The Crisis in Funding Transit Operations

For the past year, Toronto’s transit advocacy and hand-wringing focused on a planned order of new subway trains for Line 2 Bloor-Danforth. The City committed its share of funding through special transit taxes, and Ontario came in with the proviso that the Federal government pony up too.

For their part, the Feds dragged their heels not just on the subway cars, but on transit funding generally. They announced a $30-billion, ten-year national program, but money will not flow until 2026. Toronto’s subway car order will draw its federal share from that pot.

One of Toronto’s many problems is solved, but Canada still faces a Federal program inadequate compared to the backlog of national needs, not to mention the dubious future of a government that may be out of office before many dollars flow to local transit systems.

Lost in all of this is a nation-wide crisis in funding for transit operations and maintenance, money that is needed today. Since 2020, special subsidies at all levels masked the severity of the problem to keep transit afloat for pandemic-era mobility and economic support. Those subsidies are ending, and transit systems are back to the problem of finding the next dollar to operate their services.

This is the boring stuff with few photo-ops, but a huge impact on making transit an alternative to driving, or not traveling at all. Money is needed to pay operators and mechanics to drive and repair buses, and to run enough of them that service is attractive and comfortable. Low cost transit is useless if it shows up infrequently and unreliably.

The situation is compounded by inflation in labour and materials costs, and revenue losses from ridership decline and fare freezes. Actions to keep transit operating as a credible, useful mode of transport through the pandemic were necessary and laudable, but the fiscal landscape has changed and cities are hard-pressed to sustain their systems as the special subsidies evaporate.

Many transit systems face perilous service cuts if they do not obtain sustained, improved operating subsidies, but the political situation in many governments is not exactly pro-transit. There are big bucks for construction of new routes and major upgrades, but running better transit today is quite another matter.

Global News recently produced a series of reports on this problem looking at several cities in detail. The consultancy Leading Mobility published This is the End of the Line in May 2024 reviewing operating budget funding and potential revenue tools in several cities.

Just getting “back to normal” with added funding is not enough with transit’s key role in supporting economic, population and environmental change.

For many Canadian transit agencies, new revenue tools alone will not be able to meet the growing fiscal challenges for transit operations. Each level of government has mandates, plans and policies related to climate action, population growth and immigration, equity, economic development and affordability that will significantly rely on useful, reliable and convenient transit service. [This is the End of the Line, p. i]

We tend to forget that the pre-pandemic TTC had severe problems with crowding that were not addressed by penny-pinching budgets. Creeping back to 2019 demand levels a few per cent each year will not address capacity problems transit faced five years ago, let alone the need for more transit, better connected communities and transit as a welcomed first choice for travel. The problem is compounded by a misleading TTC metric of service recovery that overstates how close to “the old days” we actually are. See:

The revenue tools proposed by Leading Mobility for major Canadian cities are based on some aspect of vehicle ownership or use, although several others were reviewed. Note that this would cover only the municipal portion of transit funding with operating contributions still required from other governments.

  • Vehicle levies
  • Off-street parking taxes
  • Vehicle kilometres traveled tax

A basic problem with vehicle-based revenues is the underlying premise that road users should pay for transit, and that new levies would divert travel from private cars to public buses and trains. This assumes that the transit network actually would serve the demand now handled by autos. However, Toronto’s system, as an example, grew primarily to serve commuting trips to the core area, and planning abandoned much travel to and between suburbs to cars. The dispersed nature of suburban residential and work locations makes transit provision much more difficult.

So-called business cases for major transit projects use the imputed value of time saved by commuters who would fly past traffic congestion on new lines. This is often the primary positive value in evaluations, and it strongly underpins building the fastest possible routes, sometimes at great cost. By contrast, the disincentive of a poor transit network is rarely discussed when the real political goal is to minimize subsidies by limiting service. Nobody talks about the cost of time wasted waiting for the Dufferin bus.

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Analysis of 63 Ossington – September/October 2024

This article reviews the operation of 63 Ossington in September and October 2024. This route operates from Eglinton West station to Liberty Village with a peak period short turn at St. Clair through Oakwood Loop. Historically, the route is a patchwork of former streetcar, later trolleybus, lines including Oakwood and Dovercourt. Service south of King Street runs through Liberty Village, formerly an industrial neighbourhood, and now a dense residential area.

Until early October, the route’s south end extended west to Sunnyside Loop replacing part of 504 King during road and track construction. On October 6, it resumed the standard looping through Liberty Village. With the new schedule, service was reduced during several periods, although in some cases not by much.

General observations:

  • Departures from Sunnyside Loop were irregular, but headways improved east of Roncesvalles because buses took their layovers on King Street, not at the loop.
  • Service was less reliable on the route while the extension operated, but improved with the return of the normal south end loop. Demand on the Sunnyside extension was rather light.
  • Ossington is a fairly short route (9km one way), but it is subject to some of the same problems as longer routes. Headway reliability is poor during some periods even though there are three locations where buses could be dispatched on a regular spacing: from the two terminals, and at Ossington Station.
  • There is some evidence of headway management at Ossington Station to restore proper bus spacing, but the effect is short-lived.

Note to readers: This article and a previous one about 129 McCowan North arose from reader suggestions, and I used them for detailed presentations of tracking data in various formats. Both routes had new schedules in early October, and this provided a chance to look at how service changed for the better or worse. For some, this will be a case of “TL/DR”, and I understand that this sort of thing is not everyone’s cup of tea. To those of you who love the detail, happy reading!

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John Tory’s Dwindling Legacy

In a report to City Council’s meeting on December 17, we learn that the cost of the five remaining “SmartTrack” GO stations has risen above previous estimates. See:

This is not the first time a cost problem arose, and back in March 2023, the City faced a similar problem: See:

Here is a map showing the five stations that remain in Toronto’s SmartTrack program.

The cost and funding shares are shown below.

DateTorontoOntarioCanadaTotal
Original$0.878B$0.585B$1.463B
June 2023$0.878B$0.226B$0.585B$1.689B

The Province has now discovered that the five stations cannot be built within the available funding, and the City Manager recommends that that three of the five be retained as City priorities: East Harbour, Bloor-Lansdowne and St. Clair-Old Weston. The rational behind the choice is:

  • East Harbour will be a major hub linking GO Transit, the Ontario Line and future surface transit including the proposed Broadview-Commissioners link to the Port Lands.
  • St. Clair-Old Weston will be serve an important node in the City’s planned revitalization and urbanization of that area.
  • Bloor-Lansdowne does not have such a strategic significance, but it is already under construction and is likely a less-expensive station compared to others like East Harbour and Liberty Village.

For the remaining two stations at Liberty Village and Finch East, the report recommends that Council:

[…] request that the Province identify a funding solution, including exploring funding opportunities with the Government of Canada, to deliver the Finch-Kennedy and King-Liberty stations at no further cost to the City. [City report at p. 4]

We do not know cost estimates for individual stations as these are in a confidential appendix thanks to Metrolinx’ desire for secrecy. As of June 2023, the cost for five stations averaged $338 million, and is obviously higher now. Taking available funding and dividing by three, instead of five, yields a cost of $563 million. These are surface stations, not underground, although some of them involve work beyond the station structures proper. For details, refer to the technical backgrounder.

The report gives no indication of Metrolinx’ position on this scheme and whether they would simply drop the two stations, or proceed on their own with stations that originally were expected to be “free” contributions to GO’s capital program by the City.

A related problem is that from the Federal point of view, it does not matter whether their money pays for a new GO station, subway trains, or any other project. It all counts against Toronto’s “share”. This has bedeviled transit schemes in the past. Council always has its “priorities” and assumes that everything that comes along will get at least a 1/3 share from the Feds. This is not necessarily a valid assumption given competing Federal priorities, not to mention a possible change of government. If the Feds won’t come to the table, the Province may also hold back on funding as they did with the new subway car purchase making their contribution contingent on a Federal commitment.

If the Feds do kick in whatever extra is needed, what other Toronto projects will go unfunded because our share was burned up on SmartTrack?

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TTC’s Dubious Short Turn Statistics

In the monthly CEO’s Report, one of the KPIs (Key Performance Indices) is a measure of the number of short-turned streetcars. This used to be reported as an absolute count, but is now expressed as a percentage of all trips.

Here is the most recent version:

This chart is a fiction born of the Rick Leary era when, in theory, all short turns were banned and the stats were made to fit the objective. Like many KPIs, this suffers from a combination of system-wide consolidation across all routes and time periods, as well as under-reporting of what is really happening.

An easy way to get the true count is to look at tracking data and compare two points on either side of a short-turn location. For example, Woodbine Loop at Queen and Kingston Rd. is a favourite spot for 501 Queen and some 503 Kingston Road cars to turn back. Counting the number of vehicles crossing Coxwell (west of the loop) with the number at Woodbine Avenue (east of the loop) shows how many cars did not travel east of Kingston Road and, therefore, were short-turned.

The TTC claims that they better their 1% target for trips short turned, but it is clear that they rarely achieve this. In some cases, the value rises above 20% indicating that although much service does get to the terminal, there is a good chance that a rider will encounter a short turn. This is separate from frustrations caused by gaps and bunching.

Short turns happen for many reasons including traffic congestion, too-tight schedules, service blockages for collisions, medical problems, parades … it’s a long list. Riders really don’t care. The basic point is that service they expected to receive is not there, and usually with no advance warning.

The table below summarizes the statistics from the vehicle tracking records in November 2024 for the period from 6am to midnight. It is clear that even on an aggregated level, the proportion of short turns is much higher on these routes that the TTC KPIs indicate.

Updated Dec. 6/24 at 1:30pm: Short turn counts for 504 King eastbound, 507 Long Branch and 508 Lake Shore westbound trips added.

Note: The legends on the original charts in this post were misleading. They have been changed to better reflect what the columns and lines on the charts represent..

RouteLocationTotal TripsShort Turns% Short Turns
501 QueenWoodbine Loop EB35471985.6%
Roncesvalles WB35372477.0%
503 Kingston RdWoodbine Loop EB32521364.2%
504 KingSpadina WB64532564.0%
Roncesvalles WB327536411.1%
Church EB63191262.0%
Parliament EB61982043.3%
Dundas EB2943712.4%
505 DundasParliament EB30402127.0%
Lansdowne WB306239713.0%
506 CarltonCoxwell EB30312939.7%
Lansdowne WB325657217.6%
507 Long BranchKipling WB2074883.0%
508 Lake ShoreKipling WB193199.8%
512 St. Clair (*)Lansdowne WB206824912.0%
Oakwood WB21131225.8%

(*) For 512 St. Clair, only data from November 14 onwards when streetcar service was restored are included.

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TTC Board Meeting Dec. 3, 2024: Follow-Up

This article is a follow-up to TTC Board Meeting: December 3, 2024. The following items are covered here:

  • Accessibility Plan and Family of Services
  • Work Car Hydraulic Leak Incidents
  • Seasonal Prohibition on Lithium-Ion Battery Powered E-Bikes and E-Scooters
  • Retirement of Legacy Fare Media

See also:

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June 1/25 the Earliest Date for Eglinton/Finch says TTC Chair (Updated)

At the TTC Board meeting on December 3, Chair Jamaal Myers proposed a motion to extend the validity of legacy fares (tickets, tokens, day passes) to June 1, 2025 for the “conventional” system, and to December 31, 2025 for WheelTrans. This was adopted by the Board.

After the meeting, in a press interview, Myers was asked “Why June 1”?

He answered that June 1 was the earliest possible opening date for Line 5 Eglinton Crosstown and Line 6 Finch. Those lines have no fare collection support for the old fare media.

This puts Metrolinx in a bind: either they announce an earlier date, something they have been loathe to do for months, or they acknowledge that we will not ride these trains until late Spring, maybe. If Doug Ford holds an election as expected, there will be no ribbon cutting for him to tout his great works.

Updated Dec. 4/24 at 6:10pm: In today’s Star, Myers qualified his statement:

TTC chair Jamaal Myers told the Star on Wednesday that the TTC is preparing to operate the Eglinton Crosstown and Finch West LRTs using an internal target date of early June next year — though he was careful to note that he does not speak for Metrolinx, the provincial agency in charge of constructing both beleaguered light-rail lines.

Myer added that the June target date was set separate from Metrolinx’s construction timeline, and was solely for the TTC’s internal preparations to take over operations once the LRT is ready.

He said TTC staff are using June 1 as a target date to train the LRT drivers and it includes a 30-day “revenue service demonstration,” which will see trains run along the full track of the LRT. The internal target dates were partly created for financial planning purposes and are not specific to the LRT.

The 2017 Line 2 Renewal Program

Back in 2017, there was a proposed renewal program for Line 2 that covered many aspects including fleet planning, extensions, future demand growth, signalling and maintenance yard requirements.

Most regular transit followers in Toronto will scratch their heads and ask “what renewal program”. The problem was that it was too rich for political blood at the time and most of it was ditched after CEO Andy Byford was replaced by Rick Leary.

A fundamental premise of the plan was that all of its components would be handled through one master schedule and common overall project management. The TTC had learned from experience on Line 1 that a piecemeal approach was fraught with conflicting timetables and specifications, not to mention the danger that each piece had to be funded separately with little appreciation for the big picture.

A Rail Amalgamation Study was conducted for the TTC by HDR and Gannett Fleming starting in 2015, and it was expected to finish in 2017. The intent was to review the line’s needs based on various future scenarios. For maintenance and storage facilities, it would consider:

  • The use of 2-car sets rather than the 6-car TR train configuration.
  • Possible line extensions
  • Expansion of the work car fleet to support expanding infrastructure
  • Implementation of ATC (Automatic Train Control) signalling

A preliminary report from the study showed that capacity would be a major problem. Note that in the context of this study, the Ontario Line did not yet exist, and the intent was that Greenwood Yard would host the Downtown Relief Line trains. Even without the DRL, Greenwood would not be able to handle expected growth in demand on Line 2.

The remainder of this article shows the details of the resulting plan, notably proposals for a new Line 2 fleet and expansion of the work car fleet that might have been set in motion had this scheme not been sidelined.

The TTC had a consolidated plan for Line 2 (and for the DRL), but this fell victim to budget cuts, the idea that we could “make do” rebuilding old trains and signal systems, and then the Provincial intervention with Metrolinx showing how they “knew better” how to plan and build rapid transit lines. We all know how that worked out.

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Searching For a New TTC CEO (Updated)

A late addition to the TTC Board’s agenda for December 3 is a presentation on the characteristics the TTC should look for in a new CEO by the search firm hired to manage the process.

Updated Dec. 4, 2024: A section has been added at the end with additional information from the Board meeting.

Jayson Phelps, Senior Partner, Phelps Group, will make the presentation, but the deck is already available and contains some interesting reading. Over recent weeks, Phelps Group conducted 1160 surveys via a publicly available web site, as well as 1062 by email invitations. Individual interviews were conducted with 31 people including the TTC Board, Leadership Team and “key stakeholders”. [Full disclosure: I was one of those stakeholders.]

The presentation summarizes feedback from those surveys and interviews. It is broken down into four sections: Experience, Leadership Attributes, Capabilities, and Challenges/Opportunities. There is also a section on Key Success Factors At 18 Months.

Anyone who has read position descriptions for senior management will recognize many points of which these are only a few.

  • Knowledge of transit systems,
  • Intergovernmental experience,
  • Good communications skills,
  • Ability to build relationships with employees, governments and the public,
  • Valuing diversity,
  • Planning, budgeting and capital project management,
  • Working within limited funding,
  • Exploiting technology for organizational improvement.

Two particularly stand out:

  • Demonstrated focus on rider experience, accessibility, and affordability.
  • Passionate about improving transit systems as essential public services.

There is a long list of challenges including restoration of maintenance and service reliability, but also related issues such as organizational structure, departmental silos, and conflicting priorities.

Through the presentation, some points imply a very troubled background within the TTC. It has been no secret that the past era was not a happy one, but seeing some of these issues in print as part of a new CEO search gives a sense of the rot.

  • Ethical Leadership and Accountability
    • Upholds ethical standards, communicates honestly, and takes accountability for decisions.
  • Stakeholder Engagement and Public Advocacy
    • Skilled at navigating relationships with unions, government entities, and community organizations, fostering collaboration and trust.
    • Skilled spokesperson, building credibility with the public and enhancing organizational reputation.
  • Workforce and Organizational Culture
    • Low workforce morale, mistrust in leadership, nepotism, favoritism, and resistance to change.
    • Talent drain to competitors, non-competitive compensation, and limited diversity in leadership.
  • Operational and Infrastructure Issues
    • Maintenance backlogs, reliability issues, and slow zones requiring urgent state-of-good-repair projects
  • Key Success Factors at 18 Months
    • Public Trust: Strengthened public confidence through visible leadership, improved service quality, and consistent dependability.
    • Employee Morale: Enhanced employee engagement and reduced turnover through recognition programs, inclusivity, and fostering a collaborative workplace culture.
    • Workplace Culture: Addressed toxic workplace culture by fostering fairness, collaboration, and transparency

Terms like ethical leadership, honesty, accountability, credibility, low morale, mistrust, nepotism, favouritism and toxic workplace culture do not sound like the kind of organization TTC purports to be. Many senior staff have left either through retirement, buyouts, constructive dismissal, or simply through disgust with the TTC’s leadership.

That list of key characteristics and challenges for a new CEO tells a grim tale.

Rebuilding the TTC will be a challenge on many fronts, not the least of which is getting hold of today’s pressing issues, but simultaneously developing a plan for a new TTC and building the organization’s trust that it can be and should be implemented.

For many years, the TTC Board failed in their duty to manage their CEO and actions taken by him, and were happy to sit back as long as he met the City’s and Mayor’s target of keeping costs down. Whatever investigative details were provided to the Board prior to the CEO’s departure, we will probably never know.

For too long, some Board members chose wilful blindness. They have no place at the TTC.

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TTC Board Meeting: December 3, 2024

The TTC Board will meet on December 3 with several items of interest on their agenda.

  • CEO’s Report and Key Performance Indicators
  • Notice of Motion: Proposed deferral of legacy fare retirement
  • Financial and Major Projects Update
  • Easier Access Program Update

In a previous article, I reviewed the report on subway work car hydraulic leaks. See:

After this agenda was published, the Federal Government announced its one third support for the purchase of 55 new Line 2 subway trains. See the Major Projects Update below for more details.

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Actual vs Advertised Wait Times

A central part of any transit rider’s journey is the wait for a vehicle that may or may not show up when expected. Even with an app that tells you where the bus is, the news might not be good. Rather than being just around the corner, the bus might be several miles away, and heading in the wrong direction.

The only statistic the TTC publishes on service quality is an “on time” metric. This is measured only at terminals, and even there “on time” means that a bus departs within a six-minute window around the scheduled time. Performance is averaged over all time periods and routes to produce system-wide numbers, although there are occasional references to individual routes in the CEO’s Report.

Riders complain, Councillors complain, and they are fobbed off with on time stats that are meaningless to a rider’s experience.

The problem then becomes how to measure the extra time riders spend waiting for their bus, and to report this in a granular way for routes, locations and times.

This article presents a proposed method for generating an index of wait times as a ratio comparing actual times to scheduled values, and their effect on the rider experience. The data are presented hour-by-hour for major locations along a route to see how conditions change from place to place.

An important concept here is that when buses are unevenly spaced, more riders wait for the bus in the long gap and fewer benefit from buses bunched close together. The experience of those longer waits raises the ratio of the rider’s waiting experience to the theoretical scheduled value. The more erratic the service with gaps and bunching, the higher the ratio of rider wait time to scheduled time. This is compounded by comfort and delay problems from crowded buses, and is responsible for rider complaints that do not match the official TTC story.

There’s some math later to explain how the calculations are done for those who want to see how the wheels turn, so to speak.

Note that this is a work in progress for comment by readers with suggestions to fine tune the scheme.

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