Since September 2025, the TTC CEO’s Report has included a new presentation of various performance stats both to improve clarity, and to allow a deeper dive into each mode – subway, bus, streetcar – than was done in past reports.

• September 2025
• October 2025
• November 2025

This article presents the new pages for surface modes side-by-side, followed by the subway versions which differ because of the operating environment and infrastructure.

It would be heartwarming to see a revised set of data, but my gut feeling is that the new format adds little to older reports than pulling together many stats for each mode in one place. The actual content still leaves a lot to be desired.

To be fair to the TTC, there is a project underway to review and improve the KPIs [Key Performance Indicators] used to monitor the system, but this is not yet reflected in the reported data.

A pervasive problem with TTC’s self-monitoring is that many statistics are averages over long time periods, locations and routes. There is no sense of local variability or “hot spots” deserving of attention. Use of averages hides the problems, and prevents exception monitoring to show whether improvement happens where it is really needed.

Other metrics allow management to present a rosy picture when this does not match what riders actually see and politicians responsible for transit hear about in regular complaints.

Some metrics are demonstrably invented out of thin air. I have already written about how, until September 2025, bus reliability stats were artificially capped making eBuses appear much more competitive than they actually are. These stats should be restated for previous years to show actual trends, not fairy tales about bus reliability.

• Bus Reliability: TTC Reveals Uncapped Stats

Short turns are under-reported by an order of magnitude, and the percentage of short trips is much higher than the numbers reported by management.

• TTC’s Dubious Short Turn Statistics

Crowding is reported on the basis of “full” or “crowded” status, but these are not defined, nor is there any recognition that the approved Service Standard for off-peak is different than for peak vehicles. What might be considered only “crowded” in the peak would be well beyond the off-peak standard.

Recently, the average speed of streetcars was misrepresented as being strongly affected by autos blocking the tracks when, in fact, the lion’s share of these incidents were the result of the winter snowstorm and the ineffectual clearing of roadways by the City of Toronto. Traffic obstacles for streetcars (and in some cases for buses) remains a problem, but misrepresentation of stats will only undermine calls for better transit priority.

• TTC Misrepresents Growth in Streetcar Delays from Blocked Tracks

Fleet availability is reported relative to scheduled service, but without any discussion of factors that could limit how much service the TTC attempts to operate. This includes operator shortages through budget limits. A basic metric for transit fleets is the “spare ratio”, the number of spare vehicles above and beyond regular service requirements. Some spares exist for routine maintenance, some for ad hoc service, but some are simply sitting with nothing to do because there is no budget for them nor for the operators needed to better utilize the available fleet.

A related question is the degree to which a high spare ratio reduces the effect of vehicle failures because the pool available for scheduled service is so high. A high number of spares represents both a capital cost (procurement and yard capacity) and an operating cost (routine maintenance). Does the high number of spares represent real availability for better service, or are these the duds left on the sideline except for extreme emergencies? How large is the truly available fleet for each mode?

“On time performance” is a misleading term on several counts.

• The metric has historically only applied to terminal departures, not to overall route behaviour.
• A separate headway metric is now coming into use, and it is much more generous for the divergence of actual from scheduled service than the on-time metric in most cases.
• Service Standards define metrics for early arrivals and for missed trips, but these are not reported.
• Delay logs report the length of a service blockage/diversion, but give no indication of the number of vehicles or riders affected.

With the continued reporting of ridership levels today compared to pre-pandemic times, what is missed is a comparison of service levels. Leaving aside the bunching & gapping issue, service on most streetcar routes is less frequent, sometimes dramatically so, than it was in early 2020 and before. The wider headways are compounded by bunching problems which accentuate the relative infrequency of scheduled service. Decades ago, we saw how 501 Queen lost a substantial portion of its ridership when longer ALRVs replaced CLRVs on comparably wider headways. How much of the current ridership loss is due to much less attractive service as opposed to some inherent weakness in demand?

A comparison of pre- and post-pandemic service levels is at the end of this article.

The remainder of this article reviews the charts in detail.

In September 2025, I reported that the UITP (International Union of Public Transport) had delivered its peer review of TTC rail systems, but that TTC management did not want this document in public.

See: The UITP Peer Review: What is the TTC Trying to Hide?

A decision on whether to release the document was put off until the November 3, 2025 Board meeting, and partly redacted documents were released on November 5. See:

• UITP Peer Review Findings and Recommendations
• Management Responses – Accepted and in progress
• Management Responses – Pending further assessment and potential resourcing
• Management Responses – No further action required

Very little of the report or response is redacted, and the sections withheld are listed as containing “information about the security of the property of the local board”. At one point as the report made its way through previous debates, “commercial confidentiality” was also cited, but that has disappeared in the version that was released.

The management responses lie in three separate documents, with most items being “accepted and in progress” or “pending further assessment and potential resourcing”. Some of these will require participation by groups outside of the TTC, notably City Transportation Services. I will leave it to readers to peruse the responses linked above.

Readers should note that this is not a general review of TTC operating and maintenance practices, but rather a discussion of how the TTC keeps track of maintenance needs and manages its fleet and infrastructure. Only a few operating practices come in for comment. This review only covers rail modes, and the report is silent on bus operations and maintenance.

Subway vehicles and Streetcar vehicles are the main elements in the scope of this peer review. Other related subsystems like power, track, overhead catenary and signaling systems, which are essential parts for the operation of Subway and Streetcars,2 have been reviewed as requested by the TTC.

This peer review is a strategic review of the asset management plan and maintenance processes and is not a technical analysis nor assessment of the systems within the scope apart from the review of the Automatic train control (ATC) system specially requested by the TTC.

The aim of this peer review is to assess the TTC asset management plan and some other relevant documents, to identify gaps and improvement areas in line with the best international practices and standards. [p. 12]

Although the UITP team reviewed the TTC’s practices both through virtual discussions and information exchange, and through on-site visits, some comments give the impression that the team did not pick up on all of the local details.

Some TTC practices are lauded including the degree of in-house expertise and avoidance of outsourcing. This is ironic considering the ongoing efforts in past years to shift work to the private sector. The UITP review is quite clear in favouring the in-house option.

It is noted that the TTC conducts much of its maintenance in-house. It is good practice to keep maintenance of most systems, including rolling stock, signaling and track, in-house in order to maintain technical and performance knowledge within the organization. Whilst outsourcing may seem an attractive proposition, as it leaves the responsibility for the process to another party, it will be more expensive, and it removes control of the maintenance processes from the operator.

The long lifespan of many railway assets means that changes will take place as a result of experience in operation and maintenance processes. There will be modifications to equipment to improve reliability or reduce maintenance requirements. The life cycle of the asset is better managed by the operator if the operator has full knowledge of the performance of the asset. A maintenance contractor will take that knowledge from the operator and reduce their ability to monitor cost effective life cycle processes. [p. 18]

The bulk of the review and recommendations lie in Section 7 running from page 16-46. This article will sketch the key points, and interested readers should refer to the full report.

The items are presented mostly in the order that they appear in the document. Some sections give the sense that the authors attempted to review the TTC in detail, while others have a “cut and paste” feel of general suggestions with little reference to the Toronto situation, or the city’s position relative to other major transit systems.

At its November 3, 2025 meeting, the TTC Board will consider management’s proposed 2026 Network Plan. This is a very long set of documents, and this article will only cover the major points. Readers wishing more detail should refer to the reports.

• Report and Attachment 1 from the Chief Strategy and Customer Experience Officer on 2026 Annual Network Plan (a small introductory report)
• 2026 Annual Network Plan, and Appendices 1-5 (the details and analysis)

The recommendations are quite simple:

• Approve the 2026 plan and associated network changes, and
• Forward the plan to City Councillors, sundry senior City officials, and the General Managers of various regional transit agencies.

The “key themes” of the plan are cited as enhancing connections to meet customer needs, reviewing the express bus network and planning for construction. The “enhanced connections” are very small scale, the express review will be in next year’s plan, and construction plans are not unlike what we saw for major projects in 2025.

Running in parallel with the Network Plan is work on a Ridership Growth Strategy “which is a cost-benefit analysis of service, fare, infrastructure, and customer experience initiatives aimed at increasing ridership, pending funding.” [Main report, p. 2] This exercise, like the Network Plan, too often is budget constrained, and that mindset, including the concept that if only TTC were more businesslike, financial problems would dwindle if not vanish completely.

The Ridership Growth Strategy has yet to appear even as a consultative proposal. There is no sense of the TTC’s ambitions and whether the “strategy” will consist of the lowest possible cost changes under the guise of making the system more attractive. In an election year when keeping taxes down is a political priority, bold schemes for transit spending are hard to find.

The concept of “cost-benefit” too often ignores the general economic worth of having a transit system in the first place. There is a deep gorge between capital megaprojects where a very high multiplier effect is claimed for investment in infrastructure, and operating expenses which are treated as a burden on the City and its funding partners. Calls for fare supports and better service are treated as irresponsible demands on the public purse, but billions spent so commuters can travel hither and yon across the region are not seen as a waste. Nobody ever asks subway advocates how we are supposed to pay for their dreams.

One part of the 2026 plan reviews “poor performing routes”, but past experience shows that this generally nibbles around the edges of financial problems while giving the impression of a hard-nosed review. It does not address questions of service capacity, latent demand and quality which, after all, should be primary concerns of any transit system.

At the same time, the plan claims to have a focus on social goods:

The 2026 ANP builds on the 5YSP [5 Year Service Plan], which continues to highlight the importance of equitable, reliable, safe, and timely access to transit for the three key priority groups: women, shift workers, and lower-income customers.

Many initiatives proposed in the 2026 ANP address travel patterns of the key priority groups who continue to depend on the transit network for getting around the city. [Main Report, p. 2]

The TTC cannot be both a penny-pinching, “efficient” business while also serving goals that may not, at least on the TTC’s books, be cost-effective. Arguments that efficiencies will help pay for better service miss a key point: there are already major problems with transit service affecting all riders, and they will not be fixed by cuts to a handful of minor routes.

The TTC serves everyone, not just “key priority groups”. Indeed it is strong demand from a wide range of riders that justifies good service, provides revenue to help fund it and generates political support for further improvements.

The reference to “many initiatives” is misleading. Few changes are proposed, and they are small scale.

Consultations with a wide variety of groups including politicians, community groups, day-to-day riders, special needs riders, transit advocates and transit operators revealed consistent complaints across the city about crowding, service reliability and the accuracy of public information. These are not issues just for a few squeaky wheels, advocates who are dismissed as having too much time on their hands to criticize transit, but for ordinary riders everywhere.

A favourite buzzword, “innovation” makes its appearance in an attempt to justify ongoing work:

A more efficient and customer-friendly TTC network encourages more people to choose transit, helping reduce car dependency, lower emissions in support of the City’s ransformTO Net Zero Strategy, and making better use of existing fleet and infrastructure.

The 2026 ANP will support ongoing and future planning processes that leverage innovation, particularly in enhancing ridership data analysis as well as monitoring and reporting KPIs. A key focus will be continued improvements in how route and system productivity is measured through data-driven decision-making.

Additionally, this plan supports the TTC’s transition to a zero-emissions network by making scheduling adjustments to accommodate the deployment of eBuses across the network. [Main Report, pp 3-4]

Customer friendliness and better data analysis are not “innovations” except for an organization that has forgotten its primary mission. As for scheduling adjustments for eBus deployment, this is actually a new cost because of the lower range of battery buses, a cost, not a benefit, of “innovation”.

The plan argues that it prepares “the network for long-term growth … by aligning with the TTC’s commitment to building a resilient, competitive, and sustainable transit system.” [Main Rport, p. 4] That will not happen with small scale route changes, budget-constrained service improvements, and an attitude to reliability that sees the primary obstacles as outside of the TTC, notably traffic congestion. Yes, that is a problem, but it is too conveniently cited while ignoring basics of scheduling and line management.

The plan cites 2026 budget costs of only $0.6 million for implementation of proposed changes. This is very small change. A further $13.2 million (net) is proposed to roll out service changes approved in the 2023 and 2024 plans, but not yet implemented. There is no sense of when these would occur and how much new service would actually operate in calendar 2026.

A further problem is that there is no reference to the cost of restoring service to levels set by the board-approved Service Standards for crowding. Although the TTC has trip level crowding data, system performance is reported on an aggregate, all-day basis giving a far-too rosy picture of actual conditions riders encounter. Honest, granular reporting of service quality is an “innovation” long overdue.