The UITP Peer Review of TTC Rail Systems

In September 2025, I reported that the UITP (International Union of Public Transport) had delivered its peer review of TTC rail systems, but that TTC management did not want this document in public.

See: The UITP Peer Review: What is the TTC Trying to Hide?

A decision on whether to release the document was put off until the November 3, 2025 Board meeting, and partly redacted documents were released on November 5. See:

Very little of the report or response is redacted, and the sections withheld are listed as containing “information about the security of the property of the local board”. At one point as the report made its way through previous debates, “commercial confidentiality” was also cited, but that has disappeared in the version that was released.

The management responses lie in three separate documents, with most items being “accepted and in progress” or “pending further assessment and potential resourcing”. Some of these will require participation by groups outside of the TTC, notably City Transportation Services. I will leave it to readers to peruse the responses linked above.

Readers should note that this is not a general review of TTC operating and maintenance practices, but rather a discussion of how the TTC keeps track of maintenance needs and manages its fleet and infrastructure. Only a few operating practices come in for comment. This review only covers rail modes, and the report is silent on bus operations and maintenance.

Subway vehicles and Streetcar vehicles are the main elements in the scope of this peer review. Other related subsystems like power, track, overhead catenary and signaling systems, which are essential parts for the operation of Subway and Streetcars,2 have been reviewed as requested by the TTC.

This peer review is a strategic review of the asset management plan and maintenance processes and is not a technical analysis nor assessment of the systems within the scope apart from the review of the Automatic train control (ATC) system specially requested by the TTC.

The aim of this peer review is to assess the TTC asset management plan and some other relevant documents, to identify gaps and improvement areas in line with the best international practices and standards. [p. 12]

Although the UITP team reviewed the TTC’s practices both through virtual discussions and information exchange, and through on-site visits, some comments give the impression that the team did not pick up on all of the local details.

Some TTC practices are lauded including the degree of in-house expertise and avoidance of outsourcing. This is ironic considering the ongoing efforts in past years to shift work to the private sector. The UITP review is quite clear in favouring the in-house option.

It is noted that the TTC conducts much of its maintenance in-house. It is good practice to keep maintenance of most systems, including rolling stock, signaling and track, in-house in order to maintain technical and performance knowledge within the organization. Whilst outsourcing may seem an attractive proposition, as it leaves the responsibility for the process to another party, it will be more expensive, and it removes control of the maintenance processes from the operator.

The long lifespan of many railway assets means that changes will take place as a result of experience in operation and maintenance processes. There will be modifications to equipment to improve reliability or reduce maintenance requirements. The life cycle of the asset is better managed by the operator if the operator has full knowledge of the performance of the asset. A maintenance contractor will take that knowledge from the operator and reduce their ability to monitor cost effective life cycle processes. [p. 18]

The bulk of the review and recommendations lie in Section 7 running from page 16-46. This article will sketch the key points, and interested readers should refer to the full report.

The items are presented mostly in the order that they appear in the document. Some sections give the sense that the authors attempted to review the TTC in detail, while others have a “cut and paste” feel of general suggestions with little reference to the Toronto situation, or the city’s position relative to other major transit systems.

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TTC Misrepresents Growth in Streetcar Delays from Blocked Tracks

At the TTC Board meeting on November 3, management presented statistics on streetcar delays broken down by type of incident. TTC is quite fond of portraying external incidents, especially those related to congestion, as the root of (almost) all evil. The following page is from the CEO’s Report.

Note that external delays (turquoise) occupy the majority of the chart. During discussion of the problem of autos fouling rails, a passing remark by the Interim Chief Operating Officer piqued my curiosity when he said that there were many delays due to the winter storm.

This sent me to the TTC’s delay statistics which are available on the City’s Open Data site. There are codes for many types of delay including “MTAFR”, short for “Auto Fouling Rails”.

According to the “In Focus” box above there has been a 400% year-over-year increase in these delays, although they are styled as “fowling” implying a flock of chickens might be responsible for service issues.

Sorting the data by code and summarizing by date produces interesting results.

  • Between January 1 and September 30, 2025, there were 843 MTAFR events logged.
  • Of these, 586 fall between February 14 and 26 hitting a daily high of 65 on February 17.

These blockages were not caused by the typical traffic congestion, but by the City’s utter failure to clear snow on key streets.

  • 105 were on 501 Queen
  • 42 were on 503 Kingston Rd.
  • 84 were on 504 King
  • 93 were on 505 Dundas
  • 186 were on 506 Carlton
  • 3 were on 507 Long Branch
  • 1 was on 508 Lake Shore
  • 2 were on 509 Harbourfront
  • None were on 510 Spadina or 511 Bathurst
  • 6 were on 512 St. Clair
  • A few dozen were on various night cars

The pattern here is quite clear: routes on wide roads or rights-of-way were not seriously affected, but routes on regular 4-lane streets were hammered. (How 511 Bathurst was spared is a mystery. At the time it was running with streetcars from Bathurst Station to King & Spadina, and with buses on the south end of the route.)

To claim that the 400% increase from 2024 is some indication of worsening traffic problems is gross misrepresentation of what actually happened. Although this is the CEO’s report and he almost certainly did not assemble the information himself, he wears this issue for having reported misleading data to the Board and public.

Direct comparison with published 2024 data is difficult because until 2025 the TTC used a much coarser set of delay codes that lumped many types of events under generic headings. There was a category “Held by” in which there were 625 incidents from January to September in 2024. The 843 MTAFR codes in 2025 are quite clearly not a 400% increase over 2024.

Whenever there is a discussion of unreliable service, we hear endlessly about traffic congestion. This definitely is a problem, but not the only one, and certainly not in the way presented by the CEO.

A question arose during the debate about the problem that performance stats are consolidated across all routes. Route-by-route service quality is presented in detail in the second part of this article for all streetcar routes. This shows that problems are widespread in the system, even on routes with reserved lanes.

As for the delay stats cited by the CEO, it is clear that we are not comparing September 2025 to one year earlier as the text implies, but using events from the entire year to date including a major snowstorm that had no equivalent a year earlier. The so-called 400% jump in delays from blocked tracks is due to snow and poor road clearance by the City.

TTC management owes the Board and the public an apology for blatant misrepresentation of the delay statistics.

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TTC Bunching and Gapping Pilot

The TTC has a pilot program underway on several routes with increased supervision in an attempt to improve service quality by addressing service gaps and bunching. These are complementary effects in that a gap is often followed by a bunch, although gaps can also occur due to missing vehicles and short turns. See:

The pilot evolved over the year as some of the challenges and resource needs to manage service became apparent.

March 2025Pilot launched on 7 Bathurst, 24 Victoria Park, 924 Victoria Park Express, 25 Don Mills, 925 Don Mills Express, 29 Dufferin, 929 Dufferin Express, 100 Flemington Park, 165 Weston Road North, 506 Carlton, 512 St Clair.
Dedicated staff to manage each route were not used initially and results were poor.
June 2025The pilot was scaled back to 7 Bathurst, 24 Victoria Park, 924 Victoria Park Express, 506 Carlton, and 512 St Clair.
One route supervisor was assigned to each route.
September 2025100 Flemingdon Park and 165 Weston Road North were added.
October 2025Pilot “refined” to focus on the weekday peak periods.

The TTC recognizes that delays leading to gaps can be caused by several effects: “including including Operator behaviour, customer incidents, traffic congestion, city events, construction, and operational factors, such as door/ramp operations.” [p. 2]

Later in the report, there is mention of the effect of passenger loads and long traffic signal wait times.

If vehicles are crowded either because service is inadequate for demand, or because a gap creates an extra load, they will take longer at stops. Filling vehicles to the brim can be counter-productive and inefficient. Space limitations onboard can delay passenger movement especially for those with large objects (e.g. strollers, luggage) and mobility devices. Although ramp operations are mentioned, there are many other types of passengers with extra space and boarding time needs.

Transit signal priority is also mentioned, but there is no indication of where or what priority measures were added on the pilot routes.

The remainder of this article reviews the metrics used by the TTC to track the success of the pilot project, as well as problems and actions that might be taken to resolve them.

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TTC Annual Network Plan 2026

At its November 3, 2025 meeting, the TTC Board will consider management’s proposed 2026 Network Plan. This is a very long set of documents, and this article will only cover the major points. Readers wishing more detail should refer to the reports.

The recommendations are quite simple:

  • Approve the 2026 plan and associated network changes, and
  • Forward the plan to City Councillors, sundry senior City officials, and the General Managers of various regional transit agencies.

The “key themes” of the plan are cited as enhancing connections to meet customer needs, reviewing the express bus network and planning for construction. The “enhanced connections” are very small scale, the express review will be in next year’s plan, and construction plans are not unlike what we saw for major projects in 2025.

Running in parallel with the Network Plan is work on a Ridership Growth Strategy “which is a cost-benefit analysis of service, fare, infrastructure, and customer experience initiatives aimed at increasing ridership, pending funding.” [Main report, p. 2] This exercise, like the Network Plan, too often is budget constrained, and that mindset, including the concept that if only TTC were more businesslike, financial problems would dwindle if not vanish completely.

The Ridership Growth Strategy has yet to appear even as a consultative proposal. There is no sense of the TTC’s ambitions and whether the “strategy” will consist of the lowest possible cost changes under the guise of making the system more attractive. In an election year when keeping taxes down is a political priority, bold schemes for transit spending are hard to find.

The concept of “cost-benefit” too often ignores the general economic worth of having a transit system in the first place. There is a deep gorge between capital megaprojects where a very high multiplier effect is claimed for investment in infrastructure, and operating expenses which are treated as a burden on the City and its funding partners. Calls for fare supports and better service are treated as irresponsible demands on the public purse, but billions spent so commuters can travel hither and yon across the region are not seen as a waste. Nobody ever asks subway advocates how we are supposed to pay for their dreams.

One part of the 2026 plan reviews “poor performing routes”, but past experience shows that this generally nibbles around the edges of financial problems while giving the impression of a hard-nosed review. It does not address questions of service capacity, latent demand and quality which, after all, should be primary concerns of any transit system.

At the same time, the plan claims to have a focus on social goods:

The 2026 ANP builds on the 5YSP [5 Year Service Plan], which continues to highlight the importance of equitable, reliable, safe, and timely access to transit for the three key priority groups: women, shift workers, and lower-income customers.

Many initiatives proposed in the 2026 ANP address travel patterns of the key priority groups who continue to depend on the transit network for getting around the city. [Main Report, p. 2]

The TTC cannot be both a penny-pinching, “efficient” business while also serving goals that may not, at least on the TTC’s books, be cost-effective. Arguments that efficiencies will help pay for better service miss a key point: there are already major problems with transit service affecting all riders, and they will not be fixed by cuts to a handful of minor routes.

The TTC serves everyone, not just “key priority groups”. Indeed it is strong demand from a wide range of riders that justifies good service, provides revenue to help fund it and generates political support for further improvements.

The reference to “many initiatives” is misleading. Few changes are proposed, and they are small scale.

Consultations with a wide variety of groups including politicians, community groups, day-to-day riders, special needs riders, transit advocates and transit operators revealed consistent complaints across the city about crowding, service reliability and the accuracy of public information. These are not issues just for a few squeaky wheels, advocates who are dismissed as having too much time on their hands to criticize transit, but for ordinary riders everywhere.

A favourite buzzword, “innovation” makes its appearance in an attempt to justify ongoing work:

A more efficient and customer-friendly TTC network encourages more people to choose transit, helping reduce car dependency, lower emissions in support of the City’s ransformTO Net Zero Strategy, and making better use of existing fleet and infrastructure.

The 2026 ANP will support ongoing and future planning processes that leverage innovation, particularly in enhancing ridership data analysis as well as monitoring and reporting KPIs. A key focus will be continued improvements in how route and system productivity is measured through data-driven decision-making.

Additionally, this plan supports the TTC’s transition to a zero-emissions network by making scheduling adjustments to accommodate the deployment of eBuses across the network. [Main Report, pp 3-4]

Customer friendliness and better data analysis are not “innovations” except for an organization that has forgotten its primary mission. As for scheduling adjustments for eBus deployment, this is actually a new cost because of the lower range of battery buses, a cost, not a benefit, of “innovation”.

The plan argues that it prepares “the network for long-term growth … by aligning with the TTC’s commitment to building a resilient, competitive, and sustainable transit system.” [Main Rport, p. 4] That will not happen with small scale route changes, budget-constrained service improvements, and an attitude to reliability that sees the primary obstacles as outside of the TTC, notably traffic congestion. Yes, that is a problem, but it is too conveniently cited while ignoring basics of scheduling and line management.

The plan cites 2026 budget costs of only $0.6 million for implementation of proposed changes. This is very small change. A further $13.2 million (net) is proposed to roll out service changes approved in the 2023 and 2024 plans, but not yet implemented. There is no sense of when these would occur and how much new service would actually operate in calendar 2026.

A further problem is that there is no reference to the cost of restoring service to levels set by the board-approved Service Standards for crowding. Although the TTC has trip level crowding data, system performance is reported on an aggregate, all-day basis giving a far-too rosy picture of actual conditions riders encounter. Honest, granular reporting of service quality is an “innovation” long overdue.

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TTC Seeks Consultant for Streetcar Overhead Engineering

The TTC has an open RFP on the Bonfire site for a Triennial Contract for design services for its streetcar overhead contact system. Much of this document is boilerplate legalese, but the scope of work shows that the TTC plans to address key issues with systems related to streetcar overhead. Five specific tasks are listed in the RFP and more might be added over the term of the contract.

  • Overhead/Traction Power Supply Study
    • This involves a review of the existing system that supplies power to streetcars and the demands placed on it as vehicles move through the network. There is no mention of modelling the effect of increasing service, but this should obviously be part of the study to determine where constraints might exist to service growth. (The recent suspension of streetcar service on Bathurst during the busy CNE period thanks to a power supply failure is an obvious incentive for this work.)
  • Overhead Design for Interections
    • This task would review existing intersections with a view to improvements where appropriate.
  • Overhead Design for New and Existing Lines
    • The title is self-explanatory but it begs the question of why a new design is needed for the existing system, much of which has been rebuilt once for dual-mode trolley pole and pantograph operation, and again for a pantograph-only configuration. The latter work is still in progress, and is responsible for some of the extended bus-streetcar substitutions in recent years. Also notable is the absence of any reference to eBus charging infrastructure.
  • Streetcar Track Switch
    • Although track switches are not part of the power supply to streetcars, historically they were controlled through hardware mounted on the overhead wires. The current system uses antennae in the pavement and on streetcars, and responsibility for the system rests with the Streetcar Overhead section.
  • Streetcar Signal System Alterations
    • The definition of this task is unclear in that there are almost no signals anywhere on the streetcar system. Moreover, there is no reference to the interface between streetcar operations and traffic signals.

In this article I will address only the last two items as they are both related to issues of streetcar operating speeds, a topic raised in a recent UITP review of the streetcar system. (See The UITP Peer Review: What is the TTC Trying to Hide?) Details from this review might become public at the November TTC Board meeting.

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TTC Headway Reliability on Small Routes (Part I)

Many of the service analyses on this site concern larger, major routes like the streetcar lines and bus routes crossing substantial distances in the suburbs. The picture of service quality is not a pretty one. Starting with this article, I will review service on several of the shorter routes, many with infrequent service, to see how the TTC fares. Short routes get frequent stops at terminals where headways can be reset, but irregular service can mean long waits for riders.

Many of these routes show very irregular service and one cannot help asking how this affects ridership. The TTC talks about improving service on major routes with interventions such as reserved lanes, but seems incapable of managing headways on relatively minor routes. There is a parallel here with declining maintenance quality where issues with the “little things that don’t matter” start to bleed into the major services and the system drives away as many riders as new services might attract.

Common problems seen on most of the routes reviewed here are:

  • Headways do not generally stay within a narrow band, but can be badly scattered especially for evening and weekend service.
  • In spite of this scatter, it is quite possible that the routes meet the TTC’s service standards which merge performance over an entire day, and provide a wide margin for data points outside of the target range (40%).
  • Review of the detailed tracking data (not included here in the interest of space) shows that some of the widest gaps occur because of missing buses. There is a metric in the service standards for missed trips with a goal to “minimize” them, albeit with no target. Trips can be missed because no operator or vehicle is available, or because of a short turn before a bus reaches the terminal, or because of such extreme lateness that it might as well not have operated. This statistic has never been reported in the monthly service quality metrics.
  • Bus bunching occurs even on routes with scheduled headways of 20-30 minutes, and this can persist for multiple trips showing little effort to space out service. Where the quality metric is “on time performance”, spacing service to compensate for bunched or missing vehicles can actually work against a “good” score even though what riders see would be more reliable.

Routes included in this article are:

8 Broadview
15 Evans
19 Bay
22 Coxwell
23 Dawes
26 Dupont

31 Greenwood
49 Bloor West
50 Burnhamthorpe
62 Mortimer
64 Main
65 Parliament

An additional 13 routes will be included in Part II of this series.

65 Parliament
70 O’Connor
72 Pape
75 Sherbourne
83 Jones
88 South Leaside

91 Woodbine
92 Woodbine South
111 East Mall
112 West Mall
114 Queens Quay East
154 Curran Hall
168 Symington

After the “more” break, data for one route, 8 Broadview, are shown in detail as an introduction. Further routes are shown only in summary, but with links to PDFs containing all of the charts for readers interested in them.

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Uneven Reporting of Subway Reduced Speed Zones

Updated October 21 at 4:20pm: The TTC posted an updated map and table of RSZs dated today. Information on the map and tables now match. There are only 9 active slow zones with target removal dates through to late November. The October 21 versions have been added to the end of this article.

Updated October 17 at 11:00pm: The TTC posted an updated map and table of Reduced Speed Zones dated October 17, but the info on the map is still out of sync with the info in the table of slow zones. The revised version is at the end of the article.

In previous articles, I have reported on the number, location and longevity of reduced speed zones on the subway. See:

A recent problem with the TTC website page where these are reported is that information is inconsistent between the map showing problem areas and the tables explaining each problem and its expected resolution.

Here is the current version of the RSZ map dated October 16 at 10:16am.

Here is the text describing these zones:

There are several inconsistencies between the current map and tables.

The statement that there are 13 zones appears to be based on the count of table entries. Note that for a “bothways” restriction, they count as two. Listing only a single direction in the table undercounts the number of locations. In this case the count, based on the same premise, should be 18 not 13.

In past versions each direction has counted independently, and in some cases more than one location was flagged in a track section (marked “X2” below).

There is a further problem if we compare the claimed completion dates with information shown on September 5.

There are definitely more entries in September than in mid-October, and so the TTC has been working away at these issues. However, the projected dates have drifted in many cases.

LocationOn MapIn TableTarget as of
Sept 6
Target as of
Oct 16
Yonge SB Eglinton to DavisvilleYesYesMid SeptEarly Nov
Yonge NB Union to KingNoYesEarly Nov
University BW St. George to SpadinaYesNo
Spadina BW St. Clair West to Eglinton WestYesSB OnlyEarly Sept (NB)Late Oct
Spadina BW Glencairn to Lawrence WestYesYesSeptemberLate Oct
Spadina SB Yorkdale to Lawrence WestYesYesMid SeptTBD
Spadina BW Sheppard West to WilsonYesYesTBDTBD
Bloor Kipling to Islington BWYesEB OnlyTBD (WB)TBD
Bloor Old Mill to Jane BWYesWB OnlyMid Sept (WB)Late Oct
Bloor Bay to Yonge BWYesEB OnlyTBD
Danforth Donlands to Greenwood EBYesYesMid SeptLate Oct
Danforth Warden to Kennedy BWYesEB OnlyLate Oct

The TTC needs to adopt a consistent way of reporting reduced speed zones, counting how many are active and projecting credible target dates for remediation. As thing now stand, the information in the maps and text differs, and the count of RSZs appears to be lower than what is actually in effect. In turn, this allows management to “hit” a lower target by under-reporting problems, and this is precisely the sort of behaviour that has bedevilled the TTC’s performance metrics for years.

Updated October 17 at 11:00pm: Here are the October 17 versions of the RSZ map and tables. The TTC still appears to be incapable of posting consistent data. On the bright side, some of the zones that had “TBD” target dates on October 16 now have October or November dates.

Updated October 21, 2025

Here are the current versions of the map and tables with the information now back in sync.

TTC Service Changes Effective October 12, 2025

Major Update October 10 at 12:50pm: Additional information on bus bay assignments at various stations, on street stop arrangements pending Line 5 opening, and service changes not mentioned in earlier versions of this post. Also added are various tables and charts of fleet allocations and other information.

Updated October 10 at 11:30pm: The spreadsheet showing detailed before and after service designs for affected routes is now available.

The service changes planned for October 12 include four major groups:

  • First stage of route reorganization for Line 5 Crosstown opening.
  • Construction begins on Queen Street between Broadview and the Don River.
  • Construction begins on College Street at McCaul.
  • Construction ends in November at King & Dufferin.

History of This Article

As I publish this on Thursday, October 9 at 10:45am, the TTC has still not issued its usual detailed memo of pending service changes although the information has been floating around for weeks in various sources.

On October 9, there was a press release accompanying Mayor Chow’s media appearances, but this release only gives a hint of what is happening beyond the headline announcement of improved Line 2 subway service. That release includes a link to a page with more details, although regular TTC site readers would never find it.

Updated 5 pm October 9: A separate press release has been issued with the details of changes omitted from the first one. There are now separate pages for each modified route linked from a common page regarding the Line 5 changes. Maps showing the revised routes have been added to the end of this article.

There is an “Updates” page, separate from the regular “Service Changes” page, which can be accessed through the “Riding the TTC” page assuming you know it exists. It includes a link to the service changes, but there is no link from the TTC home page to this information. The Service Changes page gives details, but only for a handful of routes. Automatic links from route schedule pages are generated only for Service Changes items, and so the information on the Updates page is not linked for riders looking at route schedules.

Updated 10:50am October 9: The TTC Home Page now includes a link to the Updates post.

Updated 9:30am October 10: There are now route-level pages detailing the changes on the “Service Changes” page

Updated October 10: The detailed memo of service changes was issued mid morning today.

The TTC recently trumpeted its proposed Wayfinding Strategy which includes a strong digital component given the many riders who access information through online channels. Their own website badly needs overhaul, but even in its current state, information is not published in a consistent location.

The article following the break is a compendium of information from various sources.

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TTC Board Meeting: October 6, 2025

The TTC Board met on October 6, 2025. Many items on the agenda were confidential in whole or in part, and the meeting immediately recessed into private session. Four hours later, the public session resumed.

Extended private sessions have been a “feature” of recent Board meetings, and this is a major inconvenience for people who have taken the trouble to travel to City Hall for deputations, or remained available online. In years long past, the Board scheduled an in camera session before the public session so that, usually, the public part started on time. They should reconsider this practice, or at a minimum advertise a long, planned private session in the agenda so that public attendees can plan accordingly.

Items of interested included:

  • The CEO’s monthly report including an updated format for bus fleet and route performance metrics
  • The Peer Review of asset management by the International Association of Public Transport (UITP)
  • The Wayfinding Strategy
  • Renaming of the Carhouse at Leslie Barns
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TTC Freezes Non-Union Hiring

On Friday, September 26, the TTC issued an internal notice that there would be a freeze on all non-union hiring. This is in reaction to the need to find $141-million in savings to get the anticipated 2026 budget deficit down from $232-million to the Mayor’s target of $91-million.

All non-union requirement is subject to the CEO’s approval.

While, in theory, this does not directly affect service or maintenance levels, there is simply no way that the TTC can find $141-million without at least constraining the union side as well. In turn, this has implications for service growth in 2026 especially considering the ongoing loss of productive service hours to traffic congestion and changes in bus dispatching for the shorter range of eBuses. There is also the question of adequate staffing in various maintenance departments.

One current initiative to improve service is headway monitoring and management, and it is not yet clear whether this would be staffed with “management” or “union” positions.

More generally, the question must be asked whether “management” has been growing at a faster rate than other line positions (be they union or non-union) over past years. The TTC used to publish detailed staffing counts as part of the Operating Budget “Blue Books” up to 2019, but these no longer exist, at least not publicly.

A hiring freeze is only a first step in any review because it addresses vacancies that might or might not be in critical roles. Moreover, it does not address the larger question of whether management should be reorganized or downsized.

One hidden issue in staffing is the matter of consultants and outsourcing. Although the use of outside staff is not as severe an issue at TTC as at Metrolinx, this can be the source of much resentment by “in house” staff who are asked to do more with less while the taps continue to flow for outsiders. Indeed, I understand that a former TTC manager is acting as an advisor on contract to the senior team. This shows how careful an organization must be with double standards.

Recently, the TTC has consulted with interested parties including their Planning Advisory Committee, which I attend, on various service proposals and other matters going into the 2026 budget cycle. It is hard to see how such consultation can bear any fruit facing a constrained subsidy target from our “pro-transit” Mayor.

I asked the TTC to respond on this issue on Friday, September 26, and again today, September 29. As of 5:00pm, the only reply is a copy of the corporate notice that I already had from another source. Its text follows the “more” break below.

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