TTC Capital Budget Update: September 2025

At its meeting of September 4, 2025, the TTC’s Strategic Planning Committee considered a report on the unfunded “state of good repair” (SOGR) projects in their capital budget and a recommendation that these be prioritized for any new funding that might become available.

Updated September 8 at 3:15 pm: A chart has been added showing the magnitude of proposed spending and the shortfall in funding over the years 2025-2039.

The charts and tables below summarize the 15-Year Capital Investment Plan showing the distribution of funding and spending by area. The categories are ordered by priority with mandated work, a comparatively small component, coming first, followed by State of Good Repair which accounts for roughly 40% of planned spending. Note that the Provincial projects such as the Scarborough Subway and major City projects like the Eglinton-Malvern LRT are not included here.

SOGR does not preclude spending on other work, but some major proposals could compete with basic maintenance. For example, Platform Doors and the TransformTO program together account for about 20% of the total plan ($10.5-billion). Bus “SOGR” includes not just the purchase of new buses, but also the cost of technology change for charging infrastructure. Although these should be funded from separate revenue/subsidy streams, they could elbow aside basic funding. There is not much point in such projects if the basic transit system is allowed to crumble.

Some of the language in the report is rather cataclysmic foreseeing the shutdown of parts of the system, notably the streetcar network, if SOGR work is not funded. The report is inconsistent in the language used to describe the situation:

Given the current approved funding levels, the TTC will not be able to renew tangent track assets at a rate necessary to maintain and support existing service demands in a safe and reliable fashion to meet its SOGR needs. Results of an insufficient renewal rate could include restricted speed zones/slow orders, weekend/multi-day service diversions/closures, and/or emergency service interruptions. [p. 6]

But more dire language appears later:

Even when attempting to utilize more operating resources within preventive or corrective maintenance programs, the TTC may find it necessary to plan and prioritize condemning some rail corridors in favour of renewing others, and some may be fully placed out of service, with key intersections being the most at risk. [p. 18]

Such language has appeared before going back into the previous decade. We have seen what deferred maintenance did to the Scarborough RT and to the subway network which is beset with slow zones where track is not safe to operate at full speed. Delays in funding and approval for replacement of Line 2 trains pushed out their projected lifespan, a situation relieved only by concurrent delays in the Scarborough Subway expansion. By contrast on the streetcar network, some of the worst locations have been repaired in recent years, notably the intersection at King & Church, and more replacements at key locations are planned for the near future.

One cannot help thinking there is an anti-streetcar bias at the TTC where any excuse is used to hobble the system including widespread slow orders and abdication of any sense of providing reliable service.

In past years, the TTC published a much more detailed version of the Capital Budget (aka the “Blue Books”) including maps showing the current condition of assets. These put the scope and immediacy of needs in an understandable form. The closest thing today is the map of Reduced Speed Zones, but this does not indicate the scale and timing of needed work in the near future.

The more cynical among us might wonder if the lack of detail was part of a larger effort in the Tory/Leary era to downplay the gradual decline of transit infrastructure thanks to underspending and deferred maintenance.

It is ironic that the TTC is prepared to consider shutting down part of the streetcar system when there are much more extensive areas on the subway in need of major reconstruction. With a fleet of about 260 cars of which peak service consumes barely 60%, the goal should be to increase use of vehicles they already own, not to sabre-rattle about dismantling the system.

The transit system is more than tracks, and especially on the subway many unseen or little regarded systems keep service operating and stations and tunnels safe for riders. These are all part of the SOGR program, but this emphasizes how subways are expensive infrastructure not just to build but to own as they age.

Funding comes from several sources.

  • The City Building Fund is financed via property tax surcharges begun under Mayors Ford and Tory.
  • PTIF is an old program that winds down as withdrawals are made from committed funds.
  • City debt is financed through general city revenues.
  • CCBF is the Federal program replacing the gas tax allocation.
  • The projection for Development Charges could be high given the state of the construction industry and the deferral/elimination of DCs on some targeted housing programs. DC funding is only available to projects that expand service, not for day-to-day SOGR.
  • Amounts for the Streetcar Program are for the last stage of the 60-car order now in delivery and expansion of storage and servicing facilities for some of these cars at Hillcrest. It does not address the SOGR backlog.
  • TTC Internal funding comes from depreciation of assets that were bought by the TTC and not funded by other governments. In effect, this is a charge on the operating budget.
  • The New Deal was struck by the Province and City to upload expressway reconstruction and maintenance thereby freeing up capital that would otherwise be spent by the City.
  • The Zero Emission Transit Fund has help pay for electrification of the bus fleet, but it is unclear whether this will continue or be rolled into the CPTF.
  • The CPTF is the new Federal program for transit funding across Canada.

Some of these sources will run dry when the associated commitments are fulfilled.

An ongoing political problem in Toronto is the assumption that other governments will continue with project-based funding outside of these programs. This leads to allocated funding being earmarked by the City for the project getting the most attention (e.g. the lobbying for new subway train funding) with the assumption that more money will be available for other works. In the current climate, that is a risky assumption.

An important change in 2025 was the “New Deal” struck between the City of Toronto and Province of Ontario which had the effect of releasing capital dollars in the City’s plans for expressway renewal for use on the transit system. This money has been allocated as shown in the charts below which are from the 2025 Capital Budget.

Note that these charts show only vehicle overhaul programs, not the larger capital plan and shortfall.

A further problem in the medium term is that the bulge in road spending would only last for the rest of the 2020s, and there is no comparable saving in the early 2030s that can be shifted to transit. The New Deal is a short term fix, not a long term solution. This leaves many projects in the “out years” of the budget with no obvious funding.

Updated September 8: Chart added

This problem is illustrated by a chart showing the proposed spending level and projected revenues, together with the wide gap in future years. Note that as things stand today, the City is the major funder of TTC Capital, but the growing mountain of unmet needs will hit in the very near future unless new money is found or spending is curtailed. That option brings its own problems if the budget lines affected are SOGR projects as we have seen in past budget cycles.

Source: TTC 2026 Budget Update and Outlook, p. 20

The report includes tables by major segment of the system listing the unfunded capital works. For comparison, I have included the full Capital Budget presentation slides from January 2025 to put these numbers into context. The breakdown in the September report is different from the full budget in January making comparisons tricky in places.

2025-2039 Subway Capital Plan

The subway plan totals $29.4-billion over 2025-2039 of which only about a third is funded. Major funding gaps lie in the following projects:

  • Purchase of additional subway cars for growth on Lines 1 and 2
  • Line 2 Automatic Train Control and capacity enhancements
  • Line 1 capacity enhancements
  • New Line 1 and 2 maintenance facilities for expanded fleets
  • Platform edge doors

September 2025 Unfunded Subway SOGR

Although the 15-year plan projects $29-billion in spending, only $3.2-billion is for SOGR. Any of the major projects listed above could easily compromise funding for SOGR depending on political priorities.

An important issue here is that some of the SOGR overlaps with provisions for growth. For example, running more trains requires more power, and it would make sense to upgrade the traction power infrastructure at the time of major overhaul, not as a separate project.

2025-2039 Bus Capital Plan

The Capital Plan for buses totals $9.4-billion and is only partly funded. A major issue here is that the fleet electrification pushes up the cost of new vehicles and drives the need for charging infrastructure. This is partly SOGR and partly the result of a policy decision to adopt a new technology.

When the program was announced, it was “sold” in part on the basis that Ontario Power Generation (OPG) through a subsidiary, POWERON, would be a co-investor in the needed infrastructure. However, the amount of investment in the TTC’s budget requires substantial subsidy from the City and other governments that is not yet guaranteed. The proportion of investment to be provided by POWERON is unclear. I will pursue this in a future article.

September 2025 Unfunded Bus SOGR

Of the 15-year total unfunded SOGR, almost all of the $5.7-billion lies in the purchase of buses ($3.4-billion) and the charging systems ($1-billion). The degree to which these may elbow aside other SOGR requirements remains to be seen.

2025-2039 Streetcar Capital Plan

The streetcar capital plan of $2.5-billion is dominated by surface track renewal (about 50% of the total) because the fleet has already been renewed, and carhouse expansion and upgrades are already in progress.

September 2025 Unfunded Streetcar SOGR

As with the overall streetcar capital plan, surface track replacement is the largest unfunded item. Note that the amounts for the bus fleet above are much larger than the streetcar SOGR needs about which the TTC issues such dire warnings.

Also important here is the amount of work needed for other infrastructure including power distribution upgrades. A recent suspension of Bathurst streetcar service during the CNE was caused by problems with inadequate power on part of the line. It is ludicrous that the TTC which has operated streetcars for a century should have a power shortage problem.

2025-2039 Facilities Capital Plan

Of the $4-billion in the Facilities plan, about 30% ($1.36-billon) is listed as unfunded SOGR. This is an area of the budget that receives little attention in part because there are no big ribbon cutting possibilities with new roofs. Note that the “sustainability” category at $1.6-billion is not included in SOGR.

September 2025 Unfunded Facilities SOGR

2025-2039 Network Wide Capital Plan

September 2025 Unfunded Network Wide SOGR

2025-2039 TransformTO Capital Plan

TransformTO is an ambitious plan to decarbonize many aspects of the City including transit, and to divert travel from private autos to transit and active transportation (walking, cycling).

  • Electrify 100% of transit by 2040, which results in 3% of cumulative GHG emission reductions.
  • Convert one lane of traffic to exclusive bus lanes on all arterials.
  • Increase service frequency on all transit routes: bus by 70%, streetcar by 50%, subway off-peak service increased to every 3 mins.
  • No transit fares.

Assuming that the eBus purchases continue as planned, the fleet will be entirely electric by 2040. Whether this happens remains to be seen based both on implementation costs, and delays in vehicle supply.

Conversion of a lane on all arterials for transit use is extremely ambitious particularly where roads are less than six lanes wide. An essential complementary action is the improvement of transit so that it is a credible alternative to driving.

Service increases on the bus network will require a much larger fleet and more garage facilities. The plan below only addresses a bus increase, but not the proposed 50% improvement in streetcar service. There is no provision for added peak subway service which would affect fleet size, maintenance facility needs, infrastructure upgrades such as power supply, and station capacity improvements.

Free transit at current budget levels would cost over $1-billion annually in lost revenue plus the effect of added demand onto the transit system. This has not been fully thought out.

Council has not endorsed all of TransformTO, and it is completely unfunded in the TTC’s Capital plans.

3 thoughts on “TTC Capital Budget Update: September 2025

  1. I see that the Waterfront West LRT (Exhibition Loop to Dufferin Loop) is in the Streetcar SOGR section. Not quite sure this is SOGR but, IF it is, where is the Waterfront East LRT section the TTC are supposedly responsible for (Union to QQE)??

    Steve: That money was just for design work. Waterfront East is a City Project, although part of it (the Bay Street tunnel) is being done by TTC. This is an example of the problem that projects are reported in multiple budgets. Definitely WFW is not SOGR.

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  2. The federal government needs to step in to directly fund the needed funding for all transit agencies in Canada. Especially since the province of Ontario looks down at public transit, cycling, and pedestrians and will not fund them properly.

    Steve: However there is a valid question about whether funding substantially more expensive eBuses and charging infrastructure is as productive in shifting people out of cars as buying and running more hybrids with better service. Transit should not be used as an indirect subsidy mechanism when the real problem is the level of service and the lack of credibility as an alternative to driving.

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  3. Is there any information about how much of the platform door work would actually just be SOGR work with upgrades included…for example there is SOGR for hvac…and we know platform doors will require hvac upgrades…similarly platform rebuilds, fire, wayfinding, software improvements, signalling (for line 2) all seem to likely be part of other budgets…how much are these projects double counting items, or not factoring in savings that could happen if done concurrently?

    Steve: No. According to the design info that has been published, HVAC would not be needed as there would be louvres at the top of the PSD wall to allow piston-effect airflow which is claimed to be sufficient. Alternately 3/4 height walls would allow for more. I’m not sure that is *really* sufficient in many stations, especially the busier ones, based simply on my own experience of how hot they can get in the summer even with existing airflow conditions. I suspect they will do a station like Dundas/TMU or Yonge (Line 2 level) and then go “oops, we need AC”.

    Platform rebuilds are an extra included in the PSD cost because of the reinforcing needed to support the walls. This work would otherwise be unnecessary. There are a few stations that had reinforced platform edges, but they are on the oldest part of the system, and this does not appear to be a system-wide requirement.

    No fire control issues have been flagged, but there is the matter of tunnel ventilation. There is a more general issue with the planned increase in passenger volumes and train frequency that could affect requirements to bring fire control up to modern standards.

    Wayfinding changes would be generally around the station, and not necessarily on the PSD wall which faces the wrong way for people looking along the platform for exit signs, for example. The PSD wall itself is likely to be littered with video screens for advertising, not wayfinding, to replace and add to the pillar-mounted ads now in stations.

    I believe that the capability to interface with PSDs is now a standard part of the ATC software. What will be net new is the need for the train-borne equipment to have a “handshake” with the PSD controller before opening and closing doors, something that will add to the already slower door operations by the TR trains. That’s a functional requirement for the doors, although there could be some on-board software for the platform and train to exchange info and act accordingly where a door is disabled. Trains do not now have the ability to selectively open, or not open, single doors except for the manually operated control using a staff key.

    All of this is to say that I don’t expect there is much if any double counting, and in fact some items might have been underbudgeted.

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