Among the reports on the TTC Board agenda for April 11 is a recap of the SRT investigation. I have already written about shortcomings and contradictions in this report and will not belabour that here.

The fundamental question is whether management are being entirely transparent in their presentation. If there is someone on the Board bold enough to challenge them, here are a few key questions:

1. Ten days before the derailment, a high reaction rail was reported at the site, but this was logged as a low priority problem. The misalignment, reported as 1/2 inch, is on a par with the normal clearance between the LIM motor under SRT cars and the reaction rail. What repairs, if any, were made to correct this problem, and were the bolts holding the reaction rail checked for their integrity?
2. At the site, joins in both the reaction rail cap and the main reaction rail were at the same position. This weakens the structure because the two sections cannot reinforce each other against deflection by magnetic forces as trains pass. The sections are supposed to be staggered to prevent this type of failure. Why weren’t they, and how many other locations on the SRT shared the same problem?
3. How recently installed were the bolts that failed at the derailment site?
4. Consultant reports state that the manufacturer, Hilti, did not intend its anchors to be used in a situation where the bolts would flex under load as on the SRT. Why was this not reported to the Board in the September 2023 briefing?
5. New bolts on the SRT were not those supplied by Hilti, but were substituted by the TTC. The replacement bolts were longer and they used a different thread profile than the originals. Were these approved by Hilti?
6. What portions of the SRT were reviewed by the consultants, and did they find other defects similar to those at the derailment site?
7. Have all the reports, either internal or produced by consultants, about the derailment been made public? If not, why not, and when will they be made available?
8. TTC management claims that they did not reduce the level of maintenance on the SRT even though it was to close in fall 2023. However, the consultants point out that capital repairs (as opposed to routine inspections) were discontinued, and that only that type of work would have detected loose reaction rail bolts. How does TTC management reconcile these claims?
9. At the September 2023 Board meeting, TTC staff stated that the consultant’s recommendations for work to inspect and restore the SRT to safe operation would take longer then the planned remaining life of the line. How can the need to do so much work be reconciled with claims of regular inspection and repair?
10. Why were the consultant reports posted to the TTC’s website in November and December 2023 with no notice to the public nor to the Board?

The TTC would like to put the derailment behind them and focus on improvements going forward. However, one must ask how long the practices leading to the SRT crash were used, and whether shortfalls were the result of budgetary “efficiencies” rather than good engineering. By extension, what other parts of the TTC might be compromised, and what is needed to correct this situation.