Neptis Reviews Metrolinx: A Critique (IV)

This article is the last section of my critique of the December 2013 review of the Metrolinx Big Move Plan written by Michael Schabas for the Neptis Foundation. It should be read in conjunction with Part IPart II and Part III.

9. The Importance of Integration

Coupled with the need for much improved GO service as the regional network that would tie everything together and expand transit’s reach is the need for integration so that riders see one network, not a patchwork each with its own rules and fares.

Integration is what Metrolinx was created to achieve, but apathy for better funding of local service and the focus on capital expansion meant there was never an incentive to address fare consolidation. Lots of money for flashy new toys, but none to pay for basic operations.

GO is particularly to blame here. They trumpet high farebox cost recovery as a virtue, and regard “co-fares” with local 905 systems mainly as a way to avoid building more parking (paying somebody else’s bus company to bring you riders is cheaper than building a parking space for them). Service improvements that might improve the network and its usefulness within Toronto are “not our job” for GO.

The 905 municipalities have much lower transit orientation because they were built in age of cars, not of transit. There is no foundation like that in Toronto to build on (and even Toronto’s is less than impressive around the edges). The extra cost to run substantially better service for minimal ridership does not sell easily in the 905. This is partly a chicken-and-egg problem – without a robust GO network as a basis for more frequent local services as feeders, there is no single incentive to widespread improvement in coverage, frequency and hours on those routes.

Schabas’ observations on consolidation of transit under a single operator make the important point that we should avoid amalgamation for its own sake.

Local bus services act as feeders for longer-distance trips, but many passengers will always be making local trips, to schools, shopping, and recreation. It makes sense for local government agencies, appointed by elected officials, to determine routes, stops, and service standards. Logically, each local municipality also provides operating subsidies, although a portion of these can be offset by a dedicated share of the provincial gas tax. Each operator seeks to serve the local residents who fund it, and will naturally be less interested in providing services to the wider region. [Page 76]

Subsidies

Schabas is off base when he talks about the source and level of subsidies.

The Province (through Metrolinx) and the federal government provide about half of capital subsidies for municipal transit services, and all funding for GO. Special funding was allocated for development of the Spadina subway extension to Vaughan. [Page 77]

This is not true. The federal government only comes in on major projects, and on a relatively small scale for works deemed to be worth of the “economic stimulus” program. The Vaughan extension’s cost was shared equally by the federal, provincial and municipal sectors, but this was an exception to the usual pattern. After hoping that Ottawa would come in with equal funding for The Big Move, Ontario realized that it would have to go it alone on almost all projects.

It is vitally important to distinguish between megaprojects such as those in The Big Move and “routine” maintenance, commonly referred to as “state of good repair”. The TTC has a $9b, 10-year plan which is seriously underfunded in part because many cost sharing programs at senior levels have died off through sunset provisions or simply been cancelled without replacement. A notable example was a program to support bus purchases in Ontario.

Both Ottawa and Queen’s Park send gas tax funds to Toronto, but these do not come close to paying a 1/3 share of capital needs in either case.

Queen’s Park gives about $160m annually of which $71m is allocated to capital by the City of Toronto and the remainder to operating subsidies. Ottawa gives about $150m annually all of which goes to capital. These numbers pale beside an annual requirement of $900m, not to mention projects that are “below the line” and have not even been counted in the 10-year plans. $220m is most definitely not “about half” of the $900m annual requirement. To make matters worse, the TTC is short about $2.7b in committed funding for that $9b shopping list. This would almost completely vanish if the senior governments actually did pay half of the total capital needs.

The problem with these claims is that Queen’s Park shells out billions for projects like Eglinton and then lumps their value into discussions of how they “support transit”. Building a $5b line on Eglinton does not represent a contribution to the system we already have, and it quietly falls apart even as the tunnel borers inch their way across the city.

In summary, the lion’s share of day-to-day transit capital and operations, especially in Toronto, is funded by local taxes.

But Metrolinx has failed to use its powers to ensure that the local operations are coordinated to deliver regional benefits. [Page 77]

Metrolinx has no power to compel local governments to spend money they don’t have on services they don’t want. This is not a case of local councils misallocating provincial subsidy dollars, but of Queen’s Park presuming influence when it is not a full partner at the table. Recent statements by Transportation Minister Murray imply municipalities are not getting any more dollars, and that they should be happy with the gas tax revenue already provide.

The Metrolinx Investment Strategy suggested that 25% of any new revenue streams should go to municipal projects, but there was no mention of this idea in recent provincial policy announcements.

Integrated operation does occur, but there are issues of jurisdiction and revenue sharing. If Metrolinx does not address fare/revenue pooling, it cannot simply reallocate services and demand that local operators carry “foreign” passengers at a lower consolidated fare, or operate service outside of their territories. Changing the TTC’s exclusive right to operate transit service in Toronto requires amendment of the provincial City of Toronto Act, something that is in Queen’s Park’s power should they feel the urge to let others compete for transit service within the city.

Fare integration is definitely a problem. Not only is there the issue of lost revenue through lower “integrated” fares, there is the fundamental issue that GO doesn’t want to play in that game for exactly the same reason as the local operators. GO wants to hold onto every penny of revenue they now receive. The provincial agency is the worst offender in the fare integration arena.

Schabas states:

Passengers travelling from, say, Scarborough Centre to Mimico must purchase separate fares if they want to use the faster GO train as well as the TTC, although TTC has now introduced a “TTC Times Two” policy which allows use of TTC, then GO, then TTC without requiring payment of a second TTC fare. [Page 78]

This implies a recent change in fare policy by TTC when, in fact, the program has existed for well over a decade (although it is little known among TTC staff and, it would seem, certain consultants).

What we did lose was the GTA Twin Pass that was valid for both local systems and GO Transit, but that was a GO decision, not one by the local agencies.

The question of lost fares through integration brings a counter-argument that there will be more riders and the whole thing will be at worst revenue neutral, possibly even generate a profit.

TTC seems to believe that fare integration inevitably means a loss of revenue. We think this view is mistaken. While simply providing free transfer onto TTC from GO might result in a loss of revenue to TTC, international experience shows that a carefully designed integrated fare structure can increase overall system ridership and total revenues at the same time.

This statement dances around the basic question of whether either a local system or GO would have less revenue after integration.

GO has traditionally has resisted “funding” the TTC through revenue sharing. Schabas writes as if this were a matter TTC foot-dragging rather than a systemic problem brought on by the overall funding scheme for each operator. Nobody has an incentive to integrate. Moreover, from the TTC’s point of view, more passengers are not necessarily wanted if they would add to peak point demands while generating little new revenue.

That “international experience” needs to be examined in more detail to verify that the situations cited are actually comparable to the GTA, especially regarding the improved use of surplus capacity at little net cost simply by providing more attractive fares.

Integrated Land Use & Transportation Planning

Anyone living in Toronto has heard all about the need for integrated planning since the dawn of time, and one more lecture by a consultant isn’t going to change anything. The basic problem is that development industry, politically well-connected, rules about where stuff gets built and this is unlikely to change. They want cheap land with low taxes and don’t care about implications for transportation on the assumption that autos will always served and, where needed, transit will be expanded. We face similar issues with utilities such as sewer and water, and moreover the growing 905 municipalities have become dependent on development charges as a way to shield existing homeowners from property tax hikes.

Powerful political forces work against the idea that planners can actually direct growth in a form and location that best suits a future transit network. This will only change when building on the fringe rather than upscaling in existing locations becomes uncompetitive.

10. Funding Considerations

There is little doubt that with smarter fare policies, and more efficient operating practices (including changes to work and overtime rules for operating staff), the TTC and GO systems could recover all operating costs for existing services from fares and even generate a surplus that could go towards service improvements. Current operating subsidies may be supporting inefficient operating practices, rather than expanding services for passengers. [Page 80]

This is a bogus argument based on ideology, not fact. If Schabas wants to demonstrate this claim, he is welcome to try, but he will need more than a simple assertion of “little doubt” that it is true. Once again, he takes a shot at work practices as a potential saving and makes unspecified assumptions about fare structures that would generate more revenue than the current scheme. The assertion that any savings would be ploughed back into service directly contradicts actual experience with governments who seek only to limit tax increases, not to provide more for the public. We have three years and counting of this in Toronto.

Schabas mixes the idea of unregulated “profitable” private sector operations on busy routes without fare regulation, with the larger issue of providing “service” based on full time accessibility to transportation. These are two fundamentally different views of the role of transit.

As for the supposed better labour practices of the private sector, GO Transit’s rail network is a contracted service to Bombardier. Infrastructure maintenance is also contracted. If there are “inefficiencies”, it is the private sector operator’s fault.

On the TTC, a large amount of service does not run profitably because of the flat fare system – long trips cannot possibly recover their costs. As previously discussed, this was a political decision in 1973 as a quid pro quo for suburban tax support.

It is easy to say that work and overtime rules should be changed, but one needs to prove how these penalize transit today and what benefits would be obtained. Many issues – the ratio of in service time to paid time, garage and crew change mileage, the Labour Standards Act and federal rules about hours and size for train crews – cannot wished away simply because Schabas thinks we can solve transit funding problems by rewriting the rulebook.

Finally he says:

Nevertheless, it is true that very few subways (metros) can generate sufficient revenue to pay the massive costs of construction, maintenance, and renewal, especially of expensive tunnels and stations in urban areas. Almost inevitably, these systems require capital subsidies. [Page 80]

And so, Virginia, there is no Santa Claus. We cannot have free subways, or even more optimistically ones that generate profits to attract private investment. After a swipe at labour practices and claims of some metro systems that run at a profit, Schabas admits this is rare.

The London success in building transit ridership and cutting core area traffic is not news, but a big difference there is the existence of extensive metro/tube and commuter rail/overland networks. It is noteworthy that while Toronto suffered a loss of 20% of its riding in the 1990s, London continued an almost unbroken period of transit growth. [See chart on page 83] Clearly different factors were in play for that city compared with Toronto.

Levies on road users through gas tax or mileage fees presume these users (a) have alternative ways to travel and (b) will see benefits even if they personally cannot use new services such fees would pay for. Until the recent announcement of quarter-hourly off peak GO plus electrification in 10 years, commuters had no reason to believe they would benefit from transit spending. (Indeed, with the historical ratio of announcements to implementation, “no reason” may only be upgraded to “little reason” rather than unbridled joy and street festivals at every GO station.)

Many GTA trips are not covered by new transit infrastructure because concentrations mainly exist in 905-to-core travel thanks to the rail networks – both TTC and GO. It is much harder to build a 905-to-905 network, and problems of travel time (cited as issues even for LRT trips in Toronto) are magnified due to very large distances involved and the diversity of origins and destinations. If the majority of new spending continues to focus on major nodes like downtown Toronto, many regional travellers will see little benefit for their trips from transit spending. This includes the imputed reduction of congestion because that can only occur in corridors where travel can actually be redirected to transit.

With a zone fare system and some differential for peak and off-peak prices, TTC might be able to recover all its operating costs from fares, while attracting more riders. The current operating subsidy of about $450 million could instead fund service improvements and further capital investments. [Page 85]

Now we really are getting out on a limb. Proposing the reintroduction of zone fares would be political suicide. Not only would it undo a 40-year old flat fare arrangement, but it would bring the inequity of giving cheaper fares to well-off folks who can afford to live relatively close to their downtown destinations and already have short trips.

They pay $3 for a trip that they would willingly pay $5 or more to make. [Page 85]

I challenge Michael Schabas to stand in a room and say this to happy suburban riders who already think that TTC is overcharging and that downtowners get too much service and infrastructure. We have totally left the realm of studied examination of rider attitudes and behaviour and replaced it with ideological statements to suit the political fiction that transit doesn’t have to cost the public purse anything.

There is a fundamental issue of whether fares are intended to be full cost recovery and what this implies for overall network design. Do we boost fares to cross-subsidize less-profitable trips at an average 100% recovery rate, or do we selectively increase fares on less productive services? What are the social and economic goals of having transit readily available for travel throughout the region at most times of day, seven days a week? Schabas totally ignores these questions.

Speaking of fare inequity, GO provides a higher proportional subsidy per rider to long trips than to short ones – the fare per kilometre is highest for the shortest trips. GO claims this is because there is a fixed cost of having a space available on a train for the shorter trip to occupy even though the “seat” rides to the end of the line. Of course during peak periods, that “seat” was likely occupied by someone boarding at an outlying station and the short-haul rider has the compound disincentive of a higher relative fare and being forced to stand.

TTC buses into operating into the 905 “charge a fare supplement” according to Schabas. In fact these are contracted services, and the extra fare is set by the 905 agency, not the TTC, to offsets contract fees. These routes exist because they provide through services notably for York Region and avoid the cost of separate YRT-based operations.

Revising the TTC fare structure is long overdue. Change may be unavoidable as the subway is extended across the city boundary into Vaughan. Many students who travel from places like Woodbridge and Brampton to York University, using the VIVA or Züm express buses, will instead be expected to transfer to the subway at the Vaughan Corporate centre and use the subway to finish their journey. This may save them a few minutes, and it will allow Züm and VIVA to save a substantial amount of money. However it will be deeply unpopular with travellers if it means they must pay a $3 extra fare each way. TTC’s problem is that it has no way of distinguishing whether passengers boarding at Vaughan are travelling just to York University, or all the way into downtown Toronto. [Page 87]

This is already an issue in York Region with proposals to remove all bus service directly to York U whose plan is to have a bus-free “common” in place of the current throngs of TTC and York Region vehicles. Fortunately, the subway opening is now delayed until early 2017 and PRESTO conversion will be finished by then to support whatever fare scheme is concocted.

However, this remains a TTC issue because any discount, or foregone TTC fare for York students coming from York Region, would violate expectations in the original cost sharing agreement with the Region. That agreement is fundamentally unfair to the TTC as previously discussed, but as for York students, it was York Region who made the deal that would now penalize them.

Once again, Schabas presumes that riders from outlying areas would pay higher fares when the subway has been built on the expectation that a single zone TTC fare would apply to riders all the way to Vaughan Centre Station.

A more intelligent fare system for Toronto might copy that of London, which has a system of radial zones, with a premium for use of faster modes (commuter rail and subway) (but not a full additional fare), and with reductions for off-peak travel. [Page 87]

This presumes a predominantly radial travel pattern, one which is not valid today and will be even less so with the growth of trips that are not core-oriented.

To introduce “smart pricing,” TTC would need to introduce “touch out” points at station exits, just as GO now does at rail stations. [Page 87]

Touching out might be possible for subway stations (although there would be difficulties with passenger flows in some locations), but on the surface network it would be a nightmare. Schabas appears to forget that the world of bus and streetcar operations is very different, but these networks are an integral part of the TTC system. Any move to distance-based fares cannot avoid measurement of trips on surface vehicles, not just within the subway.

The extra time needed for departing passengers to tap out is an extra potential source of congestion we do not need. It is worth noting that bus and tram passengers in London are not required to tap out with their Oyster cards. Schabas should know this because he lives there.

Even GO Transit avoids having regular riders tap out by defining a “standard journey” for their PRESTO cards which is presumed for any tap-in at the end points.

GO’s biggest capital cost is rolling stock, which must be purchased to carry peak demand. [Page 88]

This may no longer be true. Infrastructure costs will become larger part of GO capital, especially the one time costs for electrification. In the early days of service on most routes, GO was able to take over existing track capacity, but as service frequency improves and the desire for operational flexibility mounts, more track is needed simply to accommodate GO’s trains. The multi-track reconstruction of the Georgetown corridor is a particularly striking example.

It is no longer simply a question of buying a few trains and laying down the most rudimentary of station facilities. This decouples costs from individual service increases and one could argue that the greater investment in infrastructure should be exploited with service to the greatest degree possible.

Charging for parking [Page 88]

I agree that this is long overdue. GO claims that people will drive if they have to pay to park, but this implies a low threshold for price sensitivity. By comparison, motorists routinely “eat” the extra cost of market increases in fuel and associated tax.

Shifting trips away from the peak presumes that there is a surplus of parking (or frequent, reliable local bus feeders). This is not true as shown by full lots early in the AM peak. GO is addicted to building parking as their primary way of attracting passengers with a ratio of roughly two spaces for every three commuters. This model is not scalable, nor is it workable for off-peak and counter-peak riders.

By implication, shifting trips could reduce or eliminate the need for more peak trains. However, latent demand is the issue here and shifting one group of riders simply allows backfill. Most importantly, this presumes riders actually have the choice to rearrange their work and home time commitments to suit GO’s fleet planning and scheduling. Some do, but many do not.

Capital spending has been erratic, less than $0.5 billion through decade to 2003, but rising sharply since then to almost $3.5 billion per year at present all of it provided by federal and provincial governments. [Page 89]

This is a creative fiction borne either from ignorance (the actual numbers are available in the TTC’s budgets and financial statements) or from a desire to imply that senior governments are carrying all of the load. Toronto is paying about 20% of the Spadina extension’s cost plus roughly 75% of routine capital expenses thanks to the wind-down of various capital funding programs at both the provincial and federal levels.

12. Conclusions

Schabas documents that Metrolinx will not achieve the ridership growth claimed in The Big Move, and I agree. Some parts of the plan will never be built, and Metrolinx has been too slow with the vital expansion of GO, although this may finally be changing thanks to Queen’s Park’s new outlook.

However, for the network as a whole, I do not agree that the only “benefit” should be the number of net new riders even though this is obviously linked to the diversion of trips from road to transit. There is also the matter of providing more comfortable travel, indeed even space, to handle transit demand and making transit a more attractive option. Network effects, not just new riders on each line, are important.

Schabas has a scathing overall view of Metrolinx:

“… Metrolinx is not adhering to its own guiding principles. It is not investing “where it matters most.” Most of its funds are going towards schemes with little or no regional focus, with costs in excess of benefits, which will deliver poor value for money. The schemes reflect the priorities of individual municipalities, but do not add up to an integrated plan to serve the region.

Metrolinx is not aggressively pursuing the most important scheme, the upgrading of GO Rail into a regional express rail network. Instead, it is focusing largely on secondary schemes that have strong local champions, but that will bring much less benefit without the regional rail backbone.

Nor is the organization living up to the principle of accountability. Metrolinx has not published a detailed financial plan, showing what it plans to build, how it will be paid for, and what this will deliver. “Benefit Case Analyses” have not been issued for some schemes. The BCAs that have been issued omit key information. The BCAs for the two most expensive schemes, the Eglinton Crosstown line and the Downtown Relief Line (DRL), were not made public until we obtained them for this report through a Freedom of Information request. In any case, Metrolinx seems to be ignoring their conclusions. The BCAs for the Transit City LRT schemes, including the Eglinton LRT, shows a very low Benefit:Cost ratio, yet Metrolinx is proceeding with the $5 billion Eglinton scheme, in contravention of its own principles of prudent financial management and accountability.

Unfortunately here, Schabas’ view of the economics, the benefits cases, is clouded by his own errors of methodology and his preference for automation and general changes in labour practices.

A problem common to Schabas and Metrolinx is that “regional focus” is a matter of boundaries. Toronto itself is a large “region” with the highest transit usage. Just because a route is inside the city does not mean it is unimportant. Such routes will tend to be more expensive because of demand levels and technology issues (e.g. underground construction on Eglinton is more a factor of local conditions than demand). That’s life in the big city where everything is bigger, demand is higher, and space isn’t conveniently available to tuck every transit plan away in its own corridor.

The term “regional plan” has been used to cherry pick projects that are claimed to have a “regional” importance even though this is clearly not the case in several instances.

Metrolinx has done a poor job of achieving its stated goals and the Neptis/Schabas report is right to call them out on that account. However, some of the alternatives proposed are not rooted in the same level of careful, credible analysis the report would expect of Metrolinx.

The Appendices

A detailed review of the cost and ridership estimates for proposed transit lines might be worth my time, but there is a point at which an extensive review like this must stop. I believe that there are enough errors of assumption and fact in the Neptis proposals that any cost estimates and business cases must be completely revisited.

And finally …

I agree with some of Michael Schabas’ conclusions, notably those related to the regional role for an expanded GO network, but we fundamentally disagree over many other options. I cannot escape a sense that his paper is as much an argument to justify a large-scale rollout of ALRT technology, something with which he has a close association, as it is an independent review of Metrolinx plans.

Were it not for the number of errors scattered throughout his analysis, I could take this report as a bona fide contribution to transit in Toronto, but one should not have to write thousands of words just to get back to something like a balanced debate.

[This article was modified on April 25, 2014 to correct typos and to make some minor stylistic changes.]

21 thoughts on “Neptis Reviews Metrolinx: A Critique (IV)

  1. I find the notion that TTC could recover more from fares, as per your notes he seems to argue for more recovery through higher fares, and lower fares. While you could likely charge more for peak, and less for off peak, and that would both alter the time some riders choose to move and encompass the impact of crowding, it is not clear to me that this would be as easy to implement. It would also be politically questionable, especially since some of the least flexible riders will be those of smallest means. It would however, allow a larger capture of revenue by the TTC, however not likely enough to cover the full network, nor is it clear the social implications are desirable.

    In your commentary I get the sense that he is arguing simultaneously for a studied intelligent approach, full fare box recovery, and a massive simultaneous change in the transit structure/network. To me these are notions that are at odds with each other. A large change in the network and pricing, both perforce will have create large unpredictable changes, in terms of revenue and ridership, and thus road congestion.

    The fact that he brings a London bias is unsettling by the fact that London has restricted car use, and has built more continously thus been in a better position to predict outcomes of the next network change. London also has the advantage of much higher density from the outset, thus the interaction of bus to rapid transit is not as vital to create a base load for a rapid transit route, and new routes that have been built have started with reasonably higher load expectations. Toronto needs to put in place rapid transit in order to achieve London’s density, so that London’s solution might then apply, however that is beyond the reasonable time scope of Metrolinx projects.

    Steve: I am amused that Schabas happily talks of riders willingly paying a few dollars more for a trip when we have trouble getting a 10 cent fare increase approved.

    Like

  2. “The 905 municipalities have much lower transit orientation because they were built in age of cars, not of transit. There is no foundation like that in Toronto to build on (and even Toronto’s is less than impressive around the edges)”

    If you look at Toronto’s borders, the density is generally the same on each side. Travelling up Yonge St (on a YRT bus!), you don’t see a radical change when you cross Steeles. There’s even matching gas stations. Same elsewehere on Steeles, or either side of the 427 and Humber River. Crossing the Rouge on Kingston Rd doesn’t provide any sense you’ve left the City for the Suburbs.

    What *is* different, however, is the level of transit service. Because Torontonians see the great transit service of the urban core, they create political pressure for better service in the low-density neighbourhoods, because that’s “fair”. So, the leafy suburbs south of Steeles get buses every 10 minutes, while those on the north side get buses every half hour. Naturally, the buses every 10 minutes carry more people.

    The “good news” implication is that the 905 can generate much higher transit ridership without first increasing density through better service.

    … and then we’re back to operational funding 🙂

    Like

  3. You really outdid yourself with this one; thanks for the detailed insight. I hadn’t noticed the 2012 report of the Auditor General the first time around; it’s amazing that the media (and the PCs!) didn’t do more with that.

    On a related note, there was also a post by Jonathan English today on the O-train as a good model for starter LRT elsewhere in North America; it would be interesting to hear how realistic this is from your perspective (as well as this author’s CityRail proposal).

    Like

  4. FWIW: Translink in Vancouver is currently planning to include touch-out on buses as part of Compass card roll-out happening any time now. There are only three fare zones and many route do not cross fare boundaries, but nevertheless it will be well-worth watching.

    Like

  5. Hi Steve,

    Thank you for your detailed breakdown and analysis (and thorough shredding) of this report. I hope media in this city take the time to read the series of postings instead of defaulting to the report and quoting from it in a misleading manner. A few questions for you:

    1. Would Metrolinx be more effective if they were an independent company building transit in the province, instead of the current setup that is subject to ad hoc changes? I’m not talking necessarily about a private consortium. I’m thinking an agency that is truly arms-length and has the ability to raise funds and build transit outside of the whims or mayors, ministers et al. (I know it would never happen as Queen’s Park would want to call the shots, but I’m curious to know what you think.)

    Steve: The basic problem is that all projects are going to be built and operated with public funds, and that pretty well rules out an “independent” company. Fundraising will always require the co-operation of governments to pass enabling legislation, and the collection will almost certainly be via existing taxing machinery to avoid the need for a parallel bureaucracy. The amounts of money are huge, and even the decision to levy any new tax (or whatever we might call it) is a political decision. I can hear the screams not about an unelected, unaccountable company reaching into our pockets. Can you say Highway 407?

    2. How do you fix Metrolinx/GO? Forget about what they were supposed to be/do. As currently constituted, what are the benefits they bring to the table? Is the current situation fixable, or is it permanently broken and in need of fundamental changes in your opinion?

    Steve: Two things. First, money needs to be on the table in advance, not as some hypothetical future state about which we can dream, but always wake up too soon to reality. Second, there must be a ethos of governance both among politicians and within agencies that sees transit’s role as making do with what was done last year and the year before that. Otherwise, any new structure is doomed to fail.

    3. As bleak as things may seem, what are some things (if there are any) you look forward to with excitement (or tempered enthusiasm) when it comes to transit now and where it is going in the GTA?

    Thanks Steve!

    Steve: The GO service expansion, sooner rather than later, and the resumption of LRT projects within Toronto once Council and Queen’s Park are beyond vote buying in Scarborough.

    Like

  6. Steve, do you get paid to be a transit advocate?

    Steve: No, although sometimes I get an honorarium for appearing at events, and I am paid for some writing (but rarely).

    Like

  7. Bravo Steve!

    Steve’s analysis is a tremendous achievement. It is obviously the result of hours and hours of unpaid labour. Labour that achieved a much better quality of analysis than what comes from many paid professionals. Paid professsionals like Mr. Schabas.

    What I find particularly disturbing about the Neptis report and many, many other similar papers is the way the authors start with their conclusions. In this case, with the absurd pushing of the ALRT technology and anti-labour bias.

    ALRT simply does not cost-justify itself. It is both capital and maintenance intensive to the point that it is difficult for it to compete with alternate technologies. We have ample experience with the expensive and breakdown-prone Scarborough RT. No more!

    Still, if Mr. Schabas sincerely believes that this technology can be improved to the point where it can cost-justify itself in comparison to alternate technologies, he should make that case openly. This is the honest thing to do.

    When I was in the Canadian Army, we had a term for Mr. Schabas’s behaviour. The Army has a process called “estimating the situation.” This means gaining all the relevant facts and courses open before analyzing which course of action may be the best.

    What Mr. Schabas is doing the Army calls “situating the estimate.” In other words, cherry-picking the data and forcing the analysis into a pre-determined conclusion. This is profoundly dishonest, and yet frequently practiced.

    Same with anti-labour. This is Toronto. To get good people you have to pay. Mr. Schabas has produced precisely zero evidence that labour rates and practices at the TTC constitute a material deviation from fair market values of labour rates and practices for the quality of workers required to safely run the TTC.

    What is perhaps most disturbing is Mr. Schabas’s deeply flawed cost/benefit analysis. As Steve correctly pointed out, many of his “savings” do not involve actual hard cash flowing back into government coffers. We can easily go broke “saving” money like that!

    On the other hand, many hard dollars elude Mr. Schabas’s analysis. For example, the $2.2 billion in mortality costs due to people being poisoned by car drivers in Toronto every year. Those are hard dollars health care dollars directly out of the provincial treasury that will not be spent if less people are poisoned. Same with the 440 people who are killed in Toronto every year by being poisoned by car drivers. My experience as a professional Accountant is that dead people tend to pay less taxes than when they were alive.

    The flip side of the health care costs of car driving are the financial benefits of a mode shift away from car driving and towards walking, cycling and public transit. Toronto Public Health has determined that many transportation infrastructure investments can pay for themselves just by their health benefits alone.

    And yet we look in vain for these multi-billion dollars in hard dollar savings to the public treasury in Mr. Schabas’s profoundly flawed analysis.

    Like

  8. Steve, the issue I have with a Spadina LRT is that ppl will have to transfer at Downsview station. With a subway, people won’t have to. Problem solved.

    But I agree that the subway stations are too grandiose.

    Steve: What are you talking about? The Spadina LRT doesn’t go anywhere near Downsview Station.

    Like

  9. Steve:

    Recent statements by Transportation Minister Murray imply municipalities are not getting any more dollars, and that they should be happy with the gas tax revenue already provide.

    Moaz: It is interesting to see how municipalities are responding to this approach given the varying degrees of provincial funding for projects. I’ve told Minister Murray that, if Toronto is getting full funding for LRT projects then each Ontario municipality that wants rapid transit should get full funding for their first project, and subsequently pay a portion for the second and other lines in the network. In the case of Kitchener-Waterloo which has already agreed to pay a share of the LRT, the provincial government should be fully covering the cost of the extension to Cambridge.

    Tom West said:

    So, the leafy suburbs south of Steeles get buses every 10 minutes, while those on the north side get buses every half hour. Naturally, the buses every 10 minutes carry more people.

    The “good news” implication is that the 905 can generate much higher transit ridership without first increasing density through better service.

    Moaz: The situation on the Western border is a bit different because so much of Mississauga Transit (MiWay) is dedicated to getting passengers to Islington Station, and because there is noticeable density on the Mississauga side of Bloor St in “Dixie” and the 427 in Malton. Apparently the neighbourhoods along Bloor in Toronto (Markland Woods and others) have the worst transit score in Toronto while Mississauga Transit buses fly past Toronto bus stops, not allowed to pick up passengers.

    Michael Schabas said:

    Metrolinx is not aggressively pursuing the most important scheme, the upgrading of GO Rail into a regional express rail network. Instead, it is focusing largely on secondary schemes that have strong local champions, but that will bring much less benefit without the regional rail backbone.

    Moaz: The thing that is interesting here is that Metrolinx was not created as an organization designed to aggressively pursue projects at the expense of local ownership and participation/consultation. That “vision” is being put forward by politicians and members of the public who are tired of the soft-pedal approach that Metrolinx is necessarily taking because of its organizational limits.

    I agree that Metrolinx could be doing a better job of encouraging and coordinating positive changes (coordination & integration of services, better fare policy etc) and local service but I also think that they know this and are going to try and make the structural changes (starting with a Metrolinx 3.0 board) and administrative changes to make this happen. But Metrolinx is akin to a huge cruise liner, not a speed boat … and certainly not a Swan Boat.

    Cheers, Moaz

    Like

  10. Steve wrote:

    “GO claims that people will drive if they have to pay to park…”

    Kevin’s comment:

    That GO claim is, quite frankly, a steaming pile of bovine effluent for many (perhaps a majority) of GO train users.

    For example, during peak hours on the Lakeshore West line, the QEW is seriously congested. It physically cannot take many more cars, and GO is a much faster way of travelling to Toronto. Ditto for car drivers taking the 401/DVP instead of the Lakeshore East line. Car driving simply is not an alternative.

    What is happening right now at many GO stations is that car drivers during the AM rush grab all the free car parking spots. Then when the rush is over and car driving into Toronto is feasible again, there is zero free car parking left.

    The solution is to have a very high fee for car parking during the AM rush. High enough to be a serious encouragement to walk, cycle or take local transit to the GO station.

    Like

  11. Kevin Love said:

    “For example, during peak hours on the Lakeshore West line, the QEW is seriously congested. It physically cannot take many more cars, and GO is a much faster way of travelling to Toronto. Ditto for car drivers taking the 401/DVP instead of the Lakeshore East line. Car driving simply is not an alternative.”

    The concern would have to be that some still need to drive, and that one of the ideas is to attract enough riders that we relieve these routes to the point that driving would be an option. I do not favour massive new parking, however, something should be done so that GO can attract enough riders that it is a reasonable option at least core bound for most residents of the GTHA. If this included really good interaction with other transit it might also mean it could become a viable option for those that were not core bound. It would be nice if for instance the MiWay link from the Streetsville GO station to the office concentration around the 401 and Mississauga Road area was good enough for GO to be a quality way of getting there from both further west and east.

    Like

  12. Kevin Love said:

    What is happening right now at many GO stations is that car drivers during the AM rush grab all the free car parking spots. Then when the rush is over and car driving into Toronto is feasible again, there is zero free car parking left.

    The solution is to have a very high fee for car parking during the AM rush. High enough to be a serious encouragement to walk, cycle or take local transit to the GO station.

    Moaz: A few weeks ago I had a downtown meeting (11 am near Union Station). Planned to leave at 10 taking MiWay but ended up being delayed so I drove to Port Credit (my “GO-TO” GO Station … despite the fact that Erindale and Cooksville are nearby).

    Since there was no parking available and I missed my 10:13 train while looking for parking, I ended up driving to downtown Toronto. Arrived on Front Street at 10:45 where I found on-street parking for $3/hr opposite Simcoe Place.

    This is not something I ever like to do regularly or alone … but if I’m taking my family downtown it is still easier to drive and it costs less money (even with all factors weighed in) too.

    Of course the situation is different with this ongoing median lane closure on the Gardiner in both directions … and while we’re being told to take transit has there been a corresponding increase in available Train service (even temporarily?)?

    Cheers, Moaz

    Like

  13. I think the TTC-YRT fare agreement will need to be revisited. It makes the most sense to require a Presto tap off (or exit payment) at stops North of (and including York University). Tapping on in Vaughan and tapping off at York U would result in just the YRT charge. Tapping on in Vaughan and not tapping off would result in YRT+TTC fare. Tapping on in Toronto (South of York U) and tapping off in Vaughan would result in YRT+TTC fare. The “Toronto taxpayer” will be up in arms when they realize that their tax dollars are subsidizing the TTC for Vaughan residents. If the YRT objects to re-negotiating the fare agreement, the TTC should establish 20-minute headways on subway service North of Steeles.

    As for parking at GO stations, it would be reasonable to start charging the same amount as the local bus service. So if it costs 75-cents to take the bus to the GO station, charge $1.50 ($0.75 x 2 ways) for parking. Have lots with automatic gates that use Presto for payment to enter the lot.

    Like

  14. Jeff H says:
    April 28, 2014 at 1:56 pm

    “I think the TTC-YRT fare agreement will need to be revisited. It makes the most sense to require a Presto tap off (or exit payment) at stops North of (and including York University). Tapping on in Vaughan and tapping off at York U would result in just the YRT charge.”

    As you say this would not make Toronto taxpayers happy if the York riders did not pay for their ride on the TTC. The only real answer is for the Province, or the Province through Metrolinx, to subsidize all transit fares in the GTHA. Like you I believe this is a stupid arrangement where the riders who get on in York and go downtown do not pay anymotre than someone who gets on in Toronto. The TTC needs to only run the service that is warranted by the ridership and if York wants more they can pay for it, capital and operating costs.

    Like

  15. Hey Steve,

    Did you end up finding out who asked/paid for this report?

    Steve: I was trying to find out via another route, but no info. Maybe it’s time to try the “front door” and just ask them directly.

    Like

  16. Moaz wrote about the Port Credit GO station:

    “Since there was no parking available and I missed my 10:13 train while looking for parking, I ended up driving to downtown Toronto.”

    Kevin’s comment:

    This is exactly what I was writing about. During peak hours, the QEW is over capacity and so seriously congested that it is physically impossible for any significant number of GO passengers to switch to car driving. GO can and should charge parking fees during the AM peak that are high enough to seriously deter passengers from driving a car to the GO station.

    Then when the AM rush is over and it is feasible to drive a car into Toronto again, there will be car parking available for people like Moaz.

    Like

  17. GO currently allows people to pay for reserved spots and they give others away to registered carpools, green vehicles, recently for charging electric vehicles and most recently for Zipcar.

    None of this helps me, the irregular user … if I want to get downtown I have to take transit or go after lunchtime with the hope of finding a parking space.

    I could probably have found a space on Level 5 or 6 of the garage at Erindale but I’ve never taken a GO bus downtown and I certainly don’t intend to start soon (especially with the closure of lanes on the Gardiner).

    On that note … I think my aversion to GO-ing downtown by bus might stem from regular trips on the UTM-St. George shuttle bus that I had to take in 3rd and 4th year.

    Cheers, Moaz

    Like

  18. Steve said:

    “Integration is what Metrolinx was created to achieve, but apathy for better funding of local service and the focus on capital expansion meant there was never an incentive to address fare consolidation. Lots of money for flashy new toys, but none to pay for basic operations.”

    I wonder at times if perhaps one of the stronger arguments for BRT on boulevards in the 905 and 416 periphery might just be improved cross running between jurisdictions and GO integration, fewer toys, better operations.

    A deliberate decision to include in BRT lines GO stations in the outer 416 and 905, wherever reasonably possible in addition to the current focus of running buses to subway. Of course this requires reasonably high frequency GO, and these stations to be a more general mobility hubs (a nexus point of several bus routes). Hwy 7 presents just such an opportunity.

    Provide inside shelter, and a good transfer point, between various bus routes and between bus and GO.

    What are the plans to integrate the local BRT and GO at Langstaff?

    Has there been a discussion of running the Yonge BRT buses through The Richmond Hill GO Station east of Yonge (admittedly about 1 km diversion)?

    Steve: Both Langstaff and Richmond Hill Stations are intended to be major transit hubs. The subway will swing east of Yonge between these stations so that Richmond Hill GO and subway stations are side-by-side. Considering the scope of the bus interchange planned at Richmond Hill, I think it’s fair to assume every nearby transit route will operate into this node. For more details, please refer to plans on the Vivanext website including the Conceptual Design Report [very large PDF].

    Like

  19. Steve said:

    “Both Langstaff and Richmond Hill Stations are intended to be major transit hubs. The subway will swing east of Yonge between these stations so that Richmond Hill GO and subway stations are side-by-side. Considering the scope of the bus interchange planned at Richmond Hill, I think it’s fair to assume every nearby transit route will operate into this node.”

    Hopefully this would survive a scaling back of the Yonge subway extension to Steeles. It would be better to have this be LRT or BRT that subway, especially as then maybe core bound users would be more likely to select GO as long is there is a high service density.

    Like

  20. Steve said:

    “Considering the scope of the bus interchange planned at Richmond Hill, I think it’s fair to assume every nearby transit route will operate into this node. For more details, please refer to plans on the Vivanext website including the Conceptual Design Report.

    It appears with subway extension that they are adding 10k trips southbound at Finch on Yonge. This is more than the capacity increase that is reasonably achievable with new signaling and additional turn capacity. Based on their table they would have nearly 25K south bound peak at Finch, nearly the current capacity of Yonge. This would allow only 11K more to build on the line (including BDL transfers) assuming they can get to 36 trains per hour. The Don Mills Subway would be required just to permit this and BDL extension (assuming that basically all core bound traffic from BDL transfered to Don Mills subway), and not provide any room for incremental growth.

    How much sense does this subway extension make? Would it not better to build something that would require Core bound riders to transfer, so they are more likely to ride GO, not to mention its construction could be much cheaper. Yes need good connection to support intermediate destination travel, but need to make sure GO is the preferred route to the Core.

    The growth will occur, the region/province needs to build something, however, it better be designed so as to direct the lion’s share of through traffic to GO. Connections with TTC further south need to allow for redistribution inside Toronto away from Yonge.

    Steve: That table of updated ridership projections is the most telling, and in a way, damning possible statements about the folly of extending the subway forever without additional parallel capacity. It is essential that better GO service appear before the subway, and at a reasonable fare compared to TTC service, to establish this as the primary way for people who are going from Richmond Hill to the Union Station area to make the trip. The capacity on the subway is needed for everyone else travelling to intermediate stops.

    This raises two other important issues. First, there is a big jump in projected ridership for the extension since the original estimates which made the “business case” not look so good. Once more, I have to ask to what extent these projections took into account possible alternate routes to downtown such as better GO service, or if this is an exercise in goosing the projections to “justify” the line just as was done for the Scarborough subway with commuters from Markham.

    Second, it is clear that the problem in the Yonge line, if the projections are to be believed, goes very far north of Bloor Street, and people who persist in only talking about “relief” stopping at Danforth do not understand the extent of the problem.

    Like

  21. Steve said:

    “Second, it is clear that the problem in the Yonge line, if the projections are to be believed, goes very far north of Bloor Street, and people who persist in only talking about “relief” stopping at Danforth do not understand the extent of the problem.”

    To me the numbers may very nearly makes the case for the Don Mills LRT to be designed to relieve Yonge even of some of those intermediate trips originating from the Steeles & Finch Bus routes and Sheppard subway & LRT. Clearly the Don Mills subway is required, but depending on actual destination of those riders from Richmond Hill etc, will that provide relief far enough north?

    Like

Comments are closed.