Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Population, density & location of development	 Projections for 2011: Significant population growth in Toronto (from 2.1 million to 2.5 million) Lower growth in rest of GTA Very large forecast employment growth in Toronto (from 1.23 million to 1.9 million) [employment near stations – single biggest effect on ridership] 	 Population forecast has been met (2.5million in 2011) Employment growth has focused outside Toronto. Manufacturing jobs have left Toronto 1980's recession reduced central area employment Toronto employment grew only to 1.30 million in 2011. More growth in Mississauga, Brampton. Markham, Richmond Hill than in downtown or Scarborough, NY centres 	 Dispersed employment in areas not well-served by transit has increased road congestion throughout GTA Growth in transit ridership lower than projected
Official Plan: location of growth	Intensification should occur at stations, nodes, city centres	 Development shifted away from stations and centres to 'Avenues' (arterial roads) 'Avenue' development levels reduced (lower density, height, massing) Protection of stable neighbourhoods (adjacent to avenues) 	 Reduction in employment, population forecasts in subway corridors Less, slower development near existing stations Lower passenger volumes than projected Development densities on "Avenues" no longer adequate to support subways


Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Official Plan: employment in centres	 North York (NY) Centre: employment forecast to grow from 29,400 in 1986 to 93,400 in 2011 Scarborough Centre: employment forecast to grow from 14,400 in 1986 to 65,000 in 2011 Kennedy/Sheppard: 10,000 employment 	 NY Centre: actual employment in 2006 = 30,200 - little employment growth - mostly residential Scarborough Centre: actual employment in 2006 = 13,700 - can't compete for GTA jobs - mostly residential development Kennedy/Sheppard: limited employment 	Potential transit ridership much less because little or no growth in employment in key centres
Market forces for development	Private developers will build major mixed-use developments at/on top of subway stations	Prime development sites on/at stations remain vacant for decades — e.g. — Eglinton/Yonge, York Mills/Yonge, Sheppard/Yonge, Sheppard/Allen (Downsview), Islington/Bloor. Wilson/Allen, Eglinton/Allen, Leslie/Sheppard	 Limited current private-sector interest in developing on/at non-downtown subway stations Lower passenger volume demand than projected

Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Acceptability of development in established, stable neighbourhoods	Development will proceed in designated development zones, consistent with Official Plan	 Community opposition to development proposals at Eglinton/Yonge, Dundas/Bloor, Sheppard/Bayview, Sheppard/Allen, Sheppard/Don Mills, Finch/Warden Official Plan designation to protect "stable neighbourhoods" Major developments forced to scale back (e.g Minto Plaza) or give up (e.g Giraffe) Higher buildings forced to locate along Highway 401 instead of on transit corridors (e.g Sheppard) 	 Reduced development potential (lower densities, heights) Council down-zoning of properties on arterial roads Lower projected passenger volumes, demand

Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Transit's share of travel market	 Transit market share will continue to increase, based on 19SO"s dramatic increase in transit ridership NY centre: target 60% market share to transit Scarborough Centre: target 55% market share to transit 	 Overall transit market share has stabilized/decreased over last 20 years (25%->22%) Target market share for transit at centres not achieved, no longer considered realistic Actual 2006 NY Centre: 34% market share to transit Actual 2006 Scarborough Centre: 21% market share to transit 	Reduction in projected passenger demand volumes
Public's travel patterns and behaviour	 Expectation of significant travel demand between centres (e.g. NY, Scarborough) because of major employment nodes Projection of significant demand (20 million annually) from outside-Toronto via interregional connections (Leslie, Kennedy), onto Sheppard Subway Concept to 'force' travelers from Finch corridor onto Sheppard Subway through changes to bus routes 	 Very limited travel demand between centres due to limited employment creation at centres Extremely limited demand arriving from outside Toronto People prefer to get seat (available at Finch/Yonge), and refuse to change to Sheppard Subway 	Reduced passenger demand/volume in Sheppard corridor

Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Other market-economy forces	 Price of gas will continue to increase and "force" larger percentage of people to take transit Price of parking will continue to increase and "force" larger percentage of people to take transit 	 North American price of gas has not increased to European levels – i.e. – \$2/litre or higher Parking is free in most suburban locations. Parking charges in central area have levelled off in past ten years 	 Projected shift of travel to transit has been less than projected Lower passenger volumes, demands than projected
Projected long-term demand for new subway lines – measured in people per hour per direction (pphpd). This is the number used to gauge capacity requirements. [Subway warranted at demand of 15,000 pphpd or greater.]	Projections for 2011: Sheppard Subway: 15,400 pphpd Eglinton Subway: 17,600 pphpd Downtown Relief Subway: 11,700 pphpd	 Sheppard Subway (actual, existing line): 4500 pphpd Sheppard Subway (projected – entire line): 6,000-10.000 pphpd Eglinton. LRT (including fully-underground central section): 5,200 pphpd Downtown Relief Subway: 12,000 pphpd 	 Current demand projections – based on updated land uses, official plan, market share, travel patterns are too low to justify subways. Subways would provide excessive capacity and require unnecessary expenditures. (see following illustration of demand vs. capacity)

Capacity by Mode Versus Ridership



Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Life-cycle cost break- even point for Sheppard Subway	 Capital cost. 30-year operating cost, net present value: used to determine demand level at which subway investment is justified, economical. Calculated to be 15,000 pphpd or higher. Below 15,000 pphpd, light rail is most costeffective 	Current projected demand for entire (originally-projected) Sheppard Subway is 6,000- 10,000 pphpd	Current projected demand – based on updated land uses, official plan, market share, and travel behaviour – results in subway not being warranted
Knowledge of long-term subway maintenance requirements and costs	• Toronto's subways were relatively new (Yonge – 30 years old. Bloor-Danforth – 20 years old), so long-term maintenance requirements and costs of subways were not fully known	 Subway-accident in mid-90's revealed need for substantial sustained investment in renewal of signals, track, tunnels, and systems. Current average annual maintenance-only costs of Toronto's subways: capital: \$275 million/year operating: \$230 million/year Required funding never completely secured, with \$2.3 billion shortfall at present 	Long-term risk and cost obligations of building and operating capital-intensive infrastructure such as subways

Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Availability/probability of funding	1990 Provincial "Let's Move" program called for construction of six rapid transit lines, total of 58 kilometres, at a cost of \$10.8 Billion (2011 dollars)	 Construction completed of 1.3km extension of Spadina subway to Downsview (1996), and 5.4 km Sheppard subway to Don Mills (2002). Total of 6.7 km; total investment of \$1.3 billion (2011 dollars). Due to financial constraints and competing demands, governments can rarely provide actual funding to match announcements and promises 	 TTC, City must be very vigilant and extra-careful to use tax dollars wisely. Build only what is warranted, to get best value out of any transit investment
Global trends, best practices	 Subway was predominant form of rapid transit. Only four modern light rail lines existed in North America. Light rail was not well understood, and vehicle design was not fully evolved 	 Light rail is predominant form of rapid transit construction. Twenty new light rail lines have/are being built in North America. New light rail lines are opening in 115 major cities world-wide. Examples include Paris, Edinburgh, Brisbane, Copenhagen, Dubai, Jerusalem, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Honolulu, Hamburg, Madrid, Montreal, Washington, Los Angeles 	 Light rail has surpassed subway in current transit construction. Meets all travel needs except those with extreme demands. Can be delivered for 1/3-1/4 the cost of subways

Factor	Status, Expectations in 1986	Status Today	Consequences of Change
Ongoing advancements, improved knowledge of transit technologies and benefits	 Subway was predominant form of rapid-transit investment. Little was known about the effectiveness of light rail 	 Light rail is predominant form of rapid-transit construction worldwide because of value and service: high capacity, expandable reliable, fast service quiet, comfortable attracts high ridership environmentally-friendly increases land values attracts development best community/local access 	Benefits and cost-effectiveness of light rail should be carefully weighed against traffic operational benefits of subways before major investment decisions are made