For the past months, Toronto Planning, the TTC and Metrolinx have hosted a number of public consultation sessions leading up to two critical meetings on the same day: June 28, 2016.

One will be the Toronto Executive Committee’s consideration of a series of reports on various transit proposals.

• Developing Toronto’s Transit Network Plan to 2031
  • Attachment 1 – SmartTrack/RER Integration Initial Business Case
  • Attachment 2 – SmartTrack Stations
  • Attachment 3 – Eglinton West LRT Initial Business Case
  • Attachment 4 – Scarborough Subway Extension Initial Business Case
  • Attachment 5 – Eglinton East LRT Preliminary Options Analysis
  • Attachment 6 – Relief Line Initial Business Case
  • Attachment 7 – Fare Policy-Current State Assessment

• Waterfront Transit Network Vision – Phase 1
  • Appendix 1 – Planning History for Waterfront Transit
  • Appendix 2 – Waterfront Transit Feeling Congested? Evaluation Framework

The other will be the Metrolinx Board’s first meeting in four months with several related items on the agenda.

• Regional Express Rail Planning Update
  • Station Access – Appendix 1
  • New Stations Analysis – Appendix 2 A superset of the corresponding City report above]
  • Regional Express Rail-SmartTrack Business Case – Appendix 3 [same report as on City agenda]
  • Enhanced Eglinton West Rapid Transit Initial Business Case – Appendix 4 [same report as on City agenda]
• GTHA Fare Integration Update
• Regional Transportation Review Discussion Paper
  • Report
  • Draft Paper

Reviewing all of this material will require several article that I hope to finish before the meetings where these issues will be discussed actually occur.

Here I will begin with SmartTrack because of all of the proposals, that has been the most threadbare one throughout the public consultation. It is complicated by being a joint project with Metrolinx who own the tracks over which the trains will operate, and who now quite clearly will also own and operate the trains regardless of what the service is called.

The material in this section is taken primarily from the RER-ST Business Case and the RER Planning Update.

What Is SmartTrack?

Beginning with Mayor Tory’s election campaign and continuing to the present, the exact nature of SmartTrack has been a moving target. Originally it was to have been a heavy rail service operating frequently over (mainly) existing GO Transit trackage from Unionville south to Scarborough Junction, then west through Union Station and up the Weston corridor to Mount Dennis where it would turn west along Eglinton Avenue on new trackage to serve the Airport Corporate Centre.

The western branch fell off first because it would have severe neighbourhood impacts and a very high cost. It has been replaced by the Crosstown West LRT extension that will take the Crosstown LRT eventually to Pearson Airport. This is the original Transit City scheme revived. An important element in looking at “SmartTrack” is that some claims made for it include the Crosstown West (stations, passengers) as part of the “SmartTrack” benefits, when in fact it is a completely different line that will be built.

Service frequency for SmartTrack was originally to be “subway like” with trains arriving as often as every five minutes, and on that basis claims were made of all-day demand in excess of 200,000 riders. Indeed, SmartTrack was marketed as the only rapid transit project Toronto needed, the project that would solve every problem. In practice, the service frequency has now been reduced to the level that GO plans under its RER program. There are no additional “SmartTrack” trains.

Originally there were four configurations of GO/RER with SmartTrack, but two of these options were excluded because they would have significant effects along the corridor, and would be expensive to implement.

[p 6] Options A and B would each require extensive additional track infrastructure, resulting in the need for corridor widening, property acquisition, consequent community impacts, and other deliverability challenges.

[p 19] As part of the GO RER program, a fourth track will be constructed on the Kitchener corridor between Bramalea and Union Station which uses the available right-of-way within the corridor. The need to construct additional 5th or 5th and 6th tracks on the southern section of the corridor could likely not be accommodated within the right-of-way and would entail property acquisition affecting approximately 200 to 300 individual properties including commercial, industrial, and residential. It would also likely require rebuilding major infrastructure recently completed in the context of the Georgetown South project including the West Toronto Diamond and the Strachan Grade Separation. Those implications present substantial costs and community impacts and are considered fatal flaws. Options which trigger the need for any additional track on the Kitchener corridor have been screened out.

Like the Kitchener corridor, the double-tracking planned within the RER program will use the available right-of-way within the existing Stouffville corridor. The need for 3rd and 4th tracks on the Stouffville corridor would also likely trigger major property acquisition affecting approximately 600 to 700 individual properties including commercial, industrial, and residential to the extent that options which trigger the need for additional tracks were also screened out due to this “fatal flaw.”

[p 22] Because of the local and express service set out in Option B, layered on top of the different services identified in the planned RER service concept, this option triggers the need for 5th and 6th tracks between the USRC and the Airport Spur. The complexity of what would be five different speed profiles (diesel express service from Kitchener, diesel local service from Mt. Pleasant, UP Express service, and electrified all-stop service from Bramalea) combined with the service traveling in the opposite direction, a 5th and 6th track would be required in the corridor. Without these additional tracks, there would be numerous points where trains travelling at different speeds or in different directions would meet.

[p 25] High-level analysis of sample time tables indicates that both Options C and D are workable without additional track requirements. For both of the workable options, the Kitchener corridor requires careful planning. Because GO RER service on the Kitchener corridor will be comprised of a mix of fleet (diesel locomotive, diesel EMU, and electric) types, service (local and express) types, and train speeds, service patterns are complex and delicately balanced. Any changes to that balance, including adding new stations which slows service down, may trigger other counter-balance alterations. Options C and D each include the addition of St. Clair and Liberty Village stations on the Kitchener corridor. In order to accommodate these stops on the local, electrified service, service from Kitchener, planned to run express from Bramalea to Union Station would need to add at least two station stops. With these adjustments, though, Options C and D are feasible.

What is abundantly clear in the text above is that surplus capacity was not simply “sitting there” to be used by SmartTrack, and that the level of service initially claimed was impractical. This has not prevented ST advocates from using inflated numbers about overall demand and service quality that will not be achieved.

Two service level and station configuration options survived the review.

These options are identical except for the omission of new stations in Scarborough in Option D. New stations common to both options are at Keele/St. Clair, King/Liberty Village, Don/Unilever and Gerrard/Pape.

At earlier briefings, the strong hint was that Metrolinx preferred Option D, but recent announcements show that the Lawrence and Finch stations have survived into the final version of the plan. The proposed Ellesmere Station has been dropped.

The only remaining contribution of the “SmartTrack” project would be the addition of six stations along the Unionville to Bramalea route, but all GO/RER trains would stop at these stations. There would be express operation bypassing the ST stops only for trains originating beyond the RER limits (e.g. trains from Georgetown and Kitchener on the western leg).

The service levels on most of the “SmartTrack” route are not as frequent as originally proposed except on Lake Shore East where Metrolinx clearly plans to have some local trains add to the “SmartTrack” service.

Modelling of the proposal has been done on the assumption that GO fares would apply to traffic from outside-416 territory beyond SmartTrack’s reach, and that TTC fares would apply inside. Exactly what that means is anyone’s guess because the whole fare structure will be reorganized under the Fare Integration Strategy still under development.

The RER Initial Business Case analysis is premised on the current fare structure, including existing GO fare structure for GO RER service, TTC fares, and existing transfer policy. The GTHA Fare Integration Strategy will serve as a vehicle for rationalizing GO and TTC Fares and transfer policy as well as address other fare issues across the region. In the absence of a complete and comprehensive regional fare integration strategy, the analysis in this report assumed the existing fare structure as an input. [p. 6]

About Those New Stations

The Regional Express Rail Planning Update includes comments about each of the proposed new stations [pp 16-17]. It is far from clear that all of them are practical.

• Liberty Village (near King St. West)
  • Key connection to major employment with large numbers of alighting passengers forecast and good travel time savings benefits; extremely tight corridor with potential construction and operations challenges
  • Subject to further development of corridor service plan and track configuration
• St. Clair West (near Weston Rd.)
  • Generally aligns with provincial and municipal policies for growth and intensification and overall net new ridership increase; deliverability challenges related to track realignment and bridge works; feasible locations may overlap catchment area with the Mt. Dennis station or limit transfer potential to adjacent streetcar
  • Subject to corridor service planning and further analysis of service implications
• Don Yard/Unilever (between Cherry St. and Eastern Ave.)
  • Good connectivity and development potential; high potential capital cost and complex construction context
  • Specific location subject to further technical analysis, corridor service plan, and discussion with public and private landowners.
• Gerrard (near Carlaw Ave.)
  • Conforms well to provincial and municipal policies; positive travel time savings benefits, high capital cost and complex construction context due to modifications to the railway embankment and overpasses, and property requirements
  • Subject to detailed consideration of specific station location with the City of Toronto
• Lawrence East (between Kennedy Rd. and Midland Ave.)
  • Located in a low-density industrial and residential area; low forecast ridership, subject to additional work with municipality/landowners; connectivity to major bus route may yield higher ridership with fare integration
  • Subject to corridor service planning and further analysis of service implications
• Finch (between Kennedy Rd. and Midland Ave.)
  • Located in a low-density industrial and residential area; low forecast ridership, subject to additional work with municipality/landowners; connectivity to major bus route may yield higher ridership with fare integration
  • Subject to corridor service planning and further analysis of service implications

Construction of these stations, including whatever changes to Metrolinx facilities are needed to accommodate them, would be at the City of Toronto’s cost (net of whatever subsidy they might pick up from Ottawa). Metrolinx has asked that Council commit to funding this by November 16, 2016, so that the work can be included in an overall GO/RER upgrade project, not as a future standalone upgrade.

Ridership

GO/RER is expected to have substantially more ridership than the existing system as it brings frequent, all-day, two-way service to a wide part of the GTHA where this is not available today. SmartTrack will add to the demand by increasing access to the service through additional stations. Yes, more stations bring more customers if they’re in the right places.

[p 4] Implementing GO RER is expected to add 4,500 weekly train trips and increase GO ridership by 140% over the next fifteen years. GO ridership in 2014 was approximately 54 million annual trips. With the implementation of GO RER on five corridors, ridership is forecast to climb 140 percent to 127 million annual trips.

[p 6] Both options increase ridership about nine to ten percent above GO RER. Because Option C includes more new stations than Option D, it goes further in increasing transit accessibility within Toronto but also lengthens travel times for medium and long distance passengers and imposes greater negative travel time impacts in comparison to Option D.

[p 6] For the GO RER Kitchener and Stouffville corridors benefits such as the dollar value of travel time savings exceed the capital and operating costs by a ratio of approximately 2:1. Economic analysis of the integrated options in the context of the overall analysis suggests that Option C would have a negative impact on the overall GO RER benefit-cost ratio, bringing about a decrease of approximately thirty percent while Option D would have a smaller negative impact, decreasing the GO RER benefit-cost ratio by approximately 18 percent. This suggests that Option D performs better than Option C from an economic perspective.

[p 29] Option C adds seven to eight new stations within the City of Toronto, making GO service more accessible to Toronto residents and connecting a larger number of origin and destination points. This option would preserve the GO RER service concept with some minor modifications to Kitchener express service. Of the new stations, 2-3 would be between Bramalea and Union Station and 5-6 would be between Unionville and Union Station. These additional stations would increase net ridership and transit accessibility and choice within Toronto but have an impact on travel times, especially for medium and longer distance passengers. For example, passengers travelling between Milliken Station at Steeles Avenue and Union Station would see their trips lengthened by more than 35%. Overall, in Option C, more passengers lose time on their trips than the passengers who save time via the new stations.

Option D adds 4-5 new stations within the City of Toronto. Like Option C, this option would preserve the GO RER service concept with some minor modifications to Kitchener express service. Option D attracts new riders but also imposes some travel time increases – for example, approximately 15% for Milliken passengers travelling to Union Station – but the increases are slight. Because Option D focuses on adding the stations with the most potential for new ridership, it adds marginal travel time to medium and long distance passengers but also saves time for other passengers. However, because fewer new stations are added, Option D does not go as far as Option C in terms of adding new access points to the GO network, resulting in smaller increases to transit accessibility and travel choice for Toronto residents.

These comments show a flaw in the way Metrolinx looks at demand. Riders are presumed to have a value of their time, and a longer trip counts against this. Later, we will see how this affects the so-called cost-benefit ratio where the slower trips “cost” money offsetting other benefits. This is entirely an accounting exercise, not an expenditure of real money. Indeed, unless the trains are running half empty for want of riders, there is no real “cost” to Metrolinx at all. An unduly slow, crowded trip will drive away riders (just look at service on the TTC), but it is not clear that the additional stops will harm the attractiveness of GO/RER service.

The larger question is the overall benefit – are riders using the service and thereby avoiding auto based trips, and is their ride convenient enough to make the choice of GO attractive. One point that is often mentioned in rider surveys is that time spent on the train is quite different from time driving because the train ride is more social, work can be done, and one can even snooze. Quite clearly the value of “time” in the two travel modes is different.

The estimated travel times are summarized in a chart. What this chart does not show is the relative reliability of any of these services compared with driving. The decision to take the rail service will be affected by the perceived quality of the time spent and by the reliability of the journey time under conditions that would snarl the expressway network.

Ridership growth is an important indication of Experience. GO ridership in 2014 was approximately 54 million annual trips. With the implementation of GO RER on five corridors, ridership is forecast to climb 140 percent to 127 million annual trips. On the Kitchener and Stouffville corridors, current ridership is 9 million annual trips and it is forecast to grow threefold to 27 million annual trips with GO RER.

Ridership analysis of the integrated RER-SmartTrack options suggests that they would increase ridership by approximately ten percent over and above what is forecast for GO RER. Options C and D are forecast to attract similar levels new ridership to the system – 2.4 to 2.8 million annual new riders beyond GO RER. Both options would provide relief to Bloor-Yonge station and on Line 1. It should be noted that this analysis assumes the existing fare structure; ridership on the integrated RER-SmartTrack options may increase with fare integration. [p 30]

That word, “Experience” is precisely the sort of comparator that is missing in an analysis based only on travel time.

Both options are expected to attract more riders because of the added stations. However, the source of these riders is interesting. Over half will be existing transit users who switch to another mode. This will free up capacity elsewhere in the network, but it will reduce the degree of auto traffic diverted to transit. Moreover, the new stations attract riders as destinations in their own right for commuters further afield, as opposed to originating trips into the core. This is a very different situation from the “classic” view of GO Transit as overwhelmingly a service for commuters to downtown Toronto who would shift from driving to transit when service is added to the network.

Findings suggest that the new stations attract ridership primarily as destinations not as boarding.

• Proposed new stations near downtown with significant job clusters nearby are more promising than proposed stations in more residential areas. For example, a Liberty Village station is promising largely due to alightings at the station. Liberty Village is an emerging employment hub and a GO station in the area is extremely attractive to people who work there.
• Option D is more successful than C because its constellation of new stations is more heavily weighted towards those located near downtown with clusters of jobs surrounding, while Option C includes both stations in residential areas and those around downtown.

For both Options C and D, the majority of passengers are switching to GO from local transit or GO bus. [p 32]

As for Yonge Line relief, this will come mainly from riders diverted onto SmartTrack who would otherwise travel west to Yonge on various routes. The Metrolinx study of this subject claimed that 4,200 riders would be shifted in the peak hour from the Yonge line to GO/RER. This effect is primarily for travel from the north and east given that the Spadina-University line intercepts travellers from the west. This number could be higher based on availability of TTC/RER transfer points at Finch and at Lawrence that were not included for that diversion estimate. However, the Scarborough Subway at STC will attract many riders whose preference for a trip downtown will be to stay on their trains rather than switch to ST at Kennedy Station.

Cost of Adding SmartTrack to GO/RER

The marginal cost of SmartTrack is estimated at:

• $1.1 – 1.7 billion for Option C
• $0.7 – 1.0 billion for Option D

It should be noted that capital cost estimates are preliminary and may not reflect the full costs of associated structure works required to deliver the stations or comprehensive fleet costs, depending on ongoing operational analysis. [p. 6]

These numbers do not include the Eglinton West LRT which is bundled with ST because it replaced the original heavy rail scheme for that segment. The cost estimate for this line ranges from $1.5 – 2.1 billion. This brings the total “SmartTrack” project cost to at most $3.7 billion possibly lower.

Detailed cost breakdowns are shown in Appendix B of the ST/RER Business Case.

The financing of SmartTrack has always been discussed as one third from each level of government, but Queen’s Park has always treated its work to enable RER as an “in kind” contribution to SmartTrack. Ottawa, under Harper, “committed” one third of the then $8 billion estimate, or $2.6 billion. Whether this is all still on the table given the lower remaining cost is hard to say. Moreover, it is not clear whether any of that “previous commitment” will in fact come out of the same pot as the new infrastructure money from Trudeau.

The project shows a paper “profit”, although this is only against projected operating costs with no reference to capital cost recovery.

On a wider basis, the “cost benefit” values are calculated including various notional amounts of which the most important are the value of travel time. As discussed above, this “value” may differ because of the different travel experience of auto versus train. The “loss” shown below for the addition of SmartTrack to the GO/RER system comes entirely from the imputed loss of value due to longer trips. Note that the total benefits including the options are still positive – the values in the Options columns add to the Base Case to produce a positive net value pf $7,100 and $7,800 for Options C and D respectively.

The City of Toronto analysis cited in the footnote above leads to a different view of ridership benefits, notably the time saved by all of the riders on existing transit services shifting to RER/ST. This produces a positive effect on the economic analysis compared to the negative effect in the Metrolinx version.

Cost Sharing

With all of the provincial money sloshing around the network, and with almost daily announcements from the Minister of Transportation and his sidekick Mayor Tory, the “other shoe” had to drop some day. Toronto is not getting an entirely free ride here.

As part of the GO RER program, about $3.7 billion ($2014) of capital construction cost is foundational to the SmartTrack program. SmartTrack is dependent on this investment being made. The Province is prepared to cover the costs of this investment, supported by federal funding, provided the City assumes responsibility for paying for SmartTrack related costs and comes to a cost-sharing agreement with the Province on other shared priority transit issues. SmartTrack costs incremental to the GO RER program, including the Eglinton West LRT extension, new stations, and infrastructure and services incremental to the GO RER program, will need to be funded through contributions from the City of Toronto, the Government of Canada and other sources of funding, such as local development contributions. To this end, the original proposal for SmartTrack included contributions of $2.6 billion from each of the City of Toronto and the Government of Canada towards the total costs of SmartTrack components. Commitments from these two orders of government will need to be finalized in order to advance these SmartTrack components of the program, including consideration of the capital construction cost, escalation, financing, lifecycle and operations/maintenance cost of the incremental new services.

The Province will also continue working with the City of Toronto to finalize equitable cost-sharing arrangements for other infrastructure costs associated with all Metrolinx-owned corridors, including utilities and grade separations, costs associated new GO train station locations as well as upgrades to existing GO train stations to support increases in service and to enhance both local and regional transit connections.

In addition, in Budget 2016, the Province re-affirmed its expectation that municipalities contribute to the ongoing operating and maintenance cost of the Eglinton Crosstown, Finch West, Hurontario and Hamilton LRT projects.

The Province is prepared to fund the capital construction costs, provided there is a commitment by the City of Toronto to fund escalation, financing, operations and maintenance costs and, where appropriate, lifecycle costs. In order for SmartTrack components to be procured alongside RER, the Province and Metrolinx require the City of Toronto’s commitment to full funding (including capital with escalation and financing, operating/maintenance costs for SmartTrack, and operating/maintenance costs for LRTs) by November 30, 2016. [pp 27-28, Regional Planning Update]

In its oh-so-traditional manner, Queen’s Park has lots of one-time money for construction, but operations, maintenance and capital renewal are quite another thing. This is a bizarre situation given the efforts the province went through to make these projects entirely “provincial” rather than simply transferring capital dollars to the municipalities.

A related requirement, with more of an effect outside of Toronto, is that Queen’s Park expects municipalities to implement transit supportive land use around stations, and deal locally with the “last mile problem” that so bedevils those who would use commuter rail for more than a park-and-ride commute into Toronto. There is no indication that any additional provincial money for such service will be forthcoming.

Why Can’t SmartTrack Run More Often?

Options A and B were dropped from consideration because of the amount of additional trackage needed to operate them, and because of capacity concerns at Union Station. The need for more tracks is triggered by the various frequencies, stopping patterns and speeds of overlapping services.

Stouffville corridor: Based on an analysis of the service associated with Option B, layered on top of planned GO RER service, there are a number of locations where four trains would be meeting or passing, meaning that four tracks would be required along the corridor from Scarborough Junction to Unionville. Because there is insufficient right-of-way in the existing corridor to construct two additional tracks, this new infrastructure would trigger property acquisition. The extent of this infrastructure, the cost, and the community impact is unacceptable and contributes to the screening of Option B. [p 21]

Lake Shore East corridor: Based on the analysis of service and a mapping out of the service associated with the RER-SmartTrack integration options over and above planned RER service, both Options A and B would trigger the need for an additional track in the Lakeshore East corridor between the USRC and Scarborough Junction.

For Option A the need for the additional track is triggered by the effective doubling of service between Unionville, Union Station and Bramalea that would be operating in this segment. The service pattern results in a much denser train pattern when local and express Lakeshore East trains are taken into account. There are a number of locations along this segment of the corridor where a number of trains meet or cross paths. In the absence of an additional track, trains moving at different speeds might be delayed behind one another to avoid collision while trains travelling in opposite directions might be blocked.

For Option B the need for an additional track is triggered by the different stopping patterns of the local and express Kitchener-Stouffville trains and also the express and local Lakeshore East service. Each unique stopping pattern has a different speed profile and without the additional tracks, the local and express service pattern along with the Lakeshore East service pattern would result in trains meeting or being unable to pass. Similar to Option A, in the absence of additional infrastructure, trains moving at different speeds might be delayed behind one another to avoid collision while trains travelling in opposite directions might be blocked. [p 22]

Kitchener corridor: Based on an analysis of the higher frequencies set out in Option A, over and above what is planned for GO RER, this option triggers the need for a 5th track between the USRC and the Airport Spur. Because the heightened frequencies reduce the amount of time between trains, there is less flexibility to accommodate the many different types of service planned for the Kitchener corridor. In order to ensure that faster train trips are not held up behind slower train trips, the additional track is required.

Because of the local and express service set out in Option B, layered on top of the different services identified in the planned RER service concept, this option triggers the need for 5th and 6th tracks between the USRC and the Airport Spur. The complexity of what would be five different speed profiles (diesel express service from Kitchener, diesel local service from Mt. Pleasant, UP Express service, and electrified all-stop service from Bramalea) combined with the service traveling in the opposite direction, a 5th and 6th track would be required in the corridor. Without these additional tracks, there would be numerous points where trains travelling at different speeds or in different directions would meet.

As discussed above, because insufficient space exists within the corridor for these tracks the expansion would require substantial property acquisition, including both a 5th track and 5th and 6th tracks. It would also require major modifications to the recently completed Strachan Grade Separation and the West Toronto Diamond. These impacts are severe and contribute to the screening of Options A, and B from further consideration.

Worth noting here is that the conflicting movements involve either trains overtaking each other, or opposing movements that cannot share the same track. This is not simply a question of train spacing and a more sophisticated signalling system to pack more trains onto the same track. This is shown graphically in a sample timetable for the combined operation.

Note that this model includes a various type of motive power including diesel for the longer-haul trains, and a mix of electric locomotives and multiple units for other services.