Much of the review concerned asset management, inventory of system components, condition tracking and planning for maintenance and replacement. There is also a concern that subway and streetcar maintenance could be better integrated due to common technologies. I will leave a full review of this until after the A&RM Committee considers the UITP report at its September 22, 2025 meeting.
One slide in the UITP’s presentation deck speaks to streetcar operations and notes the glacial pace of Toronto streetcars compared to other systems.
The gradual slowdown of streetcar speeds evolved over a long period, and some of the history is not well known by current TTC Board members nor, I suspect, by many in TTC management. Many readers will remember the sprightly operation of the previous generations of CLRV streetcars and of the PCCs before them. The slowing of streetcar operations is not just a question of traffic congestion, but of other factors including TTC policy decisions. Any move to speed up operations needs to address as many of these issues as possible.
These include:
Electric switch operation
Track condition at intersections and associated slow orders
Overhead condition notably at underpasses
Flexity door operations
Nearside vs farside stops
Transit priority at signals especially for turning movements
Reserved transit lanes
The full version of the UITP report is not available and it will be discussed in private session at the committee meeting.
The TTC has a Request for Bid open on merx for the retrofit of pantographs on up to six legacy streetcars.
The base bid is for one car, with an option for five additional.
If this work goes forward, Toronto might still see its legacy fleet returned to occasionally active duty, but there is no further information in the request.
Route 154 Curran Hall was created in September 2024 in part by carving off the Orton Park branch of 54 Lawrence East. It operates from Kennedy Station to University of Toronto Scarborough Campus (UTSC) and uses the Midland/Kennedy red lanes between Eglinton and Lawrence. From there, the 154 runs east to Scarborough Golf Club Road and then dodges north to Ellesmere via Brimorton and Orton Park. The route continues east to Military Trail and then south into UTSC.
Service is not frequent with headways from 22-25 minutes. The schedule summary below is dated November 2024, but the headway pattern is the same as the original September 2024 version.
For services less frequent than every 10 minutes, TTC Service Standards dictate that buses should be no more than 1 minute early or 5 minutes late 60% of the time. This is a rather generous target, but as charts later in this article show, the 154 misses the maximum target by a very wide margin in many cases. However, that 60% is almost a “get out of jail free” card for service reporting and allows wider headways with no upper bound for 40% of the service.
A problem common to shorter routes with infrequent service is that headways can be quite erratic. This compounds the already wide gaps between buses with unpredictable arrivals. These arise from three sources:
Buses have adequate time for generous layovers at Kennedy Station, but do not leave reliably on time.
Later in the day, some buses run in pairs even on the very wide scheduled headway.
Occasionally, a bus will be missing, and there is no effort to dispatch the remaining vehicles on an even spacing leading to double headways of 45 minutes or more.
All of these point to an abdication of line management and a laissez-faire attitude to service quality.
There were no eAlerts issued for 154 Curran Hall during July and August and this suggests that nobody was “minding the store”.
In the detailed portion of this article, I will review headways at the terminals, travel times and the service operation on a few sample days. In future articles, I will turn to other short routes with similar problems.
A route like 154 Curran Hall might not seem important in the grand scheme of things by comparison with the Finch East or Dufferin corridors, but poor service is something riders can see. It is especially galling when a route is announced as “new and improved” but fails to deliver.
In the Major Projects Update on the TTC Board’s September 2025 agenda, there is a troubling reference under three subway maintenance projects in progress.
Rogers 5G Implementation
“The schedule may be impacted because of workcar and resource availability, which prioritizes state-of-good-repair activities. The TTC will co-ordinate with internal departments to prioritize Rogers work (where possible) so that workcars are available and assigned.” [p. 19]
Line 2 Capacity Expansion Program
“The unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars is a concern and is impacting the successful delivery of Line 2 Traction Power portfolio projects.” [p. 22]
Line 1 Capacity Expansion Program
“Negative reinforcing cables VMC to Sheppard West: Construction has slowed down due to the unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars … [p. 25]
“The unavailability of the TTC Operations workforce and workcars is a concern and is impacting the successful delivery of Line 1 Traction Power portfolio projects.” [p. 26]
Reading this, I could not help thinking back to the proposal for renewal and expansion of the TTC’s fleet in the latter years of Andy Byford’s term as CEO. Until 2019, the TTC published its Capital Plan in detail in two large binders commonly referred to as “the blue books”. This practice stopped in 2020, and it was not replaced by an electronic equivalent.
From the 2018 budget, I compiled a list of planned work car purchases. Also, I requested from the TTC a list of new vehicles since 2017. The table below merges this information.
Note 1: At the beginning of the work car plan, TTC owned two tie tampers, RT-21 and RT-41. Descriptions in the detailed plan speak of acquiring two additional units similar to RT-41. However, all that appears to have happened is that one unit, RT-21, was replaced. These units are essential to dealing with track problems that lead to slow orders.
Readers will recall the major interruption to subway service in 2024 thanks to an hydraulic oil spill from a work car. This incident triggered a review of maintenance practices revealing problems with the quality and frequency of inspection, and of the general state of the fleet. One issue is the age and condition of some cars which are not always fit for service.
From the table above, it is clear that many planned work car purchases in the 2018 plan have gone forward, but some have not. I asked the TTC about pending acquisitions, but received a generic answer.
The TTC Subway Workcar fleet undergoes a continuous program of growth, replacement, and overhauls, with another 10 vehicles targeted for overhaul/upgrade, or replacement between 2026 and 2032. The usual caveats around timing being dependent on the ability to procure would apply once they are put to tender. [TTC Media Relations email Septmber 8, 2025]
As the subway system grows and ages, the maintenance workload will go up, and with it the need for both specialized staff and work cars. The Major Projects report shows that the TTC is falling behind on both counts.
This is an aspect of “State of Good Repair” that is generally hidden from public view, but is key to maintaining reliability of the infrastructure and the revenue service it supports.
James Bow has announced that the YouTube channel associated with the Transit Toronto website is moving to a new home. He asks that all subscribers migrate to it so that the new channel’s numbers will climb to a level ensuring YouTube revenue which is key to supporting the site.
The new channel is called Transit Toronto Main Channel with the handle @Transit-Toronto-Main. Content from the old channel will gradually migrate to the new home.
Transit Toronto contains a wealth of historic images and articles as well as current news. It’s well worth visiting and subscribing to the channel.
On September 18, 2025, Toronto & East York Community Council will consider a report recommending a revised proposal for speeding up bus service on Bathurst Street.
Back in July, the original proposal would have seen red transit-only curb lanes in both directions from just north of Bathurst Station to Eglinton Avenue. This proposal encountered substantial opposition, and the revised version is intended to improve transit and traffic operations when and where it is most needed in that segment of route 7 Bathurst Bus. There is no change proposed for the transit priority scheme for streetcars from Bathurst Station south to Lake Shore Boulevard.
The primary time and location of congestion affecting the south end of 7 Bathurst is in the afternoon, Mondays through Saturdays. To address this, the following changes are proposed:
No stopping will be permitted on Bathurst Street northbound from the north exit of Bathurst Station to Eglinton Avenue from 2-7pm on weekdays, and 12-7pm on weekends.
North-to-west left turns at Bathurst & Davenport will be banned from 7am-7pm Monday to Saturday, except holidays.
South-to-east left turns at Bathurst & Dupont will be banned from 7am-7pm Monday to Saturday, except holidays.
The existing 7am-9am ban on north-to-west left turns at Bathurst & Dupont will be removed.
The chart below shows the weekday and weekend travel time profiles for Bathurst Street with the existing and planned hours of “no stopping” overlaid.
The TTC’s Strategic Planning Committee met on September 4 at 10:00am in the Board Room at 1900 Yonge Street, TTC headquarters. The agenda included a presentation on the 2025 projected results and the outlook for 2026. This includes comments on the Capital Budget and Plan which I covered in a previous article.
As of June 30, the TTC was running $17.7-million behind relative to budget, and this number is expected to rise to a $36.5-million shortfall for the full year.
This is due primarily to ridership coming in lower than projected partly offset by lower than budgeted expenses.
One item not mentioned in the report is that the TTC’s Operating Budget for 2025 includes a withdrawal of $51.4-million from reserves. There are several reserves for different purposes (one covers self-insured loses from accidents), and it is not clear how much headroom there is for further withdrawals once year-end results are finalized.
The City often finds “left over” money at year end from various sources, and some of this goes into reserves and/or to making the TTC budget whole. Whether this will be available in 2025 is not yet clear.
In any event, if future budgets assume substantial reserve contributions, they could exhaust the “rainy day funds”.
At its meeting of September 4, 2025, the TTC’s Strategic Planning Committee considered a report on the unfunded “state of good repair” (SOGR) projects in their capital budget and a recommendation that these be prioritized for any new funding that might become available.
Updated September 8 at 3:15 pm: A chart has been added showing the magnitude of proposed spending and the shortfall in funding over the years 2025-2039.
The charts and tables below summarize the 15-Year Capital Investment Plan showing the distribution of funding and spending by area. The categories are ordered by priority with mandated work, a comparatively small component, coming first, followed by State of Good Repair which accounts for roughly 40% of planned spending. Note that the Provincial projects such as the Scarborough Subway and major City projects like the Eglinton-Malvern LRT are not included here.
SOGR does not preclude spending on other work, but some major proposals could compete with basic maintenance. For example, Platform Doors and the TransformTO program together account for about 20% of the total plan ($10.5-billion). Bus “SOGR” includes not just the purchase of new buses, but also the cost of technology change for charging infrastructure. Although these should be funded from separate revenue/subsidy streams, they could elbow aside basic funding. There is not much point in such projects if the basic transit system is allowed to crumble.
Some of the language in the report is rather cataclysmic foreseeing the shutdown of parts of the system, notably the streetcar network, if SOGR work is not funded. The report is inconsistent in the language used to describe the situation:
Given the current approved funding levels, the TTC will not be able to renew tangent track assets at a rate necessary to maintain and support existing service demands in a safe and reliable fashion to meet its SOGR needs. Results of an insufficient renewal rate could include restricted speed zones/slow orders, weekend/multi-day service diversions/closures, and/or emergency service interruptions. [p. 6]
But more dire language appears later:
Even when attempting to utilize more operating resources within preventive or corrective maintenance programs, the TTC may find it necessary to plan and prioritize condemning some rail corridors in favour of renewing others, and some may be fully placed out of service, with key intersections being the most at risk. [p. 18]
Such language has appeared before going back into the previous decade. We have seen what deferred maintenance did to the Scarborough RT and to the subway network which is beset with slow zones where track is not safe to operate at full speed. Delays in funding and approval for replacement of Line 2 trains pushed out their projected lifespan, a situation relieved only by concurrent delays in the Scarborough Subway expansion. By contrast on the streetcar network, some of the worst locations have been repaired in recent years, notably the intersection at King & Church, and more replacements at key locations are planned for the near future.
One cannot help thinking there is an anti-streetcar bias at the TTC where any excuse is used to hobble the system including widespread slow orders and abdication of any sense of providing reliable service.
In past years, the TTC published a much more detailed version of the Capital Budget (aka the “Blue Books”) including maps showing the current condition of assets. These put the scope and immediacy of needs in an understandable form. The closest thing today is the map of Reduced Speed Zones, but this does not indicate the scale and timing of needed work in the near future.
The more cynical among us might wonder if the lack of detail was part of a larger effort in the Tory/Leary era to downplay the gradual decline of transit infrastructure thanks to underspending and deferred maintenance.
It is ironic that the TTC is prepared to consider shutting down part of the streetcar system when there are much more extensive areas on the subway in need of major reconstruction. With a fleet of about 260 cars of which peak service consumes barely 60%, the goal should be to increase use of vehicles they already own, not to sabre-rattle about dismantling the system.
The transit system is more than tracks, and especially on the subway many unseen or little regarded systems keep service operating and stations and tunnels safe for riders. These are all part of the SOGR program, but this emphasizes how subways are expensive infrastructure not just to build but to own as they age.
Funding comes from several sources.
The City Building Fund is financed via property tax surcharges begun under Mayors Ford and Tory.
PTIF is an old program that winds down as withdrawals are made from committed funds.
City debt is financed through general city revenues.
CCBF is the Federal program replacing the gas tax allocation.
The projection for Development Charges could be high given the state of the construction industry and the deferral/elimination of DCs on some targeted housing programs. DC funding is only available to projects that expand service, not for day-to-day SOGR.
Amounts for the Streetcar Program are for the last stage of the 60-car order now in delivery and expansion of storage and servicing facilities for some of these cars at Hillcrest. It does not address the SOGR backlog.
TTC Internal funding comes from depreciation of assets that were bought by the TTC and not funded by other governments. In effect, this is a charge on the operating budget.
The New Deal was struck by the Province and City to upload expressway reconstruction and maintenance thereby freeing up capital that would otherwise be spent by the City.
The Zero Emission Transit Fund has help pay for electrification of the bus fleet, but it is unclear whether this will continue or be rolled into the CPTF.
The CPTF is the new Federal program for transit funding across Canada.
Some of these sources will run dry when the associated commitments are fulfilled.
An ongoing political problem in Toronto is the assumption that other governments will continue with project-based funding outside of these programs. This leads to allocated funding being earmarked by the City for the project getting the most attention (e.g. the lobbying for new subway train funding) with the assumption that more money will be available for other works. In the current climate, that is a risky assumption.
An important change in 2025 was the “New Deal” struck between the City of Toronto and Province of Ontario which had the effect of releasing capital dollars in the City’s plans for expressway renewal for use on the transit system. This money has been allocated as shown in the charts below which are from the 2025 Capital Budget.
Note that these charts show only vehicle overhaul programs, not the larger capital plan and shortfall.
A further problem in the medium term is that the bulge in road spending would only last for the rest of the 2020s, and there is no comparable saving in the early 2030s that can be shifted to transit. The New Deal is a short term fix, not a long term solution. This leaves many projects in the “out years” of the budget with no obvious funding.
Updated September 8: Chart added
This problem is illustrated by a chart showing the proposed spending level and projected revenues, together with the wide gap in future years. Note that as things stand today, the City is the major funder of TTC Capital, but the growing mountain of unmet needs will hit in the very near future unless new money is found or spending is curtailed. That option brings its own problems if the budget lines affected are SOGR projects as we have seen in past budget cycles.
The report includes tables by major segment of the system listing the unfunded capital works. For comparison, I have included the full Capital Budget presentation slides from January 2025 to put these numbers into context. The breakdown in the September report is different from the full budget in January making comparisons tricky in places.
At the September 4 meeting of the TTC’s Strategic Planning Committee, the desire to make some system improvements at no net cost led to some Board Members musing on discontinuing unprofitable services or shifting resources from “downtown” so that Scarborough, allegedly underserved, could get more frequent buses. This came from TTC Chair Jamaal Myers who forgets at times he is in charge of the Toronto Transit Commission.
It is one thing to argue for better transit service — more frequent, more reliable, less crowded — but this should be based on facts.
A proposal that surfaces from time to time in discussion of service standards is to improve the maximum headway on TTC routes from 30 to 20 minutes. An underlying assumption is that this will primarily affect the suburbs, but this is not the case. Many routes across the city, including the old “downtown”, have periods of infrequent service that such a change would affect.
The table below shows all routes, or route segments, operating less frequently than every 20 minutes where a policy change would demand better frequent service.
If the desire is to run more frequent service across the network, such a proposal should be balanced against the effects of any offset. For example, elimination of the 10-minute network would affect not just routes downtown but many routes in the suburbs. Is this a good policy choice, or is the real target the supposedly excess service “downtown” gets?
Pitting one part of the city against another is no way to lead an organization like the TTC, especially when the scheme is not well thought-out. There is no question that as Toronto’s network grew, the suburbs did not get their fair share of improvements. In part this was due to later development compared to the old city, and part to density, road patterns and a car-oriented philosophy. Transit has still not caught up, and needs more than a few subway lines to support stronger transit demand.
That said, the way to correct the inbalance is not to pillage the already-dense parts of the network for resources or to assume that every route in “downtown” has frequent service that can be trimmed.
Steve Munro 