This article has been broken off from the February 2012 Metrolinx Meeting report given its size and the fact that much information here does not actually come from that meeting. Comments related to Presto have been shifted to this thread.
In the original article, I reported a series of questions posed to Metrolinx about its Presto card and fare structure. I have now received responses, and these have been interpolated into the text.
At its February 16, 2012 meeting, the Metrolinx Board received a presentation and report on the status of projects in Toronto arising out of the Council action taken on February 8. The report does not add much to information already reported, but it consolidates various documents in one convenient location.
The map of the 5-in-10 plan (the version of Transit City agreed to by Toronto Council in 2009 and disavowed by Mayor Ford) appears in both documents. This map includes:
A note I received from Rick Ciccarelli (long active in transit affairs in Weston) gave further information from a public meeting on February 15 in Weston:
In speaking with Jack Collins [Metrolinx Vice-President, Rapid Transit Implementation] last night at Councillor di Giorgio’s Kodak Town Hall, he said underground [is] still in play and indicated the loading and unloading of trains at the start and end of service will be a problem for at-grade, and he also expects an interconnecting GO/TTC station to work better. He is not sure if it will go underground past this station. They are also looking at a bridge across Black Creek Drive to service the yards, plus bus connections for both TTC and regional service. The Kodak building could become a bus terminal. He said there are multiple issues to sort through before the design can be finalized including whether they are designing for 3 car LRT or full subway vehicles, and the relationship with the GO rail corridor track expansion project and the new station.
Collins confirmed at the Metrolinx meeting that the purchase of the Kodak site was concluded at about the beginning of February. The remark about possibly designing the carhouse for full subway vehicles dates, I suspect, from a period when the actual technology to be used for the line had not been settled by Council. Changing to full subway requires far more extensive design modifications than simply at the carhouse.
During the Board’s discussion, the question arose of interference in Council’s decision by the Ford brothers and their “Save Our Subways” scheme. CEO and President Bruce McCuaig replied that Queen’s Park has indicated that they will listen to Council. Chair Rob Prichard said that Metrolinx’ job was to be respectful of the Council process, and that it was not for Metrolinx to take sides with individual Councillors, but to wait for Council’s decision-making process to complete.
Director Lee Parsons asked what risk there might be that the Council debate will not be resolved by the end of March. McCuaig replied that Metrolinx needs “certainty and clarity” from Council. Prichard said that the “end game” is an agreement with the City, a binding agreement, and that McCuaig and his staff would move forward to a full master agreement as quickly as possible. In the press scrum, Prichard hopes that Council will take a position endorsing a new master agreement, and referred to comments by individual members as “noise on the side”.
Director Douglas Turnbull worried that the longer the LRT versus subway debate continues — a false one he believed because LRT is the only reasonable option — that a window of opportunity for transit expansion may be lost.
Director Peter Smith noted that both Metrolinx and Infrastructure Ontario are strong supporters of arrangements where the entire provision of a line would be outsourced. Bruce McCuaig replied that the province is committed to AFP (alternative financing and procurement) models, but various types of “package” may be appropriate. Smith wondered whether the TTC was in any position to dictate an alternative arrangement for a facility that was not their own, and thought that the public did not understand the situation well (blaming the media for this state of affairs).
On the status of penalties for cancelled projects, Rob Prichard stated that Metrolinx would provide the City’s “expert panel” reviewing options for Sheppard with information about these and the effect of various possible options on which sunk costs could be reinstated as part of active projects. Jack Collins said that Metrolinx has now broken down the costs per project and that the amount of sunk (unrecoverable) costs will go down as original route designs come back into the plan. There will be some loss from the work done on tunnel design for the eastern section of Eglinton, although to whose cost this might be is an interesting point considering that Council never requested the change.
The vehicle delivery schedule must be revisited now that Finch and possibly Sheppard are back in the mix. Delivery dates can now move back to something close to the original contract based on the 5-in-10 plan.
Director Joe Halstead asked what differences there were between the Council motion of February 8 and the Transit City 5-in-10 plan. Collins replied that the big issue is the status of Sheppard East although this also would have an effect on the SRT/LRT project. If there is no Sheppard LRT and carhouse, then extension of the SRT beyond McCowan Station is unlikely. Rob Prichard noted that the sequencing of projects may be changed depending on what is planned for Sheppard to accommodate constraints on the cash flow acceptable to Queen’s Park.
During the press scrum, the Star’s Tess Kalinowski asked at what point is Council’s position considered to have “coalesced”. Bruce McCuaig replied that there are two points:
McCuaig noted that a lot of work on the language of an agreement already existed from previous work on the 5-in-10 plan.
I asked about press reports that the Presto implementation in Toronto might be held hostage now that the Ford MoU which purported to commit Toronto to Presto was of no force. Bruce McCuaig replied that work on Presto is still moving forward, and that implementation of the fare card is linked to other funding agreements including the streetcar purchase and the provincial gas tax share. Metrolinx expects that an agreement for Presto implementation will go to the TTC Commission at its March 2012 meeting.
[I will report on other issues from the Metrolinx meeting as an update to my “preview” article.]
Updated February 16, 2012 at 6:05pm: The Public Works & Infrastructure Committee deferred consideration of the report on Eastern Avenue’s reconfiguration until March 21, 2012, “to enable the Acting General Manager, Transportation Services, to explore further alternatives that will maintain the capacity of parking on the roadway”.
Original post from February 13 below:
TTC’s Russell Carhouse at Queen and Connaught will see major track reconstruction this year.
A project to rebuild track Queen Street and Connaught Avenue was deferred from 2011 at the Mayor’s request, but the work is now out for tender. This will include the replacement of all of the special work on the north side of the carhouse including the yard accesses and the intersection at Connaught. On Connaught itself, the track layout will be changed by the removal of the existing crossover between the northbound and southbound tracks.
At Eastern Avenue, the roadway will be rebuilt to isolate the streetcar ladder tracks from the rest of the pavement and raise their level. This change will reduce the effect of the combined curve and grade between Eastern Avenue and the yard tracks which is especially pronounced at the carhouse itself. A report on the recommended layout for the street is on the Public Works agenda for February 15, 2012.
This work is part of the overall preparation of the streetcar system for the arrival of the new LFLRVs.
Wednesday, February 8, 2012 brought the debate on the future of LRT in Toronto to the floor of Council for a Special Meeting. After a year waiting for Mayor Ford to get his act together on the transit file, to bring his Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Queen’s Park to Council for debate, to bring a credible plan for financing the Sheppard Subway extensions into public view, Council had enough.
TTC Chair Karen Stintz, the last person the progressive wing of Council would have expected, filed a petition with the City Clerk on February 6 for the meeting with the support of 23 of her colleagues. Two days later, Council would be in open revolt against the Mayor. The public gallery filled quickly, with overflow viewing by video in the rotunda of City Hall, and the Press Gallery had more reporters and camera crews than I have seen at Council in years. They stayed all day — this was not a story to cover in an hour or so.
Stepping back from the political drama, this was an astounding day for me as a lifelong advocate for Light Rail Transit. Here was Toronto Council spending an entire day debating transit planning, technology and funding with a level of detailed knowledge of the issues advocates could only have dreamed of years ago. At stake was not just $8.4-billion of provincial money, but the future direction of transit development.
The results are reported elsewhere. This article presents the flavour of the questions and speeches that filled the day together with a strong sense that LRT, forty years after the Streetcars for Toronto Committee’s victory, will finally have a fair chance in Toronto. I have included details of the questions asked by most Councillors in the interest of showing the range of the debate and the growing understanding, or lack of it, by various members of the details of the issues.
Mayor Ford is not known as a gracious loser, and long before the votes were actually counted, it was clear which way the issue would turn. The lowest point of the day came just after lunch when the Mayor’s team attempted to sabotage the meeting by breaking quorum. Council cannot meet without a majority of members present (23), and the Mayor’s folks actually seemed to think that by staying away, they could halt the meeting.
This shows the desperation of the anti-LRT side, and puts Ford’s later comment that Council’s vote was “irrelevant” in a different light. So relevant was that vote that he attempted to ensure it never took place. He failed.
Updated February 12, 2012 at 10:40 pm: Remarks attributed to Deputy Mayor Doug Holyday were in fact spoken by Councillor Doug Ford. This article has been revised to correct the error which arose from mis-transcription of my notes.
This article continues the discussion of City Council on the question of whether to approve the original Memorandum of Agreement between Toronto and Queen’s Park for the Metrolinx 5-in-10 plan of 2009, or the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Mayor Ford in 2011.
I have not included every speech by every member as some of them added nothing significant to the debate. However, I wanted to give readers a sense of how each member wanted to get their oar in, and how it can take hours to reach a vote on issues.
This week’s historic vote to resurrect parts of the Transit City network is unprecedented in the history of the relationship between the Toronto Transit Commission and city council. Never before has a sitting TTC chair challenged and defeated a mayor on a major transit-policy issue.
Light-rail transit (LRT) supporters may have partied into the night, but the question for the days ahead is: What now?
Read the rest of this article on the Torontoist website.
Updated February 10, 2012 at 1:00 am:
The description of the reporting mechanism and due date for Sheppard “expert panel” has been corrected to match what Council actually passed. The information previously quoted here came from the original version of the motion.
Updated February 9, 2012 at 2:00 pm:
The minutes from the Special Meeting of Council are now available online.
Updated February 9, 2012 at noon:
On February 8, Toronto Council voted to seize control of the transit agenda from Mayor Ford and to support much of the original Transit City / Metrolinx 5-in-10 Plan that was approved in 2009. I will publish a separate article on the debate and the motions later today.
Additional coverage is available from Torontoist, and a compendium of links to other media is available at Spacing Toronto.
The two most important motions were from TTC Chair Karen Stintz.
The first confirms Council’s support for the originally planned subway-surface alignment of the Eglinton LRT line, for the conversion of the Scarborough RT to LRT technology with an extension north to Sheppard (and eventually to Malvern), and for the Finch LRT west from Keele (the future Finch West station on the Spadina subway) to Humber College. Council also authorizes the TTC to discuss with Metrolinx the feasibility of several future projects: a Sheppard West extension to Downsview, a Sheppard LRT to the Zoo, a Danforth subway extension to the Scarborough Town Centre, an Eglinton extension from Jane to Pearson Airport, and the Downtown Relief Line.
The second creates a special panel with broad enough representation to command political and technical respect. This panel will advise Council on “the most effective means of delivering the greatest number of riders with the funds currently allocated for a public transportation project on Sheppard”. The panel is to report back to a special meeting of Council no later than March 21, 2012.
Reaction from Mayor Ford and his faction was predictably hostile, but now extends to openly defying the will of Council. Meanwhile, Ontario’s Minister of Transportation, Bob Chiarelli, issued a press release affirming the importance of support from “council, as a whole”. Chiarelli has asked Metrolinx to report as quickly as possible on the effects of Council’s position.
Original post from February 6, 2012 follows the break.
Updated February 8, 2012 at 7:40am: I have often described a suspicion that there is a fifth column within Metrolinx working against the TTC and LRT plans. Royson James in the Star gives us a view into that organization in which we clearly see how it suits some at Metrolinx to misrepresent what the Toronto of David Miller and the TTC were doing. This problem goes back years, and was evident during preparation of “The Big Move”, but the Metrolinx love for secrecy, for holding all of the substantive discussions behind closed doors, kept this out of sight. Now Metrolinx may be faced with a vote at City Council that could run directly opposite to the scheme some at Metrolinx secretly have supported for years. Will Metrolinx and Queen’s Park listen?
Original post from February 7 below:
On Monday February 6, Metrolinx held a press conference to outline its position on the current subway vs LRT controversy. This article is a summary of the presentation (which is now available online) and a commentary on it.
I have taken a breather from the Chong report because of its size, the fact that it is now available online, and my desire to review Metrolinx position first. That agency has somewhat more credibility than and “Toronto Transit Infrastructure Limited”.
Purpose
The presentation is intended to “provide information” on the Eglinton line as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Mayor Ford, and to restate the principles embraced by Queen’s Park and Metrolinx.
Principles
Point 3 begs an obvious question of how the Province can hold Toronto responsible for costs incurred because they were foolish enough to proceed on Mayor Ford’s say-so without ensuring Council’s approval. As we know from the recent legal opinion, the Mayor cannot bind the City to a contract without Council’s consent.
Point 5 is unclear about whether this refers to traffic problems during construction or after a line has opened. During construction is of interest because this affects both cost and elapsed times for big projects like Eglinton. The TTC’s construction schedule for an all-underground version is extended out to 2022 because they don’t want to dig up every station location at the same time. If this were allowed, say as part of a sweetened deal with a private partner, the cost would come down.
Status
The west/central portion of the Eglinton project is common to both versions of the plan, and it is “making good progress”. Metrolinx and the TTC are working to allow an alternative procurement strategy (putting more responsibility in the hands of a private partner), but certainty is needed on what exactly will be built in the eastern portion.
Current Plan
This is shown as a map with the following components and costs:
It is worth noting that the total here for Sheppard is $4.73-billion. This is the “TTC” estimate for Sheppard, not the lower so-called “Metrolinx” estimate cited in the Chong report. Is there something about the cost of Sheppard Metrolinx knows that they did not share with Gordon Chong and KPMG (who wrote the section of Chong’s paper where this appears)?
Benefits of the Current Crosstown Plan
Just the title of this section is intriguing because, of course, Council has never approved this plan and strictly speaking, it’s not “current”.
Metrolinx claims that there will be a reduction of travel times from Kennedy to Black Creek by 25% as the line will operate at 30-32km/h overall. Of course, the subway-surfrace variant would operate at this speed too, and the only question is the speed over the section from Leaside to Kennedy. Part of this section will be grade separated (around Don Mills Station) although the extent is not yet confirmed. The total distance from Brentcliffe to Kennedy is about 8km. From Black Creek to Brentcliffe is a bit over 10km. In other words, the section where any improvement in time can possibly occur is 8/18 or about 45% of the line.
To achieve a 25% increase overall, the speed improvement east of Brentcliffe would have to be 55%. We know that the speed used for underground operation is 30-32, and this means that the presumed speed for surface operation would be only about 20km/h. This is lower than the figure actually used by the TTC in the Eglinton line’s published description (22-25km/h) and it also ignores the change in access time to the more widely-spaced stations on an underground alignment. The difference is between a 15 minute trip (at 32km/h) and a 24 minute trip (at 20km/h). If the higher TTC speed (25km/h) is used, the surface trip falls to 19 minutes. Much will depend on the degree of surface transit priority afforded to the LRT.
Metrolinx cites reliability because an underground line would be completely separated from traffic. Conversely, a surface line would have to interact with traffic and pedestrians at intersections, and there would be some effect on left turns and signal cycle times.
They also cite “convenience” because the Eglinton and SRT routes are linked. Note that this arrangement is not peculiar to the underground proposal, and nothing prevents the TTC from doing this for a subway-surface version of the line. The TTC’s concern is that demand north of Kennedy is higher than on Eglinton, and they don’t want to operate a very frequent “SRT” service with short turns at Kennedy to accommodate a smaller demand west on Eglinton. This is an issue of operational convenience rather than necessity.
Metrolinx cites higher ridership, especially in the peak, on an underground Crosstown line as compared to the subway-surface route. This is a direct effect of their demand model which is very sensitive to running times, and which redirects a considerable amount of traffic from the Danforth subway to the Eglinton line. Whether this is desirable is quite another matter given concerns about the capacity at Eglinton/Yonge station. A related question is the potential benefit of a Downtown Relief Line intercepting demand on Eglinton at Don Mills.
Overall, Metrolinx states that a fully grade-separated line doubles the capacity of the project. This is true in the sense that more and longer trains can be operated if the line is all grade-separated, but it also begs the question of the effect on overall cost of providing a fleet and yard sufficient for that capacity and whether LRVs are appropriate for a route that never runs on the surface. The presentation returns to this issue later.
Light Rail Vehicles
About $76m of $770m of the contract for 182 Bombardier LRVs has been spent to date. The “current plan” reduced this number to 135 by the elimination of the Finch and Sheppard routes, but these vehicles are suitable for “other LRT applications around the region and province”. The strongest endorsement of LRT comes here:
“Metrolinx remains confident that LRVs are a good choice given their flexibility to operate at surface, in tunnels and on elevated guideways, with a low floor and high capacity”
Metrolinx notes that the LRVs were intended to operate partly in tunnels in the original plan. They cite other examples of Los Angeles, Seattle and San Francisco. Closer to home, one can look at Edmonton, Philadelphia and Boston (where streetcars have run underground for over a century). The important point about all of these is that the LRVs do not stay underground when there is no reason for them to do so.
LRVs are low floor vehicles which, in the Metrolinx implementation, will load level with the platform (unlike the surface streetcars which must use a ramp because they operate in mixed traffic). The low floor aspect of the cars is a “small component” of the overall vehicle cost and project.
Metrolinx notes that:
“Having a low floor provides flexibility for the vehicle to be used in a surface application, when the line is extended west towards Pearson airport or north and east further into Scarborough”
Vehicle Capacity
Metrolinx cites capacities for three-car trainsets ranging from just under 10k/hour at a 3 minute headway (20 trains/hour) to just under 20k/hour at a 1.5 minute headway. This can accommodate projected ridership beyond 2051. Surface operations in a median are limited to 8-9k/hour because frequent trains and high pedestrian volumes would interfere too much with road traffic.
Results
What was once a $6.5b project is now an $8.2b project and limited funds are available for other routes. There will be fewer stations because of their higher cost underground. Metrolinx states that although this version costs more, it “delivers greater benefits”. Whether this calculation is offset by the benefits lost through not building other routes is unclear.
Going Forward
Metrolinx and Queen’s Park seek a single position from the City. They “remain committed” to partnering with Toronto, but “clarity is required”. Any City position will be evaluated against the principles stated earlier.
I cannot help pointing out that there already is an accepted Memorandum of Agreement dating from 2009 between all of the parties and especially City Council. It would be difficult for Metrolinx to claim now that the network the MOA contemplates (the 5-in-10 Metrolinx plan for Eglinton, SRT, Sheppard and Finch) would now fail this test. Tinkering with the plan by Council could re-open the question of what is an “acceptable” request.
The next installment in this drama lies with Council, and political concerns will dominate although this will be disguised by concerns for technical matters. We may learn again why Canadian winters are too cold for surface operation and other tidbits from Ford’s fountain of transit knowledge.
Updated February 6, 2012 at 11:45pm: The Chong report is now available online (linked below) together with a report from KPMG on financing the Sheppard subway. Large chunks of the KPMG report are reproduced in the Chong report.
Original post from Feb 5 follows:
Gordon Chong’s report
Toronto Transit Back on Track
Sheppard Subway Development and Financing Study
will be released sometime this week, but a copy has already found its way to me. This report was commissioned by Mayor Ford to explore the viability of his proposal, as stated in the purported Memorandum of Understanding with Queen’s Park, for the City to go it alone on the Sheppard Subway project. The report is close to 200 pages long including its appendices, and I am not going to review it in a single article.
There is no question Chong’s mandate was to substantiate the need for and viability of the subway line, and to that end his report is coloured with sections intended to denigrate LRT alternatives and the political process that led to the Transit City proposal. I will turn to this material in due course, but any decision on the subway project must stand on its own. History is worth reviewing insofar as it provides technical background and shows the evolution of transit planning in Toronto. Fighting old battles may score political points, but the subway must be justified on its own merits.
The cost and financing model are central to the thesis that the Sheppard line, and by extension a network of subways, is an appropriate goal, indeed the only goal, for Toronto. The common wisdom is that “everybody wants subways”, but as with many aspects of public spending, what people want is not always what they will get. Recent events in Toronto’s budget process are littered with lectures by Ford’s followers about fiscal responsibility and the need to make do with less. We are told that the city and its taxpayers cannot afford to pay more. We must, therefore, examine claims that major new public works are affordable with suspicion.
What is the estimated cost of any new project? Are the numbers we are using credible? Are subways actually cheaper than we have been told, and could a lower cost bring them within financial constraints of potential revenue? Are public agencies the appropriate developers of such projects? Are their costs (historical and projected) greater than might be achieved through another delivery mechanism?
While it may be a common Toronto sport to poke holes in TTC budgets, management practices and operations (a not uncommon thread on this blog), such criticism must be backed with a standard of accuracy and care.
How Much Will the Sheppard Subway Cost?
A central premise in this debate is that the TTC, and by implication the public sector generally, is unable to deliver this project at a reasonable cost. An oft-quoted figure puts the TTC’s estimate of the project at $4.7-billion while an estimate from Metrolinx sits at $3.7-billion. These numbers first appear in Table 2 in the Executive Summary, and they are routinely repeated as gospel. One must read all the way down to page 147 and Table 38 to see the details. Here we see component costs that are generally higher for the TTC estimate than the Metrolinx one, but the details reveal that the billion dollar difference is not all that it seems.
Metrolinx estimates the cost of maintenance facilities at $138-million based on a per-car value of $2.66m. A footnote on the table clearly states that the TTC estimate of $500-million is based on a new facility larger than is needed to hold just the fleet for Sheppard. Why such a big difference? Metrolinx assumes an expansion of the yard at Wilson and therefore a marginal increase in system capacity whereas the TTC makes provision for future fleet growth for demand and for system extension.
Wilson Yard has a looming problem with its size because there are limits on how fast trains can be pushed out for service buildup in the AM peak. Already there is discussion of shortening the hours of subway service to retain an overnight maintenance window between the end of one day’s operations and the start-up of the next. TTC plans include proposal for an underground storage yard north of Finch Station and, eventually, to a new carhouse somewhere in York Region. We cannot simply keep stuffing more and more trains into Wilson.
This aspect of the cost difference cannot be counted as a penalty against the TTC because it addresses a completely different model of what would be built (and why), not some inherent flaw or inflation in TTC costing.
“Operating Systems” covers a range of items listed in the comparison. For this, the TTC’s value is 4.5 times the Metrolinx value ($329m vs $73m). This amount cannot be explained simply by claiming inefficiency at the TTC, and it is wildly out of scale with the differences in other items. At the very least, anyone purporting to compare estimates would flag such a difference and explain it in their report rather than simply using the numbers without question.
“Contingency” is a catch-all allowance in any project budget to allow for unexpected events and costs during construction. Both the TTC and Metrolinx estimates allow about 26% over and above the component costs, and with the TTC’s costs being higher, so is the contingency in their estimate.
Sales tax is included in the TTC estimates, but it is not in the Metrolinx version. This shows up by virtue of an HST Rebate in the TTC section of the table which has no equivalent on the Metrolinx side. The HST is included in the component costs including the contingency factor, and the TTC unit costs are not presented on an equal, untaxed footing with the Metrolinx costs. Again, this sort of adjustment is a basic requirement of financial analysis, but it is absent from Table 38.
There are likely other areas where differences between Metrolinx and TTC figures would bear scrutiny, but as the TTC numbers are not detailed here, nor are the assumptions on which they are based, it is impossible to dig further.
Taking what we can see into account covers about three quarters of the difference between the Metrolinx and TTC estimates. Before we can believe the Metrolinx $3.7b estimate, the inconsistencies with the TTC numbers must be explained. Both values may be legitimate given the underlying assumptions used in each case, but these are demonstrably different. Saying that there is a $1-billion spread between the two is an apples-to-oranges argument.
Here, it suits Gordon Chong’s thesis that the TTC is an inherently poor steward of public funds and that the project could be delivered at lower cost through another agency or mechanism.
A January 2008 Metrolinx report on a study tour to the United Kingdom and Spain is included as an appendix to the Chong report. Even a cursory reading of this document shows that there are significant differences in the environment in which large-scale projects were undertaken in these jurisdictions compared with Toronto. A major source of savings lies in the scale and continuity of construction projects, a general agreement that the projects should go forward (possibly with less up-front review such as our Environmental Assessments), and a regulatory environment that reduces contention between proponent agencies and the companies actually building their projects. (Buried in the report, by the way, are references to “Tram” (LRT) components of the Madrid system which are considerably cheaper per kilometre than their subways.)
The degree to which each difference between the European cities and Toronto contributes to differences in costs is not explored, and yet this is essential to any comparison. The scale of their projects and longevity of their construction plans are not directly transferable to a single Toronto subway extension. It is not enough to say “look at how cheaply Madrid builds subways” without also understanding why they can do it.
In my next article I will turn to the question of how we will pay for this project.
In a bizarre political move at the TTC meeting today (January 31), Ford loyalists voted to gut staff recommendations on working with Metrolinx to finalize a framework for construction of the Eglinton project. The effect was that staff were not instructed to continue working with Metrolinx, and in theory detailed information about alternatives for the Eglinton project won’t come forward to the TTC or Council.
The votes carried with only Chair Karen Stintz and Commissioners Maria Augimeri and John Parker voting against them. Stintz has now effectively lost control of the Commission, and the true-blue Ford team has decided to run the show as they see fit. How long she will stay as chair remains to be seen given the procedural manoeuvres required to unseat her.
The situation is even more ironic because earlier at the same meeting, Stintz had fought the good Ford fight by championing using Council’s recent allocation of $5-million to supplement Wheel-Trans budgets and continue to service to dialysis patients. This is the same Commission that only months earlier effectively told these riders that theirs was not a core service of the City, and they would have to find cabs. This didn’t wash politically, and service was restored for six months pending availability of new funding.
However, the City’s money was not intended for Wheel-Trans. Stintz, by a feat of sophistry that deeply undermines her credibility, argued that “service cuts” were generic and the money could be used for either regular bus service or for Wheel-Trans. The Commission smiled sweetly, but voted to ignore Council, cut service and spend the money on a motherhood issue.
Lest readers think I am a heartless bastard, I’m not suggesting Wheel-Trans shouldn’t be properly funded, but its problems are much bigger, and the $5m was not intended to let Queen’s Park off of the hook for what is really a health services cost, not transit. Even bringing the dialysis folks into the discussion shows how unprincipled the Ford camp (then including Stintz) might be in trying to bypass their loss of control on Council.
Stintz did her bit and sandbagged a big piece of Council’s rescue motion by scoffing the $5m. However, her role as a Team Ford insider was short-lived when it became clear that by advocating an Eglinton alternative, she was now consigned to Ford’s trash heap and the truly loyal boys would run the show.
All this happened on the same day as a letter from Metrolinx to Mayor Ford and Chair Stintz said, briefly, “get your crap together and decide what you really want us to build”. Metrolinx finally understands that the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Mayor Ford last year is of little value without the Council approval essential to committing the City. “Absent Council’s endorsement of the MoU, the City is not bound by the plan and itis increasingly difficult for Metrolinx to implement it.”
Council now must seize the initiative. Everyone has been trying to be oh-so-conciliatory, saying things they hoped Mayor Ford and his team would take as overtures for compromise, but Ford wants none of it. It’s subways all the way.
By his actions, Ford has shown he only knows how to fight for turf, and that’s a disappearing quantity. Ford Nation is becoming Ford Island.
Councillors now talk openly of calling a special meeting using a procedure that requires only a simple majority to invoke. The agenda is set by the call for the meeting, not throttled by the mayor’s cronies at Executive Committee. This will allow discussion of transit alternatives, disposition of the MoU, and many other actions such as reconstituting the TTC with a better balanced group of Councillors. Council could even amend its own bylaws to strip Ford of his power to control Standing Committees and the Executive. These are powers Council granted, and Council can take them away.
In 40 years of Council watching, I have never seen such open contempt for Council as that shown by Mayor Ford. He claims a “mandate”, but forgets that Council was elected too, and they answer to voters and their distress at Mayor Ford’s agenda.
One final note: Like City Council, the TTC has never rescinded its approval of Transit City. We may debate just what exactly constitutes “approval” at the City, but at the TTC it’s quite clear. On March 21, 2007, the TTC endorsed Transit City as the centrepiece of its planning, and they have never voted for anything else. Nobody bothered to think of such a nicety when they had a fighting chance of winning the vote, and now their inattention leaves an embarrassing reminder of details ignored.
Whether Karen Stintz will survive these events as Chair or even as a TTC member is hard to say. She’s no longer one of Ford’s boys, but by trying to play both sides of the street, she’s not exactly a prime candidate for Ford’s opponents. She will have to prove her new position, if it is new, with actions that benefit transit and the city, not just the Mayor.
One way or another, we will have a new transit policy probably by the end of March.
Steve Munro 