RT-212019
Crane Flatcar (2)2017Flatcar w/ Crane
RT-87 & RT-88		2017
2018
Rail Milling CarProvided by contracted services.
See 2018 and 2024 reports.		Ongoing
Replace dual cab flat cars
RT-5, RT-29, RT-28 & RT-55		2020-23
Dual cab flat car2020-22

Readers will recall the major interruption to subway service in 2024 thanks to an hydraulic oil spill from a work car. This incident triggered a review of maintenance practices revealing problems with the quality and frequency of inspection, and of the general state of the fleet. One issue is the age and condition of some cars which are not always fit for service.

From the table above, it is clear that many planned work car purchases in the 2018 plan have gone forward, but some have not. I asked the TTC about pending acquisitions, but received a generic answer.

The TTC Subway Workcar fleet undergoes a continuous program of growth, replacement, and overhauls, with another 10 vehicles targeted for overhaul/upgrade, or replacement between 2026 and 2032. The usual caveats around timing being dependent on the ability to procure would apply once they are put to tender. [TTC Media Relations email Septmber 8, 2025]

As the subway system grows and ages, the maintenance workload will go up, and with it the need for both specialized staff and work cars. The Major Projects report shows that the TTC is falling behind on both counts.

This is an aspect of “State of Good Repair” that is generally hidden from public view, but is key to maintaining reliability of the infrastructure and the revenue service it supports.