The 12-day option won, and the TTC has now announced that it will close the station from Saturday, June 15 to Wednesday, June 26.  Bus diversions will be:

• 72 Pape will be extended to Broadview Station via Pape, Mortimer and Broadview.
• 81 Thorncliffe Park will be extended to Donlands Station via Danforth Avenue from Pape.
• 25 Don Mills will be rerouted to Donlands Station south of the Leaside Bridge and will not serve stops on Pape.

Bloor-Danforth subway service will not stop at Pape during the shutdown.

Items included in this preview:

• New Streetcar Implementation Plan
• Five Year Plan
• CEO’s Report
• Financial Statements for 2012
• Traffic Violations and Mitigation for Transit

New Streetcar Implementation Plan

At the April Commission meeting, CEO Andy Byford stated that a report on the new fleet’s implementation (including a consolidated report on various projects related to updating the system’s infrastructure) would come forward to the May meeting.  This report is on the agenda, but in the private session under the guise of an “education session” for the Commission.

Questions about the service levels that will be triggered by the rollout and more generally of the total implementation cost have been a matter of concern for members of Council and transit riders.  The TTC’s own fleet plans, which I reviewed as part of the 2013 Capital Budget, imply varying degrees of service improvement on the streetcar lines, but there has been no public commitment to this plan.

For over a decade, the TTC has responded to requests for improved streetcar service by saying that they have no spare cars, but that this would be fixed with the rollout of a new fleet.  By contrast, some TTC statements have implied that putting more cars on the street is a waste of money because they will just become mired in traffic and/or that there is no room left for additional service.

Both explanations are hogwash, especially the latter, which in any event would only apply to King and to Spadina where very frequent service already operates.  As to traffic, there are fundamental problems both with TTC line management, and with City traffic bylaws and enforcement that constrain road capacity.  The latter is the subject of a report elsewhere on the agenda.

The TTC needs to be open with its riders about the future of service and capacity on the streetcar lines.  Hiding the report in the private session does not fit with the new transparency we are supposed to have in TTC affairs, and suggests that whatever policy might be in the pipeline, it might not survive critical public debate.

The report should be moved to the public session.

Five Year Plan

Like the streetcar plan, the five year corporate plan appears on the private session’s agenda.  CEO Andy Byford has already spoken in general about this plan at public meetings, and the document is supposed to go public on the TTC’s website on May 29.

It may be useful for Byford to brief the Commission on an “educational” basis, but the report should be on the public agenda.  An item of this importance deserves more than a press release announcing the availability of a new web page.

If the plan does not include something beyond the “business as usual” projections seen in past TTC management responses for “long range plans”, it will be a failure.  A five year plan must show how the TTC can grow and improve, and must present policy options for the manner and speed with which this can occur.  Options for future year budgets — both capital and operating — are essential even if the most aggressive are too rich for today’s political climate.

The worst possible outcome would be for a tepid plan to receive the Commission’s blessing and then be used to forestall any future debate because “we already have a plan”.

CEO’s Report

Riding for period 3 (roughly the month of March 2013), was up 1.6m or 3% over the comparable period in 2012.  For reasons not explained in the report, the TTC expects demand to soften in period 4 (for which they should already have preliminary data).  For the full year, the TTC feels it will be at or close to the budget target of 528m rides.

On a moving annual average basis, ridership is up 2% over the previous year.  This compares April-March 2011/12 with the corresponding period in 2012/13.  Although riding was below budget in the first part of 2013 due to winter weather, this will be compensated for with growth later in the year.

(Although it is not included in the CEO’s report, the budgeted vehicle mileage for fall 2013 schedule periods is approximately 3% higher than in fall 2012 in anticipation of the higher ridership expected this year.)

Sales of monthly passes continue to grow, and this is reducing the average fare paid per trip.  The result could be a slight reduction from projected revenue unless ridership overshoots the target to make up the difference.  This has been a common effect in past years.

Reliability on the Yonge-University-Spadina line remains below target, and the report notes that off-peak and weekend periods are dragging down the average.  The method used by the TTC to calculate reliability has an inherent flaw for routes that run frequent service, and especially for the subway where it is physically impossible for trains to bunch to the degree seen on surface routes.

These combine to make it very difficult for a large proportion of service to be reported as “unreliable” with headways varying by more than 3 minutes from schedule.  Overall, an index of less than 90% is extremely difficult to achieve on the subway routes, but this may not reflect passenger experiences.

On surface routes, headways are generally wider than on the subway, and bunching can occur to the level of multiple vehicles within one minute.  This is reflected in lower reliability numbers for surface routes.

Major shutdowns/diversions planned:

• Streetcar service to Spadina and Queens Quay will continue to be operated with buses until mid-December 2013.
• Streetcar service to Union Station will not resume until early 2014.  The issue (not mentioned in the report) is with the completion of TTC work on the Union Station second platform that conflicts with reopening the Union Station Loop.
• Kingston Road will see extensive road, water and track repair starting in late June.  The CEO’s report says this will last until January 2014, but the internal Service Planning memo says November 2013.
• York Street trackage will be replaced starting in late June (with the intersection at Queen causing a 501 diversion from June 29 to July 10).  The CEO’s report claims that the York trackage will not reopen until October.  It is not clear why such a long shutdown is required for so sort a stretch of roadway although this may be related to work by other related projects.
• The intersection of King & Spadina will be replaced during August 2013.  There is no date yet announced for Dundas & Spadina which was also included in the 2013 capital budget.
• Track over the Sterling Road bridge will be rebuilt in September with all streetcar service ending at Lansdowne and a shuttle bus to Dundas West and High Park.
• Track on Ossington from College to Dundas will be rebuilt in September-October with the Ossington bus diverting via Bathurst.

Problems with noise and vibration in the vicinity of Jane and Old Mill Stations have been addressed by various repairs over several months, and most of these have been completed according to the report.  However, there is no information about the perceived or measured improvement in affected homes to indicate whether this work was successful in resolving complaints.

Delivery of the production run of new streetcars is still planned for fall 2013.  Without the streetcar rollout plan (see above), it is unclear when the TTC expects to convert its first route to LFLRV operation.  One major shutdown of the Spadina route remains for 2014 (the intersection at College), and my guess is that we will not see full LFLRV operation on this route until the fall at best.

Financial Statements for 2012

The financial statements for 2012 have been issued.  They are sleep-inducing for all but the most diehard among us who follow TTC affairs.

One item of note is the depletion of reserves created by past government programs to subsidize capital projects.  Capital subsidies are discussed in footnote 12 beginning on page 31 of the report.  The corresponding reserves are discussed in footnote 15 beginning on page 36.  Block payments were made to Toronto in 2007 by Queen’s Park when times were good, and burning up “surplus” provincial money by shifting it to reserves was the order of the day.

• CSIF (Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund):  Originally $275.6m, all but $18m of this has been spent, and the remainder will likely disappear in the next two years.
• ORSIF (Ontario Rolling Stock Infrastructure Fund):  Originally $150m, this fund was exhausted in 2012.
• TTIP (Transit Technology Infrastructure Program):  Originally $31.1m, this fund was exhausted in 2012.

The largest remaining reserve is the Move Ontario 2020 fund at $191m to fund Metrolinx Quick Win projects that the TTC is implementing.

With the move of the Transit City LRT projects to Metrolinx, no funding or assets for them appear in the TTC’s accounts.

The Spadina subway extension is funded jointly by four governments through a trust administered by the City of Toronto.  Ontario’s share was paid up front and is drawn on as needed.  Ottawa pays on an ongoing basis as expenses are incurred and approved.

This illustrates the nature of past subsidy programs that are time and value limited, and earmarked for specific projects or types of work.  As the reserves wind down, responsibility for continuing programs (e.g. vehicle purchases) shifts to the City of Toronto unless there are new special subsidies (as in the case of the 1/3 share paid by Queen’s Park for the new streetcars).

Traffic Violations and Mitigation for Transit

Once again the TTC launches into the debate about traffic congestion, enforcement activities and potential changes to the use of space on transit streets.  This runs in parallel with the City’s Downtown Traffic Operations Study, but the scope of the TTC’s concern is much wider than that of the DTOS.

The most common problems include:

• Vehicles blocking intersections.
• Illegal parking and stopping.
• Legal parking or standing (e.g. taxis and tour buses).

In the first two instances, the real issue is the enforcement of city bylaws including towing powers and much higher fines as deterents.

In the case of legal parking, the problem rests with City Council where anguished cries from residents and businesses take precedence over street capacity.  One of the most flagrant of these is the presence of taxis massed on King Street from Bay to York where, in theory, there is a reserved transit lane for the streetcars.  How other traffic is supposed to use the curb lane is a mystery.

Many locations have peak-only restrictions although it may difficult to discern which direction that actually might be.

The peak period itself is too short, and should be extended by at least an hour, possibly more, to reflect actual traffic conditions.  Looking again at King Street downtown, the traffic seizes up at 6:00pm when parking becomes legal.

This will be a political battle for Council and we are sure to hear lots about the “war on the car”.  I doubt we will see any resolution with the current administration.

This began in the comment thread on another item, and I have split this off as a separate topic.

Recent events have raised questions about which versions of two major stations, Yonge and Kennedy, on the Eglinton LRT were actually to be built by Metrolinx.

In the case of Yonge Station, there are two quite different versions:

In the EA document (see plate 57A-E, pages 17-21 in the PDF), link from the LRT to the subway is handled via a mezzanine level between the two lines making the transition from east-west orientation (LRT) to north-south (subway).  The primary route between the two lines reaches the subway level via new escalators and stairs into the north end of the subway platform.  A secondary route rises all the way to the existing mezzanine level from the west end of the LRT platform and connects with both the paid and unpaid areas of the north entrance (under the BMO branch).

In the Metrolinx Central Station Reference Concept (see pages 47-52), the direct connection to the subway platform has been eliminated, and all traffic is funnelled to the upper mezzanine where it would connect to the paid area of the subway through area under the old bus terminal (now closed off).  This would eventually be incorporated in redevelopment of the terminal lands.

In the case of Kennedy Station, one of the proposed layouts, quite different from what we have seen before, was shown by Councillor Bernardinetti at last week’s Council Meeting.  It was unclear whether this was the version under active consideration by Metrolinx.

I wrote to Metrolinx for clarification, and here is their response (provided by Jamie Robinson via email).

Re Yonge/Eglinton:

The current Reference Design for the station includes a main entrance to the west (in the abandoned bus terminal property), which is meant to be an interim pavilion that will be incorporated in the future development of the site by Build Toronto.

The Reference Design is indicative of one design where requirements are reflected. The AFP process allows the Proponents, and later the Project Contractor to come up with a design solution that satisfies the requirements of the PSOS (Project Specific Output Specifications).

At Yonge/Eglinton the more recent design will be used.  It is simpler to build and brings passengers through the “traditional” transfer route into the central part of the subway mezzanine just as they once came from the bus terminal.

For Kennedy:

Metrolinx has undertaken an intensive design exercise to review options for integrating a converted Scarborough RT and a new Eglinton Crosstown LRT into the existing Kennedy Station, as well as addressing other mobility hub considerations in this location. Based on this exercise, we have concluded that the basic station design indicated in the 2010 Environmental Project Report is the most functional and appropriate approach from a transit operations perspective. We have directed our design team to proceed with further design of this approved alternative.

This design was presented at an April 2010 public meeting.  It includes a double-deck LRT station north of the existing structure under the existing bus platforms.

The SRT trains would use the upper level which is designed as a large loop at the existing mezzanine level of the station.  The Eglinton trains would use the lower level which is designed as a conventional centre platform terminal station with a crossover.

Transfers between routes would be:

• SRT to Subway: walk from the SRT platform across the mezzanine to the existing stairs and escalators, then down one level.
• SRT to Eglinton LRT: via stairs and escalators between the upper and lower level of the LRT section of the station.
• Eglinton LRT to Subway: up from the Eglinton LRT level to the SRT level, across the mezzanine, and down to the subway.

In the Metrolinx reply, I was curious about the implication that bidders might change the designs that were already approved.  Metrolinx further replied:

With the decision to procure the project using an Alternative Financing and Procurement or AFP model, each proponent will be developing designs for the stations.  Therefore a reference concept design (RCD) is being developed for each of these stations.

The RCD is intended to identify the location of entrances, exits and ancillary station (ventilation) equipment to allow property acquisition and (if required) major utility relocation to commence.

The Request For Qualifications (RFQ) for the project was issued by Infrastructure Ontario in January.  Once a preferred proponent is selected, the proponent will be required t submit designs to Metrolinx and the City for approval.  The designs will be reviewed by Metrolinx.  The proponent will also be required to participate in the City’s Site Plan Review process which could potentially include the City’s Design Review Panel.  There will also be a requirement for the preferred proponent to incorporate consultation with the public as a condition for design approval.

Updated May 10, 2013 at 5:10 pm:

Metrolinx issued the following statement regarding the Eglinton project via email:

Metrolinx has decided to proceed with the approved 2010 Eglinton-Scarborough Crosstown LRT Environmental Assessment (EA) and launch tunneling just east of Brentcliffe Road.

Metrolinx had identified some potential issues with the Brentcliffe Road launch site. It investigated different options and engaged the community, including convening three public meeting. We believed that our proposals would result in significant improvements to construction staging, schedule and traffic impacts. However, in discussions with the local community and with local community organizations it was clear that there was a strong preference for a stop at Leslie Street and for a station at Laird, not moved to Brentcliffe Road. We have listened. Metrolinx will proceed to tender the contract for the construction of the tunnels from Brentcliffe Road to Yonge Street. This signals another important step in the largest light rail transit expansion in the City of Toronto’s history. When the tunnel contract is awarded later this year, construction of the east launch shaft can begin.

Metrolinx will work to minimize disruption to the community during construction. Traffic lanes will be reduced along Eglinton for many months. But, as much information as possible will be shared ahead of time so people can choose alternate routes. We will also develop a traffic management strategy with the City of Toronto. Finally, Metrolinx community relations staff are available to provide information and answer questions.

[Email from Jamie Robinson at Metrolinx]

I spoke with Robinson to clarify various issues, and here in brief are his responses to my questions.  (The notes below are my paraphrase of his comments.)

• There is a need to get on with the tendering of work on the Crosstown so that construction can begin.
• Any changes to the approved design will require approval by Toronto Council which, under the current circumstances, could be difficult to achieve on a timely basis.
• The cost for an underground alignment between Brentcliffe and Don Mills would be approximately the same as the surface alignment to which the project has returned.  The extra cost of tunnelling is offset by the cost of removing contaminated soils east of Brentcliffe and the shoring needed for the launch shaft adjacent to existing development.
• Traffic disruption in the area will last 2.5-3 years (this launch site will be the extraction point for all tunnelling west to Yonge Street).
• Plans to reinstate the Ferrand Drive stop east of Don Mills are not affected by this decision as this stop was in the originally approved project.

I asked about the design of Kennedy Station given that a version of this site was shown at the recent Council meeting by Councillor Berardinetti.  Robinson confirmed that this design has not yet been settled, and it is unclear whether Metrolinx will simply return to the original design, again to avoid an EA amendment.  He will provide an update on this situation next week.

Updated May 10, 2013 at 4:15 pm:

TTC Chair Karen Stintz has tweeted that Metrolinx has decided to return to the original plan for Eglinton between Laird and Don Mills with surface running east of Brentcliffe.  Detailed reasons for this change of heart have not yet been issued by Metrolinx, notably an explanation of why the tunnel to Don Mills, presented as an essential engineering requirement at recent meetings, has been dropped.

I have sent a request to Metrolinx for an official statement on this matter including a technical explanation for the change.

Updated April 24, 2013 at 10:00 pm:

Metrolinx proposes to change the section of the Eglinton route to underground construction between Brentcliffe and Don Mills.  On April 23, they held a public meeting to discuss this proposal.  The presentation deck is available online.  There is a detailed map on page 5 of the presentation.  The PDF version is at high resolution and can be zoomed to read the notes and design details.

At a previous public meeting where an early version of this scheme was proposed, Metrolinx heard concerns about:

• The loss of the stop at Ferrand Drive east of Don Mills,
• The loss of the stop at Leslie Street and, with it, easy access to parkland,
• Bus activity at the proposed Laird Station, and
• Alternative alignments the route might take.

The need for all this was triggered by Metrolinx’ decision to shift the access site for tunnel boring from a portal on the hill between Brentcliffe and the west branch of the Don River to the southeast corner of Don Mills and Eglinton.  Their claim is that the soil at the Don River is contaminated, that construction is now complicated by condos that have been built nearby, and that about $20m in construction cost can be avoided by shifting the launch site elsewhere.

To those who have followed the Eglinton line’s history, it is no surprise that Metrolinx would propose to underground the line to Don Mills, and they were pushing the merits of fewer stops and faster “regional” travel back in the days Transit City was struggling for their attention.  Metrolinx simply does not understand that this line is not “regional” but local especially as it will go nowhere near the 416 boundary in current plans.

In any event, Metrolinx tries to make a case for the new scheme with arguments that simply don’t hold up, and the sense of “say anything to keep them happy” pervades the presentation.

Station Spacing

Metrolinx proposes to shift the Laird Station to Brentcliffe about 400m to the east.  The reason for this is to “improve park access” (via long walkways from Brentcliffe down to the park itself) and to “even out” the spacing of stations between Bayview and Don Mills.

The park access is nowhere near as convenient as a station at Leslie would be, especially for anyone who is neither a cyclist nor an avid walker, because Brentcliffe Station is located at the top of the west bank of the Don Valley.

As for “even spacing”, this is hogwash given that stations are to serve people, and a Brentcliffe station is further away from the main concentration of would-be riders who live west of Laird.  Indeed, an early plan of the Eglinton line placed the station at Brentcliffe and it was shifted west precisely because that’s where the riders would be.  Spacing has nothing to do with the issue as almost all of the land east of Brentcliffe is green space.

At the meeting, there was good support for going back to the original plan with surface operations east of Brentcliffe, but the moderator and Metrolinx folks seemed to be encouraging acceptance of the new plan as “second best”.  That was not the sense of the meeting, but it will likely be reported that way.

The Access Shaft

It is quite astounding that someone didn’t figure out there was a soils problem, let alone one with adjacent development, a long time ago for the originally proposed launch site east of Brentcliffe.  I cannot help thinking Metrolinx is taking advantage of what might have been a difficult situation to make the case for a design change they always wanted, but could not justify.

At the meeting, it was claimed that this change is cost neutral.  That is very hard to believe if the delta for the original launch site is only $20m over original estimates.  That will hardly cover the cost of tunelling all the way to Don Mills Station.  Yes, there are savings in avoiding modifications to the Eglinton Avenue bridge over the Don, but it is not credible that this would pay for the extended tunnel.

An alternative launch site at Bayview & Eglinton, using the playing grounds beside Leaside High School, was rejected because of the length of time — five years — that work would occupy the site and the neighbourhood disruption this would cause.  That’s a real stretch considering that tunnelling for the entire line is supposed to be completed in less time than that.  The slide concerning the Bayview access option is not in the online slide deck although it was included in the meeting materials.

Brentcliffe and Laird Stations

Because the proposed tunnel now dives under the river rather than emerging east of Brentcliffe, the tunnel where this station would be located is much deeper than in original plans.  Although Metrolinx claims its stations will be accessible, it is unclear exactly what this means, specifically whether there will be bi-directional escalator service from street to platform plus an elevator.  Moreover, secondary entrance(s) will not have any accessibility features.  For deep stations, this means a lot of stair climbing.  (See presentation page 6.)

A strange exchange came up during the Q&A when someone asked about siting a station between the two streets.  The first and obvious answer is that with a station being only 130m long, and the space between the streets measuring 400m, this change wouldn’t really please advocates of either location.  A midblock station would be further from the park, but still well east of Laird.

In any event, Metrolinx rambled on about how with the private sector being involved in construction, there was another round of design reviews in which the station designs would be finalized, and the site could be adjusted then.  This is complete nonsense because (a) the station location affects tunnel grades and a new location would require an EA amendment, and (b) the private bidders are supposed to “inherit” an already-built tunnel structure around which they will place the stations.  Obviously, Metrolinx has to decide on the station locations as part of tunnel design.

This exchange had all the earmarks of someone making up an excuse to avoid debate on the fly.

Surface Bus Routes

One claimed reason for the shift away from Laird involves surface bus service.  Metrolinx claims that the TTC will integrate the 56 Leaside and 51 Leslie, and this will mean the combined route will make west-to-south and north-to-east turns at Laird or at Brentcliffe depending on which site is chosen.  Apparently, there was concern that this operation will completely foul up traffic at the Laird location, even though the claimed frequency of service was every 10 minutes at peak.  The real issue, regardless of location, for some people was that this connection will be open air, and people waiting for a northbound Leslie bus will do so at a regular bus stop on the east side of Laird or Brentcliffe as the case may be.

(If the station is at Brentcliffe with the primary entrance on the southwest corner, there is no reason the TTC could not run southbound service via Brentcliffe, and northbound service via Laird and Eglinton so that both transfer stops could be served by the same weather-protected waiting area in the station entrance.)

The whole issue of TTC service was a bit of a conundrum for Metrolinx who claimed that any surface routes, including a supplementary bus on Eglinton, were up to the TTC (who were not at the meeting).  Sorry, but that excuse won’t wash.  Earth to Metrolinx: you are building a transit corridor, and you are responsible for co-ordinating all of the service that will operate there, not just for your pretty green trains.  The Metrolinx folks also didn’t seem to know that their recent proposed amendment for the Mt. Dennis portion of the line includes a table of proposed TTC services including “34 Eglinton” which would no doubt serve the eastern part as well.

The Leslie Stop

Without question, if the line is underground (and at this point under the Don River), a station at Leslie cannot be justified given the very low density at this site even allowing for future development north of Eglinton (e.g. the Sony property).  On a surface LRT line, a stop at Leslie would be simple to include, but Metrolinx’ decision to go underground with a south-of-Eglinton alignment scotches that possibility.

The matter of a future GO Transit connection to the CPR tracks came up during the Q&A.  Again, the Metrolinx team showed its ignorance when they claimed that there were not plans to implement service on this line beyond a Federal study (one that will probably die once influential MPs along the route retire or are defeated, notably the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Assistant).  However, service on this corridor was originally in the 15-year Big Move plan, and it has been pushed back to the 25-year plan in recent revisions.  For Metrolinx to claim that no service is planned here is either a flat out lie, or simply a case of incompetence — not knowing what’s in your own plan.

In any event, as and when the CPR does get GO service, a technically preferable station site would be at the Don Mills crossing north of Eglinton and a potential station on, dare I say it, a Don Mills subway (aka the DRL).

All in all, Metrolinx appeared to be making up excuses about the Leslie stop out of thin air without fully understanding the options in this area.

Don Mills and Ferrand Drive

In the original scheme, Don Mills Station and its approaches from both east and west would have been built cut-and-cover.  However, with the change to bored tunnel, the entire structure must remain far enough underground to give headroom for the boring machines.  this shifts the depth of the station, and presented problems with the space needed for turnback tracks at the station and a ramp back to the surface.  For this reason, the Ferrand Drive stop was eliminated in the design shown a few months ago.

Now, Don Mills Station has been revised so that the portal out onto Eglinton is far enough west that the originally proposed Ferrand Drive stop can be included.  This was another nibble Metrolinx planned to take out of the surface operation, but the bite may have proven indigestible.  This change will keep the advocates of a Ferrand stop happy.

Meanwhile, at Don Mills, potential integration with a new subway line (the “Downtown Relief Line” or the “Don Mills Subway” as I prefer to call it) is not mentioned.  The plans show no provision for a north-south station connecting with the Eglinton line’s east-west box structure.

The DRL itself is the subject of confusion at Metrolinx where the length and cost cited on the Big Move’s Next Wave page do not match with the diagrammatic map.  Terminating the line at Danforth is not a viable design, but the TTC/Metrolinx seem to be dragging their feet on pushing north to Eglinton despite the benefits of such a scheme.  Clarity on the DRL’s design would help considerably in placing discussions re the Eglinton route in context.

Conclusion

Metrolinx is missing a great deal of detail, but if past experience is anything to go by, their mind is already made up, and the option presented to the public meeting will be the one on which the EA amendment will be based.  There are serious questions about assumptions in this version, but getting them asked, let alone answered, will be quite another matter.

Metrolinx really does need to try again and get its story straight on many of the issues raised at the public meeting.

Updated April 18, 2013 at 11:00 am:

The Environmental Project Report addendum covering the section of the line west of Black Creek is online as part of a report to the Toronto Executive Committee for April 23, 2013.  This includes the redesign of the section from the tunnel portal east of Black Creek Drive through Mount Dennis Station to Jane Street, although only the section as far as Weston Road would be built in Phase 1 of the project.  Attachments to the report include:

• Chief Planner’s Report with comments
• Addendum Part I
• Addendum Part II
• Addendum Part III
• Addendum Part IV

The revised alignment is shown in Figure 2-5b at the start of Part II.  This includes cross-sectional views of the portion in Phase 2 which would be built cut and cover from the west limit of Weston Road to a portal in the hill down to the Jane Street flats.  Detailed views appear in Figures 3-7a to 3-7d at the end of Part II, and 3-7e to 3-7g at the start of Part III.

Although the portion west of Weston Road will not be built in Phase 1, it has been revised so that demolition of the houses on the north side of Eglinton is no longer required.  (A list showing the original and revised property requirements is in Table 5-2 in Part IV.)

The Mount Dennis Station itself straddles the rail corridor in a layout that is described under “Option 11″ in the report.  The existence of options 1 through 10 documents the long process of working through alternative schemes for this section of the route, and ironically ends up with a variant that in the early days of the line’s design was called “too expensive”.

(The overview map of Option 11 in Figure 2-4 of Part I erroneously shows the alignment as underground to west of Jane Street when, in fact, it emerges from a portal east of Jane and runs on the surface west from there.)

The alignment east of Mount Dennis Station has been designed to remain completely grade separated and protected including the junction leading to the maintenance yard.  Metrolinx intends to use automatic train control on the underground section of Eglinton, and the yard access will be part of the ATC territory.  (A detailed view of the yard layout is in Figure 3-7e.)

As the line emerges from the portal at Black Creek and crosses on a bridge to the Kodak lands, an access track to the yard splits off from the westbound track.  A single crossover east of this split would allow an eastbound train to reverse into the yard.

Two exit tracks from the yard turn south and west with one of them joining the westbound track and one running just north of it.  At this point, the layout is three tracks wide.  A double crossover between the eastbound and westbound tracks lies in the area just west of the yard exit.  The northern exit track from the yard merges with the westbound mainline track just before the station where the platform separates the eastbound and westbound tracks.

Metrolinx’ intent is that Mount Dennis will be a “Mobility Hub”, and the station is now actually designed with a view to that purpose.  However, there remain concerns about walking distances to various nearby facilities including the bus terminal and a community centre, but this is almost inevitable given that the “hub” stretches from Weston Road to Black Creek Drive.

Although Metrolinx shows generic drawings of primary and secondary exits, with escalators and elevators only at the former, their drawings do not show in detail the level of accessibility at various access points to the station and its satellite facilities such as the bus terminal.  This is a “Mobility Hub” in Metrolinx lingo, and the ability to easily circulate within it and to all nearby points will be essential.

The report includes a preliminary service plan with trains to operate at 2’00″ headways between Mount Dennis and Don Mills, with a 3’00″ headway beyond to Kennedy Station.  Proposed bus services and frequencies are also shown including a “34 Eglinton” route (a surface bus to supplement the LRT subway) at a 15’00″ headway.  (See pages 3-2 through 3-7 in Part II.)

Updated April 13, 2013 at 6:45 am:  Presentation materials from an April 10, 2013, public meeting on the Mount Dennis Mobility Hub design are now available.

This presentation includes a major change in the treatment of Eglinton Avenue and of the Mount Dennis station itself.  Previous schemes struggled with two physical problems at either end of the site:

• At the east end, the retaining wall on the north side of Eglinton created a barrier and constraint to any significant change to the road layout, and the LRT alignment necessarily tunnelled through the hill behind the barrier to get under the rail corridor.
• At the west end, the station box and provision for tracks west of the station caused design problems and conflicts with existing buildings.

The station now sits well east of Weston Road with the station box centred under the rail corridor. This shift also allows the old Kodak building to have a role as part of the station.

The existing retaining wall and the land north of it are dug out to provide a short section of surface LRT on the approach to the station.  This places the junction with yard tracks on the surface (rather than the original underground scheme, and allows the Eglinton corridor to be widened and improved as part of the future design of the Black Creek intersection.  (The design proposed at the December 2012 meeting moved the retaining wall, but not as dramatically as in the April 2013 version.)

Metrolinx is under no illusions that the type of neighbourhood this could become is many years away and will require efforts by the city to encourage development, but at least the transit scheme now attempts to be a catalyst for that development rather than taking the bare-bones “this is all we can afford” approach.

I was unable to attend the April 10 meeting, and welcome comments here from any reader who can give a sense of how this proposal was received by the community.

Updated December 13, 2012 at 8:45 am:  Presentation materials from the public meetings are now available online.  Links to them have been added to the article below along with my comments.

Metrolinx has announced two public meetings at which design changes to the Eglinton-Crosstown LRT project will be discussed.

Eglinton East — Leaside to Don Mills

Tuesday December 11, Ontario Science Centre (Telus Conference Room), Don Mills south of Eglinton, 7:00 to 9:00 pm

In the original plan, the LRT would have emerged onto the surface through a portal in the centre of Eglinton Avenue as it descended from Brentcliffe Road toward Leslie Street.  This location would also have been the tunnel launch site, a twin of the structure near Black Creek Drive.  This location conflicts with recent redevelopment of the area.

Metrolinx now proposes to continue the tunnel under the west branch of the Don River straight through to Don Mills Station.  The tunnel launch site will now be in the parking lot of the Ontario Science Centre.  The original design east of Don Mills remains with the line surfacing between Don Mills and the DVP.  The east branch of the Don River will be crossed at street level because this would be a much more difficult piece of tunneling given the valley’s depth and the need to bore through bedrock.  Leslie Station has been deleted from the plan.

Updated:  Presentation materials are now available online.

Laird to Don Mills Addendum Page

Detailed PDFs are included showing the original and proposed alignments for the Eglinton line from Laird Station to the Don Valley Parkway.

Although some costing information was discussed at the public meeting according to some who attended, this is not included in the presentation materials.  Among the benefits claimed for the revised plan:

• Relocation of the launch shaft to Don Mills will put it in a better location with less effect on local residents and simpler engineering and construction (soil conditions and stabilization, site access).
• No new or widened bridge is required for Eglinton Avenue and this eliminates effects on the river valley below.
• Operation between Laird and Don Mills will be faster because it is underground and because there is no stop at Leslie.

Another stop to be removed is at Ferrand Drive between Don Mills and the DVP.  This stop is no longer physically possible as it conflicts with the exit ramp location that has shifted because a pocket track has been added east of Don Mills station.

What we are seeing here is a move away from surface construction and a return to the original Metrolinx view (dating back to the launch of Transit City) that Eglinton should be a high-speed “regional” line, not a local service.  Whether the surface design east from Don Mills and west from Weston will survive, especially if there is a political change at Queen’s Park to an anti-LRT administration, remains to be seen.

Metrolinx plans to have a revised Environmental Project Report completed in March 2013 for approval by May in time for tendering of the tunnel work.  The web page linked above includes provision for feedback which should be submitted by January 4, 2013.

Eglinton West — Mount Dennis

Wednesday December 12, York Memorial Collegiate, northwest corner of Keele & Eglinton, 6:30 to 9:30 pm

A revised alignment places the Weston Station underground on the northeast quadrant of the Weston-Eglinton intersection with an improved connection to the rail corridor as compared to previous plans.

A Metrolinx “mobility hub” is planned for this location, and part of the meeting will be devoted to working through community preferences for its design.  Also up for discussion are the preliminary plans for the Maintenance Facility on the former Kodak lands.

The original plan called for a wide box tunnel section west of Weston Road that would have required demolition of several houses.  My understanding is that this will no longer be required, but await confirmation of this when Metrolinx publishes detailed designs.

One almost certain victim of changes to the plans will be the segment from Weston to Jane.  Neither the Jane LRT nor the Eglinton West extension to the airport are part of the recently-announced Phase 2 of “Big Move” projects, and a mobility hub at Weston suggests that it will be the western terminal for some years to come.

This is made quite clear in the project description on the Metrolinx Crosstown Project page where the line is described as running from “Black Creek to Kennedy Station” and the map shows the western end at Mt. Dennis.  The map has not yet been updated to reflect underground construction east to Don Mills.

Updated:  Presentation materials are now available online.

Keele to Jane Addendum Page

Mount Dennis Mobility Hub Page

The new design confirms that Weston Station has been redesigned to lie further east than its original site and with a good connection to a future GO station because the LRT station platform will now be partly under the rail corridor.  The planned three-track section west of the station has been eliminated and this resolved problems with property conflicts along the north side of Eglinton Avenue.

The section west to Jane Street is now clearly shown as being part of “Phase 2″ of the project, and it would not be built until the western extension to Pearson Airport occurs, if ever.

The transition out of the tunnel at Black Creek drive has been modified so that Eglinton Avenue would now swing south of the portal, and the LRT would cross Black Creek on a bridge dipping back underground after an at-grade junction with access tracks to the maintenance facility on the former Kodak lands.

The Mobility Hub study is in some ways much more ambitious than the LRT plan because it foresees a much revised and revived set of neighbourhoods around the future LRT and GO station.  The challenge here will be to maintain this vision through changing political and economic climates over the next decade until the LRT line is in operation and acting as an anchor for Mount Dennis.

On one hand, we have an intensely local debate at the ward, if not the neighbourhood level, with the worst of petulant “I-want-a-subway-too” politics.

On the other, the region and the province are preoccupied with funding a large-scale plan that happens to have a spin-off for local transit, but one that will only give Toronto a fraction of what it costs to run and maintain the TTC today, let alone make substantive improvements.

In some ways, the TTC has been its own worst enemy managing on one hand to alienate potential supporters with poor community relations, unreliable budgeting and declining service quality, but on the other managing to attract riders and be more financially “efficient” in spite of itself.  When political support for better funding and service is needed, the “success story” is that the TTC has managed to cram more riders into fewer buses and streetcars.

This is not a sustainable approach to transit.  Growth – which has come disproportionately in off-peak periods when there is still some capacity in parts of the system – cannot continue on this basis.

Byford will formally launch a Five Year Plan for the TTC in the week of May 27, 2013, but his speech gives a broad outline of his goals.  Are they enough, or is there too much concentration on the decor while the house rots around us?

Byford’s plan has seven goals under which a range of activities will be grouped.  These are:

• Safety
• Customer service
• People and management
• Asset management including service quality
• System growth
• Financial sustainability
• Improved TTC reputation and community engagement

Inevitably in a large organization, there will be overlaps between these major headings, but from Byford’s remarks there is also an acknowledgement that they exist and that improvements in one area affect performance elsewhere.

At yesterday evening’s York Quay Neighbourhood Association meeting, Byford spoke in detail about three areas within the organization: processes, equipment and people.

Some of the TTC’s internal processes are, and these are Byford’s words, archaic and bureaucratic.  Systems and practices exist to serve the organization, the “production” of service rather than the customers who ride it.  A well-known example is the short-turning of vehicles to get operators back on time, and Byford talked of the need to split this so that operators can short-turn without interrupting passenger trips (this is already done to some extent on the subway and at times on the 501 Queen car).  Fare disputes now cause vehicles to stop (and in the case of streetcars all following service) while waiting for “the cavalry” to arrive.  This must change to focus on keeping service moving.

Equipment and infrastructure will undergo major changes in the subway (TR trains, automatic train control, the Spadina extension, the Union Station 2nd platform), on the streetcar system (with a new fleet) and the bus system (with the reintroduction of higher-capacity articulated buses).  Track upgrades in the subway are needed so that the full benefit of ATC can be realized rather than having trains poke through slow orders.

Presto will bring smart card fare collection to the TTC (with credit card support to follow) beginning on the new streetcars and spreading to the rest of the system.  The transition will be complex because of the need to support both the new and old fare media and protocols at the same time.

Service levels with new, larger vehicles will be a challenge because of the debate over how to use increased capacity.  Should the TTC replace capacity or vehicles one for one, or something in between?  This question has not yet been answered and depends in part on the budgetary stance taken by transit supporters in the 2014 City Budget debates.

Of the three areas, people and management are the most difficult.  If the TTC implements all of its planned changes in other areas, but still has poor service and inconsistent relationships with its riders, the organization will have failed.  However, Byford argues that how people are managed affects how they behave, how they treat customers.  TTC management is on notice that the TTC “culture” must change.

When Byford came to Toronto, he found the worst of all possible situations – good people, of whom there are many in the TTC, were ignored while the bad ones “got away with murder”.  Now he has buy-in from the transit union that the offenders will not escape.  Whether he will be as successful with his management and decades of a top-down mentality is another matter.  (During the few years I worked for the TTC in the late 1960s, there was still a strong hangover from the military attitudes of a war that was over two decades in the past.  The TTC does not change quickly.)

Byford wants a culture of accountability at the top and the bottom of the organization.  “Bad things can happen”, says Byford, when this is missing.  The not-my-job attitude, the finger-pointing is inevitable when avoiding blame is more important than fixing a problem.

The recently appointed Group Station Managers will become “one stop shops” for Councillors, BIAs and community groups, and will get to know the neighbourhoods they serve.  Internal and external co-ordination should improve too if Byford’s plans work out.  Later in the evening, as I discussed in another article, lots of confusion remained about the status of the Queens Quay and Spadina streetcar services and related projects.  Hopeful words maybe, but Byford doesn’t have this under control yet.

At this point, we have a quick overview of some of what Andy Byford hopes to achieve at the TTC.  When the full plan comes out, please, let there be more detail and specifics about targets to be achieved, about concrete improvements riders will see and feel in their daily travels.  The “quick wins”, the low-hanging fruit such as vehicle and station cleanliness are a good start and show what can be done with some effort, but the big task is to make the TTC a system people want to ride, not one that is a reluctant choice.

For this Byford will need public and political support, and certainly more money.  Some savings will be found in areas such as better line management (getting better capacity out of what’s already on the street) and in one-time changes such as a move to one-man crews on the Yonge-University subway.  But that’s no substitute for a recognition by management and by politicians that transit must be more than a bare minimum, a service we provide grudgingly.

Prattling on about the poor “taxpayers” and “making do for the greater good” forgets that everyone benefits from better transit service whether they use it or not.  That’s the message we hear in calls for better regional funding and large-scale capital projects, and we need to hear it just as loudly for day-to-day service.

The most important goal Byford could include in his detailed plan will be a view of what transit service will be like in five years on the TTC with better and reliable frequencies, less crowding, and a sense that Toronto is providing the best it can.

TTC CEO Andy Byford spoke yesterday evening at a meeting of the York Quay Neighbourhood Association.  The question of transit service on the waterfront this summer was a major topic.

At this point, there is some uncertainty about when streetcar service will resume first to the loop at Queens Quay & Spadina, and then to Union Station.  A late November date had been mentioned by Waterfront Toronto in a recent briefing to the neighbourhood, but Byford himself talked spring 2014.  His remarks implied that this was somehow connected with work on the Union Station second platform.  If the real constraint is at Union, then completing the track on Queens Quay doesn’t appear to be the issue.

I have asked for clarification of the dates from the TTC who are, according to Byford, pushing Waterfront Toronto to get their work done.

In the meantime, there is a desire for improved service on the waterfront, and the TTC plans service increases on the 509 Harbourfront bus.  Weekend headways improved on May 12, and weekday improvements are planned starting June 24.

In response to a question about “seamless” transit service across Queens Quay, Byford replied that the TTC is reviewing travel patterns, but there is very strong demand to Union Station and the idea of replacing the rail link up Bay Street with some sort of people mover in the existing tunnel is a non-starter.  The 65 Parliament bus may be extended west, and the 6 Bay bus east to Parliament if demand warrants it.

Byford argued that the Waterfront East LRT needs to be built, and sought to avoid the impression that he is concentration only on the Downtown Relief Line (DRL).  Many LRT projects including Sheppard East, Finch West, Waterfront East and (pause here for a chuckle) the SRT/LRT conversion need to proceed too.

When the new Low Floor LRVs arrive, capacity can be increased.  This was an intriguing comment because it implies Byford is not considering a 1:1 capacity replacement with the new cars, at least on this route.

The YQNA has raised issues about signage and the difficulty of finding where transit service is during construction.  On his way to the meeting, Byford travelled by TTC and made the connection from Union to the 509 bus looking as if he were a tourist for a continuous set of direction signs.  He noticed that the path is not marked continuously.  This is a pervasive problem including on Queen’s Quay where the location of service is impossible to discover if one is unfamiliar with the area, and difficult even for a seasoned rider.  Constant changes due to shifting construction don’t help.  Byford agreed that improvements are needed.

A request for a free bus to the waterfront during certain times was rejected on the basis that the money could be better spend on service.  Expedited, all-door boarding and rigourous clearing of vehicles parked at transit stops can also aid service, Byford said.  (As a personal observation, I boarded a 509 bus southbound at King and Yonge as if it were a streetcar to get to this meeting thanks to a large truck parked at the bus stop.)

Residents asked for a stop eastbound at York, but Byford advised that this  has been rejected by city traffic engineers.  Requests for transit shelters should go to Waterfront Toronto who are responsible for street furniture.  (This entire exchange was odd given that earlier in the evening, Byford had talked about the culture of finger-pointing between departments and agencies.)

Some of the responsibility for improvements will lie, Byford said, with the new Group Station Manager whose territory includes Union Station.  However, this won’t look after problems with the surface portion of the 509 Harbourfront route unless there is some creep in the job description.  This begs the question of a surface equivalent of a GSM to look after community concerns especially when there are temporary route diversions for construction and special events.

(I will discuss the remainder of Byford’s remarks concerning his Five Year Plan in a separate article.)

Updated May 8, 2013 at 11:40 pm:  Streetcar service on Queens Quay and lower Spadina will not resume until late November, contrary to previous information here and gleaned from sundry TTC rumours.  The delay arises from Toronto Hydro being six months late on their work thanks to budget problems.

Demolition of the streetcar right-of-way began on May 6, 2013, east of Yo-Yo Ma Lane to the Spadina & Queens Quay intersection.

Yo-Yo Ma Lane marks the western limit of the “new” Queens Quay, an will be the point where eastbound traffic will cross over the streetcar tracks to the new roadway on the north side of the street.  The tracks will be rebuilt east from Yo-Yo Ma Lane to align with the new intersection at Spadina.

Demolition of the existing Queen’s Quay Loop begins on May 7.

The TTC tentatively plans to resume streetcar service on 509 Harbourfront in September late November, but this depends on many utility relocation projects along Queen’s Quay completing to the point where the streetcar right-of-way is no longer needed as a road diversion and construction staging area.

Waterfront Toronto will hold a public meeting on May 8.  From their website:

Community Update Meeting

Join Waterfront Toronto on May 8, 2013 for a detailed construction progress report. Learn more about:

• Construction activities to date and our overall construction schedule
• The types of construction to expect this spring and summer
• Traffic management and TTC service

The meeting will be held from 6pm – 8pm in the Brigantine Room at Harbourfront Centre.

TTC CEO Andy Byford spoke at a meeting of the York Quay Neighbourhood Association yesterday evening and the status of transit service to Queens Quay was a major topic.  There appears to be some confusion among and within agencies about the date when service will return to Queens Quay on the 510 as a through route and as a streetcar.

The TTC Service Planning memo for the schedule period beginning June 23 says that the current operation is expected to last until the end of that period (late July).  However, Waterfront Toronto and Andy Byford himself speak of November or even December dates.  The TTC website has given June 2013 as a date for service resumption for quite some time, although this is to be corrected, presuming someone knows what the information should be.

Part of the confusion may arise from the fact that streetcar service will be suspended for reconstruction of the intersections at King and at Dundas and this will require bus replacement on the route.  Those buses will be able to run through to Queen’s Quay replacing the shuttle and so there will be “through” service, just not with streetcars.

I have asked the TTC for definitive information on the date for resumption of streetcar service to Queens Quay.

The Service Planning  memo also notes that a planned shutdown for reconstruction of the platform at Spadina Station Loop has been deferred to 2014.  One can only hope that this will include changes to allow two LFLRVs to serve the platform simultaneously for unloading and loading.

Updated May 8, 2013 at 11:45 pm:

Service on 510 Spadina streetcars will not return to Queens Quay until late fall, likely with the late November schedule changes.

Two intersection rebuilds (at King and at Dundas) are planned for this summer, and buses will once again replace streetcars while these are in progress.

Demolition on Queens Quay had reached the west side of Spadina today, but had not yet moved into Queens Quay loop as originally planned.

Updated May 7, 2013 at 8:30 am

Demolition of the Queens Quay Loop is planned to begin today.  The Spadina shuttle bus will be rerouted to loop via west on Queens Quay from Spadina to Dan Leckie, north to Lake Shore, east to Rees, north to Bremner and west to Spadina.

Southbound buses will stop at Spadina and Queens Quay on the northwest corner.  Northbound buses will stop at Lake Shore and Spadina on the southwest corner at the same location as the eastbound 509 Harbourfront service.

Tentatively, TTC plans to resume streetcar service south of King to a rebuilt Queens Quay loop in July, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Updated April 5, 2013 at 3:15 pm

Waterfront Toronto’s construction notice for the week of April 8 includes the following change in the overall construction staging plan:

TTC Demolition West of Peter Slip: Crews are expected to begin work on the demolition of the TTC corridor west of the Peter Slip Bridge – including the Spadina Loop (located around 410 Queens Quay). The demolition and rebuild of the Spadina Loop, which begins later this month, will enable the 510 Spadina streetcar to resume service to Queens Quay in late fall 2013.

Given the delay in getting the track over the railway corridor back in service thanks to non-TTC problems in that area, it makes sense to finish the entire Spadina route rather than restoring service for a brief period and then removing it again.

I wrote to Waterfront Toronto and to the TTC to clarify two issues:

• What is meant by “late fall”?
• Will the TTC install temporary track on Queens Quay to allow restoration of 509 Harbourfront service in July as planned, or is this too delayed until the fall?

Here is Waterfront Toronto’s reply:

At our Queens Quay CLC yesterday, we provided stakeholders with information about our summer construction plans. At that meeting, we let stakeholders know that our streetcar corridor rebuild is delayed due to some issues with hydro work and our own storm and sanitary construction. This means that we won’t be able to resume streetcar service for July and August as we had planned to do. Instead, we are going to work on the rebuild through the summer and advance work on the demo/rebuild of the Spadina Loop. (As you may recall, our initial construction staging was to run the 509 for July and August and then take it down again to rebuild the Spadina loop from September to early 2013). Advancing the Spadina loop means that we’ll have all of our rebuild work complete by November 2013 instead. TTC is currently working on its service plan for when our rebuild is complete.

We’re going to have a public meeting on May 8 to discuss our summer schedule and how it relates to TTC service.

In the text above, “early 2013″ should obviously read “early 2014″.

This begs an obvious question:  Why will the reconstruction of the loop and nearby streets take so long?

Updated March 24, 2013 at 11:30 am

The intersection of King and Spadina is scheduled for reconstruction during the month of August 2013.  A preliminary notice has been posted by the City of Toronto.

Updated March 6, 2013 at 5:15 pm

The track work planned for February was delayed by extremely bad weather, but was completed on the weekend of March 2/3.  New track is now installed to the north side of the eastbound lanes on Lake Shore Blvd.  Crossing further south involved the exit switch from Queen’s Quay Loop, and this portion will be done when the loop is rebuilt.

Recently, I received an email passing on a rumour about a “stop work” order on the Spadina bridge and a delay of the planned resumption of streetcar service south of King to Queen’s Quay.  I checked with the City of Toronto, and here is their reply:

The current Spadina project has not been put on hold. The Contractor is continuing to proceed with work in a progressive manner. We experienced a few issues that have led to extra work being required in order to complete the contract. The extra work related to conditions that were unknown at the time of design and related mainly to the need to relocate the existing track drains, removal of styrofoam insulation and reinforced concrete encountered in the subgrade and the reconstruction of the south approach slab. Some of which required additional designs to be prepared and approved prior to material being ordered and work completed. This extra work has unfortunately delayed the completion of this component in the planned work.

The original scope did not account for any extensive winter work; however, with the unanticipated extra work being added to the project, it has forced a significant portion of the bridge work to be completed under cold weather conditions. Cold weather conditions also lead to delays, as we expect approximately 30-40% reduction in performance depending on the severity of the weather. We have also experienced higher than normal levels of precipitation for the first months of 2013.

We had anticipated resuming streetcar service for the May 12th board period; however, the delays due to the extra work and the weather have extended the expected completion date to the first or second week of June. Transit resumption will be determined after the completion of the project.

The Contractor is continuing to work on the project and has added additional crews to mitigate any delays. The work in the next two months will be mainly confined to the bridge and the mezzanine work.

Stephen Adams, PMP, P.Eng.

Updated February 6, 2013 at 1:00 pm

Planned road, water and track work at Lake Shore and Spadina beginning Thursday, February 7, 2013 will close parts of the intersection over the coming weekend.  This work will complete the new track south from the railway overpass to the north side of Queens Quay Loop which will be rebuilt later in 2013.

There is still no track from Front Street south to just north of Bremner Blvd., but work in the area appears to focus on putting things back together rather than finding yet more holes to dig.

The TTC is currently planning to resume streetcar service south of King in May 2013.

Updated November 29, 2012 at 12:00 nn

The date for restoration of streetcar service south of King has been pushed back to March 30, 2013 because construction south to Lakeshore may not be completed before winter weather sets in.

New track has been laid between Bremner and Lakeshore although as of November 28 it was not yet set in concrete.  The section north from Bremner across the bridge to Front has not yet reached the point of tracklaying because other work on the bridge is still underway.

The scheduled service for the holiday period presumed that streetcars would run south to Queen’s Quay, and these will now short-turn at King.  With all of the extra running time this will provide, it will be interesting to see how the layovers (already difficult due to bunching and physical limits on capacity at each terminal) will be handled.  There may be a lot of very slow operation on this “rapid transit” line.

For January and February 2013 the schedules now in effect will be used.

Updated November 18, 2012 at 9:30 am

Service resumed on the 510 Spadina car from Bloor to King this morning.

Car 4121 made a test run in the early hours.  (Photo courtesy of Will Oxford)

Southbound approaching Spadina Circle

Northbound at Spadina Circle

Northbound at Adelaide

Note that the new concrete on Spadina has not been stamped to give the impression of cobblestones, but simply brushed as any other concrete such as sidewalks would be.  This leaves two generations of finishes on the route.

Updated November 15, 2012 at 7:20 am

As of the afternoon of November 14:

At the south end of Spadina, placement of the foundation slab for the track on the south approach to the bridge over the rail corridor (Lakeshore to Bremner) is in progress.  Various construction activities are in progress from Bremner to Front.  New track is in place across the Bremner/Spadina intersection, and from the south side of Front north to King.

North from King, cleanup crews are touching up paint on the shelters at stops.  Between College and Bloor, the last of concrete work mainly for stop rail replacements is in progress.  New overhead contact wire has been hung, but is not yet attached to supports.  Installation of the new standard trough overhead (already in use at the Atlantic Avenue underpass on King and the Dufferin underpass on Queen) is underway at Spadina Station Loop.

Streetcar service returns to the 510 Spadina route on Sunday, November 18.

Updated October 25, 2012 at 5:10 pm

Demolition of the trackbed over the bridge south of Front has begun and the section between the bridge and Lakeshore is now being graded to prepare for the new foundation slab.  The intersection at Bremner will be closed over the weekend of November 2 to 5.

The section south of Lake Shore including Queen’s Quay Loop will not be rebuilt until 2013.

Updated October 21, 2012 at 12:30 pm

Work has begun on the portal at Spadina Station with the demolition of the southbound track between the tunnel entrance and Sussex Ave.  Construction equipment is poised to attack the northbound track, and a weekend closure is planned for replacement of the track across the Sussex intersection.

South of King, new track has been placed to just north of Front, and the intersection itself is being rebuilt from October 20-23.

From Bremner south to Lake Shore, the trackbed excavation is complete.  Visible in the debris are the remnants of styrofoam bats that had been placed as an anti-vibration measure when this track was built over two decades ago.  This may have isolated the track from the bridge deck, but it did nothing to isolate the rails from the track slab and the resulting roar from track corrugation.

Updated October 16, 2012 at 12:55 pm

Concrete work is almost completed for the section of track around Spadina Circle and the nearby stop at Willcocks northbound.  No work has begun yet at Spadina Station Loop or its approach ramp.

South of King, the new foundation is in place to just north of Front.  A short distance on either side of Front has been excavated in anticipation of rebuilding the intersection itself.

Excavation of the old track and roadbed is underway from Bremner south to Lake Shore.  No work has taken place yet on the bridge over the rail corridor.

Updated September 29, 2012 at 10:40 pm

Work began on the section south from King to Lake Shore in the week of September 24.

Looking south on Spadina from King.

Looking north on Spadina from Clarence Square.

Reconstruction of the track around Spadina Circle began in mid September.  Unlike intersections and tangent (straight) sections, the rails on the curves are welded on site (the process is the same as shown for McCaul Street near McCaul Loop in another article).

Work on the east side is now completed to the point that only the top layer of concrete remains to be placed.  On the west side, the track is in place in the excavated right-of-way and welding is progressing around the curve from south to north.

The following photos were taken on September 19.  Here, the track on the east side of Spadina at the north end of the circle is being assembled.

The east side of Spadina Circle looking north.

Looking south on Spadina toward College Street.

The west side of Spadina Circle looking south.

No work has been done yet at the north end of the line from Sussex into the tunnel portal at Spadina Station.

Updated August 22, 2012 at 9:20 am

Reconstruction of the intersection at Adelaide & Spadina is almost completed with curb lane and sidewalk work remaining.

The City of Toronto has announced the next major stage in trackwork from King south to Lake Shore including reconstruction of the streetcar track as well as the platforms at Front and at Bremner.  Watermain work at Lake Shore and structural repairs on the bridge over the rail corridor will be co-ordinated with this project.

Work at the portal north of Sussex and around Spadina circle is already scheduled for the period from September through early November.

Streetcar service will return as far south as King (via Charlotte Loop) on November 18, 2012, and to Queen’s Quay Loop on December 23, 2012.

View looking west on Adelaide across Spadina. The church spire in the background is at Bathurst.

Updated July 18, 2012 at 11:00pm

Most of the concrete has been placed for the main part of the intersection at Queen & Spadina, and work is in progress to complete the four approaches and stops.  This view is taken from the southeast corner.

In this view, new track is being installed for the south approach and the southbound stop.  Note the area where the stop has been excavated only down one level leaving the attachment points for the metal ties that were part of the original installation.  This is an example of how the new style of track construction will avoid the need to completely rebuild track when it comes up for replacement.

Meanwhile, a few blocks away on McCaul Street, Toronto Water is working underneath the streetcar lanes.  The track, including the McCaul Loop which is inside the  building on the east side (left), will be replaced once Toronto Water is out of the way.  This isn’t part of the Spadina project itself, but having McCaul closed at the same time adds to the fun of navigating downtown as a transit user or motorist.  501 McCaul cars are currently running to York and Richmond, and they will resume running to Wolseley Loop at Bathurst Street next week when Queen reopens for streetcar traffic.

Updated July 14, 2012 at 7:00pm

The full intersection was almost complete when I visited this afternoon with only one small piece missing from the south-to-east curve.  Here is the view from the SW corner which you can compare with the July 13 shot to see the day’s progress.  Less obvious is welding that was taking place and the connection of grounding cables to the track.

Looking south on Spadina across the north quadrant, the last to be installed.

Looking west to the intersection showing the area where the new westbound stop and enlarged island will be built.

Updated July 13, 2012 at 10:30pm

The Globe and Mail has an article about road construction projects by Carys Mills including a photo taken from the northwest corner of the intersection around 1pm judging by the shadows.  The curve segments linking up the four corners are starting to go in, and they were not there when I took the photos below at about 9am.  This job is moving very quickly.

Updated July 13, 2012 at 1:55 pm

Morning of Friday, July 13

The west quadrant’s installation is well advanced.

For the moment, the TTC’s tent is perched centre stage on the diamond.

Demolition of the east approach and safety island are complete.

Thursday, July 12

The first piece of the south quadrant goes into place.  [H. McMann photo]

Later in the day, looking east along Queen.  The eastern quadrant is in place while excavation of the approach are continues.  The concrete pour for the north quadrant’s base is in progress.

Looking southwest to work still in progress on the south quadrant.

Wednesday, July 11

The concrete foundation has been poured for the central part of the intersection while excavation continues around the margins.  [Photo by Harold McMann, with thanks]

Lifting the pre-assembled central diamond off of a trailer.  [H. McMann photo]

The diamond placed in the centre of the intersection.  [H. McMann photo]

Monday, July 9

Demolition begins on the south side of the intersection.  All of the concrete, old rails and ties must be broken up and removed before the new foundation can be poured.  This work continued through the week with the last of the old intersection coming out on July 12.

Updated July 5, 2012 at 4:30 pm

Construction work to modify platforms at various stops along Spadina is now underway.  The affected stops are fenced off as current or future worksites.

Broken concrete around special work on Spadina at College has been repaired.

Although not included in the original list of track replacement projects, the section from King south to Lake Shore will be done in this construction season.  The TTC has confirmed that this part will begin in September.  The work will be co-ordinated with bridge repairs by the City of Toronto.

The intersection at King will be rebuilt in 2013.

The Spadina and Queen routes will divert around their intersection starting on July 9 for replacement of the track, one of our three “grand unions” where it is possible to make turns in all eight possible ways.

510 Spadina

• Southbound to Queen’s Quay: via Dundas, Bathurst and Adelaide to Spadina
• Northbound from Queen’s Quay: via Adelaide, Peter, Queen, Beverley and Dundas to Spadina
• Queen short-turn service (replaces 510 to King service): same diversion as above without operating south of Adelaide

501 Queen

• Humber and Long Branch services including 301 night car: both ways via Shaw, King and Church
• Bathurst short turn service: loops downtown via Church, Richmond and York to Queen (these are, effectively, 502 Downtowner cars in disguise as 501s).
• 301 night buses will use the same loop via Richmond and York as the 501s.  This will mean that some of the night service will be provided on Queen and some on King, and that some stops will only have service from the night bus.
• No replacement service on Queen from Shaw to Church except for the infrequent, and weekday daytime only “501 York” cars.  No replacement service on Queen from Church to York evenings and weekends.

Shuffle Demons Return to Spadina Bus

Today, the TTC brought GMC fishbowl 2252 out of retirement as an extra on 510 Spadina.  The occasion was an onboard performance by The Shuffle Demons who were promoting the launch of a new CD with music including their 1986 tune Spadina Bus.

This will probably be the last time (for now at least) we see a New Look bus in revenue, albeit supplementary, service.  Many of the buildings in these photos did not exist when fishbowls plied Spadina.  The bus itself is about 30 years old.

Southbound at Bloor Street.

Between Queen and Richmond.

Southbound crossing Adelaide with a 510-King short turn bus waiting to turn east.

Northbound approaching Front with the usual parade.

Northbound at Clarence Square, the former southern terminus for most runs on the 77 Spadina bus.

Northbound at King.

For views inside the bus, see The Torontoist’s article.

For a video, see The Grid.

Original June 21 post:

The TTC has various pages with info on this project:

• Spadina Streetcar Track Reconstruction
• Modification to Platform Islands
• Spadina Bus notice
• Construction notice July 2012

According to the track reconstruction page, the dates of the intersection projects originally listed in the recent CEO’s report have been changed.

Queen & Spadina will be completely closed for two weeks starting Monday, July 9.  It will re-open partly on Monday, July 23, and the project will be completed by Friday, August 3.  Queen cars will divert around the site until the east-west track is available for service.  The diversion routing has not been announced, but given available trackage will likely be between Church and Shaw.  As for the Spadina bus, I can only imagine how little time it will actually spend on Spadina below Dundas.

Adelaide & Spadina will be closed northbound from Monday, August 14 to Friday, August 24, and some restrictions will remain in place to Sunday, August 26.

Track reconstruction north from College to Sussex (in two separate sections) will begin after Labour Day.

Bus service is expected to continue on Spadina until Sunday, November 18.

A consolidated list of Council actions has been added to show the net effect of many overlapping motions and amendments.

Updated May 9, 2013 at 11:00 pm:

After an extremely long debate and complex voting process, the primary outcome of Council’s actions was:

• “That City Council support the extension of the Bloor Danforth Subway Line from Kennedy Station to the Scarborough Town Centre and north to Sheppard Avenue.”
• “That City Council request that the North York Relief Line (unfinished subway construction between Sheppard Avenue and Allen Road, and Yonge Street and Sheppard Avenue) be recognized as a substantive project priority for Phase 2 Metrolinx funding.”
• That consideration of various other projects such as the Bloor West subway extension be referred to the Chief Planner for analysis and incorporation in the review of the Official Plan now in progress
• That Council not support any of the proposed “revenue tools” to fund transit expansion or operations, but that if Queen’s Park chooses to implement some, Toronto wants its cut subject to a number of conditions.

The full minutes, for those with the heart to wade through them, are on the City’s website.

From a procedural viewpoint, Council merely offered “support” or a “request” for new subway lines, but did not actually ask that the Scarborough LRT be recast as a subway project.  Speaker Nunziata ruled that Council was not technically reopening the matter of its agreement with Queen’s Park, and therefore only a simple majority of votes was needed for motions regarding changes to the proposed network to pass.

Before the voting even began, Transportation Minister Glen Murray had told the Queen’s Park press gallery that the province was building the already agreed-to network and would not entertain a change to subway technology for the SRT replacement.  This did not deter Council from asking for the change anyhow, no doubt hoping that political winds at the Pink Palace will bring a change in policy.

This on the same day Transportation Minister Glen Murray emphasized that the province will not be giving Toronto a new subway extension in exchange for a deal on revenue streams to build transit. “I want to be very clear so no one misunderstands me: We have 15 projects, we’re not revisiting those projects, we’re continuing to build those projects,” he said. [The Globe And Mail, May 9, 2013]

Over half of the voting time, and a great deal of debate, was wasted on the question of which revenue tools, if any, Council would support.  The staff report recommended a few, but rejected most.  Rather than completely replacing this recommendation with a set of motions to adopt or reject each tool, Council wound up with a rat’s nest of overlapping and contradictory motions proposing new lists, and with some Councillors proposing amendments to others’ motions.  The effect at times was to create double and triple negatives in the effect of some votes rather than simply taking each tool/tax/fee in turn and voting up or down on whether Council supported it.

In the end, Council rejected all of them, a process that could have taken a lot less time with only a modicum of procedural leadership.

Toronto now faces a provincial government that will almost certainly ignore its requests and, in the short term, will proceed with the agreed plan (which Council did not attempt to revoke).

For their parts, Metrolinx and the TTC owe everyone a much more detailed statement of the cost implications of the LRT and subway options to inform any decision to take one or the other path.  Whether we will actually get this, given the vested interests in the fog of misinformation hanging over Council’s debate and Metrolinx planning, is another question.

Update 2 – Decisions taken by Council:

In this section, I have attempted to collect related motions together so that the overall intent of Council (assuming such a thing exists) is clear.  Where an action is included in quotation marks, this is a direct quote from the Council motion.

Council did not explicitly name Sales Taxes or Development Charges in the list of revenue tools it supported.  This has been construed by some Councillors as a backhanded endorsement by omission.  However, a separate motion recommending a 1% province-wide sales tax dedicated to transportation programs throughout Ontario was defeated by a vote of 28:16.

Although Council does not support a parking levy, if one is imposed then:

• “City Council request the Provincial government to consider no charge for small scale commercial parking and differentiated charges for paid commercial parking lots and other large scale free commercial parking.”

Council indicated general support for regional transit expansion and for dedicated revenues to fund The Big Move’s capital and operating costs.  Any new taxes or fees implemented should follow certain principles:

• “All project selections be based on a cost/benefit analysis that emphasizes improving transportation capacity, relief from congestion, and is linked to appropriate land-use planning.”
• Operation of transit expansions should be fully costed.
• New GTHA fees should be dedicated to GTHA transportation, they should imposed at the same level across the region and they should not “create a disincentive to economic growth in Toronto”.
• The mix of fees should balance between effects on residents and businesses.  They should take account of affordability for those of low incomes with tax credits to be considered to offset the cost for this group.
• New revenues should not be used to fund the existing $8.4b provincial commitment to the “phase one” Big Move projects.
• GO Transit capital and operating costs should be carried by the province separately from new revenues.  This position conflicts with the presence of GO expansion projects in The Big Move.

Council’s support for new fees is conditional on a 25% share of the revenue for incremental funding (ie: net new money) of municipal transit expansion with priorities to be set municipally.  A regional property tax was explicitly rejected because this revenue stream is required to fund local requirements.

Separately, Council asked that Queen’s Park agree to fund 1/2 of transit operating costs, state of good repair programs and rolling stock in Toronto.

Council asked that the Federal government contribute to The Big Move with “equitable and increased” funding.  The Feds were also asked to implement a regional income tax reduction to offset the cost of new taxes to the GTHA.  Yes, you read that correctly.  Council wants the Feds to, in effect, pay for the cost of transit expansion through a tax cut in the GTHA that would be clawed back through new provincial revenues.

Council asked that Metrolinx work with provincial and federal agencies to implement projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) to minimize costs.  Of course, there is no guarantee that this will actually deliver better, cheaper projects over their lifetime, but this is part of current financial orthodoxy.  In a separate motion, Council also asked that Metrolinx issue an international Request for Proposals (RFP) for future subway construction in Toronto.  This is actually already Metrolinx’ practice.

Council asked that capital maintenance costs for any projects built and owned by Metrolinx be borne by that agency.  By implication, municipalities should not be responsible for funding repairs to infrastructure that they do not own.  This could be tricky depending on the wording of operating agreements between Metrolinx and municipalities.

Council asked that all Metrolinx and TTC projects “be aligned with City Building goals including appropriate transit oriented development on Metrolinx properties” and that both agencies “undertake Community Benefit Agreements for all transit lines and local projects funded through new revenue tools”.

Council requested reports from the City Manager on:

• a revised governance structure for Metrolinx,
• principles for allocation of the 25% municipal share of new revenues,
• the “opportunity” to use the municipal share to finance 50% of existing GTHA transit operations.

Council referred the following additional transit lines to the Chief Planner:

• a Sheppard LRT spur to the Zoo,
• a Finch West subway from the Spadina subway to Humber College,
• the Downtown Relief Line,
• the Sheppard Subway Line from Don Mills Station to Scarborough Town Centre,
• extension of the Bloor-Danforth Subway Line to the East Mall and Sherway Gardens Mall.

Council also decided that it should:

“not proceed with the proposed Yonge North Subway Extension until improvements have first been made to increase capacity on the existing Yonge University line by an amount at least equal to the increased ridership generated by the Yonge North Subway Extension.”

This is oddly worded because both the Richmond Hill extension and any project to relieve capacity downtown are Metrolinx projects within The Big Move, not Toronto projects.  This appears to be a drafting error, and the motion should have read that Council does not support building the extension until there is capacity to absorb the new riding.

Notwithstanding the report request to the City Manager, Council also made several requests to Queen’s Park related to Metrolinx:

• “The governance and decision-making processes of Metrolinx must be changed to ensure Toronto has an appropriate degree of control over the use of new transit-related revenue tools applied in Toronto.”
• “Mechanisms are put in place to insure the accountability of Metrolinx, including the appointment of the Mayor or his designate to the Board of Metrolinx.”
• That the board revert to its original format with political representation from the regional municipalities on an “equitable basis” between Toronto and the other regions, and that the chair be appointed by the province.  All decisions on the spending of new revenues would be controlled by this board.

Original article from 8:33am May 9:

Toronto Council was supposed to debate the issue of transit “revenue tools” yesterday, May 8, so that it could advise Queen’s Park which were acceptable in Toronto’s eyes, or at least which were the least unacceptable, given that nobody likes new taxes.

The debate, which will continue today, descended into complete chaos of “let’s make a deal” transit planning of the worst kind seen in decades.

The whole affair started simply enough with a move to wrest control of the City Manager’s report on revenue tools from Mayor Ford’s Executive Committee.  That was accomplished by a procedural vote needing a 2/3 majority of councillors present, a move that took took advantage of at least one Ford ally from the meeting.  That was on Tuesday, May 7.  Late Wednesday morning, May 8, the item came up for debate.

The entire scheme started to unravel with a move by Scarborough Councillor Glenn De Baeremaeker to make any approval of new funding tools conditional on changing the proposed Scarborough LRT to a full subway line.  As I have discussed in other articles, the arguments for this change are tenuous and include flat out misrepresentations of several aspects of the two options, notably their relative cost.

Not content to stop at one subway, other members of Council have started to chime in with their pet projects including a Bloor West subway, the Sheppard east and west extensions (the latter dubbed the “Pasternak Relief Line” by some), a totally grade-separated line on Finch, and a resurrected Jane LRT.  The combined additions to the network cost are astronomical, but that’s not really what Councillors care about.

Some, like De Baeremaeker, are fighting for their political hides, worried that they be portrayed as less than supportive of their supposedly downtrodden suburban communities.

Some are fighting political battles by proxy for the provincial parties.  The Tories bang the drum on the “no new taxes” front while failing to explain how the mass of high-cost transit proposals will be funded.  The NDP trots out their hobby-horse of corporate taxes arguing that Council should not support increases in regressive, user-based fees such as sales or fuel taxes.  Even some Liberals are up to mischief attempting to create an embarrassing situation where Premier Kathleen Wynne would be forced into a Hobson’s choice of changing her position on The Big Move network, or of overriding Council’s desire for new subway lines.  The Liberals in question are still fighting the lost leadership battle.  None of this serves the debate about funding and building a major expansion of the GTA’s transit network.

What is overwhelmingly evident is the leadership vacuum at City Hall.  Throughout the debate, Mayor Ford wandered in and out of the chamber wearing his Toronto Maple Leaf jersey and clearly was more interested in how the hockey game might play out than a vital debate.  He didn’t really have much to do with De Baeremaeker making a complete fool of himself and compromising both truth and any sense of responsible transit planning.

For her part, Karen Stintz, having launched the whole process, sat silently while the debate drifted further and further from any coherence and, by extension, possible support for any “plan” including her own “One City”.  Rather than letting the genie out of the bottle and getting three well-chosen wishes for her transit scheme, Stintz is revealed as a Sorceror’s Apprentice who cannot control the blind forces she has unleashed.

Procedurally, there is one hope: any formal change to last fall’s LRT-based agreement between Toronto and Metrolinx would require a 2/3 majority of Council to be reopened.  This may block some of the more outrageous schemes for a time, but won’t undo the damage of  a divisive, if-I-don’t-get-a-subway-I-won’t-play attitude on Council.

At Queen’s Park, the Tories must be rubbing their hands with delight at yet another chance to embarrass the Wynne government.  Meanwhile, the NDP, utterly incapable of actually making a decision without weeks of polling and “conversations”, shows no coherent leadership, and the Liberals have to deal with a fifth column of anti-Wynne Scarborough MPPs.

I must not leave out the transit agencies here.  Metrolinx has been notoriously unwilling to actually defend its plan by fleshing out details, providing accurate information about what it will build, how long this will take and how much it will cost.  The TTC produced a report in January 2013 comparing the subway and LRT options that included costs we now know overstate the LRT option by $500m.  Is this incompetence or an underhand attempt to make the subway option look better than it really is?

Amusingly, some Councillors such as Speaker Nunziata are happy to attack the TTC for being incapable of doing anything right, notably the “St. Clair disaster” which also figured in the debate.  However, they are more than happy to cite a bogus comparison of technologies.

As I have written before, there may be an argument for some subway expansion provided that this is based on trustworth projections of costs and benefits (yes, I know, I’m sounding like the Board of Trade here), not on rosy-eyed dreams of development and transit demand in every corner of the city.  None of the debates, including some of the input to The Big Move, rests on such a foundation, and “planning” consists of issuing boxes of crayons to a kindergarten class.

Toronto deserves so much better, but we are unlikely to see it, and a chance to actually build the transit we need may be lost for at least a decade.

The City Manager’s Report on “Revenue Tools” to fund transit expansion may, or may not, find its way onto Toronto Council’s agenda on May 7/8 depending on the success of political manoeuvres to bring the item onto the agenda.  Executive Committee chose to defer the item to its May 28, 2013, meeting at which point the issue will be moot as Metrolinx will already have issued its recommendations to Queen’s Park.

In the run-up to a forced Council debate, it is not enough for some, including TTC Chair Karen Stintz, to simply appeal to a sense of democracy – six members of Executive should not be able to block debate by 45 members of Council on an important matter.  This became a chance to dust off the “One City” plan and pull together a Scarborough coalition by advancing the cause of a Scarborough Subway – an extension of the Danforth line east and north from Kennedy Station to Sheppard and McCowan.

No sooner was this scheme back on the table, but other would-be players began to mutter about their own pet projects.  That “extra half billion” the subway option in Scarborough may cost on paper could attract billions of add-ons, almost like the worst of pork-filled appropriations in the US Congress.  What might fall off of the table to pay for the Scarborough subway plus any other extras needed to bring reluctant Councillors onside is unknown.  Queen’s Park has been quite clear that there is no additional funding from that quarter, and so and extra must come from Toronto.

Queen’s Park can, of course, ignore whatever Council may try to add as conditions on approval of revenue tools, but if these undo the agreement to build LRT lines signed barely a year ago, this is no trivial discussion.  Regional planning will take a back seat to political aspirations just as it has for the past four decades, and momentum for actual construction rather than endless debate and delay will be lost.

The whole concept that the subway option is “affordable” turns on the premise that it is only slightly more expensive than the LRT, and brings benefits the LRT option cannot.  Some claims made for the subway option are, at best, misinformed, and at worst outright deceptions.  Unfortunately, the public agencies charged with providing accurate information are staying silent lest they be drawn into yet another political debate that could wreck professional careers.

Here are a few questions that should be asked and answered.

How Much Will The LRT and Subway Options Cost?

According to a TTC report from January 2013, and LRT line ending at Sheppard would cost $2.3-billion versus a subway at $2.8-billion.  The base year for these quotes is not given, nor is it clear whether inflation to completion is included.

However, as recently as the Stintz One City Plan of June 2012, the cost estimates were both half a billion lower at ($1.8b and $2.3b respectively).  These were quoted in 2011$.

Updated May 7: The TTC’s Brad Ross writes in an email today:

1. The costs for the SRT in the January report were 2011 dollars.
2. They included vehicles, plus $500 million for yard provisions.

Metrolinx continues to cite $1.8b on the Big Move website, although this is quoted in 2010$.  It is not clear what the cost base year is for the TTC figures, nor the presumed construction period for the TTC options which would affect the inflation to completion.

Fleet

At one time, the TTC was planning to replace the existing Scarborough RT with new “Mark II” RT cars similar to the second generation of cars used on Vancouver’s Skytrain system (not to be confused with the new “Canada” line that serves the airport and does not use the same technology).  This project included an expanded carhouse and maintenance facility east of McCowan Yard, and provision for this persisted in the plans even after the project became an LRT scheme.  It is unclear whether the TTC’s cost base includes this carhouse for the LRT option.

Updated May 7:  The TTC has confirmed that the $2.3b cost estimate for the LRT option includes $500m for a new carhouse.  This is not, in fact, required and therefore the cost of the LRT option is overstated by the same amount.

By contrast, no new storage or fleet is required for the subway option because the TTC has an embarrassment of extra subway cars.  This situation arises from an era when fleet planning assumed all subway cars were the same, and that even with some new equipment, the Spadina subway extension would operate in part with the current fleet of “T-1″ cars.  However, with a decision to move to the new “TR” unit trains on the Yonge line and a switch to automatic train control, the T-1 fleet will be relegated mainly to the Bloor-Danforth line.

However, the TTC owns more T-1 trains than it requires to operate both the B-D and Sheppard subways.  The surplus is available for an extension such as the Scarborough Subway.  This reduces the cost/km that would otherwise have to factor in yard and fleet requirements.

Stations

The subway extension will only add three stations to the network, and not serve as wide an area as the LRT line would have.  The TTC projects that the population close to rapid transit service will be roughly half the size with a subway as with an LRT (24k vs 47k).

Despite the relatively bad station locations, the TTC projects slightly higher ridership for the subway (36m annually for subway versus 31m for LRT) in part due to the elimination of the transfer at Kennedy Station.

The One City plan cites daily ridership of 44k (present) for the SRT versus 125k (future) for the subway, but winds up with a similar total subway ridership of 38.9m/year.  This misrepresents the two options by comparing an existing, shorter, capacity constrained RT line to a new subway.  As we see in the TTC estimates, the extended and improved LRT would carry almost as many as the subway line.

For the LRT option, Kennedy is to be reconfigured, but the proposed Metrolinx design has not yet been published.  The TTC’s version included in the EA for the line shows the new SRT station beside the subway station to allow a simpler interchange via an expanded mezzanine area.

The LRT option includes a future extension to Malvern, something that is not possible with the subway and would, instead, need to be a spur off of the Sheppard LRT if and when that line is actually built.

Closing The SRT

The length of a shutdown for reconstruction of the SRT along the same right-of-way has been cited at various lengths ranging from 3 to 5 years.  Generally, the larger numbers are used when someone wants to advocate for a no-shutdown option.

In July 2012, I received the following email from Jack Collins, Metrolinx Vice-President, Rapid Transit Implementation:

Your recent blog posting implies that Metrolinx or the Province has increased the duration of the SRT shutdown period from 3 years to 3 to 4 years.

This is not the case. The first time we heard 3 to 4 years was during the City Council debate on Wednesday concerning the One City Plan.

This duration did not come from a Metrolinx representative and in all our discussions with the TTC staff the shutdown has been three years, and hopefully less if we put our minds to it.

I wanted to assure you and your readers that even with an AFP type contract, the current Metrolinx plan is:

• SRT will stay in service until after the 2015 Pan Am/ Para Pan games
• The AFP contract will have a condition that will limit the shutdown period to no more than 3 years
• As part of the AFP contractor selection process, contractors will be encouraged to come up with plans to reduce the shutdown period to less than 3 years

Scarborough Subway advocates routinely claim that the SRT will shut down for 5 years (the One City plan cites a value of “4+ years”).  What the subway advocates do not address is the question of the existing SRT’s longevity.

In the Transit City Plans, the SRT conversion would already be underway with the new LRT line to open before the Pan Am Games in 2015 and a roughly 3-year shutdown period.  When Queen’s Park stretched out the funding for Transit City and forced the TTC to keep the SRT running until after the Games, the TTC reluctantly agreed, but was concerned about whether the technology could be kept alive that long.  As things stand, the SRT service has been downgraded so that the existing fleet and control system can achieve the scheduled performance.

No detailed design nor EA has been conducted for the Scarborough Subway, and given past experiences, it would be astounding if such a line could be in operation by 2020.  There is a high likelihood that the existing SRT will simply stop working well before then forcing a shutdown even with the subway option.  The implications of keeping the SRT running until a subway line opens have not been explored or costed.

Although Metrolinx is on the record with an estimate of three years or less for the SRT shutdown (see above), the longer five year number is often cited because former Minister of Transportation Bob Chiarelli published a timetable for transit projects showing the SRT being completed “by 2020″.  Relative to a fall 2015 shutdown, this is read in some circles as “five years”.

Metrolinx does its own plan a disservice by staying so quiet on the subject when publicly aiming at 2018 would improve the LRT plan’s credibility.

In fact, Metrolinx plans to begin construction on the Conlins Road Maintenance Facility in late 2014 along with track on Sheppard East and the portion of the LRT line east of McCowan Yard.  A pause to have the LRT-vs-Subway technology debate all over again, especially if this is founded on a dubious comparison of the costs, could further delay transit expansion in Scarborough.

Concluding Thoughts

All of this debate has surfaced thanks to repeated delays to Toronto’s transit plans both by Mayor Ford and by Queen’s Park who, for a time, played along with Ford even in the absence of Council’s agreement.  TTC Chair Karen Stintz wants to see her plan implemented and thoroughly wrest control of the transit agenda from Ford, but she needs Scarborough’s support to achieve this.

What has been lost here is an overall sense of what the City needs from its transit system than yet another set of lines drawn on a map and the political horse-trading that goes with such an exercise.

Council should debate which revenue tools it feels comfortable supporting as part of a provincial transit scheme, but the debate about the network layout and content belongs elsewhere.

Postscript

I originally made this remark in the comment thread, but it belongs here in the main post.

I could reluctantly be brought around to the subway point of view if only the cost figures could actually be compared on an apples-to-apples basis and remain only “moderately” more expensive for a subway, and if the subway advocates would address the issue of the SRT shutdown period through either option. As things stand, the rosiest possible picture is painted for the subway, and that sort of argument arouses suspicion.

Local boosterism coupled with a “to good to be true” argument for a transit proposal should raise questions.  Whether they will be asked, let alone answered, remains to be seen.

• May meeting preview
• CEO’s Report
• Customer Satisfaction Survey
• Property Acquisition Management Plan
• Pape Station reconstruction
• A deputation about the 507/501 streetcar service

Updated May 6, 2013 at 5:20pm:  In the original version of these notes, Commissioner Heisey’s concern about unreliable service on Dundas Street was reported.  The Commissioner has written to me to note that the service was actually worse than how I quoted his remarks.  His correction is included near the end of the “Customer Satisfaction Survey” section below.

May 24th Will Be A Busy Meeting

Reports and discussions in the pipeline for May include:

• An update on the Leslie Barns project and on the many sub-projects concerning the reconstruction of the streetcar system to accommodate the Low Floor LRVs.
• A report on the Gateway News Stand lease issue.
• A five-year plan for the TTC including an overview of the future of streetcar service.
• A discussion of the City Manager’s report on the Metrolinx Investment Strategy (this may be pre-empted by actions at the City Council meeting of May 7/8).
• A report on the problem of automobiles blocking intersections on red lights.
• A discussion of the proposed amalgamation of the TTC’s Pension Fund Society with OMERS.  (This item was held down from the April agenda because confidential information on the subject cannot be released to the non-Councillor commissioners until after Council approves this action at its next meeting.)

CEO’s Report

Results are now in for early 2013, and the TTC’s ridership and revenue are down from budget projections, mainly due to the poorer-than-expected weather.  However, riding is still running above 2012 levels, and the TTC expects to make up the loss over the year.

The moving annual average of ridership is 2% over the comparable period a year ago, and ridership in the second reporting period (mainly the month of February) was 4% above last year.

Subway punctuality continues to be lower on the Yonge-University-Spadina line than on other routes through a combination of passenger assistance incidents, fire/smoke delays and continuing problems with the new TR subway trains.

SRT punctuality improved substantially in fall 2012 when the schedules were adjusted to reflect operations that this aging technology can actually achieve.  Severe weather in February caused problems with snow and ice accumulation, an ongoing issue with the SRT power pickup, motor/track design and vehicle doors.

Surface route punctuality fell in February due to bad weather, but the bus system was more severely affected.  The TTC is reviewing operating strategies to plan for future major winter weather disruptions.

Route by route statistics on reliability were published on the TTC’s website, and I commented on them in a recent article.  Problems with the methodology to create these stats remain, but I won’t belabour the point by repeating previous criticism here.  TTC management are aware of the issues and working on improvements both to the quality of service and the way in which this is measured.

Planned major service disruptions include:

• Spadina from Queens Quay Loop to King.  This is shown in the CEO report as completing by June 23.  Until I hear details of construction plans at the coming Waterfront Toronto public meeting, I remain skeptical of this date.  However, for scheduling purposes, this may be the target.
• Harbourfront route.  The CEO’s report shows that streetcar operation will resume around the Labour Day weekend.  Again, I await Waterfront Toronto’s construction update for definitive information.
• Planned shutdowns of the YUS for rail grinding have been deferred because the equipment leased to perform this work is not in working order.
• Streetcar service on Kingston Road will be suspended from June 23 to November 24 for track and road reconstruction.
• Track replacement on York Street will involve the shutdown of the Queen/York intersection from June 29 to July 10.  During this period, service on Queen will divert via Victoria, Dundas and McCaul.  There is no indication yet whether a special schedule with extra running time will be operated.

TTC Chief Customer Officer Chris Upfold, sitting in for CEO Andy Byford, advised the Commission that with the subway’s aging infrastructure, the scope of repair work will become more significant, and disruptive shutdowns will become more common.

Customer Satisfaction Survey

(The presentation for this report is not yet online on the TTC’s site, only a one-page covering report.  When and if this is available, I will add a link to it here.)

The TTC conducted four surveys through 2012 to assess customer attitudes to a variety of issues with transit service, the physical environment of the transit system and perceptions of the TTC as an agency.  These were carried out in April, July, September and December with sample sizes of 551, 1100, 1000 and 1000 respectively.  The small sample in the first survey reflects a late start on the overall project.

City of Toronto residents aged 13 to 70 who used the TTC at least once every few weeks were included in the survey which lasted about 10 minutes by phone.  The respondent breakdown was:

• 47% use the TTC once a day or more often
• 31% use the TTC several times a week
• 12% use the TTC once a week
• 10% use the TTC once every few weeks

The mode of transportation for respondents’ most recent trip were:

• 75% by subway
• 65% by bus
• 22% by streetcar

The numbers add to more than 100% because trips involve multiple modes.  As with a previous city survey of transit mode, the streetcar system percentage is disproportionately high relative to its size in the network showing its relative importance in passenger numbers.

The purpose of the most recent trip was:

• 47% to work
• 17% for personal business
• 14% for pleasure/recreation
• 13% for school
• 8% for grocery shopping

The method of fare purchase was:

• 53% by ticket/token split 41% by token, 12% by ticket
• 33% by monthly pass split 26% by adult, 7% by other
• 11% by cash
• 3% other

(Note: No confidence levels were included with any of the published statistics.)

Customer satisfaction declined overall through 2012 with a good-excellent rating falling Customers are pleased with “soft” aspects of the system, but they are unhappy with subway and surface vehicle crowding.  Wait times and the lack of helpful information about delays were also flagged.

Good-excellent ratings for wait times were reported consistently through the year by about 70% of subway riders, but the numbers fell to the low 50%s on the bus system, and similar numbers for streetcars with a noticeable dip below 50% in the third quarter (when the effect of major construction projects probably affected many riders).

By contrast, journey times were ranked good-excellent fairly consistently for all modes at 60-70%, again with a third quarter dip for the streetcars.

Crowding is a big problem and ranked slightly worse on the subway than on the surface modes.  Only slightly more than 50% rated crowding for any more as good-excellent.

Vehicle cleanliness was rated good-excellent by about 60% of respondents across all modes with buses running slightly behind the rail modes.

Maps and information predictably did poorly for surface modes where there is less access to this information (unless one is using a smartphone application), while the ratings were higher for the subway (where the system is simpler, and status displays are available in most stations).

The Q&A with Commissioners following the report’s presentation brought out intriguing concerns:

• Commissioner Alan Heisey asked about the effect of wider headways on wait time, specifically as this would affect routes where longer vehicles will be operated.  Given that wait times are a major source of dissatisfaction, will the wider headways only make the problem worse?
• Heisey observed that he had recently tried to use the Dundas car, but had walked from Yonge to University without being overtaken by any service.  (As he was saying this, I looked at Nextbus and found that there was no Dundas car in either direction between Dufferin and Yonge Street.)

Correction:  Commissioner Heisey wrote:

Steve, you misquoted me.

The walk I did with my kids was way worse than Yonge to University.  We started walking west [east?] on Dundas West from Kensington Market, west of Spadina and Augusta, and walked all the way to University without a street car passing us.

This is at the walking speed of a 9 year old, my daughter, who was with me.

The Star reports that Chris Upfold is well aware of the issues with service quality:

First, says Chris Upfold, the crowding is real. “The biggest damage we did was the reduction of our loading standards 18 months ago. Our service is the biggest driver of our overall customer service satisfaction,” he said.

“Although many of our other scores have gone up — and reliability is up 3 to 5 per cent above what it was a year ago — people feel more crowded on buses and streetcars,” said Upfold.

I must say that it’s good to see someone at the TTC acknowledging that the Ford era penny-pinching service cuts, a tactic still not repudiated by Chair Karen Stintz, are having an effect on the attractiveness of transit service.

• Commissioner Raymond Cho, who represents a ward in eastern Scarborough, asked about a geographic breakdown of the survey.  He regular receives complaints from riders who wait endlessly for buses that don’t show up or are full.  Chris Upfold replied that the survey looked at all Toronto customers, but he missed the point that issues may differ from one part of the transit network to another.  (Some of this showed up in the regional breakdowns of the City’s recent review of transportation concerns.)  The TTC, however, will try to drill into survey results to identify subgroups where the dissatisfaction is highest to understand their concerns.
• Commissioner Anju Virmani asked about systems the TTC would like to emulate.  What system do we want to be when we grow up?  Upfold replied that the TTC, like any transit system, had to be the best for the city it was in.  There are things to emulate from a 150-year-old system (London UK) or from new systems in the Far East, but one can’t simply take a system from one city and plunk it down in another.
• Commissioner Virmani also asked about having the customer survey tracked against the goal of the customer charter.  Staff agreed that this should be done.

The quarterly surveys will continue through 2014 and results will be included in future CEO reports.

Property Acquisition Management Plan

This report addresses recommendation from the City’s Ombudsman regarding the process for handling public consultation on construction projects, especially as this relates to proposed acquisition of property.  The TTC will mend its ways and engage communities and affected property owners much sooner in the process.

The report would have been adopted but for a concern that the language did not commit the TTC to sufficient advance notice.  It would still be possible for affected parties to learn of a project the day before a public meeting or announcement.  The report was sent back to staff to examine longer notice periods and the effect this might have on project proposals.

Pape Station Reconstruction

Recently, TTC staff surveyed users of Pape Station to determine preferences between two schemes that would speed completion of the reconstruction project at that site.  Although it was supposed to finish in early 2012, the project has dragged on at least in part due to unexpected site conditions.  Regular travellers through the station see progress from time to time, but periods of inactivity don’t give the best impression.

The TTC proposed that completely closing the station for 12 days would allow work to be accelerated because full access to the worksite would be possible without having to protect for passengers.  This would bring substantial completion of the station forward to September from late December.

The survey gave three options:  close for 12 days in a row, close for 6 2-day weekends in a row, or keep with the original plan.  The first option, a complete shutdown, won by 52.3% of the votes.  The weekend-only option received 33.2% and the “no change” option 14.1%.  Further details of the survey are in the linked report.

The TTC will announce the dates of the shutdown together with information on route changes and alternate service provisions in a few weeks.

A Deputation About the 507/501 Service

Normally, I would not critique deputations at the Commission as these are expressions of public interest just like my own.  As a very long-time occupant of the deputant’s chair, I respect the right of anyone to have their five minutes presenting ideas to the Commission.

A regular feature of meetings these days is Alan Yule who gives entertaining illustrated talks on a variety of subjects and does a good job of integrating threads from various aspects of TTC policy and operations into one presentation.

This time out, Yule spoke about the proposed restoration of a separate 507 Long Branch service split from the 501 Queen car.  This is a scheme I proposed many years ago, but which TTC staff fought against.  It is poorly understood by the area Councillors, and is for all purposes a dead issue.

• 501 Queen cars would operate between Neville and Humber as they did before the routes were integrated.
• 507 Long Branch cars would operate from Long Branch Loop to Dundas West Station providing overlap with the 501 and 504 routes.  This would ensure that even if the latter were short-turned, riders would be able to continue through without being marooned at a transfer point.
• 508 Lake Shore through service from Long Branch to downtown would be maintained and improved during the peak period.

What was disappointing was that Yule’s presentation dwelt on the minutiae of how the revised service could be configured at no extra cost to the TTC rather than on the benefits of this service relative to what’s there now.  The whole point is that outside the peak period, demand for local service on Lake Shore is stronger than demand to ride through into downtown, and the erratic service provided by the 501 Queen car works against provision of reliable service on the western end of the route.  (The demand figures were cited in a TTC report some years ago, and they come from the Transportation Tomorrow Survey conducted by the UofT on behalf of planning agencies in the Toronto area.)

Councillor Peter Milczyn dismissed the scheme saying that riders on Lake Shore want to get downtown, and the integrated service was specifically to get rid of the unreliable connection at Humber Loop.  This misses the point about the route overlaps, but at this point I give up.  Southern Etobicoke will continue to get unpredictable service unless the TTC makes a major effort to clean up operation of the 501 Queen car.  A flotilla of Swan Boats at Humber Bay is more likely.

On April 30, 2013 from 10:00am to noon in Toronto Council Chambers, the City of Toronto Planning Department will present the first in a series of events where planners (and inspired amateurs) will:

talk about key planning issues from a historical perspective, to talk about innovative emerging ideas and research concepts, and to learn how other Cities have tackled complex planning issues currently facing Toronto.

These sessions are intended as a development program for City staff, but because of the large venue, this one will be open to the public.

The topic will be Transit Planning: A Tale of Two Cities with three presentations and a Q&A.

Edward J. Levy will speak on “Rapid Transit in Toronto: A Century of Plans, Progress, Politics & Paralysis”.

I will speak on the past, present and future of the streetcar system with specific emphasis on its role in handling the growing population and travel demand in the near-downtown areas.

Students from the Environmental Studies program at YorkUniversity will speak on “Transit growing among the Vineyards: Lessons from Montpellier, France”.

For those who cannot attend in person, the session will be webcast.  A link to this is available on the City Planning website.

See you there, or online.

See my comments on the Torontoist.

(Original post from April 24 below.)

Toronto Executive Committee’s vote to “receive” a report on potential transit revenue tools showed an appalling lack of leadership by Mayor Rob Ford, and a sense that he and a handful of minions can dictate the city’s agenda.

My comments are up on the Torontoist.

A few minor changes adjust schedules to improve service.

2013.05.12 Service Changes

In this article, I will review the details of operations on four sample days from the month to illustrate the fine-grained detail of service on some representative days.

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

March 2012 was very mild with little precipitation.  On March 13, temperatures ranged from 2.7° to 18.1°C and there was a small amount of rain (0.6mm).  This was the second weekday of the March school break when traffic is typically lighter than usual.  As weekdays go, these are fairly benign conditions.

• 29_20120313_Headways_NB
• 29_20120313_Headways_SB
• 29_20120313_Chart

The headway charts each have seven pages corresponding to seven points along the route starting at King Street in the south and ending at Wilson and Transit Road in the north.  The time of day is read across the chart, and each point represents a bus and the spacing between it and the vehicle ahead.

If every bus came at exactly the same spacing, all of the dots and the trend lines interpolated between them would be straight except where there is a change in the scheduled headway.  The trend lines do roughly track the scheduled headways, but the variation between vehicles can be seen in the sawtooth pattern of individual points.

Where a point is on the zero line, this means that two buses (sometimes more) passed the location “together” within the measurement accuracy of the vehicle tracking system.  A very low headway is always accompanied by high headways corresponding to the service gap on either side of the bunched service.

The TTC’s goal is for 65% of the service to lie within three minutes of the scheduled headway (in effect, three minutes either side of the trend line).  With a few exceptions this is the case northbound at King until about 2pm (1400 hours), but things get more ragged as the day wears on.  In the evening, at around 8pm (2000 hours), there are two gaps of about 20 minutes, and several of the data points thereafter lie outside of the three minute target band.

At Bloor Street northbound, the wide gaps in the evening have lessened thanks to short turns, but headways are still spread over a 12-minute range.  By the time we reach St. Clair northbound, the gaps between vehicles are getting longer starting around 3pm (1500) and clustering of vehicles is quite evident.  This continues all the way to the north end of the route.

The southbound headway charts need to be read from the last page backward to see the progression down Dufferin Street.  Service leaving Transit Road (just outside of Wilson Terminal) southbound has a fair amount of scatter around the trend line except for a brief period at midday.  By the pm peak, wide headways (commonly over 12′ with one spike to 24′) are common and service does not get back to a better behaved pattern until mid-evening.  Bunching is still evident until about 10pm (2200).

Working south along the line, the erratic headways of the pm peak settle down once we reach Eglinton and the Briar Hill short turn service has merged into the route.  Even so, the headways range over a 12-minute interval for much of the day and into the late evening.  The closer we get to the south end at King, the more pronounced the gaps become.  This is a typical pattern with poorly spaced service because trailing buses in short gaps catch up to their leaders and the gap behind them grows.

What is quite clear on these charts and others like them in this article is that no attempt is made to smooth out the service by breaking up packs of buses and forcing them to operate on something close to a regular headway.  In both directions, vehicles leave their terminals unevenly spaced, and it is no surprise that this condition simply reinforces itself along the route.

The service chart maps every vehicle on the line in space and time.  Each bus travels back and forth from north (top) to south (bottom) of the route, and its chart moves from left to right in time.  Any irregularity in service shows up with uneven spacing between vehicles, or bunching caused by events such as traffic accidents and congestion.  Where lines run horizontally, a vehicle is stationary for a time either at a traffic signal, a busy stop, or a layover point.

The first major gap shows up just after 7am southbound at Eglinton when five buses show up together at about 7:15am.  Two of these originated from the Briar Hill short turn, and the other three from Wilson.  They travel together southbound until one of them (the yellow line in the chart) short turns at College, has a short layover, and then returns north as a trip to Briar Hill.  Two of them go as far as Dufferin Loop (at Springhurst) (the black line and a faint green one).  The final two make a trip to the eastern entrance of the CNE, but then return to Dufferin Loop where they have a layover before returning northbound.

Although there is a bit of bunching, this is an example of a pack being sorted out to restore better spaced service on the return direction.

The remainder of the am peak is fairly uneventful although some bunching is evident.  We know from the headway charts that this not a problematic part of the day.

Similarly, the period from 10am to 1pm is fairly well behaved with only occasional bunching and no wide gaps.  It is worth noting here that vehicles get time for a reasonable layover at both the Wilson Station and Dufferin Loop terminals.  There appears to be only one short-turn southbound at Queen at about 11:50am (bright green line on the chart).

Coming into the afternoon, the character of the chart changes and we can see gaps developing.  Note that this is not accompanied by a change in the overall slope of the lines on the chart that would indicate congestion (i.e. slower operation) at specific troublesome parts of the route.  A gap leaves Wilson Station southbound at about 1:30pm and it gets progressively wider as a cluster of five buses makes its way south to Dufferin Loop.  Much of this cluster returns north, and it is only on their next southbound trip, after 3:00pm that somewhat better headways are restored.

Throughout the afternoon, pairs and trios of buses leave Wilson Station southbound.  Almost none is short turned, and where one does turn back at Queen (pink line, about 2:45pm), the bus immediately becomes part of a pair that grows to a quintet of buses headed north.

After 3:00pm, the effects of congestion are evident for northbound service as the lines tilt over and vehicles take longer to traverse their route.   One factor is the problem of overcrowding which can affect vehicle performance and stop service times.  Buses running in gaps can take longer then evenly-spaced counterparts over the same segment of a route.

A gap that appears to be congestion-induced begins northbound from King and widens to 24 minutes by the time we reach Lawrence.  At roughly the same time and location, a pack of three buses is travelling south from Wilson Station.

From 4:00pm to 7:00pm, gaps and bunching are common, and there is severe congestion south of Queen Street.  Service to the CNE Eastern Gate is erratic with many of these trips short-turning at Dufferin Loop to save time.

By the early evening, the congestion problems are gone, but bunched operation is the norm with multiple vehicles leaving from both terminals.  Short turns at various locations attempt to put buses back on time, and some of these moves even fill gaps to even out the service.  However, the pattern continues up to 10:00pm (2200).  Things are somewhat more reliable in the late evening, but an example of, shall we say, unprofessional operation is evident with a pair of vehicles (turquoise and dark blue) that leave Wilson southbound at about 11:00pm and run as a pair for two round trips until “dark blue” goes out of service at 1:10am.

That was a more-or-less “ideal” day for operating conditions.

Friday, March 23, 2012

March 23 was another day with tolerably good weather.  Temperatures ranged from 11.9° to 17.4°C, and there was 0.8mm of rain.  This was the beginning of a fair weekend, and spring traffic was definitely in evidence.

• 29_20120323_Headways_NB
• 29_20120323_Headways_SB
• 29_20120323_Chart

The overall form of the northbound headway charts is similar to what we saw on March 13, but the range of values is worse especially in the evening.  Afternoon peak effects appear a bit sooner, and headways are more extended toward the north end of the line.

Late in the pm peak, there is a huge gap (over 30 minutes) southbound from Wilson Station southbound.  This is part of a large gap that echoes over the route through the peak as we will see in the detailed chart.

As on March 13, many buses are leaving their terminals close together and this produces the inevitable pattern of gap-bunch-gap-bunch. throughout the day.

On the service chart, the differences in the character of service show up in many ways:

• During the late morning and midday, there is slightly more short turning, and pairs/triplets of buses are already forming.
• At certain times, congestion both ways approaching St. Clair is evident, but the cause is unclear.  Nothing in the TTC service alerts for March 23 mentions the Dufferin route.
• By the early afternoon, packs of four or more buses are evident.  Although there is some short turning to break these up, they reform just as quickly.
• After 3:00pm (1500), congestion northbound around Yorkdale Plaza is evident.  (This sort of thing showed up in an analysis I did of 29 Dufferin on Boxing Day several years ago.)  This effect disappears after about 6:00pm.
• After 4:00pm (1600), a wide gap travels north from Bloor and opens out to over half an hour by the time it hits Wilson Station.  Some short turns come into the southbound echo of this gap, but it persists to the south end and …
• After a quintet (!!!) of buses leaves Bloor northbound at about 5:45 pm, there is a gap of nearly half an hour that travels north to Wilson.
• The early evening is a shambles with a parade of seven buses reaching Dufferin Loop southbound around 7:40pm in a gap of about 20 minutes.
• Despite some short turning, the service continues with bunches and gaps through the evening.  Even the late evening service isn’t well-behaved, but there are fewer buses on the street (and lines on the charts).  By this time, nothing is short turning, but there is also no attempt to space out the service and provide an even headway.

That’s an example of a really bad Friday, although the weather was not a factor here.  The problems may arise from greater demand and congestion, or from a different (or laissez-faire) management approach, or from the schedule which would have been the same for the two days.  To what extent each contributed to the wide difference in service character I cannot say definitively, but the difference between a light traffic and heavy traffic day are certainly evident.

Now we will turn to the weekend service.

Saturday, March 17, 2012

From the chart of running times northbound from King to Transit Road published in a previous article, we know that there was considerable difference between March 17 (the weekend at the end of March break) and March 24.  On the 24th, running times were much longer, and this is reflected in a very different service pattern.

Temperatures on March 17 ranged from 8.6° to 11.5°C, and there was no precipitation.

• 29_20120317_Headways_NB
• 29_20120317_Headways_SB
• 29_20120317_Chart

The northbound headways show a similar overall pattern to what we saw for weekdays.  The spread of headway values exceeds the TTC’s target three-minute band throughout the day, and this becomes noticeably worse in the evening.  Many vehicles leave the south end of the line close together, and the corresponding gaps in service travel north getting wider as they go.

Southbound headways from Wilson Station are better behaved especially through the morning and early afternoon.  They spread out somewhat from 3:00 to 6:00pm, tighten up a bit, but then become very scattered through the evening.  The pattern at Wilson deteriorates further south on the route with more bunches and wider gaps evident at Eglinton, and worsening by the time we reach Bloor.

On the service chart, we can watch the situation unfold.  The first page, before 7:00am, shows quite consistent running times and reasonable vehicle spacing.  Between 7:00 and 10:00am, some bunching begins to appear, but also the lines show that pauses at stops are now becoming more common, and some of these are fairly long, notably at Bloor.  For a few trips, one bus (the purple line appearing southbound between Lawrence and Eglinton at 7:00am) seems to have trouble staying on time, and its follower (black), although properly spaced relative to other service, manages to catch up.  At 9:00am, “purple” is short-turned at Dufferin Loop and gets back into the correct spacing.

Between 10:00 and 1:00pm, the same pattern continues, but with even more time spent at stops.  (Generally speaking, delay at stops will appear as short horizontal steps in all of the lines at the same vertical positions.  Delay due to congestion will be spread out and appear as a change on the slope of the lines.)  A gap southbound from Wilson at about 11:15 appears to be due to a bus spending a long time at the terminal (possibly a missed crew change).  This vehicle reappears in its proper place filling the gap southbound at St. Clair around 11:40.

By the early afternoon, bunching is becoming more common and some congestion effects are starting to appear around Bloor and near Yorkdale.  These get worse in the mid-afternoon, and bunching is quite evident.  Very little short turning occurs, and buses run back and forth with some gaps echoing across the route.  This continues into the early evening.

After 8:00pm, the headways widen, but nothing is done to correct the irregular spacing of buses.  They continue to travel in pairs and trios sometimes leaving terminals as a pack (northbound from CNE East just before 8:30pm, and again just after 8:40pm.  Bunching continues through into the late evening producing the wide swings in headway values shown on the earlier charts.

Saturday, March 24, 2012

Temperatures on March 24 ranged from 6.5° to 12.5°C, and there was 0.4mm of rain.

• 29_20120324_Headways_NB
• 29_20120324_Headways_SB
• 29_20120324_Chart

Northbound headways show the same pattern on the 24th as on the 17th, but with wider swings in the values, and an earlier onset of service well beyond the six-minute target band.  One notable feature is a sudden recovery to short headways between 6:00 and 8:00pm, but otherwise many trips are at headways much wider than the advertised service.

Southbound headways, notably in the morning, are not quite as regular as they were on the 17th and wide values of 12 minutes or more show up at around 3:00pm.  The evening headways are erratic as on the 17th with gaps over 15 minutes showing up regularly.

On the service chart, the day begins roughly as it did on the 17th although there is somewhat more bunching in the morning.  A gap opens up northbound from the CNE at 8:20am, and this echoes back from Wilson with a parade of five buses southbound at about 9:15am.  The late morning continues in the same vein with some bunching, and an increasing amount of time spent at stops.  One vehicle sits, presumably out of service, northbound at Davenport for a bit over half an hour (10:55 to 11:30am), but it is placed back in position with a Briar Hill short turn at 11:45am.

The familiar Yorkdale congestion begins to appear northbound at about 12:30pm, but this persists until about 6:30pm and is more severe than on the 17th.  Congestion between Queen and King both ways appears after 3:00pm, and this persists until about 5:00pm.

By 1:30pm, the service has become marshalled into groups of three or more buses, and these run back and forth in packs with almost no short turns or service spacing right through to the early evening.  Short turns do become more evident after 4:00pm, but comparative order is not restored until about 6:00pm.  This takes us into the hour of relatively well-behaved service until the point where many vehicles return to the garage.

From 7:00pm onward, and especially after 8:00pm, bunching is common, there are wide gaps in service, and there appears to be no effort to sort this all out.  Neither traffic congestion nor lengthy stop service times are evident.

Sunday, March 25, 2012

Temperatures on March 25 ranged from 4.3° to 20.0°C, and there was no precipitation.

• 29_20120325_Headways_NB
• 29_20120325_Headways_SB
• 29_20120325_Chart

Service on Sunday the 25th is less affected by congestion and stop service times than on the 24th, but more than makes up for this with some breathtakingly irregular spacing of vehicles.

Headways northbound from King are erratic right from the morning with some buses running at twice the normal headway or more at 9:00am.  Bunching continues through the daytime with pairs of vehicles running northbound right through to 6:00pm.  The evening brings headways ranging from under 6′ to over 30′ at King, although short turns reduce this range slightly at Bloor.  However, the wide gaps become progressively wider exceeding half hourly by the time the service reaches Wilson Terminal.

Southbound, the situation is similar.  Buses leave Wilson southbound on an irregular headway, often in groups, right from 9:00am.  The evening service is badly bunched and gaps over 15′ are common even with the benefit of some short turns at Briar Hill to fill the widest gaps arriving southbound from Wilson.  Gaps over 20′ are common at Bloor, and when these are compounded with short turns, gaps to the south end of the line are common and large with a peak of 42′ at about 9:00pm.

The service chart shows some of the gory details:

• Bunching southbound from Wilson at 9:00am is clearly caused by vehicles entering service off time such that they tend to run together with a vehicle already in service.
• There is no congestion through the morning and midday period, but the effect of stop dwell times is evident.  Some bunching does occur, but this gets sorted out on return trips.
• A gap opens up after 12:30pm northbound from King with one vehicle (pink line) taking considerably longer than others nearby to make the northbound trip.  By the time this reaches Wilson, four buses are running in a pack.  Three of them return southbound together.
• As the afternoon continues, the pattern of bus platoons we saw on Saturday the 24th begins to appear notably southbound at about 3:10pm.  A group of four buses leaves Dufferin Loop northbound at about 4:30pm, and they remain together as close friends for one-and-a-half trips.
• By the evening, echoing what we saw on the headway charts, the service has become very badly spaced out.  Some short turns are completely ineffective in filling gaps.
  • Northbound north of Eglinton at 7:45pm, a bus (blue) that has been running as part of a pair is short turned and returns south together with a through bus (pale green).
  • A trio of buses leaves Bloor northbound at 9:00pm, and two of them short turn, but come back south accompanied by a through bus from Wilson.  That bus short turns at Bloor (salmon), but returns north together with a through bus (pink) from Dufferin Loop.
• Erratic headways and bunching continue right through to the end of service.

General Observations

The days I selected for presentation here show how widely the conditions in which service operates can vary from one day to the next even though the same schedule may be used (all weekdays, all Saturdays, etc).

From running time analyses in the previous article, we know that there are times when buses cannot make their trips within the allowed schedule.  Should this be fixed by scheduling to worst-case conditions, or to something less with an expectation of moderate numbers of short turns, or by moving completely to a headway-based scheme with running times adjusted on the fly to suit daily conditions?  This is not a simple question, but the TTC must grapple with it.

On “good” days, the headway actually operated would be better than on “bad” days, but at least the goal on both occasions would be the same – keeping service evenly spaced.  While on paper, this might produce “worse” service than the advertised schedule, we know that the common experience of riders bears little resemblance to it.  “Frequent service” really means “frequent gaps”.

This begs the question of whether it is practical to manage to a schedule when there are such divergent conditions on a route.  Managing to a headway may be more challenging (and would definitely require changes in contract language and crew design), but it could result in a target that might actually be achievable.

Of course, managing to a headway includes one important component: management.  Clearly there are periods on the Dufferin bus where little is done to organize the service and break up platoons to provide better service to riders.  Groups of buses do not just magically appear, but are created by uneven service from the terminals.  The condition worsens through the compounding problem of gaps and overloading.

A Personal Note

On occasion, I get complaints that I am being too hard on the poor old TTC, that I am too unreasonable in expecting better service especially on “difficult” routes such as Dufferin.  To this I make two replies.

First, the patterns of irregular service shown here are pervasive through all of the data I have looked at from the TTC, although the severity varies from route to route.

Problems with vehicle spacing commonly thought to be the preserve of streetcars (which cannot pass each other) show up routinely on bus routes.  The lack of management of short turns – ensuring that these vehicles actually fill gaps rather than simply creating new pairs travelling in the opposite direction – shows up everywhere.

Some operators play games and run hot, right behind their leader, for hours on end.  Some operators dawdle operating in a manner intended to force a short turn and siesta.  But these are exceptions, and they should be easy to spot from routine monitoring.

Second, the problems with erratic service show up on routes even at times and on days when no external “force of nature” bears down on the luckless transit system.  The TTC is too quick to blame outside factors without understanding the reality on the street.  To their credit, the TTC’s recently published route performance statistics show that they now see just how bad and how pervasive the problem is, but we have taken decades to reach this point.  We cannot afford to wait decades to fix the problem especially if we hope to make transit an attractive alternative to driving.

There are locations where the City must make hard decisions about how road space is used.  Should parking be allowed in periods when it triggers severe traffic congestion?  Should deliveries on major streets be restricted to specific hours when there is capacity to give over road space to handle them?  Should traffic signals more aggressively favour transit vehicles?

We are asking taxpayers to devote billions to new transit construction, but somewhere along the way, we need to make the Dufferin bus and other routes like it provide reliable service.

Halton’s population of half a million is planned to grow by 50% in the coming two decades as new residents pour into the Greater Toronto region, but the infrastructure to support them does not exist.  This problem is shared by other municipalities either because they face growth of their own, or because they lie between newer neighbourhoods and downtown and absorb increases in travel through older parts of the GTHA.

Metrolinx had originally slated all-day service for Halton on the Kitchener and Milton GO lines in the first 15 years of its 25-year Big Move transportation plan. But the plan’s updated version pushes the GO expansion to the list of projects in a 16- to 25-year window.

Besides more GO trains to Milton and Georgetown, Carr said the region wants Metrolinx to reinstate plans for another GO station on Trafalgar Rd. and it wants the Lakeshore West GO line electrified so it can deliver 15-minute express service.

Municipalities in the 905 now have (or are planned for) populations and the transportation demands they will create that exceed the capacity of road-oriented development.  Even if transit in the 905 (and commuting capacity for 905-to-416 travel) were much better, the land use patterns work against effective transit service.  This is not just a question of dispersed work and home locations, but of neighbourhood designs generally where stops to run errands as part of larger trips demand the use of a car.  These problems will not be wished away with better bus routes or all-day GO service.

Halton, like many regions, is reacting to proposed new region-wide “revenue tools” with the question “what’s in it for us”, but this is a natural result of the “Big Gap” between the original promise of Metrolinx (and of provincial plans for managing GTHA growth) and what is actually happening on the ground.

Various plans exist for the expansion of GO Transit service, and these have changed from time to time leaving some confusion about what, exactly, will be provided and when service expansions will occur.

GO2020 and The Big Move

Back at the dawn of time, before The Big Move had been published, many transit agencies created plans that would feed into the new regional plan.  GO2020 was GO Transit’s contribution (Transit City was the City of Toronto’s).  At the time, GO and Metrolinx were separate agencies – one ran the trains while the other drew maps.

At the heart of GO2020 was a set of commitments to network and service expansion including:

Frequent service – On primary corridors, a train or bus departure at least every 15 minutes during peak periods and 30 minutes in the off-peak periods will serve a full range of travel needs.

Competitive travel times – Travel times on both train and bus will be competitive with automobile travel. Express and limited-stop service, and priority measures for buses, will ensure that GO is an attractive option.

The report went into considerable detail about what we would see by 2020:

Peak-period train service – By 2020, GO Transit’s rail corridors will be serving diverse travel needs, with significant amounts of traffic against the peak direction and between outlying activity centres, in addition to the high volume of passengers to downtown Toronto. Two-way, all-day service will be provided within the Core Service Area. Services will extend beyond to serve more distant Urban Growth Centres as appropriate.

• High-frequency, peak-direction trains in Core Service Area – GO will expand Built-Up Area peak-period service on the existing corridors to offer a train at least every 15 to 20 minutes in the peak direction on all existing rail lines, supporting the intensified development envisioned in the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe. This level of service is designed to fully develop the 2020 work travel market in each corridor from the regions outside Toronto to the immediate Union Station area. The goal is to attract 80% to 85% of these travellers, with corresponding increases in travel to the broader area around downtown Toronto.

When demand justifies more than four trains in the peak hour, GO will introduce express trains and offer a peak direction train at least every 15 minutes for each station. With GO’s high-speed, interregional services, departures more frequent than every 15 minutes would not attract significantly more customers.

However, introducing additional fast express trains instead (with few or no local stops en route, and average operating speeds ranging from 75 to 85 km per hour) would result in a more attractive service and improved ridership.

The number of trains arriving at Union Station during the morning peak hour will more than double to meet the demand for regional rail service. Inbound ridership for the year 2020 will increase due to population growth in GO Transit’s regional markets, enhanced service on all corridors, and GO’s expanding market share, even if the number of jobs in downtown Toronto does not increase dramatically.

Significant changes in the relative cost of driving vs. taking GO, fare integration with the TTC, or public acceptance of transit use could result in even higher numbers. To meet demand, trains will have to arrive at Union from the Lakeshore East and West lines nearly every five minutes, from the Milton line about every eight minutes, and every 12 to 15 minutes from each of the other corridors.

This high concentration in the peak hour will need a substantial increase in Union Station’s capacity for trains and passengers. It will drive construction of track and other infrastructure improvements, including passenger stations and terminals, rail and bus corridors, vehicles, and support facilities, which are addressed in the MoveOntario 2020 capital investment plan and the Metrolinx RTP.

• Regular counter-peak trains in Core Service Area –

Customers travelling to workplaces and other destinations outside downtown Toronto, or between stops along the corridor, will have a regular schedule of counter-peak trains every 30 minutes or less.

• More train service options – To improve access to the Core Service Area, GO will introduce trains along rail lines it is not currently using. Peak-period GO Trains will operate between Bolton, Seaton, East Markham (Locust Hill) , and the Yonge/Summerhill area. These improvements are consistent with the Metrolinx initiative to optimize use of existing rail infrastructure.

All of this is summarized in a table at the end of the report.

[Click on the table for a larger version]

This entire list was included in GO’s 2020 plans, a timeline well within the original 15-year window of the original Big Move, but the actual plan delivered these services over a longer build-out than GO had proposed.  In the case of Milton, The Big Move offered less service than the GO2020 plan would have provided.

15 Year Plan  25 Year Plan  Legend

The Big Move ran aground on some basic problems:

• Some rail corridors could not be easily exploited for GO service especially at the frequencies proposed in either the GO or Metrolinx plans.
• The combined capacity of a fully built-out system coming into Union Station exceeded that terminal’s capacity even after the massive reconstruction now in progress.
• Use of the CPR tracks through central Toronto would require a transfer point to the Yonge University subway at a location where it has no capacity to accept additional riders.

The provincial agencies were good at drawing lines on maps, but not quite so good at understanding the limits of the infrastructure.  Moreover, the scale and speed of GO improvements was to be considerably slowed in The Big Move probably to stretch out funding requirements.

In the specific case of Milton, GO2020 offered 15-minute peak service to Meadowvale with 30-minute counterpeak service.  Offpeak periods would see 30-minute headways all day with buses beyond Meadowvale to Milton.  (Right-of-way constraints beyond Meadowvale make extension of frequent service to Milton difficult.)

In The Big Move, the 15-year plan offers “Regional Rail” service on the Milton corridor with full day, two-way service.  By the 25-year plan, this is upgraded to “Express Rail” (very frequent service) as far as Meadowvale.

Recent updates to The Big Move push the “Regional Rail” service off to the 25-year plan, although the “Next Wave” plans do include all-day two-way service to Meadowvale.

More generally, those “15″ and “25″ year markers are slippery and in the revised Big Move, count from “today”, not from the original 2008 plan.  25 years now means 2038 compared with the original 15-year goal of 2023, and the GO2020 goal of 2020.  Halton has good right to be annoyed.

Selling the Plan

The new revenue tool package will be a hard sell across the GTHA not just because it means new taxes when the mantra of past decades has been that we cannot afford any of them, and that cuts in spending take precedence over all other policies.  That sales job is not helped by the less than forthright planning by Metrolinx and GO (now one agency).

Services that might have been delivered in the near future drift off beyond the lifespan of all current governments and the imaginations of most taxpayers.  There is no sense of what we will really build and when we will see the benefits.

The Next Wave of Metrolinx projects will consume about $22-billion in capital.  The proposed funding scheme includes $2-billion annually from new revenues, of which 25% will be diverted to municipalities.  This leaves $1.5b per year and makes the Next Wave roughly a 15-year project (not including inflation or future operating costs).  Roughly half of the total will be consumed by two subway projects, the Downtown Relief Line and the Richmond Hill extension.  These are so large that they belong in a separate category, possibly with a different funding strategy.

Metrolinx must pull together a coherent overview of its many plans and promises, together with a realistic evaluation of the constraints that exist on network growth.  If we really are going to see a benefit from new revenues, this must be measured against clear, achievable plans, not a grab-bag of schemes with vague implementation dates.  Just as Toronto saw its ambitious Transit City plan scaled back and delayed, the hopes for GO2020 have been diluted.

Halton and other regions have every right to distrust that transportation plans essential to their future will actually materialize.  Population and congestion growth will not pause just because Queen’s Park lacks the will to be honest about the scope of spending required.

The coming Investment Strategy must be more than a one-page report with a list of three or four potential taxes.  It must really explain what the “investments” will buy us, when they will be delivered, and what benefits we will see across the GTHA.  Anything less is an abdication of Metrolinx’ and the Government’s responsibility.

The path is from Customer Service on the top navbar, then to Customer Charter on the side bar, then to Quarterly reports, and finally scroll down.  Or you can just click here.

This table covers the first three months of 2013, and lists the reliability of every surface route.  “Reliability” is defined roughly as:

• If the distance between a vehicle “B” and the one preceding it “A” is within three minutes of the scheduled headway, then the vehicle is within the acceptable window of reliability.
• The measure is taken at various points along a route (we don’t know the locations or number for any route), and summed across an entire quarter’s operation.  This will smooth out everything but very large scale, long-lasting disruptions, and will tend to give an index that tracks the overall behaviour of the route.

The system-wide target for streetcar routes is 70% punctuality (within the headway window), and for buses it is only 65%.  Looking at individual routes, there are huge discrepancies.

No route gets over the 90% line, although several are in the mid to upper 80s.

• 8 Broadview
• 31 Greenwood
• 44 Kipling South
• 78 St. Andrew’s
• 510 Spadina

Of these routes, four are relatively short bus routes where congestion is not an issue, and with only a modicum of effort, operators should be able to stay on time.  The Spadina car is a special case because it runs with a very short scheduled headway for much of the day, every day of the week.  It is physically difficult for cars go get more than (H + 3) minutes apart, and impossible for (H – 3) because this would be a negative number.  Service that meets the target is very easy to achieve even if the line appears chaotic at times simply because there are so many vehicles close together.

Life is rather more desperate on some major routes that don’t come close to achieving the system-wide targets.

Routes below 60%:

• 7 Bathurst
• 35 Jane
• 51 Leslie
• 56 Leaside
• 58 Malton
• 60 Steeles West
• 90 Vaughan
• 95 York Mills
• 96 Wilson
• 102 Markham Road
• 141 Mt. Pleasant Express
• 160 Bathurst North
• 161 Rogers Road
• 165 Weston Road North
• 171 Mount Dennis
• 196 York University Rocket
• 224 Victoria Park North
• 303 Don Mills Night Bus
• 306 Carlton Night Car
• 353 Steeles East Night Bus
• 385 Sheppard East Night Bus
• 501 Queen
• 505 Dundas

We will spare a special thought for riders on routes that don’t even make 50%:

• 97 Yonge
• 99 Arrow Road
• 105 Dufferin North
• 107 Keele North
• 117 Alness
• 142 Avenue Road Express
• 145 Humber Bay Express
• 301 Queen Night Car
• 502 Downtowner
• 503 Kingston Road

The two Kingston Road services are notoriously off schedule/headway, and it is not unusual to see pairs of cars on headways that should be over 10 minutes.  Downtowner cars short-turn at locations guaranteed to avoid actually serving any riders while achieving some sort of on-time goal.

And a truly special mention for the basement selection of routes:

• 144 Don Valley Express (35.90%)
• 309 Finch West Night Bus (38.81%)
• 508 Lake Shore (25.08%)

(Lake Shore is probably a special case because it is not uncommon for cars to be missing on this route, or for them to enter service off-schedule.)

These stats are not broken down by time of day nor by day of the week.  From analyses I have published (and many more that sit in my files), there is a common problem that evenings and weekends see service on routes, some of which may have tolerable “average” values like Dufferin (76.03%), completely fall apart.  Nobody appears to be managing the line, the schedules may or may not provide adequate running time.  Buses and streetcars run in packs and short turn with no discernable purpose related to providing regularly spaced service.

For years, the TTC has trotted out stock excuses for service quality and made claims that things aren’t all that bad.  Well now we see their own numbers, and even with the limitations of their methodology, it is clear that the TTC’s claims were hogwash.

Unreliable service is a particular problem on routes with wide scheduled headways, especially the all-night services.  A ±3 minute measure may not be entirely appropriate for a 30 minute headway, but we have no way of knowing whether the night buses and streetcars are only slightly off schedule, or completely unpredictable.  At least with Nextbus, one can find where a vehicle actually might be regardless of its scheduled arrival, but this plays havoc with any attempt to make transfer connections.

In a masterful understatement, the TTC observes:

We continue to seek opportunities to improve performance on our routes.

The first step in recovery is to admit that you have a problem, and with the publication of these indices, the TTC has at least taken that first step.  Whether they continue to blame external factors for every ill remains to be seen, but they have been addicted to that behaviour for decades.

For all the talk of a Customer Charter, the quality of service is a non-negotiable part of what transit is all about.  When people complain about not being able to get around the city by TTC, reliability and capacity are two major issues.  These are linked because, on some routes, capacity is lost to irregular service.  On others there simply are not enough vehicles especially on streetcar lines where a car shortage has been a standard excuse for over a decade.

I cannot avoid a special mention of all those bus routes in the list of poor performers.  For years, detractors of streetcars prated that only with buses could we have reliable service.  Rider experiences on many routes, and now the statistics, prove this to be wrong with bus routes running as bad or worse service reliability than many streetcar lines.  The “flexibility” of buses only allows for even more exotic ways to run erratic services.

In a week when the TTC rolls out its new Group Station Managers, they need to turn a blinding light on surface operations, the weakest part of their network.

• The main staff report giving background information and proposing the revenue tools that staff recommend Council endorse.
• A summary of the consultation conducted by the Planning Department under Phase 1 of their “Feeling Congested” campaign.
• A summary of the poll taken by Ipsos-Reid to survey city residents on their attitudes to new revenue tools.

Staff recommend that seven new revenue tools be implemented in two phases.  The first phase would include:

• Fuel tax
• Sales tax
• Commercial parking levy
• Development charges

The second group would not kick in until the so-called “first wave” of Metrolinx projects (to be funded mainly from general provincial revenue) are completed, likely about 2020.

• Highway tools
• High Occupancy lane tolls (HOT)
• Vehicle registration charge (VRT)

The premise for the staged implementation is that new taxes affecting motorists exclusively are inappropriate (and politically impractical) if an alternative to driving does not exist.

Other groups have proposed their own preferred list of revenue tools, and there are many overlaps with the City’s list.

• Only a reintroduced VRT is not on the Metrolinx short list.
• The Toronto Region Board of Trade favours all of the City’s first group except Development Charges, and includes HOT revenue as a fourth component in their list.

Public consultation though “Feeling Congested” and the Ipsos-Reid polls showed very high support for the concept of dedicated transit funding, but responses on which tools were preferred varied between the two samples.

[Source: City staff report, page 11]

The Ipsos-Reid group is supposed to be statistically representative of the city as a whole, while the Feeling Congested group will be weighted with self-selected respondents and participants in the public workshops.  It is not clear whether each group had a comparable understanding of the amount of revenue each tool could potentially generate.  In any event, well over 80% of the participants in both cases agreed with the premise of new revenue tools.

This figure is at odds with other reported polls in which under half of all respondents agreed to paying new taxes or fees to support transit expansion.  Some political and media reaction has turned as much on the “we don’t trust those bastards with our money” argument as on any discussion of the underlying need for more and better transit in the GTHA network.  Alternative funding schemes such as increased government efficiency or casinos, not to mention the billions supposedly available for the taking in the private sector, amount to fairy dust, but many voters are easily swayed by something-for-nothing hucksterism.

Notable by its absence from the potential revenue tools is the corporate income tax.  This issue has been raised by many at the public feedback sessions, by the NDP at Queen’s Park, and even in the staff report:

… the Province should consider maintaining its Ontario corporate tax rate freeze, at 11.5%, rather than reducing the rate to 10% once the provincial budget is balanced.  This could generate a total of $1.5 billion provincially, or approximately $750 million GTHA-wide on an annual basis, which could be applied as an investment tool to fund regional transportation expansion. [Staff report, page 16]

City staff are cautious about issues related to municipal funding including the responsibility for maintenance of projects Metrolinx builds, and the future status of municipal payments to the GO Transit capital program ($20-million by Toronto in 2013).  Although 25% of “next wave” funding is earmarked for municipalities, the rules, if any, about how this might be spent don’t exist yet.

Another concern is municipal participation in project selection for the “next wave”.  This affects the entire GTHA, and has already cropped up in a “what’s in it for us” sensitivity in many locations.  (I will turn to this in a separate article.)

A separate report to Council will address priorities as seen by City Planning staff, as well as issues of governance and transparency for the administration of the new tax revenues.

Detailed Responses by City Quadrant

The Ipsos-Reid and “Feeling Congested” surveys are broken down by city quadrant and reveals different attitudes and concerns across the city.  Support for transit funding is uniformly strong, but the details vary with local conditions.

Ipsos-Reid

For some revenue tools, there is not much spread in the percentages across the four quadrants (these must have some degree of statistical error, although its magnitude is not specified in the report).

[Source: Ipsos-Reid report, page 8]

Development charges fared poorly in the “south” where, presumably, there are enough condo owners to fear the effect of such charges on future prices.  Payroll taxes were also unpopular in the south likely reflecting a higher average income there.

By contrast highway tolls, vehicle registration taxes and fuel taxes were much more popular in the south than elsewhere no doubt because people in the suburbs are more likely to be car-dependent.

92% of respondents favoured dedicated revenues for transportation infrastructure with 49% in the “strongly favoured” camp.  Either the survey managed to miss a substantial portion of “Ford Nation”, or that group has a fundamentally different attitude to transportation funding than the Mayor.  The lowest support, at 88%, was in the western quadrant.  (See page 14)

Support for spending on all forms of transportation is strong with cycling bringing up the rear at 61%.  The differences between support for transit, road and highway spending are similar except in the south where highways understandably rank lower, but still at 76%.  These numbers suggest that respondents are happy to see money spent on everything and were not really presented with the challenge of options limited by available financing.  (See page 16)

The demographics reveal an interesting breakdown of modal use by the participants.  47% drive as their primary means of transportation while 41% use transit.  This is a considerably better split than we see in city-wide transit modal share statistics, and begs the question of how the numbers can be reconciled.  Driving is higher in the suburbs, over 50% in all cases, but only 27% in the south.  Transit is strong in the south and north quadrants (48% and 43%), with considerably lower use in the east and west (37% and 34%.  Cycling and walking are the primary mode for slightly over one quarter of respondents from the south, with cycling being consistently well below the level of walking.  (See pages 20-21)

Looking at the purpose of trips versus the mode chosen, transit wins out over cars,  slightly, for work trips, and much more strongly for school trips.  Again, the regional breakdowns show the effect of much higher transit and lower auto usage in the south quadrant.  For shopping and errands, cars win out by a wide margin in the suburbs while autos, transit and walking show comparable figures in the south.  This is no surprise given the built form of the older parts of the city where housing and much shopping are side-by-side.  Visits to family and friends show a similar strong auto-orientation in the suburbs, with transit and autos sharing the market in the south.  Transit numbers are likely affected for all types of non-peak travel by service quality and network connection issues.  (See pages 22-24)

Of the respondents who use transit “monthly or more often”, the breakdown of transit modes used is quite interesting.  Overall 89% report using the subway and/or SRT, 76% a bus route, and 52% a streetcar route.  Understandably the streetcar number is highest in the south (74%) but it also is reported by a substantial number of transit users from the other three quadrants.  This suggests the streetcar routes are acting as part of trips that begin in the suburbs and come downtown by subway, and they are an important part of the distribution system for the rapid transit network.  Buses also represent an important part of the mix showing their roles both as feeders to the rapid transit network and for travel within the suburban quadrants.  Almost 90% of transit riders may use the subway, but the importance of the surface network cannot be ignored.  (See pages 27-28)

Feeling Congested

Feedback from participants was solicited in a different way from the Ipsos-Reid survey, and some of the questions asked were different.  Also, of course, participants were self-selected rather than being recruited to fit the statistical demographic of the city.

As a first exercise, participants were asked to chose among eight rather loosely-defined objectives for making decisions about a transit network.

Source:  Feeling Congested Phase 1 Summary, page 9.  The definition of each criterion is on page 8.

This table reveals a few important points, notably that the sample is overwhelmingly from the downtown quadrant.  Consolidated figures should be used with care unless they reflect an across-the-board agreement with the smaller samples from the suburban areas.

Travel experience consistently ranks high across the city, but affordability shows up as the top choice in the east, and as second choice in the north.  (Advocates of fare by distance should take heed on this count.)  Some of the planning goals such as supporting growth and shaping the city fall lower.  Whether this is through disinterest, or simply because attributes more closely linked to actual transit service took precedence, is hard to say.

In both Scarborough and North York, “travel options” brought out the issue of directness of route, transfers and travel times.  Both of these areas have surface networks oriented to feeding the subway, but not as well-designed for travel that isn’t oriented to the rapid transit network.

The criteria of “Fairness” and “Equity” overlapped somewhat, but the importance of transit to improve mobility in the suburbs was flagged in both Etobicoke and Scarborough.

“Affordability” means different things to different people.  To some, notably in Scarborough, it means keeping the cost of transit low.  To others, it means an avoidance of excessive spending.  This is a clear example of the lack of clarity and focus in this part of the “Feeling Congested” surveys.

As in the Ipsos-Reid poll, over 90% of participants support dedicated revenues to fund transportation infrastructure.  Concerns raised about how the money would be collected and administered, as well as issues of fairness to low-income families, also mirrored Ipsos-Reid.  (Page 14)

Feedback on the individual revenue tools is not broken down by region in the “Feeling Congested” report.  The comments on specific tools (pages 18-19) are, therefore, likely disproportionately representative of the downtown quadrant and this could explain the difference in tool ranking here versus the Ipsos-Reid numbers.

Finally, a breakdown (Page 20) shows the preference for new spending if it is directed to specific areas.  Roads and highways rank higher in the north and east while cycling and pedestrian infrastructure rank strongly downtown.  Transit does well, at over 75%, everywhere.  The very high rank for cycling downtown reflects, I suspect, the effect of self-selection of the participants.  We know from Ipsos-Reid that cycling represents a comparatively small part of the travel market (although this could grow with better infrastructure), but a very vocal one.  Pedestrians are not far behind.

Concluding Thoughts

The support by Toronto Council for a suite of transit revenue tools, taxes or whatever we want to call them, will be essential to the overall regional push for improved transit.  There is political support “out there” in the 905 and at Queen’s Park, although there’s a lot of looking over the shoulder to see if anyone is actually following in the parade.

In a separate article, I will turn to the question of The Big Move and the “Big Gap” (real or perceived) between what it claims will be accomplished and what voters and municipal politicians might see as benefits that will flow from new taxes.

This report will go to Executive where it will meet a hostile response from the Mayor whose well-publicized reaction to any shopping list of new taxes was a puerile barf, not the most sophisticated of responses, but typical for what passes for leadership.  Whether the report will survive unscathed to go to Council, or whether there will be an attempted pocket-veto at Executive, remains to be seen.

Council may once again have to relieve the Mayor of his control of the agenda if they are going to take any responsibility for transit funding and planning.  Regardless of which tools Councillors may favour, simply allowing the Mayor to bury the issue would be unacceptable, and would undermine Council’s credibility on the transit file.  There will be time to debate which tools Toronto will prefer and what we might do with the money, but that debate must occur in Council where all of the city is represented.

Responses to some questions (Q4-Q7) in this article were originally attributed to Metrolinx.  In fact these responses came from the Minister’s office based on policy information collected there.  Text of the article has been changed accordingly (italics).

Back on March 14, I wrote about a conversation I had with the newly created Minister of Transportation, Glen Murray.  We ran short of time, and I left questions about transit financing and the role of local systems for an email followup.

It took a month, but the responses have come in, some verbatim from the Minister, some the Ministry office to which the more “technical” issues were forwarded.

I added a supplementary question about the Metrolinx Investment Strategy and the actual level of spending based on information in the Five Year Strategy.  The question and the Ministry’s response appear at the end of this article.

The exchange is unedited.  Judge for yourself how forthright these responses might be.

The first three responses came from Minister Murray’s as a verbatim transcript.

Q1: With the planned growth of GO Transit to a two-way, all day operation and increased frequency of service, access to/from stations must be provided by local transit. Parking is effectively at capacity and moreover is a service for inbound commuting traffic that arrives early enough to use it. All-day and counter-peak riders are not served by parking. Local transit systems are, if anything, retrenching in their operations, not building. What financial assistance will be provided (capital and operating) to recognize the additional demand placed on local systems to act as feeder/distributors to the GO network?

We are trying to coordinate. For instance, Barrie has had a 30% increase in their public transit capacity with seven new transit hubs coming to their city, and they are coordinating with our hubs which will allow us to have transit expanded to Barrie. This is a model we would like to see across the GTHA: stronger integration of local transit service with the GO Service. The other piece is for parking lots and parkades: those should be transitional and we should be working with the municipalities to build transit services. Obviously this has a lot to do with walkability and transit-friendliness of neighbourhoods, so Places To Grow and The Big Move have been implemented in an integrated fashion, so we are moving to more development that is more transit friendly and we can reengineer existing development to be more walk-able and more transit friendly is really the way forward.

Q2: Local municipalities including Toronto now pay a portion of the GO Transit capital budget through development charges. Toronto’s share recently has been $20m/year. Given the substantial additional funding needed for GO expansion, will the local contribution to GO be “uploaded” to the Province (funded either from general revenue or from the new tools)?

I have not considered that yet, and that would be a result of a conversation with municipalities. Right now, the province is carrying the vast majority of the cost for The Big Move, and moving forward, we hope to see stronger partnerships with municipalities and with the Federal government.

Q3: Local municipalities now receive a share of provincial gas tax. (Toronto currently gets about $160m of which $90m is directed to the TTC’s operating subsidy, and $70m to the capital budget.) Will this continue under new revenue tools, or be rolled into them. In other words, will the $2b annual in “new” money be partly offset by loss of existing subsidy streams? All three of these are, I realize, issues which could be construed as part of coming budget discussions, but they are obvious questions local municipalities will ask. Has any of this been incorporated in work on the Investment Strategy?

Those will all be factors that we will consider in the investment strategy.

The next three come from the Minister’s Office:

Q4: TTC estimates that opening the Spadina extension will cost an additional $14-million annually net of new revenues. (This comes from info in their 2013 detailed budget papers.) This is clearly a regional project. What role will Metrolinx/Ontario take in funding this, or will Toronto taxpayers (or transit riders) shoulder the entire cost either through added local subsidy or transit service cuts to divert resources to the Spadina line?

The Province has not made a direct commitment to fund the operating costs of the Toronto Transit Commission’s (TTC) Toronto York Spadina Subway Extension. Because of the interregional aspect of the extension, an Executive Task Force, including representatives from the City of Toronto and York Region is in place and is responsible for overseeing the development and construction of the project. The TTC is the Project Manager (except for the passenger pick up and drop off facilities and bus terminals located in York Region – to be managed by York Region).

The TTC will be responsible for the full operating costs of the subway extension from Downsview Station to the Vaughan Metropolitan Centre in York Region and receive all revenue from the service, with the exception of the operating costs and revenues for bus terminals and passenger pick up and drop off facilities located York Region, which will be maintained and operated by York Region.

It is important to note Municipalities are eligible to use their annual Provincial gas tax funding towards public transit capital and operating expenditures at their discretion.

Q5: Have the budgetary requirements of increasing operating subsidies — both from increased scope of operation and from declining cost recoveries — been taken into account in provincial planning?

Yes, as part of the provincial budgeting process for GO Transit, Metrolinx seeks the resources needed from the province to provide a regional transit service that is sustainable, attractive and able to meet the objectives of The Big Move.  This includes addressing the operating cost implications of any planned GO service improvement. As a result, the province does take into account the anticipated operating needs of the new services introduced in its planning. It should be noted, however, that as new GO Transit services are implemented, the specific operating implications vary depending on the nature of the service improvement being made. Not all new services introduced will result in declining cost recoveries.

Q6: Have there been any discussions about the comparative costs and problems of handling all inside-416 travel on a TTC network, including rapid transit buildout, versus the potential role of GO?

If you are asking whether any thought has been given to the TTC assuming all public transit, including GO transit operations, in the 416 area, the answer is no.  In 2009, the Metrolinx Act was amended to allow for a Metrolinx ownership model for new priority regional transit infrastructure in the GTHA. A Metrolinx ownership model assists in bringing a regional perspective to transportation planning and implementation of projects of regional significance. It also helped create a sustainable funding model by using provincial investments to build provincial infrastructure.  Metrolinx is working closely with the City and the TTC on the implementation of the rapid transit projects, and have agreed that the TTC would operate the four LRT lines under an operating agreement with Metrolinx- including vehicle operators, station operations, safety and security and train control.

On the Spadina subway, the Ministry is clear — it’s up to Toronto to foot the bill, possibly by diverting some of the gas tax subsidy the city now receives to pay for this regional service.  How much service within the 416 will be cut, or how much will overall fares rise, to pay for this?  Without question, Toronto made a bad deal in accepting responsibility for all of the future costs, but at the time they may have had reason to expect a special subsidy.

On that last question, the Ministry completely missed the point.  One major component of the “crisis” in regional travel is the capacity of services into the core area.  With GO taking the stance that it’s purpose is to serve “regional” trips, and its hostility to any suggestions that it take up inside-416 travel, this demand falls entirely on the TTC even though parts of the outlying 416 are actually further from the core than parts of the 905 served by GO.  Capacity planning should be based on a unified network regardless of who runs the trains.

The fundamental question is whether there has been any planning to support local transit costs that are driven by the expansion of the regional network, not to mention the extra costs that Metrolinx itself will face from service expansion.

These should be integral parts of the “Investment Strategy”.  Simply hoping that the municipalities will pony up funding for better local transit is an abdication of leadership by Queen’s Park.

How Much Revenue Does Metrolinx Need?

The Metrolinx Five Year Strategy contains a chart showing the funding sources out to 2020/21:

This is contained on Page 24 of the document.

Q7: All of the discussion to date has focussed on the “next wave” with the assumption that this will consume a good deal of the money from the new revenue tools. What does that extra $2b pay for (especially the part that isn’t “committed” funding) and where will the money come from? Is Metrolinx really a $4b annual program, not a $2b one, especially after the “committed” projects in the “first wave” have been completed.

The annual $2B Metrolinx figure refers to the additional revenue required to fund the capital costs of the Next Wave of transit projects.

As you know, Metrolinx is currently developing an Investment Strategy, which will include proposals for revenue tools that could be used to support The Big Move, its regional transportation plan for the GTHA (of which the next wave is a part). Metrolinx is required by legislation to deliver its strategy to the province and the heads of council in the GTHA by June 1, 2013. Once the province receives the strategy, it will consider Metrolinx’s recommendations and move forward as appropriate.

Well, yes, we know that, but the Ministry has dodged the question of what the added $2b will pay for.

The chart is also interesting because it clearly implies spending would begin on the “Next Wave” well before the First Wave has finished.  Readers may remember how the rollout plan for Transit City (and the First Wave) was extended because the terribly overstretched Toronto construction industry could not possibly absorb the work.  Somehow, we are going to build up to a $4b/year spend rate if that chart is to be believed.

Defending new revenue tools will be hard slog, politically.  I cannot help feeling that Metrolinx and the Ministry are making up policy as they go along, and have no real idea of the money to be spent and how they will manage both regional and local funding needs.  In Ontario’s new Premier, we have a strong advocate for transit and added funding.  I only wish that the policies her agencies are generating were more coherent.

In March 2007, the Transit City plan was announced with a proposal for seven new LRT lines of which the first two, Sheppard East and Finch West, would have opened in 2012  and 2013 on the original schedule.

Beyond the suburban LRT expansion, the TTC knew that it would be expanding the fleet of the existing “legacy” streetcar system, and the combined system would require several new carhouses and maintenance facilities.

In April 2007, the TTC awarded a contract for the development of a master plan for streetcar maintenance facilities.  This study produced an update report in May 2008 (the covering report is not available online).

Note that the location for a new downtown carhouse is shown in the Port Lands at roughly the location of what would become Leslie Barns.

At the time, the network was all to be built to TTC gauge, and there would eventually be full interconnection of all parts of the system.   However, Transit City was an aggressive plan, especially as regarded funding.  With the world financial crisis of 2008 and a recognition that the total cost of Transit City would be higher than first estimated, the entire schedule was pushed back and eventually taken over by Metrolinx.  However, the need for a new facility on the legacy network remained.

By May 2009, the TTC had conducted a site selection, although it was clear that the Leslie Barns site had always been their favourite spot.  Fourteen sites were examined, and of these six were found to meet the selection criteria (numbers 1-6 on the map below).

A notable exclusion from the final list was the Lever Brothers site at the foot of Broadview Avenue.  This will re-appear in a future report.

Of these six sites, four are self-evidently non-starters given their remote location relative to the existing system, and the debate really came down to the Ashbridges Bay site (1) and the Eastern Avenue site (2), although the TEDCO site on Unwin Avenue (3) stayed in the running through a more detailed design process.  The Eastern site was less-loved than the Ashbridges site given its proximity to the Film Studio district and the need for an access track through a residential neighbourhood.

The Commission approved a confidential property acquisition report for the Ashbridges (Leslie Barns) site even though the public consultation to present the site options would not take place until mid-June, 2009.

This decision did not sit well with some in the local communities for various reasons:

• the land in question was viewed as a green space that should be preserved;
• the connection track via Leslie would interfere with existing businesses and disturb residents;
• the connection track would interfere with the cycling paths.

At this point, there had not been an Environmental Assessment nor any detailed review of utility relocations needed for this site.

The purchase of 204 new Low Floor Light Rail Vehicles (LFLRVs) was approved by City Council in the summer of 2009, and the expected arrival of the new fleet in 2013 drove the requirement to have a new maintenance facility in place.  This schedule has slipped by about a year in part due to uncertainties over the LFLRV purchase thanks to the election of Rob Ford as Mayor in fall 2010.

In December 2009, the TTC formally approved the Ashbridges location for the new facility, and debate then turned to the access route cars would use to reach the carhouse.

In June 2010, the draft Transit Project Assessment Study (TPAP) was before the Commission, and it included an evaluation of various alternative routes, but did not include one that was put forward by the local Councillors with my support (a route via Eastern and Knox that would access Queen Street through Russell Yard).

Without rehashing that entire issue, the nub of the TTC’s preference for a straight route down Leslie Street rested on the following considerations:

• the route was direct and involved a minimum number of turns for streetcars;
• Leslie Street was already identified as a “Higher Order Transit Corridor” in the Official Plan where it was shown as part of a Kingston Road to Waterfront line;
• the route was the most cost-effective to build and operate.

Funding of $345-million had been provided in the 2010-14 Capital Budget, but this did not include provision for soil removal and site remediation, nor for the connection track to Queen Street.  Problems with the soils were clearly identified in the TPAP [see pp 6, 17 & 18 of the report].

The TPAP process was expected to continue through the fall 2010 with a final report in December, although this period overlapped the municipal election that would bring a new Mayor and a new Councillor to the ward in which the carhouse was located.

Also on the agenda in June 2010 was a report regarding the Unilever site (“Lever Brothers”) that had been rejected earlier in the evaluation process.  During the site survey in 2008, this location was rejected because the land was partly entailed by existing leases, and its availability was uncertain.  By mid-2010, control of the site was again in the landowner’s hands (UL Canada), and the TTC again reviewed the property.  Although it was not on the market in 2010, the site was sold for a condo development in 2012.

The TTC noted that the existing buildings and previous uses of the site would require demolition and cleanup, although there was no estimate of the magnitude of this cost.  A potential delay of up to three years (to 2016) was cited if the project were shifted to this site, and a cost premium of about 20% was expected including an unspecified amount for the longer connection track from the Lever site to Queen compared with the Leslie/Ashbridge link.

In December 2010, a new TTC with a decidedly different political slant on this project considered a report on the soil removal and capping at the Ashbridge site.  The contract itself was for $51.4-million, but other cost escalations required a total of $89.7m in additional project funding (bringing it up to $435m).  Debate on the item was vigourous, and the item was deferred to allow staff to bring additional information to the table.  [The $435m figure is later referenced as $437m, and I suspect the lower number is due to rounding of some amounts quoted here.]

In February 2011, a follow-up report noted that there had been ongoing consultation with local Councillors including consideration of various alternative sites for the new MSF.  The original plan to proceed with the Ashbridge site was confirmed, although the Commission did instruct staff:

to investigate the feasibility and costs of locating some of the new streetcars at the Hillcrest yard and/or the adjacent hydro corridor and exhibition place loop recognizing that additional streetcar storage at alternative sites does not change the need for the Ashbridges Bay Streetcar Maintenance and Storage Facility. [from Minutes of the meeting]

In July 2011, staff reported back with an update on various issues:

• Proposals to use surplus land at additional sites to reduce the space needed at Ashbridge MSF were rejected due either to space limitations, or to the relative inefficiency of having small storage sites that would require vehicle servicing and dispatching staff.
• The utility situation on Leslie Street was now known to be more complex than originally projected.  This raised the total cost of the Leslie Street option, and this was taken into account when looking at an alternative route.
• The connection via Knox was rejected for various reasons (detailed in the report) although some of the earlier objections had been dropped or reduced.  Canada Post remained convinced that streetcars on Knox would be a great disruption to their operations even though their main truck terminal is at the opposite (eastern) end of their site, and actual on-street observation revealed that Knox had very light traffic of any kind during the period when most streetcars would be leaving Ashbridge MSF.

In November 2011, the Commission approved work by Hydro One at a cost of $15m to relocate a high voltage cable passing through the MSF site.  This cable had been identified in the TPAP report.

In January 2012, the Commission approved the main contract for the MSF in the amount of $237m.

In May 2012, the Commission amended the existing design contract with AECOM Canada by adding $10m to the previously spent $28.7m.  Among the pressures for increased were the work involved in studying many alternative schemes for the MSF itself, lengthy work on site plan approval, and additional scope of work for streetscape improvements and utility relocation.

All three of these contracts are funded from the base project budget, as amended.

In March 2013, the Commission approved a contract for the Leslie Street connection and associated work including utility relocation and streetscape improvements at a cost of $105m.  A further increase in the project budget of $50-60m will be sought from City Council bringing the total up to $497m (over the earlier $437m) within the 2014 budget.

A big chunk of the increase comes from the need for new Toronto Water infrastructure under Leslie Street where an old wooden watermain, now roughly 70% silted up, is too close to the surface for the track slab to sit above it.  Although some early discussions of this work had talked of Toronto Water paying 80% of the cost of a new main (given that the existing plant was at roughly 80% of its useful lifespan), this source of funding is not mentioned.

This is certainly an issue for the 2014 budget given that Toronto Water has its own source of capital funds through the water rates and would have to rebuild this old main in any event.  The approval motion includes:

2. That the TTC request the City Manager to ensure that the infrastructure that the City requires to be implemented in conjunction with all TTC projects is clearly identified to the TTC early in the project planning and is budgeted for in the appropriate City Division budget.

The original project had an estimated cost of $345-million in 2010.  This grew in part due to project delay, and in part due to underestimation of the cost of site remediation at the chosen Ashbridge (Leslie Barns) property bringing the total up to $437m.  Further additional design work and change in scope brings the likely total to $497m.

Although some of this might have been avoided with the selection of another site, the larger question is the degree to which a credible “all in” cost estimates should have been produced earlier in the evaluation.  Other options ruled out of consideration might not have ranked as poorly with better up-front knowledge.  Much of the debate turned on the fact that the Ashbridge site was the preferred location quite early in the process, and the design proceeded on that basis even before it was formally selected.  There was an air of inevitability, and this is never a sign of good faith in “public consultation”.

That said, the newly named “Leslie Barns” was something of a political football with Councillors competing to show who was best protecting their neighbourhood.  The overlay of anti-streetcar, anti-Miller bias at City Hall was exploited to gain prominence for a debate on the carhouse that was a thinly-veiled attack on the new streetcars and continued surface rail operations in Toronto.

We are now past this debate, and construction will proceed over 2013-14.  Now the TTC must make good on the capacity increases it spoke of for the streetcar network back when the LFLRV order was planned.

“Consistent, top-line themes” are identified right at the outset:

Participants across the region feel frustrated with the level of congestion they face on highways, roads and public transit. They feel the negative impact of gridlock on family life, work obligations and health. The inadequacy of existing public transit systems is a common concern for participants. GTHA participants agree that across the region – along its busiest routes – our roads, highways, subways, trains and buses are straining to meet demand.

The need for reliable and frequent service was heard consistently across the GTHA. Participants are looking for leadership among transit providers to collaborate and deliver improved levels of service that is better integrated across the region. Participants look forward to system improvements that will allow them to more easily coordinate their schedules, enjoy a wider range of transit options with less uncertainty and stress, and travel more efficiently and cost-effectively from A to B. [page 3]

A few points leap out here:

• “Public transit” is a generic problem, not a “GO” or “TTC” or “HSR” issue, and there is no call for a few “magic bullet” solutions.
• Frequency and reliability rank highly, and would-be riders want to see better co-ordination and service delivery.
• Efficient and cost-effective travel are important.

A subtle but important linking factor here is that delivering on these issues requires a network approach, and high quality operations are at least as important as building new infrastructure.

The 920 roundtable participants were generally supportive of new “revenue tools”, although to be fair this is a self-selected population.  They have a strong interest in transit plans and were briefed on details of the options and experiences elsewhere in the world.  If the same level of interest and information applied to a larger share of the population, we might see better polling numbers, but there is strong distrust even among participants that new money will go to new transit.

Congestion

Congestion is a problem across the GTHA, and it affects people over wide areas and at many times of the day and week, not just traditional peak periods.  The road network, once a relative ease to use, has filled and only small disturbances or constraints are needed to push it over the edge.  What this bodes for future traffic from a growing population is not pretty.

Inadequate capacity or frequency on public transit systems is a common concern for participants across the GTHA. Some participants feel there is no motivation to get out of their cars and into transit, because it is overcrowded or underserviced. [page 10]

This is not just a downtown Toronto problem, but one affecting all of the GTHA.  Wide gaps in off-peak service (if it exists at all) limit the trips people can take, and delays threaten reliability.

The question of local service comes up later in the report as an issue for mobility within parts of the region.  Everyone isn’t trying to get to central Toronto, and travel within local municipalities is difficult or impossible for many.

Integration

Poorly co-ordinated schedules of various operators and the lack of service guarantees compound the problems of congestion.  Some participants talked of avoiding local systems and driving directly to a GO station to avoid connection issues.  Multiple fares also came in for criticism.

Across the GTHA, participants want a seamless transit system that enables people to travel easily, regardless of destination. [page 11]

Paying for the System

Participants supported GTHA-wide revenue tools (regardless of which were chosen), and some saw the potential for spending outside the GTHA of province-wide revenues.  Benefits should also flow across the region, not just to commuter trips, to widen transit’s reach as a travel option.

Accountability is an important component.  Any new funds must go “directly to construction and results”, and Metrolinx should “clearly define budgets and timelines” and “be accountable for those commitments”. [page 13]

Looking to the World

One observation was particularly striking:

Participants across the GTHA talked about their experiences in cities around the world with high-quality transportation systems. Communities in Europe and the US are touted for being modern, efficient and responsive. Many participants look forward to a transportation system that elicits a similar response from visitors to the GTHA. Some people expressed concern that the GTHA is trailing behind when it comes to transportation, particularly for tourists, seniors, students and businesses. [page 14]

This is a very different context from four decades ago when a transit plan could comprise a few subway lines and some commuter rail (most of which we didn’t build), and Toronto could claim to be a paragon among world transit systems.  People travel.  Over half of our population wasn’t born here and they know what other cities and countries are doing.  Squabbling about small scale improvements and “watching out for the taxpayer” seem to be strangely absent in many world centres cited as examples Toronto should follow.  As a Durham resident put it:

We need to think of transportation as a budget necessity, not a subsidy. [page 14]

Always Politics

Participants expressed reservations that political dynamics might impact long-term plans like The Big Move. They would like assurance that The Big Move is sustainable and has the staying power to surpass changing governments and funding priorities.

Across the GTHA, participants expressed a need for guarantees about the long-term viability of The Big Move. [page 19]

Over the comparatively short life of Metrolinx, we have already seen the role that politics, not to mention shifting economic climates, can do to large scale plans.  What started as a bold move to show people what transit could achieve (the “first wave” of projects) now stretches out to 2021 simply to ensure that Queen’s Park can fit the spending into their constrained budgets.  How this will fare under a new government does not bear contemplating.

The “Next Wave” is little more than a shopping list, and there is no sense from Metrolinx of project costs or staging, and how these will relate to the new revenue stream.  Uncertainty makes for an easy political target when supporters can’t point to specifics, and critics can cite previous delays as counterexamples.

Regional Views

Many themes emerged from the regional meetings:

• The lack of integration between local transit systems, and with GO Transit, conflicting schedules and infrequent service work against people trying to get around their region.
• Links between systems should be seamless.
• Local service must be improved and it must expand with growing communities.
• Transit is important in keeping seniors active.
• Service to and from Toronto needs to be a bi-directional, all-day, 7-day operation to serve a wider variety of trip types.
• Frequency and reliability provide greater flexibility for riders to plan their schedules.
• Overcrowding makes transit unattractive and uncomfortable.
• Both quantity and quality of transit service need improvement to lure people out of their cars.
• Better transit can reduce dependence on auto travel.
• The lag between announcements and service should be reduced — improvements should be delivered faster.
• Improved capacity into the Toronto core is important both with additional rapid transit, and by improving the use of streets through parking restrictions.

What Lessons for Metrolinx and Queen’s Park?

A pervasive question for any Big Move advocate is whether this network will actually be built, when, and what, really, will it accomplish.  Despite repeated invocation of the $16b worth of projects already underway, there’s not much to show in completed work.

The Big Gap between Metrolinx and many of the participants’ desires lies in the realm of local service.  This is a subject which Metrolinx constantly and forcefully maintained was not part of its mandate ever since its inception.  They were a regional planner, and local service was a municipal affair.  That’s like saying we can plan 400-series highways without considering the local road network to which they will connect.

This position, of course, avoided the delicate problem of Queen’s Park resuming local transit funding, let alone priming the pump to encourage substantial service improvements.  Local systems face continued funding and service cuts just at a time the whole region is talking about the need for more and better transit.

Belatedly, the “Investment Strategy” now includes 25% for a variety of local purposes with 15% going to local transit.  This is a very late addition to the IS, and there is no supporting analysis to establish just how much spending (including local shares) would be required to provide that “last mile” part of regional travel, let alone improve journeys within the regions.

To put the number in context for Toronto, a $2b/yr stream would yield $300m for local transit of which Toronto would be lucky to see half, or $150m.  This is less than half of the TTC’s operating subsidy for 2013.  A further wrinkle is that the funding really shouldn’t just be used to offset an existing municipal expense because that will bring no improvement on the street.  Moreover, it’s unclear whether the new $150m would be offset by an end to the existing $150m Toronto gets from provincial gas tax.  Shell games like this are common in budgets, and Queen’s Park needs to be clear on its intentions.

Outside Toronto, the challenge of improving transit is greater because the 905 regions are starting from a lower established service level and market share.  Getting to a “good” level of transit serving all-day travel will take a big jump in funding.

“Integration” is a term we heard a lot over past years, but in practice much of the effect was to justify the Presto card project.  All that brings is a common payment mechanism, not a common, integrated fare nor a reduction in cross-border tariffs.  As for integrated service, problems remain between local providers and with GO, especially in GO’s avoidance of integration within the 416.

Nowhere in The Big Move have we seen an attempt to address the needs for local travel and the cost of implementing complementary services to the Big Move network.  For too long, the Metrolinx/GO mindset has been to run trains and let the local trips take care of themselves, especially in Toronto where a mature system sits on their doorstep.

This is not an acceptable “regional plan”, and Metrolinx should hasten to bring the supposed benefits of the new funding schemes into line with the type of improvements people identify as their needs.  This will take a change in focus from capital construction to operations and service, not just for Metrolinx routes, but throughout the GTHA.

Will Metrolinx address this challenge, or will they simply announce a preferred list of new taxes and fees, and leave the rest to Queen’s Park?

The problem has been fixed.

Public consultation until today featured a longer list, and several of the options fell off of the table thanks to public and political feedback.  The complete list and a detailed analysis of each option can be found in a 225-page report “Big Move Implementation Economics Revenue Tool Profiles” produced by AECOM and KPMG in March 2013.

At a press conference, Metrolinx CEO Bruce McCuaig emphasized that the duty of his organization is to make recommendations, to offer advice, but that the final choice on tools and the amount of revenue to be sought will be up to the politicians at Queen’s Park.  This neatly shifts the focus of detailed questions, but avoids the question of just how much detail will be included in those recommendations.

A handout we are sure to see during the next round of consultations outlines the general philosophy and gives details of what might be achieved with each short-listed tool.

The most important statement here is that

An Investment Strategy is about more than just raising revenues for transportation; it’s about implementing mechanisms that grow a more livable, prosperous and sustainable region.

To this I would add that a “strategy” also includes important components such as the staging of projects and discussions about the speed (or lack thereof) with which the full Big Move network is implemented.  Today and in the past weeks leading up to the announcement, we have heard a lot about new revenues, but little about how they should be “invested”.

This is not a situation where Metrolinx should sit back and wait for Queen’s Park to act.  They should present alternative construction and implementation plans, financing, and the implications for revenue needs in the short and long term.

The $2-billion/year figure has been the standard number cited by Metrolinx going back to the release of The Big Move.  Five years ago, this was a $50-billion project with a 25-year implementation plan.  At the time, the price seemed to be low-balled, and in any event it did not include inflation.  McCuaig wants to maintain consistency in the revenue target in part, I suspect, to avoid frightening voters and politicians with the spectre of runaway costs.  However, the Next Wave funding scheme includes giving $500m (25%) annually to the municipal sector, and this slice comes off the top of what would otherwise have gone to Metrolinx.  The combined effect of inflation and the municipal share will cut substantially into Metrolinx’ ability to deliver its program.

Changing the tools that would be used or the amount raised might be the subject of a legislated review period to allow adjustment up or down, or to rebalance income streams.  This would give an option to raise more in the future, presuming that politicians of the day had the stomach to propose such actions.

Oliver Moore from the Globe asked if Metrolinx had a “hierarchy” of preferred tools.  McCuaig replied that the large revenue generators are needed in any toolkit simply to get to a $2b total, but that policy considerations such as land use or influencing transportation decisions might also bring in the smaller tools such as Land Value Capture, Development Charges and High Occupancy Tolls.  This was not a convincing response, but those three tools are beloved in some political circles, and they are unlikely to drop off the list without further study.

Newstalk 1010 asked about drivers feeling that they are unfairly targeted by the proposed tools.  In fact, most of the proposed tools have nothing to do with motorists.  McCuaig missed this obvious rebuttal, but talked about how the investments would not just be in transit but also generally in transportation.  Metrolinx hopes to double the regional share of trips by transit from 16% to 33% in the next 25 years, and this will require an integrated view of transportation of whatever kind.

Mike Crawley from CBC asked about the tools that were not included in the recommended list.  McCuaig repeated his position that the larger revenue generators are needed plus key tools to influence land use and travel choices, but that Metrolinx would “take input” on others.  Royson James from The Star asked why tools such as the Vehicle Registration Tax were not included.  McCuaig replied that Metrolinx preferred to use consumption-based rather than user-based tools.

Ben Spurr from NOW asked what municipal reaction have been to these proposals, and how much buy-in does Metrolinx need to go forward with them.  McCuaig replied that the decision to implement any of the tools is up to Queen’s Park, but obviously Metrolinx wants to get municipal input.  Much later in a scrum, when asked about the reaction of Mayor Ford, McCuaig emphasized that he would look to Council for its position.  This is the same approach Metrolinx has taken to decisions on transit technologies and priorities.

A reporter from CHCH asked about timelines–when could transit riders expect to see improvements, and what would happen with promised improvements such as all-day service to Hamilton.  McCuaig replied that $16b worth of projects is already underway (this is the oft-mentioned first wave to be funded from provincial general revenues, but which was stretched out to 2021 to reduce year-by-year financing needs).  What may happen with an implementation schedule after June 1, McCuaig could not comment as this would be up to the province and municipalities.  All-day Hamilton service to James Street Station will begin in 2015.

In speaking of the “Next Wave”, McCuaig hinted that the project list is not cast in stone, and that feedback from interested parties and municipalities could bring changes.

CP24 asked about the implementation and enforcement costs for some tools.  McCuaig replied that sustainability of revenue, ease and cost of implementation, economic impacts, social equity, and the effect on travel choices would all be considered in the detailed evaluation of potential tools.

In the case of a sales tax, if it were implemented province-wide, then revenue from areas outside of the GTHA would have to go back to them, but that the implementation details (whether to tax only inside the GTHA and how revenue might be distributed) would be left to Queen’s Park.

A fundamental issue for McCuaig is that any revenue and spending proposals be seen as fair on a geographic basis.  This may be challenging considering that the benefit from projects built in one municipality may flow to their neighbours.  Metrolinx has not produced any breakdown of the revenue that might be generated for each tool in each municipality.  This background will be essential to understanding how any basket of revenue tools will raise money, and by implication how the money will have to be spent through the GTHA.

Hamutal Dotan of the Torontoist was the first of several to ask about operating costs.  This is not a trivial problem for Metrolinx because there are at least three different sets of costs:

• The cost of operating new lines built as part of The Big Move
• The cost of operating existing services (mainly GO rail) as all-day, 2-way operations
• The cost of upgrading municipal transit systems to act as feeder/distributor networks to the core GO services

Some of this will be offset by new revenue, but none of the GTA systems including GO breaks even today, let alone with greatly expanded service.

When the Investment Strategy was before the Metrolinx Board back in June 2008, the base scenario was for $3b/year, and possible values ranged up to $9b/year including capital costs for system growth, operating costs and ongoing renewal of the system.  Needless to say, this number has fallen considerably thanks to sticker shock, but it gives some idea of what was considered at the time.  This amount did not appear to include provision for local transit costs, only for those of the Metrolinx network.

On the bigmove website, another view of the Investment Strategy appears showing the evolution of the capital, operating and renewal costs over a 50-year period.  This information fairly clearly shows that there is no thought for the second and third cost categories shown above, and moreover that the revenue stream is “spoken for” in the out years, and is not available for additional projects.  When this chart was drawn up, it presumed construction of the entire Big Move 25-year plan, something that appears well beyond the capacity of current revenue and spending proposals.

How Metrolinx will achieve its aims with only $1.5b/year (after the municipal share is sliced out of the pie) is quite a mystery.  As for the municipal sector, Toronto’s likely share would not even bring the city back to a 50% share of subsidy by Queen’s Park enjoyed in the pro-transit days of the 70s and 80s.

Notable by its complete absence from the discussion is any mention of accessibility or the operation of para-transit services such as Wheel-Trans.  This is yet another area where the responsibilities are left to the municipal sector to muddle by as best they can.

I asked about the staging and delivery of not just the “Next Wave”, but the “Third” and “Fourth” waves beyond.  When would Metrolinx start to spend its new revenues on projects such as the DRL or on other as-yet unfunded schemes.  McCuaig replied that the DRL still must go through a great deal of analysis and design before actual construction, but this dodged the more general question about less complex projects and the ability to move forward with schemes that require less work to become “shovel ready”.

One reporter asked whether municipalities would be forced to implement intelligent traffic systems including speed limits and signal controls to improve traffic flow (downtown Toronto is already under study by the City).  McCuaig replied that funding for such work would come out of the five percent (itself part of the 25%) set aside for local transportation improvements.  More to the point, the question perpetuated the downtown focus of the “congestion” debate even though the worst problems lie in the outer 416 and beyond.

Finally, the question of transit fares as a funding source came up.  McCuaig noted that the “user pay” principle is a common sentiment, but that fares are not sensitive to a rider’s ability to pay.  Part of the toolbox evaluation will be to ensure that those of lower income will not be disproportionately affected.

I would also point out that the suggested $0.15 fare surcharge would disproportionately fall on Toronto riders who are far-and-away the majority of travellers in the GTHA.  Such an increase, relative to roughly $2 average fare for all TTC trips, would be a 7.5% bump and this would likely preclude any concurrent increase in the base TTC fare structure putting them even further behind on funding operations and service.  If anyone thinks of imposing a fare surcharge, this should be on a percentage basis so that GO Transit riders don’t get a “free ride” with a trivial increase in their much higher fares.

Fare revenue should be reserved for operating costs, not as a source of capital, so that people can get more of what they are paying for–service.

The press conference ended with a recognition by McCuaig that ongoing review and adjustment of the revenue tools would be needed, and that the need for investment will not stop with the “Next Wave”.  There will be a constant debate about recalibrating the plans, and adjusting the speed of implementation.

Concluding Thoughts

The Metrolinx list is notably lacking in an Income Tax for individuals or for corporations.  Indeed, only a Payroll Tax would be specific to the corporate sector, and it could fall unevenly depending on how labour intensive a company might be.  The philosophical question must be whether the corporate sector, which stands to gain from increased mobility for employees and for goods, should help to fund the infrastructure and operation of the transportation network.

This option was dismissed in the background study because of concerns that any income-based taxes would affect Ontario’s (or the GTHA’s) competitiveness.  This entirely missed the point that the lack of transportation infrastructure is itself a drag on the local economy, and is a common problem cited by the very businesses whose distaste for new taxes is well-known.

If we are going to give the impression that “everyone should pay”, this is a good place to start.

Two other fundamental problems are the funding of local transit services at a level sufficient to be a real alternative to driving, and the question of how quickly new lines will come into operation.

Without local transit, most trips will remain dependent on the private auto, and the urge to simply stay in your car rather than parking at a transfer station (even if there is room) is hard to fight.  My impression is that Metrolinx has given this problem only the most cursory examination, and yet it is a central issue raised in the roundtable discussions held with GTHA residents.  People recognize the importance of local service to get them around their own areas, and to connect them with the trunk routes.  They also demand fare integration that treats the network as one entity without artificial tariff boundaries.  Any consolidation of fare structures will require greater subsidy, but this is yet to appear as a major item for public discussion at Metrolinx.

As for construction schedules, Metrolinx must somehow escape from previous claims that the construction sector could not possibly take on more work.  If this is to be believed, then it will simply not be possible to spend all the money we collect with new revenue tools as fast as it rolls in the door.  Any discussion of project staging and the speed with which The Big Move can be implemented must have a credible understanding of industry capacity.  This would likely have to be subdivided for major types of work such as tunnelling as opposed to less specialized work such as road construction and the creation of LRT/BRT rights-of-way.

Finally, Metrolinx has not included any discussion of financing options such as whether to go “pay-as-you-play” and limit construction (and later operations) to what can be achieved with $1.5b/year, or if the revenue stream would be seen as a long-term tool to service debt that would be raised to accelerate construction to the earlier part of The Big Move’s 25-year planning horizon.

In short, this is a “revenue strategy”, not an “investment strategy”.

There is a lot still to do, and the real decisions, as always, will come from the political level.  If the minority Liberal government survives long enough, we might even see the beginnings of major transit upgrades, but this will require resolve, stamina and leadership to counter the facile populism of the no-new-tax brigade.

• Purchase of Articulated Buses
• The CEO’s Report for March 2013
• The Gateway Newsstand Contract
• Priorities for Subway Station Elevators

The Leslie Barns project, and the streetcar system renewal in general, received comments in the press recently about the scale of expenditures, and the sense that the TTC estimates understated the full cost.  See the National Post here and here.  I will discuss these issues in a separate article.

Updated April 2, 2013:  Rahul Gupta has addition background on the Gateway issue at InsideToronto.com.

Purchase of Articulated Buses

I have already written on the Torontoist website about the implications of larger streetcars and buses for transit service.  In brief, the TTC remains committed to cutting costs by increasing the ratio of passengers to operators, but much less committed, if at all, to improving the capacity and quality of service on the streets.

When the new cars were ordered, TTC emphasized that capacity would be increased on streetcar routes to address long-standing shortfalls.  In an era when discussions of new revenue tools wonder how many billions might be extracted from the southern Ontario populace, the starvation of the TTC (and transit systems generally) for operating funding is a disgrace.

CEO Andy Byford will be presenting a five-year plan for the TTC sometime in the next few months.  Will we get more of the same, or will there at least be an option for aggressive improvement of transit service and capacity?  Will TTC Commissioners finally break free of the budget madness at City Hall where every dime of new spending is viewed as “gravy” to be eliminated?  Stay tuned.

The TTC has not published the presentation materials from the meeting for this report.  I have scanned some of the printed handout here.

The TTC expects that the new buses will carry 45% more passengers than the current low floor fleet.  This presumes a fairly even distribution of passengers through the vehicles that will come with all-door loading.

The seated loads for the two vehicles are 48 and 36 respectively for an increase of about one third.  The design loads for service are based on seating plus 20% for frequent routes (10 minute or better headways) where the larger buses would be used.

The presentation cites the improved productivity of carrying more passengers with fewer operators, and takes a reductio ad absurdum approach of comparing bus routes with the subway.  Trains are used to carry the 486,800 passengers who ride daily between Finch and Union, something that is clearly impossible with buses.  The use of larger trains somehow “justifies” the use of larger buses.

What the TTC neglects to mention is that when the larger TR trains were added to the line, they did not cut service by 10% to pack more riders into the bigger trains and reduce operator costs.  The additional capacity was badly needed to handle a backlog of demand for service.  This aspect of the equation–the ability to add capacity without more operators–is completely missing from the discussion.

Instead the TTC cites several routes where ridership is strong and growing, and then shows proposed service levels with no provision to accommodate growth, nor a discussion of how much of the “saving” available with artics will be eaten up by the need to run more service on these routes.

The estimated savings from replacing 206 regular buses with 153 artics is $9-million annually.  These could be “reinvested” by:

• Reducing crowding standards from 53 to 48 during peak periods on standard size buses (there is no mention of a comparable reduction on artics).  This would take the standards back to the Ridership Growth Strategy era.
• Creating a network of routes with 10-minute or better headways as proposed in the Transit City Bus Plan.  This would affect off-peak services on major routes by guaranteeing that service would never fall (on paper) below 6 buses/hour.  If this is pursued, the plan needs substantial revision to take into account changes in the LRT network plans, and to include the streetcar system.
• Creating a network of express services on major routes.  Some of these are on the list for artic bus operation and it is unclear what the combined effect of the new expresses plus the headway widening due to artics would produce, especially for “local” services.
• Balancing the operating budget.   For two years, the TTC has cut services in order to reduce costs on marginal off-peak lines (2011) and increase peak crowding (2012).  The TTC is running out of places to trim “fat”, and the use of artics to raise the passenger-to-operator ratio is one of the few places left .  The value in terms of service quality is not considered here despite the TTC’s new-found fetish for “customer service”.

If route capacity is replaced on a 1:1 basis during all hours of service, the additional capital cost of the artics will be recouped in three years, according to TTC management.

The TTC does acknowledge that longer wait times are a disadvantage for riders especially on evenings and weekends, and they suggest that a 10-minute maximum be placed on new headways.  Unfortunately, given the shambles that passes for service on some routes, a 10-minute schedule will quickly turn into very wide service gaps, especially if short-turns continue to occur.  This policy would reduce some of the savings available, showing clearly that the TTC has already factored the wider headways during all operating periods into its calculations.

Recommendations on what should be done will be presented by staff “in advance of implementation”.  If past experience holds, this means that the Commission will be presented with a fait accompli after the schedules have been posted, not when there is still time for policy guidance to affect the outcome.

A strange catechism has taken root at the TTC, and it runs like this:

• Greater per-bus capacity, leads to
• Fewer buses needed, leads to
• More space/time between buses, leads to
• Buses less likely to catch up to each other, means
• Less need for short turning.

Remember this, children, because it is the new received wisdom for service planning and operations.

With frequent service (2’38″ on the sample route, Dufferin), when a bus is caught by a traffic signal, it will incur extra waiting time.  The TTC quotes 70 seconds as the delay, but of course that’s a full cycle, and the delay is only from the tail end of the amber for the stopped bus through to the end of the cross-street’s red.  This is more like 30 seconds, not 70.  In any event, according to the TTC, the following bus may catch fewer reds, carry a shorter headway and catch up eventually to its leader.

The TTC then claims that this bus (the one that is already early) will have to be short turned.  This is nonsense, as we have seen in many route analyses published here.  Buses are unevenly spaced because they leave terminals on unreliable headways, and en route will carry different loads.  A short turn will typically occur because a bus is late (likely the one following the gap created by bunching), or, sometimes to fill large gaps coming the other way on the route.  The latter is often a matter of chance as the re-entry of vehicles from short-turns does not appear to be well monitored.

If the claim that wider headways with artics will reduce bunching were true, then we should see little bunching outside the peak period especially evenings and weekends when headways are wider.  In fact, on Dufferin, the service is demonstrably worse.   The problem is not the type of vehicle but the way the buses on the route are mismanaged.

The TTC presentation notes that the single biggest component of trip time is spent serving passengers at stops (16-20%).  Faster service through all-door loading can reduce this, but it requires proof-of-payment fares and inspectors.  It is unclear whether the extra cost of fare inspection for this mode of operation has been factored into the net savings for the larger buses.

If there really are savings to be had, this could be used to trim running times and partly offset the planned wider headways.  However, it is important to note that many stops only serve a few passengers (though the cumulative effect can be substantial), and the greater component of delay in these places is the need to stop at all, not the time taken by passengers getting on or off.  All-door loading can reduce this at major stops and also aid in better distribution of riders within vehicles, but the effect will not be proportional at every stop on a route.

Larger buses should be better able to handle surge crowds such as those from special events or school dismissals.  However, this depends on the capacity actually being available, not already filled with “regular” riders.  With design loads that use almost all available space, the ability to handle surges is compromised.  Moreover, heavily loaded buses take longer at stops because passengers must force their way around each other to board and leave.

The TTC raises the issue of winter operations and notes that artics are used in snow-prone cities.  Stories of buses jack-knifing and of artics being pulled from service elsewhere seem not to have reached TTC ears.

Overall, the presentation has an “emperor’s new clothes” feeling to it.  By claiming that somehow the wider headways to be operated will actually improve service, TTC management ignores both their own experience with headway management and the well-known planning rule holding that wait times are a greater detriment for would-be riders than in-vehicle time.  An opportunity to publicize new vehicles as a way to actually enhance service capacity and quality has been completely wasted.

CEO’s Report

The CEO’s report covers the transition from 2012 to 2013 with some measures still reporting 2012 results.  (In the discussion below, the TTC refers to “periods” which are a standard length in full weeks to eliminate calendar effects between periods and between successive years.)

Ridership for period 1 was 46-million compared with a budget figure of 47.2m, but still slightly better (0.5%) than the 45.8m figure for the same period in 2012.  Bad weather and worse than usual illness in the GTA are held responsible.

The financial results still reflect 2012 operations which ran better than budget, but we don’t yet have numbers for 2013.

Punctuality values are still high for the rapid transit system, and the TTC will raise the bar for the Sheppard and BD lines to match currently achieved values.  On the YUS line, problems with the new TR trains are reported as declining, but no stats are included.

On the surface routes, punctuality remains near the target levels of 65% (bus) and 70% (streetcar) for trips that are within 3 minutes of the planned headways.  Looking at moving annual averages, there has been a small improvement in the bus system results, but the values will have to stay above last year’s numbers to sustain this.  Moreover, the target itself is low enough to imply that one in three vehicles is not within the 3-minute band for “punctual” service.  On the streetcar system, the values stay fairly flat allowing for seasonal effects of construction delays.  These scores do not reflect the worst of the winter weather and snow which came in February.

I will not belabour the question of the meaningfulness of these stats as this topic has been discussed on this site before.  The TTC plans to introduce new measurement schemes later in 2013 at which time we will see how well they address limitations of the current methodologies used for subway and surface measurements.

Elevator and escalator availability is reported as high in the range of the 97% target.  This is another measure that needs to be revisited as it does not necessarily reflect the all-day status of these devices.

The Customer Satisfaction Survey rating declined from 74% to 72% in the fourth quarter of 2012.  This disappointed the TTC given the efforts they have made, but there are a few basic questions including:

• What level of change in this rating is simply statistical variation?  Is this a one-time blip or is it part of a downward trend?
• Which TTC initiatives actually improve the factors that matter most to riders?  Cleaner stations and trains may be appreciated, but what about service?  The ability of the service scores to reflect customer experience at a fine-grained level is dubious.

The Customer Satisfaction ratings for 2012 were 76%, 74%, 74% and 72% for each of the quarterly polls.  No previous data are available because the old “Chief General Manager’s Report” did not include it.  The numbers suggest a downward trend over the past year, and this obviously begs a question of whether crowding and general condition of service issues dominate the results.

The TTC plans to begin publishing route-by-route service scores fairly soon.  These will likely be based on the current methodology for measuring service quality and, presumably, these will be migrated to whatever new scheme is implemented later this year.  An important component missing from the online reports is historical data so that the trend in values from day to day can be examined without having to manually capture and track this information.

Gateway Newsstand Contract

In October 2012, the Commission at management’s recommendation approved an extension of the lease under which the Gateway newsstands in the subway operate.  As things stood, there were varying expiry dates for the many locations, and these would be consolidated to simplify contract administration by the TTC and planning by the lessee.  In fact, the head lease is held by Tobmar Investments who sublet the newsstands to independent operators.

This arrangement was presented as an “unsolicited proposal” to the Commission, and in the process of lease approval and further discussion, the details of the new contract were released as part of a Commission report.  This makes it nearly impossible for the TTC to conduct a fair competition if the proposed contract does not hold.

Another company, International News, objected that it did not get a chance to bid, and the question of fairness escalated to the Mayor’s office.

In January 2013, the matter was back at the Commission with a management recommendation to conduct an RFP for new bids in light of previously unexpected interest from other parties.  After considerable discussion, the Commission voted to re-affirm the deal with Tobmar.  This decision was now back at the Commission for reconsideration at the March meeting.

The room was packed with representatives of many newsstand operators for whom the replacement of Tobmar by another head lessee would likely be an end to their business.  Tobmar itself presented information about the process leading to their original proposal in 2012, and it became evident that “unsolicited” was hardly an appropriate description.  TTC management had opened discussion on various issues including the question of renovating some locations in advance of the Pan Am Games (lest Toronto look not quite world class enough, I suppose).  These discussions had been underway for some months before the October 2012 report.

The debate that followed was unlike anything I have ever seen at the TTC with open hostility in the questioning of management by the Commission and clear feeling that inaccurate information had been provided to previous meetings.  The whole matter has been put over to the April 2013 meeting when management will present a consolidated view of events taking into account information about past negotiations provided by Tobmar.

Priorities for Subway Station Elevators

In response to a deputation in October 2012 and a request from Commissioner (and former Vice-Chair) Peter Milczyn, TTC staff reviewed the priority for elevator installation at Old Mill Station (located in Milczyn’s ward).

Leaving aside stations on the SRT which will be rebuilt as part of whatever technology supplants the current one, Old Mill ranks last among inaccessible stations with 4,774 daily passengers.  For this reason, it is scheduled near the end of the elevator project list in 2023.  (Two major stations, Islington and Warden, are further off in 2025, but these are placeholders pending possible redevelopment at both locations.)

The fundamental problem facing the TTC and its legally mandated implementation of accessible facilities is that Queen’s Park legislates the timelines, but provides no funding.  Only the far-off 2025 deadline for completion of all retrofits saves the TTC (and Toronto) from having to fund and launch an aggressive program to rebuild three dozen stations in a brief period.  Indeed, station reconstructions generally have slowed down thanks to capital budget cuts at the city, and some elevator projects may have to proceed as free-standing projects with all the inefficiency this brings.

While I sympathize with Commissioner Milczyn and the plight of his constituents, his efforts might be better spent on securing funding for the entire program, not just for his local stations.

The Commission decided to defer the entire matter for three years to see whether circumstances will have changed.  This sounds as if they are waiting out elections and policy developments at all three levels of government.

Only one small problem: the TTC didn’t have any cars fit to use for this service.  Car 2766, the last Witt on the property, only operated occasionally around Hillcrest for special events.  Car 2894 was sitting in a barn in Hawkestone, Ontario near Barrie.

2766 loops around the Way Building at Hillcrest Yard in August 1967. The occasion was a streetcar charter visiting the shops, and special arrangements had been made to bring out the Witt car.

2766 near the west end of the yard. Davenport Road is behind the water tower in the background.

Car 2894 ready for transport to Toronto.  February 1973.

2766 with interior repairs underway.  February 1973.

The extremely simple truck frames of a Peter Witt car.  Bus aficionados will note the GMC buses including an old Gray Coach in the background.

2894 before repairs begin sitting beside a PCC with renovation in progress.

2766 sits beside PCCs on the rebuild line.

Painting 2766.

Hand lettering the original name “Toronto Transportation Commission” on 2766.

Interior of 2894.

2894 on the rebuild line.

2766 pokes its nose out of St. Clair Carhouse on the opening day of Tour Tram service, June 24, 1973.

We’re not quite at the 40th anniversary of this service, and I will save photos of the cars on the streets of Toronto for another post later this year.

The intent is to find short-to-medium term improvements that are possible:

… getting more out of the existing transportation infrastructure, in an attempt to make travel in the downtown less challenging and more efficient for all road users.

There will be an Open House for this study in the rotunda of Metro Hall (John Street south of King) on Wednesday, March 27 from noon to 9:30pm.  The study’s website includes a link to a short survey of travel patterns.

This post will be used as a repository for updates on the study as well as comments from readers.

Thanks to reader NickL who included a link in a recent comment to a photo of car 4402 on a flatcar coming to Toronto.  The photo is by Eric May on the Railpictures.ca website.

Car 4401 remains in Thunder Bay as Bombardier’s test car.

But, you say, don’t we have the Quick Wins?  The Big Seven?  The Second Wave?  Shovels are in the ground and all we need is the will to spend!

Things are not quite that simple.

What we do not have is a clear sense of what we will achieve and when we will achieve it.  In 2008 Metrolinx produced The Big Move, our regional transportation plan with two very broad objectives — a 15 and a 25 year plan.  Demand projections, including a vision of what traffic and transit might look like, only considered the fully-built 25-year plan, something we already know will not be finished (if ever) within the projected time span.

Some projects received a “Benefits Case Analysis”, but these studies considered each line in isolation rather than looking at what subsets of the whole plan would contribute to the network.  Indeed, the biggest “benefit” of many lines would be the money spent to build them, not their contribution to transit overall.  This would follow the tradition of transit projects in the GTHA as economic and job stimulus packages first, with transportation improvements as an afterthought.

An “Investment Strategy” is not simply a matter of figuring out where new revenues might be found, but of recommending the best way to use them, to “invest” in the future of the region.

What Is Metrolinx For?

To put this discussion in context, it’s useful to look back at the legislation that defines Metrolinx’ purpose, the Metrolinx Act.

Duties of Corporation re leadership in transportation integration

6.  (1)  In carrying out its objects … the Corporation shall,

(a) develop and adopt a transportation plan for the regional transportation area and plan, co-ordinate and set priorities for its implementation;

(b) fund, or arrange and manage the funding for, integrated transportation across the regional transportation area;

(c) promote and facilitate co-ordinated decision-making and investment in the regional transportation area among the governments of the municipalities in the regional transportation area and the federal and provincial governments in order to ensure the efficient and cost-effective resolution of matters of shared concern respecting transportation, including,

(i) the provision and the optimal use and location of transportation infrastructure, including highway and transit infrastructure,

(ii) the integration of transportation infrastructure, including highway and transit infrastructure, and

(iii) the integration of routes, fares and schedules of the regional transit system and of local transit systems in the regional transportation area; and

(d) promote the safety, efficiency and protection of transportation corridors.

Also:

Investment strategy

32.1  On or before June 1, 2013, the Corporation shall provide the Minister and the heads of the councils of the municipalities in the regional transportation area with a copy of the Corporation’s investment strategy, including proposals for revenue generation tools that may be used by the province or the municipalities to support the implementation of the transportation plan for the regional transportation area.

In section 6, funding is only one part of a longer list of duties assigned to Metrolinx, and in section 32.1, revenue tools are to be included in the Investment Strategy.  This is an important distinction because the IS should not just be about revenue, but about how it will be spent and the benefits in will bring.

If all we wanted was a list of revenue tools, that could have been provided five years ago when the first shopping list appeared on a Metrolinx board agenda.  A “final” version of the IS was to be approved in October 2008, but this was not to be.  Those intervening months brought an international banking crisis and ended the bold, forward-looking stance of Ontario on transit projects just as The Big Move was published.  We have not fully recovered from that delay.

In the original draft Investment Strategy, Metrolinx and Queen’s Park expected a 1/3 funding share to come from Ottawa.  This was a foolhardy assumption then, and it remains so today.  Yes, there is some infrastructure money in the federal budget, but the GTHA’s share would not pay for 1/3 of The Big Move, let alone other backlogged infrastructure needs.  Ottawa prefers to announce transit support on a project basis, city by city, rather than simply handing over a guaranteed revenue stream for decades to come.

If Ontario, if the GTHA cannot afford The Big Move without federal dollars, then we need a “Plan B”.  With the scale of new revenues now pegged at $2b-plus annually, it is clear that building the plan takes precedence even if we have to pay for the whole thing out of our provincial and municipal pockets.  Any help from Ottawa will be “found money”.

Where Is The Big Move?

According to the Metrolinx website, they “anticipate” that a progress report “will be complete by early 2013″.  It is now almost April.

The Quick Wins

Back in the 2008 budget, there was a grab-bag of “Quick Win” projects totalling $744m:

• Bolton GO park-and-ride
• Durham BRT
• Halton BRT
• Hamilton A and B Lines
• Mississauga Dundas and Hurontario Corridors
• Pearson Airport/Renforth Gateway
• Toronto Yonge-University-Spadina Subway Capacity Improvements
• York-VIVA BRT, Yonge and Highway 7 Corridors
• Plus: BikeLinx ($5M)

A major chunk of that total was the subway “capacity improvements” consisting of signalling upgrades on the original Yonge line that are still underway.  That capacity won’t actually be available until much more is spent on the entire YUS and the fleet is expanded to operate more frequent service.  Hardly a “quick win”, but it sounded good at the time.  I will leave it to readers to contemplate what has been delivered for the remaining items.

The Big 7 and The First Wave

Back in 2008, analysis was underway for seven major projects:

• Eglinton Crosstown Rapid Transit
• Finch West Rapid Transit
• Scarborough Rapid Transit (upgrade and extension)
• Sheppard East Rapid Transit
• “SuperGO” Lakeshore East and West electrification
• York-VIVA Highway 7 and Yonge Street (full build)
• Yonge Subway Extension north to Richmond Hill

We all know just how far this list has progressed.  Finch and Sheppard, originally expected to open over the next few years, were pushed back to the end of the decade thanks to provincial spending cuts.  The Scarborough RT project is merged with the Eglinton line, but has been deferred, and may yet morph into a full “Scarborough Subway” depending on the ebb and flow of political tides.  The Yonge extension to Richmond Hill is on the back burner now that Metrolinx and the TTC have decided the riders won’t fit on the existing subway network.  And electrification?  Maybe in 2017, maybe, but only from Union to the Airport.

Over the last five years, the list of active projects has changed and we now have “The First Wave”.  According to the bigmove.ca website, the following projects are underway:

• Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension
• Union Pearson Express
• York Region vivaNext Rapidways
• Eglinton Crosstown LRT
• Mississauga Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Project
• Scarborough Rapid Transit (RT) Extension
• Finch West Light Rail Transit (LRT)
• Georgetown South Project
• Sheppard East Light Rail Transit (LRT)
• Union Station – Train Shed Revitalization

Many of these projects were not in the earlier lists and they were proceeding independently of The Big Move and its funding.  Ontario has still not confirmed that these will all be built using general revenues as originally promised and without recourse to the income from the new revenue tools.

The Next Wave

Recently, Metrolinx announced a second wave of transit projects all of which would be funded from the new revenue stream.

• Brampton Queen Street Rapid Transit
• Downtown Relief Line
• Dundas Street Bus Rapid Transit
• Durham-Scarborough Bus Rapid Transit
• GO Rail Expansion
• Electrification of GO Kitchener line and Union Pearson Express
• GO Lakeshore Express Rail Service – Phase 1 (including Electrification)
• Hamilton Rapid Transit
• Hurontario-Main Light Rail Transit
• Yonge North Subway Extension

The Next Wave also includes funding directed to municipalities for local transit (15%), regional highways (5%) and other local projects (5%).

According to the bigmove website:

The first wave of projects all have a completion date of 2031 or earlier and the completion date for the next wave of projects is currently under review.

Considering that The Big Move was a 25-year plan released in 2008, and

2008 + 25 = 2033

this is not exactly spectacular progress.  The original plan raised alarms that even with the full buildout over 25 years, the GTHA would at best keep pace with rising transportation demand.  When we can’t even finish what we planned, nor have any sense of how much of the problem each phase addresses, drumming up support for new funding may be a challenge.

The original 25-year plan was recently amended, but this primarily reflects timing adjustments and a recognition of the growth in GO Transit’s service territory.  What there is no sense of is what a “Third Wave” (or more) will contain or when we can hope to see it.

The original Big Move plan required $50b in funding both for capital, and later for maintenance.  This did not include inflation nor did it take into account the additional operating cost and fare subsidies inherent in large-scale growth of the network.  That’s where the $2b/year figure originated, but it is hopelessly out of date.  How much will it actually buy?  We don’t know, and that’s a big question for the Investment Strategy to answer.

Two Men and a Spoon

When the original set of projects was cut back in scope and stretched out to 2020 by Queen’s Park, the claim was made that the construction industry could not absorb all of the work and we had to accept a longer delivery period.  In a city filled with construction sites, that was hard to believe, and it’s even harder when we are talking of new revenues of at least $2b/year to fund system expansion.

Is there really a constraint in the industry, or was that a convenient excuse to delay some of Toronto’s proposed LRT lines and push airport service (other than the fair-haired child, the Union-Pearson Express) off into the indefinite future?  The airport is one of two major hubs identified by The Big Move, but you would never know this given the sluggish progress toward actually serving both the terminal and the employment area around it.

There is no point in raising billions in new revenue if we cannot actually spend it, and the Investment Strategy must include a staging plan for construction of future projects that either accepts a constrained building environment, or puts that myth to rest once and for all.  In particular, if new tools begin generating revenue at the latest by 2015, why should we have to wait until the first wave of projects completes in 2020 before building one more centimetre of transit in the GTHA?

What Should Be In The Investment Strategy?

The debate about transit funding cannot take place in a vacuum.  Voters who will be asked to support major new taxes and fees (whatever else they might be called) need to know what they are paying for, when they can ride on it, and what benefits it will bring to their travel.  This is the classic formula for selling transit plans and funding elsewhere, notably in Los Angeles which, against all past experience, is now used as a shining example of how to expand a transit system.

Too much of the discussion turns on how we will fill out the map with completed projects, and not enough looks at when we actually need the services.  Hand-wringing about, for example, the cost of a Downtown Relief Line (by whatever name) avoids the question of when we need to have it built and open providing new capacity.  That’s the kind of argument people now stuck in the jam at Bloor-Yonge can understand, not a vague promise to build a line somewhere, someday.  The same applies to long-haul regional services on GO Transit and to improved local transit as feeder routes to the GO backbone.

• What are the timelines for planned rapid transit expansion in the GTHA?
• What rate of spending will be required to support this expansion?
• Should the plans be front-end loaded using medium-term debt to be repaid from future revenues?
• What are the inflationary effects on project costs?
• If federal money is available, how would this be used — to reduce provincial and municipal shares, or to accelerate overall progress?
• How, if at all, will “private sector” funding or financing contribute to the building of transit lines?
• What rationale should be used for division of funding responsibilities with the municipal sector?  Why are some projects “regional” and others “local”?
• Is there a constraint in the construction industry that prevents progress beyond a certain level of activity?  Is this specific to certain types of project or to construction in general?
• What is the fate of projects beyond the “Next Wave”?
• And finally, what tools should be used to raise the money needed to pay for all of this?

If Metrolinx only talks about revenue tools, but leaves out all the details on what they plan to achieve, then this whole exercise has been a waste of five years.  Queen’s Park and everyone in the GTHA who pays the slightest attention to transit have long known what is needed, but lacked the will to champion transit expansion and take the funding question out into the political arena.

Now, with the Board of Trade, Civic Action and others beating the drum for better transit and more transit spending, Metrolinx must abandon its timidity and produce a thorough, realistic plan for transit expansion in the GTHA.

This is the last major piece of track in regular service to be rebuilt to new standards introduced almost 20 years ago.  (Downtown tracks on Victoria, York, Richmond and Wellington will be replaced over the 2013 and 2014 construction seasons.)

This will include pavement and sidewalk reconstruction, water main work, and the installation of new track.  This work includes replacement of the intersection at Queen & York, but not at King & York which is comparatively new.

Only the northbound track will be retained and, as I understand current plans, the special work at Adelaide Street will be removed.  If at a future date, the TTC decides to reactivate Adelaide Street from Charlotte east to Victoria, the York Street intersection will be dealt with at that time.

The City is studying Richmond and Adelaide Streets with a view to installing cycling lanes, and the reconstruction of Adelaide will depend on the design that emerges from this process.  A related issue is the ongoing construction of condos along Adelaide requiring curb lane occupancy and causing  damage to the road from heavy trucks.

Co-ordination with the Spadina & King project during August will be needed to ensure that there is one street clear for King and Queen services through downtown.

Monday afternoon’s peak was not a good one for TTC subway service:

• 5:16 Trains holding for smoke at track level at Eglinton Station (cleared 5:31)
• 5:25 Trains holding for smoke at track level at Keele Station (cleared 5:33)
• 5:58 Power cut at Dupont halting service from St. George to St. Clair West.  Train doors opened in the tunnel.  24 minute delay

The times shown for the smoke delays are from timestamps on TTC e-Alerts, and the actual duration of the delay was probably longer.  We know from Byford’s comments that there were a few passenger assistance alarms from people requiring medical assistance, but these never showed up as official alerts to riders.

The TTC’s daily measurement of service punctuality for the Yonge line fell to 93%, below the target of 96%.  This is an all-day average of performance at many places on the line, and it takes a big upheaval in service to make a dent in the considerable amount of more-or-less punctual service rating for the line as a whole.  The index has never been known to fall below 90%.

The delays were only part of the regular menu of service disruptions including mechanical failures of trains, track and signal problems, weather, security incidents, not to mention suicides.  Running a well-behaved service can be quite challenging.  One of those challenges is to simply keep people informed about what is going on when multiple delays interact to foul up service, and info about what is left running changes from moment to moment.

Seeing Andy Byford there on YouTube with his mea culpa is a nice touch, but there is a limit to how many of these the TTC can issue before riders simply say “oh no, not again”.  The TTC’s new Customer Charter commits the organization to improvement, but the message coming through loud and clear at public meetings is “show me”.

Monday’s events highlight some obvious issues for managing complex events, but they also raise questions about how much we can reasonably expect of the transit system.

The incident with the doors opening on a train between stations was a matter of human error by the Guard who inexplicably opened them when the train was stopped north of Dupont Station at a red signal.  Automatic Train Control could have prevented this, but that’s years away and, fortunately, this sort of incident is extremely rare.  The TRs will only open their doors when the train is stopped, and indeed the sensing associated with this feature is part of the extra delay time when trains arrive at stations.

Updated Mar 21:

There has been another incident of train staff accidentally opening doors in the tunnel as reported today by the CBC.

Any incident like this, and including fires or smoke, requires a power cut and affects service in both directions, whereas an ill passenger, most of the time, holds up service only one way for a brief time while they are assisted off of the train.

However, there are a lot of incidents, and each of them adds to discontent among the affected riders.  Even if someone only encounters a major delay once or twice a month, that’s the experience they remember and tell their friends about.  What’s more, if the system cannot get through the rush hour without, simply as a matter of probabilities, having a few non-trivial delays, this compromises the TTC’s ability to achieve its planned capacity.

A few years ago, the TTC had an independent review by UK-based transport consultants who found that, generally speaking, the TTC subway wasn’t all that bad for systems of comparable age and technology.  However, the consultants warned that hoped for increase in capacity required more reliability in trains and infrastructure, fewer incidents of passenger illness caused by crowding, and a general attention to running as tight an operation as possible.  Some delays are inevitable, and for them the issues are incident management, good communications with passengers, provision of alternate service if possible, and quick recovery of full subway capacity.

When we talk about how close the TTC might be to running out of capacity, optimists love to quote the highest possible figures — automated trains running on the closest headways, passengers flowing quickly to and from trains to minimize dwell times, equipment with superb reliability, and a magic world in which nothing ever goes wrong.  That’s not how the subway actually operates, and Byford’s task is to expunge every source of “controllable delay” from the system.

On Metro Morning, Byford made a passing remark about improving terminal operations and getting trains out promptly.  That’s an important change, one that is essential to maximizing the trains/hour actually operated and maintaining good service spacing.

Getting the subway to work as well as it possibly can is an important start, but it’s only part of the job.  We will probably never see YouTube apologies for the large gaps in service on surface routes, but instead will have small tutorials on why short-turns are required.  Sadly, “TTC Culture” still includes too strong a sense that most of the problems are external and this must change.

A target of 65% for “punctual service”, itself based on a generous 6-minute-wide margin for service relative to scheduled headway, accepts that the odds are better than half that a rider will encounter a significant gap at least once a day, probably more if they take multiple trips.  What we don’t see is a measure of how well or poorly passenger loads are distributed among buses and streetcars, and what the riders see rather than what the hourly or daily averages report.

If transit really is going to attract more riders, especially those facing longer trips, reliability is key.  To some, the solution is a network of subways, but that simply won’t happen thanks to cost and the time needed to build them.  Some new rapid transit capacity is overdue, but it must be placed where it will do the most good, not as pet projects of particularly noisy and influential members of Council.

Meanwhile, the TTC must address service quality on that vast part of the network not served by subways, and Andy Byford must be just as prepared to take responsibility for the Finch and Dufferin buses and the Queen streetcar as he is for the Yonge subway.

In Part II, I turn to the actual time required for buses to make their journey on the route during the month of March 2012.

Updated March 20, 2013: In the comment thread, there was a question about whether different vehicles operating on this route showed any difference in travel times.  I have added a section to the end of the article to address this.  (The short answer is “no”.)

Original Article from March 10, 2013:

To understand what is going on, it is necessary to look at segments of the route so that local effects can be seen clearly, and so that time taken for layovers at terminals is considered separately from driving time.

Weather & Special Events

The weather in March 2012 was generally very mild with small amounts of snow on only a few days.

Weather_March_2012 (Source: Environment Canada)

March Break fell in “Week 3″ of the month from the 12th to the 16th.  There were no statutory holidays because Easter weekend fell in April.

Scheduled Running Times

Part I includes a table of headways and running times for the route, and I have linked it here for convenience.

The section of interest is for February-March 2012 under the columns:

• RTT:  Round trip time allocated to driving.  A one-way trip should use half of this value.
• Rcvry:  So-called recovery time.  In practice, the values allowed bear little relation to the time of day or route conditions.  In fact, this is usually an amount added to the round trip so that it will be an even multiple of the headway.  A fairly common adjustment the TTC makes is to convert “recovery” time to “driving” time in reaction to increased congestion on a route without actually lengthening the total time allocated to a trip, changing the headway or adding vehicles.
• Total: The sum of the driving time and the recovery time.

In reviewing actual times, I will treat the time between points near the terminals separately from the terminals themself in order to isolate fluctuations due to layovers, if any.  On the Dufferin route, the points of reference are King Street (just north of Dufferin Loop), and Transit Road at Wilson (just south of Wilson Station).  Driving time should cover this interval with enough left over for entering, serving and leaving the terminals.

Northbound from King to Wilson Station

These charts have the same layout as the headway charts in the previous article, but show travel time between points rather than headway at a point.

29_201203_NB_KingTransit_Links

Running times on weekdays have a common pattern with values of 35-40 minutes through the AM peak and into late morning.  The values are highest in the afternoon slightly before the PM peak itself.  This suggests that congestion is actually worse before the onset of peak period traffic restrictions.  Peaks on Fridays, and to a lesser extent Thursdays, tend to be higher than earlier in the week.

Running times fall back to lower values as the evening goes on, although again Fridays tend to stay a bit higher than other days.

The cloud of data for all weekdays shows the same overall pattern, but has a notable feature in the small clusters of unusually low values at around 9:00am and 7:00pm.  These are buses hurrying back to Wilson Garage.

The PM peak data are more spread out with the “cloud” of points noticeably opening up from about 4:00pm to 6:00pm.  There are also fewer data points here because the 29A Tycos short turns don’t reach Wilson are are not included.  The values are spread over a range from 40-50 minutes with several reaching into the band up to 60.  During this period, the scheduled trip time on the 29D (Wilson Station to Princes Gates) is 54 minutes one-way, and it is clearly impossible for most buses to achieve this when they will need at least 45 just for the section from King to Wilson & Transit Road.

On Saturdays, the peak comes earlier, at about 3:00pm, and it is higher than the PM peak travel time.  On Sundays, the travel times rise to a fairly steady value by noon and drop off in the evening.

Saturday afternoon scheduled times allow 51 minutes, all in, for a one-way trip.  Some of the trips actually observed, notably on March 24 and 31, took that long just to get from King to Transit Road.  Even the lowest of the trend lines on March 17 lies at about 44 minutes, and this leaves only 7 minutes for the route south of King and north of Wilson including terminal time.

Normally I do not include all of the detail for the “uninteresting” parts of a route in these articles, but in this case I will give the whole set to show how there are parts of 29 Dufferin where running times are quite consistent across many periods of service.  This is not a situation where the entire route is beset by unusual, unpredictable traffic events.

King to Bloor

29_201203_NB_KingBloor_Links

Running times in this segment range from about 5 to 11 minutes, but stay within a narrow band that varies slightly and in a similar way over all weekdays.  One source of delay is the Dufferin Mall, and this effect depends on shopping patterns.  There is no visible AM peak, and only a small PM peak.

On Saturdays, times longer than on weekdays are seen in the afternoon, particularly late in the month.  Sunday times are not unlike weekdays, but with lower values in the morning.

Bloor to Lawrence

29_201203_NB_BloorStClair_Links

From Bloor to St. Clair, there is little variation in weekday times except for a short and small peak in the afternoon just before 4:00pm.  This could be the effect of peak traffic buildup before rush hour parking restrictions cut in.  As with the section south of Bloor, the longest running times are seen on Saturdays.

29_201203_NB_StClairEglinton_Links

The section from St. Clair to Eglinton shows almost no variation at all through all periods and days.

29_201203_NB_EglintonLawrence_Links

Between Eglinton and Lawrence, the times are quite consistent, although there is a noticeably lower average value in the evenings.

Lawrence to Wilson

29_201203_NB_LawrenceWilson_Links

Weekday running times are fairly consistent across the day with a slight rise in the afternoon and a drop-off in the evening.  The last two Fridays are noteworthy for their peak at a higher level than other days.  This shows the effect of congestion near Yorkdale Mall which grew later in the month on weekends thanks to the balmy weather in late March.

Similarly on Saturdays, running times in this segment roughly double from 4-5 minutes in the mornings and evenings to over 10 minutes between 3:00 and 5:00pm.

Sunday shows a similar pattern, but a much smaller peak value.

Wilson to Transit Road

29_201203_NB_WilsonTransitRd_Links

The short segment on Wilson from Dufferin to Transit road eastbound shows no variation in running times throughout the week.

Wilson Terminal

The following chart shows the round trip times from Wilson & Transit Road through the terminal and back again.  This includes driving and loading time plus any layover.

29_201203_WilsonTerminal_Links

The trend lines behave a bit oddly on weekday mornings, and the reason can be seen in the all-weekdays data cloud on page 6.  There is a peak in values after the morning rush hour with some quite high values.  My suspicion is that these represent crew changes where a vehicle sat without an operator for an extended period.

The weekday values tend to be lowest during the PM peak with a trend line at about 7 minutes, and most values lying about 3 minutes either way of this.  The values are more spread out and tend to be higher in the evening.

On Saturdays, the times sit at around 10 minutes mid morning and early evening, with a drop to about 6 minutes around 3:00 pm.

Sunday times are spread out especially in the early evening.

The observed values suggest that a round trip on the order of 7-8 minutes represents common operating practices, although a shorter value is physically possible, but likely with only minimal time for a station stop.

Southbound from Wilson Station to Dufferin Loop

29_201203_SB_TransitKing_Links

Running times from Transit Road & Wilson south to King Street have a short peak for trips southbound between 8:00 and 9:00am.  The band of values is about 10 minutes wide through the day until the onset of the PM peak at about 3:00pm, and this lasts until around 6:00pm with a quick fall-off into the evening.  As with the northbound trips, the time required to travel the main part of the route leaves little in reserve for the terminal areas.

No one part of the route is responsible for the majority of the extra time (unlike, say, the Queen car where specific sections exhibit large swings in running times while others are almost constant through the day).

Wilson to Lawrence

29_201203_SB_WilsonLawrence_Links

Weekdays on this segment show little variation through the day with some trips lying well outside the main group of data points in the PM peak, but not much change in overall values for the peak period itself.  Early morning and evening running times are a bit shorter and the values are more tightly clustered.

On Saturdays, the running time is higher than on weekdays, notably late in the month as we saw for northbound service.  This is the effect of Yorkdale Mall.  On Sundays, there is a slight increase in running time during the mid-afternoon, but not as pronounced as on Saturdays.

Lawrence to Eglinton

29_201203_SB_LawrenceEglinton_Links

Between Lawrence and Eglinton, there is little variation in running times, although there are some odd clusters between 6:30 and 7:00am, and again in the early evening.  I will examine these in detail in the third article in this series.

Weekends show little variation in running times.

Eglinton to Bloor

Running times from Eglinton to St. Clair, and from St. Clair to Bloor show little variation at all times.  I have omitted the charts for them as there is nothing unusual to see.

Bloor to King

29_201203_SB_BloorKing_Links

Between Bloor and King, weekday running times are quite consistent except for March 30 when service was interrupted during the PM peak.  The largest times are seen on Saturdays.

King to Dufferin Loop and Princes’ Gates

29_201203_KingTerminal_Links

29_201203_CNETerminal_Links

There are two terminals at the south end of the Dufferin route.  Most service turns at Dufferin Loop just outside the western entrance of the Exhibition Grounds and only a few blocks south of King Street.  During some periods, part of the service runs through to a loop near the Princes’ Gates at the eastern entrance.  These have been separated so that we can see the behaviour of each set of vehicles.

What is immediately noticeable about the service to Dufferin Loop is that the running times fluctuate widely, much more so than for driving time along other segments of the route.  This shows that some drivers are taking substantial layovers at this location especially on weekends.  The typical driving time on weekdays from King to Dufferin Loop and back is about 10 minutes during the daytime, somewhat less in the evening.

For service to the Princes’ Gates I have included only the consolidated weekday “cloud” given the gap in the hours of service and the limited number of data points for each day (both of these tend to produce meaningless trend lines).  On the schedules, the difference between travel times for “Dufferin” and “Princes’ Gates” trips is 10-12 minutes, but the actual values for weekdays exceed this considerably.  The values lie over a band about 10 minutes wide and with values in the range from 15-25 minutes for the PM peak.  (AM peak values start off higher because, early in the day, buses are operating with peak period running times, but off-peak traffic.)  On weekends, the trend lines lie at about 20 minutes for much of the day.

Both of these suggest that some buses are allocated (or take) considerable layovers at this end of the line.

Round Trip Times from King to Wilson Station

To get an overall view of the time required for buses to operate the 29 Dufferin route, we can look at round trips from just north of Dufferin Loop to Wilson Station.  This includes most of the route, but excludes the south end with its separate terminals and widely varying layover times.

29_201203_KingWilsonRoundTrip_Links

Note that the scale on these charts is different at 120 minutes rather than 60.  The horizontal lines remain at 10 minute intervals.

Trips longer than 120 minutes which typically involve a long layover at Wilson Terminal have been omitted.  What remains shows the typical time required for a bus to drive north from King to Wilson, serve the terminal, and return south to King.

The pattern is consistent for weekdays with a wider range of values coming into the PM peak, especially on Fridays.  Round trip times quickly drop off from 90 minutes in the daytime to lower values through the evening dropping eventually to near 60 minutes.

On Saturdays the trendline lies higher from about 10:00am to 5:00pm especially on the last two days of the month.  Sundays sit at a consistent value of 80-90 minutes through the afternoon with shorter trips in the morning and evening.

Another way to look at the same data is to consolidate it further to follow overall patterns and statistical behaviour.

29_201203_KingWilsonRoundTrip_Stats

There are three charts in this set showing data for weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays subdivided by half-hourly intervals.  Each chart shows five lines:

• The mean value (dark blue) — the average value of all trips in the half hour period.
• The maximum and minimum values found within the half hour period on any day.  Note that if one day in a month had unusually high traffic congestion, this could push the maximum value up substantially (see 8:00pm weekdays).  However, a sustained level of congestion over many days would be needed to pull the mean up as well.
• The mean plus or minus one standard deviation in the values.  The standard deviation measures the degree of dispersion of data, and if it is small this means that most values are tightly clustered around the mean.  If it is wide, then the data have a greater range of values.  Provided that the data behave “normally” (in the statistical sense), about 2/3 of the data points will lie within one standard deviation of the mean.

The following table compares scheduled running times with average values.

29_201203_RoundTripTimes

In cases where there is only scheduled service to Princes’ Gates, a calculated time for Dufferin Loop is shown.  The difference between the scheduled time (Dufferin Loop to Wilson Station) and the observed round trip averages (King to Wilson Station) are also shown.  In some cases, this time is insufficient to cover the King to Dufferin Loop trips (exclusive of layover) for the average trip times, let alone for trips that exceed the average.

A basic scheduling problem is the need for running times to reflect the majority of usual demands without being so generous that buses are idling along the route or at terminals.  On a route like Dufferin with widely varying conditions it is possible for “average” values to be insufficient under common conditions such as shopping congestion and other activities specific to certain days, weather conditions, or short periods other than the expected AM and PM peaks.

In the next article, I will turn to details of specific times and days to review the behaviour of the route “on the street” with time-distance charts showing the movement of vehicles including bunching and short turns.

Updated March 20

The Effect of Vehicle Type on Running Time

Three different types of vehicles operate on 29 Dufferin:  Orion V diesels, Orion “next generation” diesels, and Orion “next generation” hybrids.  Given the hilly nature of the route, the amount of stop-start traffic and the heavy passengers loads, one reader asked whether there is a difference in vehicle performance.

To address this, I broke out the running time data for trips northbound from King to Wilson & Transit Road by vehicle type, and calculated the means at half-hourly intervals.  The following charts show:

• All weekdays combined on one chart
• Each day, Monday through Sunday, on its own chart

29_201203_NB_KingTransit_LinksByVeh

The mean travel time is roughly the same for all three vehicle types (note that Orion Vs are little used on weekends and have been omitted).  Weekday times are highest in the afternoon peak with Fridays being the highest of all.  Saturdays look not unlike weekdays, but the peak period starts earlier and lasts longer.

Periods when the mean falls to zero indicate that there was no vehicle of the specified type that made the full trip from King to Wilson during the interval on the days in question.  This can be caused by short turns north of King or south of Wilson, or by the luck of vehicle assignments to trips leaving within the period.

Matt Elliott (aka @GraphicMatt) has produced a chart showing the contribution of each of four recommended sources and the range of possible incomes.

The Board of Trade has launched a new website under the name letsbreakthegridlock, and this includes a background paper on the evolution of their recommendations.

Most striking about the proposed revenues is that even the “low end” total is close to $3-billion per year with the high end over $4b.  The Board of Trade is not recommending specific levels for the new revenue stream, but the Toronto Region and Queen’s Park need to aim high.  The Metrolinx Big Move plan was priced at $2b/year, but that estimate is several years out of date and does not include inflation.  It also does not include any money for local transportation improvements that was recently announced as part of the “Next Wave”, and which would increase the total needs by one third.

This is not some wild-eyed, pinko-commie, downtown bunch of granola-eating, pot-smoking, tree hugging, tax-and-spend radicals — it’s the Board of Trade, and they claim wide support from their members.  Congestion and the lack of good transportation options within the GTHA are strangling business and making the region uncompetitive.  That’s the kind of effect businesses notice, and they recognize the effect of decades of disinvestment in the transportation network.

Three of the four proposed tools are easy to implement as extensions of existing tax regimes and they produce substantial revenue.

Regional Sales Tax

An additional 1% sales tax applied across the GTHA would generate $1.0-$1.6b annually.  Although there could be some boundary effects (businesses locating just outside of the tax region to lower their prices), the GTHA is a big place.  Given the scope of Metrolinx service territory that now reaches to Niagara Falls and Kitchener-Waterloo, the tax region could well be bigger than the formal “Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area”.

Parking Space Levy

A levy of $1.00 per day per parking space levied on non-residential parking would raise $1.2-$1.6b annually.  It is unclear how raising the cost of parking would benefit the transportation network, and a small increase per user is unlikely to push motorists over the edge onto transit, especially in areas built around car access to large parking lots.

This effectively becomes part of the cost of doing business for owners of malls, office blocks and industrial parks.

Regional Fuel Tax

A levy of $0.10 per litre would generate $640-840m per year.  To put this in context, there is already a five-cent tax at both the provincial and federal level that is directed to transit.  The new levy would effectively double the transportation-related tax on fuel.

The degree to which such a levy will influence behaviour is difficult to say.  Motorists are notoriously difficult to move out of their cars primarily because the alternatives are often unavailable or uncompetitive for their needs.

High Occupancy Tolls

A toll of $0.30 per vehicle kilometre would generate $25-$45m per year.  This toll would convert existing high occupancy (car sharing) lanes  to tolled lanes where anyone could pay for the privilege of driving in the (presumably) less crowded HOV lane.

Such a scheme is counter-productive.  Any changes to the road network should encourage increased utilization of the capacity provided, not offer those who can afford the option the ability to buy their way into a high occupancy lane.

In the background paper, we learn that this option was not even part of the mix originally studied by the Board of Trade, and it was a late addition to the recommended list (but with no real justification).

The background paper says the four recommended tools:

have the potential to act as the “heavy-lifters” of revenue collection [page 28]

This is simply not true of the HOT proposal.

I cannot help thinking someone in the Board just wouldn’t let this paper out the door without giving him (or her) the option of buying their way out of congestion.  This is pandering of the worst sort, and it devalues the Board’s report by its presence.

The Roads not Taken

Several potential revenue sources were studied but rejected [page 26]:

• Road Tolls/Charges – $1.3b – 1.5b ($.10 per km)
• Increased Income Tax – $640m-740m (0.5%)
• Higher Property Taxes – $670m (5% increase)
• Employer Payroll Tax – $630m – 730m (0.5%)

Income Tax is of particular interest because it is seen by many as a “progressive” tax that targets higher incomes more than low, while Sales Tax affects everyone.  The Board observes:

Increased Income Tax: The potential for economically negative impacts for the Region, such as smaller businesses moving out of Region and disruptions in local capital markets, given tax could cover income derived from investments.

This is a rather self-serving remark coming from a group with obvious interests in the business community.  The obvious rejoinder would simply be to increase taxes across the province (and possibly remove some existing exemptions).  Benefits from public spending will obviously flow to the same investors who might plan a flight to tax havens like North Bay or Winnipeg.

Other Financial Sources

To its credit, the Board accepts that the problem is of raising new revenue, and that spending cuts or “efficiencies” will simply not provide the needed capital.

Given the current fiscal state of all levels of government, bridging this funding gap will require new and dedicated funding streams. To suggest there are opportunities to find $34 billion from within the existing provincial and municipal funding envelope by reducing waste or finding efficiencies is simply not realistic. As the Drummond Report highlighted, for the provincial government to just meet its projections of annualized 1.4% increases in spending up to 2017 and balance its budget, it must reduce spending by $30.2 billion.  [page 20]

At the municipal level, they also observe:

there is a decreasing ability for development charges to mitigate the costs of capital as build-out and intensification plateau over time across the Toronto Region.  [page 20]

This has been echoed in material from consultations by Toronto and Metrolinx where the dollar value of development charges is tiny compared to the level of sustained spending required for regional plans.  Moreover, the development industry is notoriously unhappy about anything that adds to the cost of new housing units, especially as that market begins to soften.

Public-Private Partnerships come in for a review with the hope that by transferring some project risk to a private partner, performance will improve and projects will not be saddled with cost creep as this would penalize the partner.  However, the Board rightly notes:

However, it must be stressed that they [P3's] are not new revenue streams. In many respects they are akin to a mortgage; you shop around for the best rate and get savings, but in the end, you still have to pay the interest charges and principal.  [page 21]

Metrolinx has recognized the limits of private investment, and on the Eglinton project expects that only about one third of the total financing will come from private partners.  The rest will be traditional public funding from general revenues and/or public debt.

Tax Increment Financing (TIF) and Special Property Taxes also get passing mention, but mainly in the municipal financing context.  There are two important distinctions here.

First, as the Board observes,

However, because of their location based bias (i.e. major urban centre redevelopment projects) they would not cover the entire costs of large cross region transit projects.  [page 22]

By their very nature, these taxes assume a direct link between new construction and benefits nearby of increased land values.  This is easy to demonstrate for cases where governments invest in a reclamation scheme for run-down neighbourhoods (Toronto’s waterfront infrastructure would be a good example where the investment and benefit are side-by-side), but much harder for a regional network.  A “Downtown Relief Line” has benefits scattered throughout the transit network and region, but assigning any of them to specific properties would not be possible.  This is a cost that must be borne generally because that is the scope of the benefit.

Another important issue not mentioned by the Board is that redevelopment schemes have a bad habit of not producing the expected economic activity and benefits.  Just because you build a subway terminal, buildings don’t sprout overnight beside it.  A public investment may take decades to bear fruit.

Transit Fares

The Board does not view fare revenue as an appropriate tool for capital projects, but rather that this stream should support better service.

[T]he Board believes it is more appropriate that this funding stream be directed towards covering operating costs and service enhancements like more frequent GO train service on what is still underutilized rail infrastructure within the Region of Toronto.  [page 23]

To put things in context, the total TTC fare revenue is roughly $1b annually on a budget of about $1.5b.  A very substantial fare hike would be needed to generate substantial revenue ($200m annually would require at least 20% higher fares, a jump proportionally much greater than in any of the other proposed revenue tools).

Farebox revenue from other systems in the GTHA is trivially small with the largest share coming from GO Transit (about $325m in the 2011/12 budget).  Huge fare increases would be needed to generate substantial additional revenues to support capital works.

Where Do We Go From Here?

For months, the Toronto Region Board of Trade has been hinting quite broadly that it would come out in favour of new revenue tools and a substantial revenue steam to fund investment in the GTHA’s transportation network.  This is an  important step as it shows support from the business community, not just from the “usual suspects” advocating more spending on transit.

With this announcement, the Board has clearly dismissed the view that we can have everything we need and want without paying for it, a view held by “conservatives” of whatever ilk that has hamstrung calls for more public spending in many portfolios.

Now we need a provincial government with the will to embrace and advance a program of transit investment.  In a future article, I will turn to the Metrolinx “Investment Strategy”.

Ed Levy has just released “Rapid Transit in Toronto”, a webbook tracing the history of a century of transit schemes for our city.  This was produced with the support of the Neptis Foundation.

The online version of the book covers a wide range of topics and is filled with maps, history and observations about the evolution of transit plans (much more so than actual construction) in Toronto.  The book is downloadable in chapters sized either for email circulation or full resolution (see the PDF page).

I have only quickly browsed the chapter outlines so far, but there is a lot of material here, and it is so good, finally to see all of this in one place.  If nothing else, it will save those of us with shelves full of studies having to actually pull out the hard copies whenever we need to check something!

Congratulations to Ed, a fellow advocate for better public transit, on publishing such a major overview of our history.

The most recent TTC document setting out their intended use of the new fleet appeared in the 2013 Capital Budget Blue Books.  These are not available online, but I presented the TTC’s fleet plan in an article last fall.  From the numbers of vehicles to be assigned to each route, one can work back to the service frequency and capacity numbers.  In general, peak period headways get a bit wider, but the capacity goes up, in some cases dramatically.

The TTC faces two challenges: one on the budget, and one in operations.

Toronto Council has been extremely stingy with operating subsidies and “flat lined” the TTC over the past two budget cycles.  Hard liners will want the TTC to simply replace service on an equivalent capacity basis and maximize the savings in operator costs.  This would be a disaster for service quality even if the TTC actually ran cars on the headways they advertise.

On the operational side, any increase in headways brings even wider gaps when the service is upset by weather, random delays and short turns.  It is already a matter of record that the largest drop in riding over the past two decades came on the lines where 50-foot long CLRVs (the standard Toronto cars) were replaced by 75-foot long ALRVs (the articulated version) on an equivalent capacity basis.  Falling riding led to reduced service and the familiar downward spiral.  This must not happen when the new fleet rolls out across the system.

Since at least the mid-1990s, the TTC has told us that they cannot improve streetcar service because they have no spare cars.  In part, they are the victims of their own fleet planning.  The TTC originally rebuilt some of its old PCC cars (the fleet preceding the current one) in order to have enough to expand operations on the Harbourfront and Spadina lines.  However, by the mid-1990s, service cuts on many routes thanks to the economic downturn in that decade and the subsidy cuts by the Harris government, reduced the fleet requirements to the point where the PCCs could be retired and the Spadina line opened without buying any new cars.  When riding started to grow again, the TTC had no spare vehicles to improve service, and to make matters worse, the fleet was entering a period of lower reliability thanks, in part, to poor design.

Toronto waited a long time for new cars to be ordered, and this process was delayed both by the decision to go with all low-floor cars, and by political meddling at City Hall.  New residential construction along the streetcar lines pushes up demand, but the TTC cannot respond with better service until they have more cars.

Recent discussions about the new cars have included comments about how we cannot possibly have more streetcars on the road.  What many people forget is that the streetcar services were once much better than today.  In this article, I will look back at service levels once operated in Toronto, and at the service that we might see if the TTC actually operates the new fleet in the manner their Fleet Plan claims.

For the purpose of comparison, I have chosen services as they existed on several dates:

• April 1954:  The Yonge subway has just opened between Union and Eglinton and much of the north-south flow into the core has been redirected from surface routes onto that line.
• April 1964:  The University subway has opened, but Bloor-Danforth is still two years in the future.
• January 1968:  The Bloor-Danforth subway has opened between Keele and Woodbine, but extensions beyond are still under construction.
• October 1971:  The Spadina subway has not yet opened.
• October 1980:  The subway is at the extent it will remain for many years, but 1980 brings the first drop in TTC riding for decades thanks to the Gulf War induced recession and spike in oil prices.
• April 1990:  The early 90s recession is just about to arrive.
• February 1996:  The combined effect of the recession and Harris service cuts hits the TTC which will lose 20% of its former peak ridership.
• September 2006:  The TTC has started to climb out of its ridership slump, but has not yet surpassed its previous record level.
• March 2013:  TTC now has record ridership and service is improving, although not much on the streetcar system thanks to fleet constraints.
• Post LFLRV implementation:  Working from the planned fleet allocation, it is possible to calculate future capacity levels on each route, although some assumptions are needed about details of service design.

Service Into the Core Area

Four streetcar routes continue to serve the core area (506 Carlton, 505 Dundas, 501 Queen, 504 King plus supplementary routes 502, 503, 508 and trippers on some lines).  In the following chart, capacity numbers are based on the services in place at each time period.

Core_Area_Streetcar_Capacity

The values shown are for the peak hour inbound in the AM peak, and are based on the design capacities of the vehicles for service planning, not on their crush capacities.  The ratio between these is higher for streetcars than for buses because of the relatively larger amount of standee space.

As a simple example, a service of 20 cars per hour (three minute headway) of PCCs or CLRVs (design capacity 75) provides a line capacity of 1,500 although with crush loads this could in theory go up about 30% at a penalty to passenger comfort and speed of service.  (More cars would be needed to maintain the headway because they would spend longer at stops thanks to crowding.)

Queen and King have always been the two busiest corridors, but Dundas and Carlton were once provided with much better service as well.

College/Carlton

The figures shown for the west and east sides of this route are identical except for 1954 when an extra short-turn service was provided on the eastern leg.  The route is otherwise unchanged over the entire period.

Dundas

This corridor has seen various service designs over the years.  Until the B-D subway opened, the west side was served by Dundas cars while the east side was served by the Harbord route (which terminated at what is now Pape Station).  After the B-D subway was in operation, the Dundas route served both sides of the city, but for a time some of the peak service short turned (at City Hall, later at Church) and served only the west half of the route.

Queen

The Queen car originally ran from Neville to Humber with a separate service provided on Lake Shore by the Long Branch car.  The two routes were amalgamated in 1995.  Supplementary AM peak services on Queen include:

• Long Branch service via Queen to Church Street in peak periods (discontinued after route amalgamation)
• Service from Kingston Road to McCaul Loop (now called 502 Downtowner)
• Eastbound trippers from Roncesvalles carhouse (effective April 2013)

Capacities shown are based on the vehicle type(s) in operation on each date.

King

The King car has operated from Broadview & Danforth to Bloor & Dundas for nearly a century.  Supplementary AM peak services in King include:

• The Kingston Road Tripper (now 503 Kingston Road) operated from Bingham Loop to Roncesvalles & Queen via King Street, but was cut back first to Dufferin and then to its current terminus at York.
• After the amalgamation of the Queen and Long Branch routes, a Lake Shore tripper was introduced from Long Branch to downtown via King.
• A service of King trippers operates eastbound from Dundas West Station starting at about 7:00 am providing extra service on the more heavily-loaded west end of the route.

What is immediately obvious in this chart is the much higher level of service and capacity provided by the major streecar corridors before the B-D subway opened.  Some of the change in demand is a direct result of that subway which absorbed trips to the core formerly handled by these surface routes as an alternative to the very busy Bloor streetcars.

The King car is a special case because it is a route that has held its post-B-D ridership the best.  This is helped by new residential demand both to the east (the St. Lawrence neighbourhood, and more recently the Distillery), and to the west (Liberty Village and the Bathurst/Niagara condos.  As more development appears, and as this shifts north to other corridors, they too will come under pressure for increased service.

Streetcar Services Outside of the Core

In addition to the four corridors entering the core area, there are services in a number of locations whose evolution is worth looking at.

Outside_Core_Streetcar_Capacity

Bathurst

Until the Bloor-Danforth subway opened, the Bathurst car provided a very frequent service from Vaughan Loop (St. Clair & Bathurst) with two-thirds of the cars operating into the core area via Adelaide eastbound (returning west on King).  When the B-D subway opened, the route was shortened to loop at Bathurst Station, and all cars operated to Exhibition Loop.

The Spadina subway absorbed more demand from feeders to the Bathurst route, and the wider headways from ALRV operation contributed to further decline as wait times became a substantial part of trip times for riders on this short route.

Queen & Kingston Road

Services from the Beach once operated much more frequently than today, especially on Kingston Road which was fed by bus services from southern Scarborough.  This demand almost totally shifted to the B-D subway and especially to its extension beyond Woodbine Station.

The drop in demand on both the Queen and Kingston Road corridors is also related to changing demographics and travel patterns from this area, although there is something of a vicious circle thanks to service quality.  Beachers enjoy a premium fare express bus to downtown although on a 15-minute headway, this does not contribute much to the corridor’s capacity.

Roncesvalles & Broadview

These north-south outer parts of the King route once drew much demand from feeders at the terminals, but now moreso from residents along the routes.  Although it is not shown here, the TTC initially cut more than half of the route’s service when the B-D subway opened thinking that nobody would ride the streetcar any more.  Most of the service had to be restored a few months later when the TTC discovered what “local demand” really meant.

Lake Shore

Originally service on Lake Shore west of Humber Loop was provided by the Long Branch car with peak period service through to downtown via Queen.  Since 1995, this area is served by 501 Queen with half of its service running through to Long Branch and a small supplementary peak direction 508 Lake Shore service (3 cars inbound AM, 4 outbound PM, expanding to 6 PM in April 2013) via King Street.

St. Clair

The St. Clair streetcar provided very heavy service feeding into the Bathurst car and the Yonge subway until the B-D subway opened in 1966.  Riding fell off as some trips shifted to north-south routes such as Dufferin, but picked up again when the Spadina subway provided a direct route to downtown from the St. Clair line.

Until 1974, the Rogers Road car supplemented the St. Clair service between Oakwood and Yonge.

On the chart, no value is shown for 2006 because the route was under construction.

Spadina

Until 1997, service on Spadina was provided by the Spadina bus and the scheduled capacity was actually higher than that of the streetcar service that replaced it.  However, the buses routinely were caught in traffic and provided much worse service than the scheduled values would indicate.

Plans for the Low-Floor Streetcar Fleet

On both of the charts above, the last, pink column for each route shows my estimate of the capacity to be provided by the new fleet assuming that the TTC sticks with its published fleet plans.  These will take many years to roll out, but service improvements should not have to wait for all of the new cars to arrive.

In 2014, the Spadina/Harbourfront route will be the first to get new equipment, and this will free up cars to improve service elsewhere, assuming that Council provides the TTC with adequate funding.

Three routes (Carlton, Dundas and St. Clair) are particularly hard hit with wider headways because the planned capacity increase is less than 30%.  With 100% larger cars, the frequency of service will be much worse.  Whether this change is actually implemented by the TTC remains to be seen, especially with growing demand from development along these routes.  My estimated service levels are on the second page of the Fleet Plan linked from the article above.

Another problem with the Fleet Plan is that the TTC wants to get rid of the less-reliable ALRVs before it implements LFLRV operation on the Queen and King routes.  This would imply a shift back to CLRVs and a temporary improvement in headways, only to be followed by much less frequent service with LFLRVs.  This does not make sense.

The TTC is expected to produce a rollout plan for LFLRV service later this year and it will be more public than burying it in the budget papers.  This is also important for operating budget planning in coming years.

Looking Back to Former Streetcar Routes

The level of service operated on some routes, notably Bloor-Danforth, usually stuns anyone who didn’t see it first hand.  Comparisons with today’s operations show just how much traffic that formerly fed into the streetcar routes now is handled by the trunk east-west subway line.

Discontinued_Streetcar_Route_Capacity

Bloor-Danforth Streetcar

Until the subway opened, service was provided on Bloor-Danforth by two-car trains of PCCs running less than 90 seconds apart.  The route extended from Luttrell Loop (east of Main) in the east to Jane Loop in the west.  Service to the east was heavier than the west, and a short-turn operation looped at Bedford (now St. George Station).

The design capacity (based on 75/car) was over 6,000 passengers per hour, and actual loads were above what is now considered a reasonable service design level.

After the Keele-Woodbine segment of the B-D line opened in 1966, shuttle services ran on the outer ends of the streetcar line connecting with the remaining bus feeder services.  The level of demand for these two links can be seen in the service level for 1968 with a capacity of 3,000 per hour, greater than any streetcar line now operating.

This shows clearly the role of feeder bus services as much of the demand on the two shuttles did not originate from local traffic in the mainly low-rise residential areas they served.

Harbord

The Harbord car took a meandering route from the west end of the city to downtown.  In 1954, it began at Townsley Loop (St. Clair & Old Weston Road) and ran south and east along Davenport, down Dovercourt to Bloor, east to Ossington, south to Wellesley, and east (finally on its namesake street) to Spadina, then south to Dundas.

After the CNR grade separation west of Lansdowne, the route was cut back to St. Clarens Loop (now a parkette east of Lansdowne on Davenport), and with the B-D subway opening, the route was carved up into many pieces as it no longer had a role as a downtown link from suburban bus feeders.

It is hard to believe that Harbord Street at Spadina now operates with the infrequent Wellesley bus (5 trips per hour) compared to a capacity of over 2,000 riders/hour in 1954.  This is definitely a case where the subway completely absorbed the surface route’s demand.

Bay

After the Yonge Subway opened, service on Bay was provided by the Dupont car (supplemented further south at times by the Dundas car).  Streetcars were replaced by buses after the University Subway opened, and service capacity today is less than 1/3 of the level when streetcars operated.

Demand on this route has changed considerably with traffic to the business district coming more via the subway and GO Transit, and the Bay bus having its greatest demand at the north end of the line for government offices.

Quite recently, this route has seen new demand from condos along the northern part of Bay and also to the new developments in the eastern waterfront, notably George Brown College.

Church

Until the Yonge Subway opened, north-south routes close to Yonge provided supplementary capacity for travel into the core.  The Church car lasted only until mid-1954, and the bus replacement service gradually dwindled until it disappeared totally in 1996.

Parliament

Streetcar service on Parliament was replaced with buses when the B-D Subway opened in 1966.  The level of service is now much lower.

What Could the Streetcars Do?

Looking at the former service levels on streetcar line, one is tempted to say that this is a vast amount of untapped capacity.  That is a true statement, but equally important are the questions of where riders will come from and whether service will be operated at a reliable enough level to attract them.

Already we can see the effect of new development on the King corridor east and west of downtown, and the Queen corridor is about to see similar growth of development and demand.  This effect will spread north to Dundas and to College/Carlton presuming that the economic incentives to continue residential intensification downtown remain.  St. Clair is also starting to build up with new high-rises near the Spadina Subway, but mid-rise developments are planned further west.

A two-minute service of the new LFLRVs (30 cars per hour) would provide a design capacity of 4,500, well above any existing route’s service today, but within the capability of on-street operation.  The challenge will lie in elbowing other traffic out of the way, and in handling pedestrian movements at major stops.  Whether any route will actually reach this level of demand remains to be seen.

The TTC and the City must plan for the population and travel demand that will exist in the coming years, not simply perpetuate service levels that have been constrained by fleet size for well over a decade.

I began by asking about the change of his Twitter handle from the suffix “TC” (for his riding’s name, Toronto Centre) to “ONT” and his recent comments about transportation in northern Ontario.  Murray’s focus there is on economic development, and the need for transportation facilities to support investment, especially in mining.  On the question of passenger services, it was a bit harder to nail down the Minister’s position.

Murray is a big fan of High Speed Rail, and feels that the Windsor-Quebec corridor needs that sort of investment as an important first step, followed by improved rail and bus feeder services.  Yes, but what does this do for the north?  Murray sees the need for a spine rail service linking Toronto to the north with bus routes feeding into that spine, but neither details nor any sense of timing emerged.

Two important dollar figures, however, came out.  First, in southern Ontario, current spending on the 400-series highways is about $2.4-billion annually, and there is an argument to be made for upping spending on transit.  Second, mining now brings in about $1-billion annually, and the industry’s primary complaint is the lack of infrastructure, not their tax burden, according to Murray.

Metrolinx and The Big Move

In a February 20th interview with the Globe and Mail, Murray spoke of “smarter investments”.  I asked him to elaborate on this.

An important issue for Murray is that transit investment should be directed to places people want to go and where transit can stimulate better land use.  Although Metrolinx has a map of projects, The Big Move, the contribution of each element in that plan is unclear.  Which ones do the most to reduce congestion, to improve transit network capacity, to support development?  Murray would like to see better data on future ridership and ways to measure the potential of various options.  The term “evidence based” rolls by, although it is not quite clear what this means as one cannot always have evidence of a plan’s worth until at least part of it is already built.

Minister Murray does not want to just keep up with congestion, he wants to “get ahead of the curve” by choosing and building the most effective elements in a transportation network.

There is no question about the initial Big Move projects for which $16b was committed by the McGuinty government.  Those projects are going ahead and are in various stages of engineering and construction.  As for the “Next Wave” and beyond, Murray hopes to see improvements that can focus on development potential and good network connections.

That development potential is central to Murray’s views on financing.  He is very concerned about asking “middle class” taxpayers who will, for the foreseeable future, be driving their cars and SUVs through suburbia to pay for transportation systems that are underutilized.  Bad choices of routes and projects will only undermine a funding strategy.

Vancouver is an important model to him because of that city’s integration of suburban development with transit expansion.  However, Murray’s focus on land use planning and whatever success it may have in Vancouver ignores the actual financing.  Generous support from various governments, not development charges or tax increments, paid for construction of the Skytrain system.

I asked about the fundamental problem that, thanks to decades of underinvestment, the locations where more capacity is needed may not be those with development potential.  Murray acknowledged this, but offered no indication of how to reconcile the situation.  Murray sees some locations, such as central Hamilton, as ripe for new development based on transit access, but what will be needed to lure investors to build, and businesses to occupy new space?  Others major transit hubs may have very long lead times before development appears around them.  Toronto subway terminals are excellent examples in that regard.

Without getting into specifics, Murray wants the Metrolinx Investment Strategy (IS), due June 1, to not simply list many revenue tools, but to show how the money from whatever tools are chosen will produce measurable benefits.  Murray sees the IS not simply as an enumeration of options, but an actual plan for how money would be used and the transportation network developed.

So far, there has been much talk about the type of tools (The Metrolinx “Big Conversation”), but much less about what they would build or how new infrastructure would address transportation problems.  Indeed, the GTHA has been presented with a preselected list of “Next Wave” projects without any discussion of whether they are appropriate.  A review of The Big Move is due in 2016 (and will presumably begin well before that), and none of the Next Wave projects will get underway until the new plan is in place.  There is much room for adjustment and improvement rather than treating the choices as a fait accompli.

Technology Choices

Murray talks about “innovative technologies”, although it’s not clear just what he means by this.  To me, “innovation” is code for “something we don’t have now” and often brings along a snake-oil salesman with a dubious product that will “solve all our problems”.

Murray is impressed by the Vancouver system and its use of elevated structures, and was surprised at the resistance to this sort of construction in Toronto.  I recounted the history of the SRT and of proposals to build elevated guideways and stations on various streets in the city including Eglinton.  There is a huge difference between an elevated running on a rail or hydro corridor with stations on overpasses (such as the SRT Midland Station), and a line running down the middle of a road like Eglinton Avenue.  The issue has always been that each technology fits in certain circumstances, and some are more adaptable to a variety of building styles than others.  I couldn’t help noticing that Murray did not say anything about LRT systems such as in Calgary and many other cities.

Murray observed that discussions about transit often decline into arguments about specific technologies (the whole subway vs LRT vs BRT debate).  I have found that terms like “innovation” and “flexibility” as applied to transit technologies usually mean “my technology is better than yours”, but preempt discussion by asserting an inherent superiority simply because something is new or is more easily implemented on a network designed around its strengths.  Oddly enough, when I talk of the “flexibility” of LRT, the result is often a blank stare or a lecture on how BRT will save the known universe.  Terms are often what we choose to make of them.  I am not sure whether these are simply buzzwords for Murray, or have some specific, measurable meaning in network analysis.

The Union-Pearson Express (UPX) project is well underway, and there is no question that it will be completed to its original design — an express, premium fare service — for its planned opening in late 2014.  (After our meeting, the Minister was off to a groundbreaking at the future Airport terminal.)  However, Murray sees this as an example of a line that can be rethought with electrification for 2017 and better integration with the overall regional network as well.

On the Waterfront, Murray spoke of development possibilities east of the Don River in south Riverdale and beyond that might be served/stimulated by some sort of “people mover” to downtown.  That sort of statement sends up a red flag for me simply because it’s a “solution” that defines an orphan line and may, at best, only fit into some decades-future plan for the waterfront rather than serving today’s needs.  What this means for any future LRT network into the East Bayfront and beyond to the Port Lands remains to be seen.

What Are Corridors For?

Metrolinx already owns some of the rail corridors in the GTHA and the hydro lines are also in the public realm.  Could these be used not just as today for commuter rail and power transmission, but also for new transit services — transit on hydro lands, local as well as express service on rail corridors?  This topic interests Murray, but his thoughts don’t appear to be well advanced on this.

One major problem, especially if we bring road corridors into the mix, is that these lands are by their very nature hostile to pedestrians and to transit-based development in the immediate vicinity.  This is the classic gaffe of thinking that an available right-of-way is a “solution” without properly defining the problem it is to address.  That said, there is more to be had from some corridors than their present use.  The challenge is to avoid having the corridor locations override the actual transportation needs of travellers in the GTHA.

Metrolinx Governance

By this point in our chat, we had already run over time, and the Minister’s next meeting was knocking at the door.  As I prepared to leave, I asked one last question about where Murray thought Metrolinx governance should go.  The organization started out with some degree of public visibility through a political board, but then retreated into a closed shop where only basic decisions, already arrived at in private, are ratified in public.

Murray replied that he would like to see a “competency based” board with people who have a real passion, knowledge and interest in transportation, and that discussions should be more public.  He cited Waterfront Toronto’s board (another agency that reports, provincially, through him) as a good mix of people with an interest in and knowledge of their portfolio.

We shall see where this outlook takes Metrolinx in the future.

Postscript

A number of questions I had prepared went unasked due to time constraints, but I plan to send them to Glen Murray’s office to continue the discussion.  These include several related to local transit financing and the integration of local services with Metrolinx regional operations and planning.

As I walked back out onto Wellesley Street, I had mixed feelings about our conversation.  On one hand, Murray’s desire to see Metrolinx put more flesh on its plans – to convert a cafeteria menu of transit lines cobbled together from many local wish lists to a truly integrated plan with defined outcomes and benefits – is long overdue.  There is an “Emperor’s New Clothes” feeling about a lot of Metrolinx’ work, and the sense that what we will get is a lot less impressive than what we are promised.

However, some of Murray’s comments about technologies and financing put him uncomfortably close to the Ford camp of transit planning where vague ideas and ideologies supplant detail.  Moreover, we risk talking about the network of 2050 without recognizing the need for better travel options in 2015, and of financing that depends on development that might not materialize in our lifetime.  I don’t think that’s what Murray intends, but that’s how he sounds a bit too often for comfort.

On the bright side, Murray does not want to stop the work already underway.  Toronto has seen far too much delay.  I mentioned that many years ago, in the spring of 1990, I attended an announcement by then-Premier David Peterson of the rapid transit network that would blanket Toronto with subways.  Peterson lost an election soon after to Bob Rae, who in turn lost to Mike Harris five years later.  All we got was the Sheppard line to Don Mills.  Ontario is very good at not building.

That is not the intention of the self-styled “new” government at Queen’s Park.  Whether they get the chance to deliver on their promises depends on political calculations much bigger than those of The Big Move, and on the government’s will to stay with transit and transportation as essential parts of investing in the GTHA.

Leaving Hillcrest Yard

SB on Bathurst at the CPR underpass

Under the CPR underpass

At Bathurst Station

Leaving Bathurst Station

NB north of Bathurst Station

Returning to Hillcrest

Another test run is tentatively planned for the morning of March 15 leaving Hillcrest after the last 512 St. Clair car has passed enroute back to Roncesvalles carhouse at about 2:30am.  Car 4400 will make a round trip to Exhibition Loop.

Updated March 15, 2013 at 11:20 am:

Photos from the run to Exhibition Loop are in a gallery on the Torontoist’s website.

The participants were:

• Matt Galloway, host of CBC’s “Metro Morning”, as moderator
• Jennifer Keesmaat, Chief Planner of Toronto
• Larry Beasley, retired Chief Planner for Vancouver, keynote speaker
• Carol Wilding, president and CEO of the Toronto Board of Trade
• Councillor Peter Milczyn, chair of Toronto’s Planning & Growth Management Committee and member of the Toronto Transit Commission
• Councillor Michael Thompson, chair of Toronto’s Economic Development Committee
• John Howe, Vice-President, Investment Strategy and Project Evaluation at Metrolinx

The most newsworthy comments of the evening were a clear break by the two Councillors, both members of Mayor Ford’s Executive Committee, with the Mayor’s position on financing transit.  Michael Thompson stated that getting rid of the Vehicle Registration Tax was “a mistake”, and Peter Milczyn stated that Council (by implication with or without the Mayor) would approve “a suite” of tools to generate the needed revenue.

The message that “the people are ahead of the politicians” on transit financing, first raised by Carol Wilding, was a consistent theme.

Updated Mar. 5, 2013 at 11:10 am:

Although Larry Beasley’s thesis was that Moscow was trapped in an inescapable hole caused by decades of inaction on transit investment, this information appears to be out of date.  As one commenter here has noted, since the arrival of a new mayor and the availability of petrodollars, a lot has been happening.  This can also be seen by a cursory trip around the internet looking at the Moscow system.

Yes, the hole they have to dig out of was very deep, but they’re trying.  Toronto has not yet really acknowledged the effort needed not just to arrest the decline, but to make up for decades when transit wasn’t “important enough” beyond fighting over a vanity subway line or two.

Introduction

Jennifer Keesmaat led off with an introductory talk about the City’s review of its Official Plan and the critical issue of how to finance transit.  As already reported here in a previous article, Phase 1 of the process runs to the end of March when staff will recommend to Council the tools that should be endorsed as part of the regional Metrolinx Investment Strategy.  Phase 2 will follow with identification of priority projects and refinement of policies.  Phase 3 will produce the recommended project list and link reduction of congestion to funding tools.  All of this will take place, in theory, by the beginning of 2014.

Keesmaat is still touting the standard argument that reduction of congestion is the goal, but we have known ever since The Big Move was published by Metrolinx that the best we can hope for is to manage congestion and the effects of growth, not eliminate it.  She also raised the question of goods movement and the role of the road network.

This is an undercurrent in many discussions, and could be a Trojan horse used by advocates of car-oriented projects.  What is still missing is a recognition that the balance between roads, transit, cycling and pedestrians varies across the city, and the presence of a 16-lane expressway in one part of town does not imply that entire city should be bulldozed in the name of faster trucking.  Indeed, the trucking needs vary from one area to another, and the densely developed residential and commercial areas do not have the same needs as an industrial park.

Keesmaat noted that Toronto has been successful in directing growth to areas identified in the Official Plan.  That’s good as far as it goes, but this misses two key points.  First, many of those areas would have grown anyhow whether the OP flagged them or not.  Second, the OP may have identified transit corridors and hoped to sustain growth with new routes, but in fact Toronto has built little to support the premise that transit will be integral to the City’s growth.  The most flagrant example is on the waterfront, but we also risk increased density on major corridors without a commitment to increased transit service or infrastructure.  This inactivity feeds directly into public skepticism about new transit plans.

Keesmaat noted that growth should be directed, and land use should be organized to reduce the need for movement — be it commuting for work and education, or to leisure activities.   However, changing existing land use and travel patterns on that scale takes a generation or more, and the established city is self-reinforcing.  Downtown is and will remain downtown.  Universities will not move to new locations to suit the convenience of transit planners or the aspirations of every municipality.  Industrial uses will remain where they have good transportation, almost certainly road-oriented.

The Feeling Congested website has had over 10,000 hits and there have been 6,000 responses to its questionnaire.  (The hit count seems rather low considering that a site like mine goes through that many in less than a week.  The number may actually refer to unique visitors.)  Keesmaat reported that feedback from consultations shows that people want a clear link between new revenue and actual building, and that improvement of the travel experience (for which read quality and quantity of service) must improve.  The site remains open for responses until March 15.

Keesmaat concluded by saying that there is an “enormous appetite for tangible outcomes”, and that people want “more pleasure” in their everyday lives.

Keynote

Larry Beasley echoed the mood of the evening in saying that it’s about time we have this conversation, and then launched into a defense of land use planning as the best way to plan transit.  Proximity is the best solution with diversity in choices of modes for movement.  People will choose their travel mode trip by trip, but policies should encourage and support movement by walking, cycling, transit, goods movement and last by automobile.  There will be less space for cars, but they won’t disappear.  He lauded what Toronto has already done with its directed growth (see above), increased  densities, strong transit ridership and high cost recovery (which Beasley sees as a mark of a health transit system, not of a skinflint collection of funding partners).

Toronto has a very different transportation problem than other North American cities, one that is harder to cope with, and Beasley calls this “the Moscow syndrome”.  Beasley has worked in that city in its attempt to come to grips with rising transit demand and strangling congestion, but Moscow faces the result of 20 years during which nothing was invested in the system after the fall of the Soviet system.  The transit network has very high daily ridership, the urban structure encourages walking and transit trips, but things are coming apart at the seams.  A trip to the airport takes three hours in traffic, and crowd control measures are needed on the transit system.  There is not enough money for any projects, and governments have been in a collective denial about the scope of the problem.

There are universal truths — transportation needs cannot be sustained just on automobiles.  Auto investment leads to increased use, and in Moscow’s economic climate, to exponential growth.  Failure to invest leads to a decline in transit’s attractiveness and falling riding, and the longer this persists, the harder it is to catch up.  Moscow planners have no idea how to get control of the situation.  The dysfunctional network makes the city less competitive and economic development incentives don’t work because they cannot overcome fundamental transportation problems.

Moscow offers a lesson to Toronto.  We are not as far down this path, but the symptoms are there for anyone to see.  Moscow’s experience confirms that this is not about choosing one funding source, but all that are available.  The debate will be over timing and ordering of new revenues (some are easier to implement both organizationally and politically), what Beasley called a “choreography of spending”.

There are basic consumer trends that must be recognized:

• People have a high expectation of what they will consume, that they have a good experience, and that service (in this case) transit must be there.  Who provides it is secondary to its actually existing.
• People are fed up with government’s loss of control.
• People will avoid what they don’t have to pay for, but will pay for what they want.
• People will pay up front if they have a guarantee of delivery at the promised quality.
• People will always compare new costs with what they face now and will regard new transit spending (at a presumed $600/person/year) as “not that big a deal”.
• People want to be involved in the decisions.

Beasley had a set of recommendations for Toronto:

• We must go further to get integrated planning across the region and across transportation modes.
• Citizens must be involved for widespread understanding and acceptance of plans.
• There must be an air tight guarantee of directed spending, and a citizens’ “bill of rights” for mobility.
• Key decisions should be made directly by the electorate.  Direct democracy is messy and should be saved for fundamental issues.  There needs to be advocacy for new plans including information on the effect of doing nothing or of various approaches to balance between modes.  Trust in the wisdom of the people and engage them in the debate.

Beasley noted that extra charges could be used to discourage unwanted practices, while discounts could be used as incentives for desired behaviours.  He then undercut his own thesis by proposing that the wealthy could buy the right to park and this revenue could be used to subsidize transit for the needy.  Density bonusing could be formally on sale with extra revenues going to fund transit investment.

Well, no.  If parking is bad, it does not matter whether you can buy your way to paradise.  As for density, if your Official Plan says that an area should grow at a certain density, then buying your way out of that constraint makes the “planning” irrelevant.  Moreover, fast turnover of land near new transit lines is not guaranteed as we have seen in Toronto.  This is not just a question of bad planning by Toronto (look at the long-dormant “Etobicoke Centre” at the six points, or the lack of development around the Spadina subway), but of the basic fact that “the market” builds where there is a demand and a profit to be made.

Toronto must plot out a pro-active strategy and plan for growth or we will not stay as an “A-league city”.  Toronto has to pay for what it needs.  There may be some money in budgetary savings and “waste”, but this is nowhere near enough.  New money is needed, and Toronto should borrow now against future revenue to deliver improvements quickly.  Get on with the job, and flag anyone who stalls the process and the cost of delay.

The Panel Discussion

Matt Galloway directed a series of questions to the panel.

To Carol Wilding:  What has the Board of Trade been doing?  Public engagement has been ongoing for over a year, and the public, including the business community, is ahead of the politicians who may be unwilling to seize the issue.  People are fed up with policy “zigzags”, constant changes of direction, and there is a real sophistication in understanding issues and costs.  Galloway replied that polls show that huge numbers of people don’t know what is going on with planning.  Wilding observed that there is a “range of understanding” but people are ready for decisions.

To John Howe:  Nobody knows what The Big Move is.  Metrolinx is a young agency, only five years old, but they have an integrated plan.  What is needed is a better communications job, and a desire to think and act as a region.  Galloway again: but many don’t know about this.  Howe: we are  building already and we need to sell what we are doing.

At this point I must offer an observation of my own.  Metrolinx repeatedly trots out the $16-billion in projects now underway as an example that “things are happening”.  The problem is that the majority of this money has not yet been spent and there is some concern whether the first tier of projects will all be built, or at least funded from general revenues as originally announced, thanks to ongoing deferral of actual spending by Queen’s Park.  As for the individual projects, a great deal of this is out of sight to most people.

• The Spadina subway extension, a project launched before Metrolinx even existed, has major construction effects on the areas through which it passes, but is otherwise of little concern to most of the GTHA.
• The Eglinton LRT project has not progressed beyond construction of the access pit at Black Creek Drive.
• Construction at Union Station is a constant reminder for GO Transit riders and for people who work or travel near Front and Bay, but is unknown beyond there.
• Work on the Union Pearson Express affects those along the corridor, but few others.
• Work on busways in Mississauga and in York Region similarly affects the immediate vicinity of the works, but nobody else.

The GTHA is a big place, and if we were to draw a map showing where work is actually underway and visible, there would be a lot of white space.

To Jennifer Keesmaat:  The same issue — a large number of people don’t know what’s going on.  The City’s consultation rounds are intended to get the message out, and talk about the City’s role and its future.  Movement must be refined around pedestrians, cycling and transit.  Toronto is part of a regional framework, but this won’t necessarily mesh with the City’s plans.  Toronto is already a large region on its own crushed under the weight of its amalgamation.

To Carol Wilding:  What about a “Toronto first” outlook?  Wilding’s definition is much broader than borders.  She agrees with Keesmaat that there is a micro conversation about the City of Toronto and active transportation, but there are also discussions around the region.

To John Howe: How does Toronto thrive in this context?  Howe feels that for the region to work, there must be a strong Toronto.  However, there are 6.6m people in the region and travel across regional boundaries is common.  This misses the whole point that we are supposed to be encouraging local demand, but recogizes that regional demand isn’t going away soon.

Jennifer Keesmaat observed that creating places to live in Hamilton while working in Toronto will cost a lot to support, and we will fail.  We need local transit, closely spaced stations for easy access and neighbourhood hubs.  A network designed around long-distance movement will not provide this.

Peter Milczyn felt that there is too much parochial talk about “fair shares” in any planning.  He would like his constituents (in Etobicoke) to be able to move around the region into Brampton or Markham, say.  Local land use should support good transit access and compact urban nodes.  Toronto has done a bad job with nodes notably at subway stations.  Metrolinx is a new agency — can/will they do better?

Michael Thompson wants to look at the region in its entirety.  It takes someone three hours to get downtown from Malvern.  We need to look at everyone’s needs and all of the transportation network.  He remembers when the zone fare paid at Don Mills and Eglinton was eliminated, but also when stickers on transit vehicles proclaimed that they were funded by the Province of Ontario.  How can we connect local neighbourhoods into the system.  The public needs more say at both the local and regional levels.

Matt Galloway asked Thompson whether he would ask voters to support transit funding in the coming election.  He replied that he is in favour of distance based fares, and that his constituents would pay this if only they can get service.  What else beyond fares?  A sales tax seems to be a very appropriate tool.

Peter Milczyn prevers a parking levy because this links bad land use to the cost of providing transportation.

Galloway:  Is there the political will?  Milczyn replied that the status quo isn’t working.  How much of an obstruction is the Mayor?  Milczyn calmly but forcefully replied that “Council will speak”.  In the past administration [Miller], there was no linkage between new taxes (Land Transfer and Vehicle Registration taxes) and outcomes.  Now that we are delivering on new transit investment, the debate will shift.  Michael Thompson spoke of the need for leadership.  This is not just about travel, but the loss of competitiveness in Toronto.  The view that we can have affordable transit without paying for it no longer holds, but we must show people what they can have and make a realistic presentation of the options.

Galloway:  How do you counter people who are opposed to the plans or the spending?  Michael Thompson replied that at the end of the day, we have to look at the future of the city and make tough decisions.  Does this mean something to people now?  You can’t have it both ways — this is not realistic.  Leadership requires that we let people know somebody has to pay for transit.

On the “choreography of spending”, Larry Beasley explained that some sources are easy to implement, some more painful.  Road and bridge tolls faced stiff opposition in Vancouver.  If you start with easier sources and build something, then there will be greater reception for additional revenue sources.  We must be specific about phasing, project costs and the actual cost/person.

Carol Wilding agreed saying that the conversation is about the appetite for funding tools.  Everybody has to sacrifice, and there are many examples of urban centres who have already done this.

Jennifer Keesmaat noted that bringing people into the conversation with good information and analysis yields benefits, builds trust and gives politicians information for discussions with their constituents.  She reported a recent conversation with Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion who urged using the revenue tool cities already have — property taxes.

Matt Galloway asked John Howe about the issue of charging for parking at GO lots.  Howe replied that Metrolinx must report by June 1 with a recommended set of tools for 25 years and beyond.  We are one of the last urban regions without dedicated funding tools.  Direct funding from governments doesn’t work any more as they are already “tapped out”.  But what if parking charges drive people away from transit?  People don’t want to feel that we are targeting just one segment for new revenue.  A mix of user fees, “everybody pays” taxes such as sales tax, and beneficiary levies (such as development charges) are all needed.  Moreover, we shouldn’t just build transit but also walking and parking for access.

Larry Beasley noted that good transit station integration with access to neighbourhoods are needed.

Peter Milczyn noted that when the TTC started to charge for parking, transit riding went up and parking use went down to the point that some property is now being redeveloped for housing right on the subway’s doorstep.  If people don’t want to pay for parking, they won’t get anywhere fast by driving rather than by taking transit.  What about pedestrians and cyclists?  The city has a responsibility to provide infrastructure and space, and must also look after road improvements and maintenance.

What about the polarized conversation of roads versus transit?  Michael Thompson felt that Toronto is “getting there” on this topic, but we will continue to be a car-friendly city for a long time.  We rely on the auto industry for economic activity.  Galloway: What does this have to do with getting around — if there are fewer cars there is more opportunity for better transit, cycling and public realm improvements.  Thompson noted that autos won’t disappear overnight.

Larry Beasley pointed out that in 10 years, at most, automobiles will be “clean”, and the pollution argument will go away.  The demand for personal mobility will continue to rise, and we need to manage cars more aggressively than ever.  They are only one of the movement choices.  Pedestrian and cycling facilities are too often “value engineered” out of projects, and these modes need to have a guaranteed source of funds.  The focus is on transit because that’s where the big problem is seen.

John Howe noted that 25% of the proposed Next Wave revenue stream will go to local projects including active transportation.  Jennifer Keesmaat replied that the challenge is where this 25% is used — for example there is no public realm budget for the Eglinton corridor — and that there is a gap between statements and the reality of what is planned.  Who pays for what remains an issue (and by implication especially if Metrolinx downloads some aspects of transit projects into that local 25%).   Keesmaat felt that money should be provided for a cross-city cycling track across Eglinton.

Should we put these questions to the public?  Peter Milczyn wondered whether we have the time or the leadership for such a campaign.  Los Angeles had a mayor as leader of the transit tax referendum, but Milczyn was unsure that Toronto has this leadership.  We know what the problem is, what the solutions are, and there is the political will to proceed.  The 2014 election will be the plebiscite.  Larry Beasley felt that this audience was “the converted”, and these policies need a deep constituency.  It’s basic democracy and a stronger way to build support.  Michael Thompson agreed that consultation with residents is needed, but many of his constituents say “just act”.  Carol Wilding said that from a business perspective, there is a need to consult, but businesses don’t want more and just want politicians to get on with the job.  Anyone who says “I don’t like that” must be challenged for an alternative.  Saying “I won’t pay” is not acceptable any more.  What more incentive do we need beyond the $6-billion annual cost of congestion?

As a wrap up question, Matt Galloway asked what sign people who are not at this meeting will have that action is here.  John Howe:  We are building already, and this is the launching pad for the next wave of tools.  Carol Wilding:  The Board of Trade will come out with a narrow set of tools and a shift in focus to specifics from the general discussion.  Peter Milczyn noted that the city’s consultation on revenue tools will come to Council for a decision soon.

Jennifer Keesmaat felt that the conversation should be “unending but evolving”, and without it we will miss a deep understanding among the public.  We must hold politicians accountable.  The conversation is very different from three years ago and we are now talking about how to pay for transit.  A charter is needed setting out what the City of Toronto will commit to with new revenue tools, and we must build trust with the public.

Michael Thompson reiterated the need for leadership.  This is a time to act.  Although there is a lot of work in progress, the public doesn’t know about it and we must demonstrate what is going on.  Where will this leadership come from?  From the people and from Council.

Larry Beasley argued that if in three months everybody adopted the same citizens’ bill of rights for mobility that would give a guarantee that we will deliver to a common commitment.

Questions From the Floor

Will electric vehicles (unspecified) be included as a transportation mode.  From Thompson and Milczyn, “yes”, although it is unclear just what this means.

The elephant in the room is Rob Ford.  What will Council do to get “Ford Nation” to open their eyes that the Mayor’s hope for private funding with no new taxes won’t work.  Peter Milczyn replied that Council will approve a transportation plan and a funding plan — there will be a majority in support.  Michael Thompson said that the fact we (the Councillors) are here should send a strong message about support for this direction.  Milczyn said that we have had a lot of drama that is entertaining, annoying and frustrating, but not much is slowing down.  Thompson observed that there has been no response from the private sector on funding and this is not a reality.  Part of the process will be to change the dialogue to realistic options.

A student from York University (who took only one hour to get downtown from the campus!) spoke as a suburbanite wanting to keep what they have.  Does user pricing mean that we will segregate populations by tolls and distance-based transit fares?  Where does local funding come in?  Jennifer Keesmaat replied that The Big Move is looking region-wide, but we don’t want to create unintended consequences.  When we look at projects for Toronto, there may be a gap with what Metrolinx is doing, and planners need to work with Council on filling that gap for specific projects.  We must avoid the consequences of selective application of revenue tools across the region.  John Howe felt that regional benefits should be “equitable” without explaining just how this would be measured given that spending in one location may benefit residents elsewhere.

In the GTA, there are 15,000 condos built each year representing a $40b investment over 10 years.  The transit investments proposed are much smaller, relatively, than we are making this out to be.  If the problem is $6b in lost economic activity, how do you solve this with only $2b in annual investment?  Who will stand up and say this is not enough, let’s spend $40b in the next 10 years.  Carol Wilding replied that we need to get the money, and a different suite of tools is needed to get more.  She noted that Los Angeles tried to accelerate its multi-decade program.  Do we need to be more ambitious?  John Howe replied that we need to manage expectations.  We are not going to eliminate congestion, only manage it to a reasonable level.

Toronto is seeing corridor development, but it should use buses, not surface rail.  Users should pay through fares, and there should be higher gas tax.  Carol Wilding replied that through consultations, the Board of Trade concluded that a combination of tools is needed.  One “user pay” mechanism won’t get us where we are going.

The “weak mayor” system guarantees poor leadership and candidates.  How do we get a discussion of this?  Peter Milczyn replied that Council has all the discretion they need about how to spend.  We have state of good repair and expansion issues, and these are better addressed on a regional basis than by individual municipalities.  Michael Thompson warned that we must be careful what we wish for, that the “wrong person” could wind up in power.  The Council system works, it is collegial, and members work through challenges.  Thompson is not supportive of a “strong mayor” system.

Twenty-five percent of the city is paved (roads, parking lots).  Should there be a progressive gas tax to penalize cars?  Jennifer Keesmat replied that it makes sense that users pay.  Peter Milczyn noted that in some jurisdictions, a vehicle tax is based on engine size.  John Howe cautioned that gas tax is not a robust revenue source as consumption is falling as people switch to more efficient vehicles.  This is not necessarily a long term tool.

Do politicians have to go against the oil industry to increase taxes on cars?  Most folks would hate a toll, but if it is just added to their fuel bill it would be easier.  Larry Beasley replied that gas tax is “a damn good idea” for the near future because it causes costs to the user and can shift demand.  However, we should not fall into “one source” funding and need a robust bundle of tools.

A Vancouver study showed that the public subsidy of cars amounts to about $2,700 per car per year.  Is there the political will to address these cost, and what will Council do to reinstate the Vehicle Registration Tax?  Michael Thompson replied that it was “an absolute mistake” to remove the VRT.  Many of his residents didn’t really mind paying it, but if asked “should we get rid of it” were more than happy for the savings.  How will people be confident that there won’t be a future rollback of transit revenues as a tax cut?  Thompson replied that given the need for better transportation and funding tools, this is something we must not do.  The mistake won’t be made again “at least not by me”.

Peter Milczyn argued that there will be a suite of new levies, but these will be dedicated to transportation.  The old VRT went into general revenue, an error of “the previous administration”, and that a general tax generates general discontent.  People will accept a specific tax.  (I could not help thinking that if this is the fig leaf needed to get Ford supporters to embrace a Miller era tax, so be it.)

There is a lack of cycling infrastructure.  One quarter of the new revenue stream will go to local projects, but what proportion within this goes to active transportation?  Jennifer Keesmaat replied that this is essential, and Peter Milczyn confirmed that this will be part of the overall Official Plan, and should be included in a mobility bill of rights.

What will be the effects of the new tools on those with lower incomes, and what guarantee is there that businesses will pay too?  Jennifer Keesmaat replied that on a regional basis the city has a high business assessment and this is a risk flagged by the commercial real estate industry.  However, Toronto has very low property taxes and has more room on this side.  Carol Wilding noted that this is an issue in addition to the ongoing migration of employment lands to residential use.  Businesses are ready to pay their share, and the key is to avoid too much distortion in the market.

Twenty five years ago, the same issues were being discussed at public meetings.  The greatest concentration of development is downtown.  What is being done about more capacity and the ability to get around?  The Moscow syndrome is here already.  People won’t come downtown because of congestion.  John Howe replied that The Big Move has advanced the “relief line” for more access to downtown, the UPX will provide a direct link to the airport by 2015, and the passenger concourse for GO at Union Station will be expanded to three times its current size.

There are workers in skilled trades all over the city working on transit projects.  They are having the same discussion about how to fund future projects and jobs.  An educated workforce will support the politicians, and workers understand that they need to contribute to future jobs.  By analogy to Los Angeles, will large infrastructure projects be used for job creation in “at risk” communities?  Michael Thompson talked about the City of Toronto’s strategy to bring young people into the trades through public projects.

There is a lot of asking (consultation), but not a lot of telling (education) people about what is going on.  Does Metrolinx have a plan to bring the public onside?  John Howe talked about consultations now in progress including a residents reference panel.  A public campaign through advertising will begin soon.  Larry Beasley urged that education should not get lost in consultation.

Conclusion

The need for real movement on network planning and funding is beyond question except, possibly, to those misguided politicians who hate taxes and who prefer to play to those voters who can be sold a something-for-nothing view of the future.

What is needed is for politicians at City Hall and at Queen’s Park to focus on getting new revenue tools and credible plans in place rather than working on each other’s defeat.

The question of customer service reaches back into the days of the Miller/Giambrone administration. I have written at some length on this issue before.

• Service, Courtesy, Safety (Parts I, II and III)
• Three Views of Customer Service
• Has TTC Management Hijacked “Customer Service”?
• More Icing, Less Cake

Although the earlier exercises were well-meaning, this process has been underway for over three years.  In August 2010, an advisory panel produced a report that included more recommendations for ways TTC passengers could improve their behaviour than ways the TTC could provide better service to riders.  The effort had all the earmarks of a self-serving justification for inaction from an organization far too set in its ways.  Indeed, a panel member confirmed to me that TTC management had a large influence in the report, an obvious conflict where the customer viewpoint should be paramount.

In October 2011, TTC Chair Karen Stintz said that “it would take some time” to implement recommendations as “culture change” is not an overnight thing in an old organization.  That’s a fair comment, but this argument cannot be trotted out forever to imply that some changes will come eventually, just not now.  “TTC culture” is a phrase I have heard for years well back into Adam Giambrone’s term as chair, and it is wearing rather thin after so long.

Those of us who have a long history of TTC watching are inevitably suspicious of this process, and it is with that background I approached the announcement.

On February 28, an op-ed piece from TTC CEO Andy Byford appeared in the Toronto Star.  Byford opens with this important statement:

I’m under no illusions about the need to improve all aspects of our service. In fact, I have called for a five-year modernization of the TTC, including a culture transformation of its people, processes and equipment. I want the TTC to continue to show that it’s serious about delivering improvements for its customers.

He continues:

My culture mantra is to challenge mediocrity and to focus on delivering improvement that demonstrates that we are serious about change …

We have already achieved some quick wins …

But there remain issues that need fundamental addressing if we are to sustain this.

The TTC’s base product — the service on the street and on the rails — needs improvement …

The TTC, of course, faces capacity and funding constraints that hinder some of our ability to deliver improved, expanded service. I will continue to press the TTC’s case for much-needed sustainable funding.

This is a recognition that what we have now does not meet the city’s expectations, a call to action to regain the TTC’s status in the premier league of transit systems.

On March 1, CBC’s Metro Morning ran an interview with the TTC’s Chris Upfold.  It began by a chat with TTC riders out on the street, and their responses almost universally spoke of the need for better service.  Cleanliness and security are nice, but we need more service.  The concluding remark — “Show us” — is an essential counterpart to the TTC’s goal of being “a transit system Toronto can be proud of”.

The TTC (both Upfold and Byford), a bit touchy on this subject, have spoken of people who say “don’t waste money on cleaning up the system, give us service”.  That misrepresents the position taken by me and many others for whom the general decrepitude of the system showed a lack of care, of pride and hinted at much more serious “under the covers” problems with maintenance.

We have been here before during the reign of former Chief General Manager Al Leach and a series of budget cuts each of which was accepted by management who said, in effect, that they could make do, and nothing critical would be compromised.  Putting up with a little less every year might work for the short term as an ever popular “diet” for public service agencies, but eventually a culture of just getting by translates to just keeping the wheels on, and sometimes even that is not possible.

The question is not one of clean buses or good service, but of both.  TTC efforts and publicity must show that both are priorities.  Making the Queen car and the Dufferin bus provide reliable service should be as deserving of press conferences and photo ops as opening a refurbished washroom in the subway.

It’s About Service

To the TTC’s credit, the Charter’s first commitment relates to service:

We will deliver a reliable and punctual streetcar, bus and subway service. Our success will be measured through our daily and monthly scorecards, and our overall performance will be better in 2013 than in 2012.

Statistics that are now averaged across the system monthly will be reported at the route level and on a daily basis.  This is a good first step, and the TTC plans to fine tune the model it now uses:

In the fourth quarter, we will introduce a new and more accurate way to reflect the experience of our customers and the reliability of service …

The questions remain of whether “punctual” is measured relative to schedule or to planned headway, not to mention what the TTC will do to resolve service quality problems so that “punctuality” is meaningful over entire routes at all times of the day and night.  Fine-grained reporting should improve the visibility of “problem” routes.

Suggestions: 

• Daily route-level reporting should appear, not just quarterly updates, and this should include weekends, not just weekdays.
• Include a mechanism for displaying historical data, not just “yesterday” so that comparisons over time are easy to make.

Keeping Riders Informed

Several items in the Charter speak of ways that information will be made available to riders.  Screens at some station entrances will announce disruptions that might make a rider think twice about entering the subway.  NextBus information screens are now available at some major subway-surface interchanges so that riders know when their connecting vehicle might appear.  NextBus text displays at some streetcar stops let riders know when to expect a streetcar.

This is a good start, but much more, especially the stop-level displays, is needed.  In the subway, there is a gap between the information provided at entrances (where the displays have been installed) and the platform (where passengers accumulate and many arrive from connecting vehicles without ever passing the station entrance).  On platform displays are limited to the number of devices the advertising company who owns them will install, and there are holes in coverage (most amusingly at TTC head office, Davisville Station, which only recently gained a display at mezzanine level).  Information availability should not be hostage to whether an advertising company can make a profit selling space on the display.

New displays for stop poles and shelters are now in test on the 94 Wellesley route as discussed in a previous article here, and a redesigned route map will appear in late 2013.  (Of course, this map will have disappeared from transit shelters, but that’s another story.)

Absent from the Charter is any reference to the TTC’s website.  Information about routes is scattered through multiple pages, and availability differs between standard browser and mobile access.

WiFi and cellular service will be implemented as a trial at Bloor-Yonge and St. George Stations.  Once the TTC verifies that this does not interfere with any existing critical systems such as their own radios and train signals, this service will be expanded throughout the network.  (Service between stations is a separate, future project.)

By the summer, the TTC will have a new plan in place for major emergencies.  This will redeploy TTC staff into the subway for passenger assistance during periods when part of the system will be shut down for an extended period.

Suggestion: 

• The TTC should establish a rollout plan and budget for expanding real-time information at stations and shelters system-wide together with target dates for completion of sections of the network.
• The TTC should review the structure of information on its website and implement a single point of access for schedules, real-time performance and other stop, route and local neighbourhood information.  This should be co-ordinated with initiatives by other agencies such as the City of Toronto for a unified wayfinding and information system.

Responding to Riders

The TTC has increased the hours of its call centre so that it is now available 7:00am to 10:00pm every day, and they plan to get “answer times” down to 90 seconds, maximum.

The Group Station Managers have been appointed, and they will be announced soon.  Six managers will be responsible for all aspects of groups of stations including knowing the “why” of everything taking place there and ensuring that maintenance projects don’t get lost in the shuffle.

Suggestion: 

• Find a way to track station information online and make it accessible to riders who want to know what is happening at their station without having to chase someone for an answer (or worse, “we don’t know”).  If the TTC can provide detailed information about major construction projects at stations, surely they can do this for routine status updates.  The Group Station Managers should be responsible for this.

In the second quarter of 2013, the TTC plans to

“reinvigorate the security model so that we can provide a safer working environment for our employees and a safer travelling environment”.

To what extent this might be entwined with the TTC’s desire to regain “Special Constable” status for its security group, or any plans to expand that group, are unclear.  Feedback from customer surveys indicates that riders feel safe riding on the TTC even with occasional incidents such as a recent onboard stabbing.  The quick identification and apprehension of a suspect shows the value of surveillance systems.

The Charter includes a commitment to install luggage racks on the 192 Airport Rocket buses, something that in fact has already taken place.  This is a long-overdue improvement that should not have required “Charter” status to implement.

The TTC plans to update its staff uniforms:

We are creating a new uniform to modernize our image and help our staff and customers feel proud of the TTC.

I am not sure that this counts as “Customer Charter” material beyond the idea that staff and riders should be proud of the system.  However, much more is involved with that issue including service quality and working conditions.  Notable by their absence from the Charter’s launch were any representatives from the employee unions.

Renewing the System

New vehicles are the focus of this section.  The TTC has 28 of the new Toronto Rocket (TR) trains on the system, and plans to receive the remaining 42 at a rate of five per quarter.  This will bring the project to a close in early 2015.  The last 10 of these trains are for the Spadina extension, and full conversion of the Yonge-University-Spadina line to TR operation should be possible in mid-2014.

The first prototype streetcar will begin on-street testing in March 2013, and two more prototypes will be delivered in the second and third quarters.  Production models will begin to arrive late in 2013 for in-service rollout in 2014.  The issue of where and how this rollout should occur, and the disposition of the older cars, is already a matter of debate at the political level.  I will turn to this in a future article.

Articulated diesel buses will make a return to Toronto this year with the majority of the deliveries in 2014 and early 2015 (the order was recently extended to 153 buses, a fact not reflected in the Charter).  The TTC hopes to move to all-door loading to reduce dwell time at stops and improve utilization of space within vehicles.

Although the TTC notes that these will “will help us meet ridership demand on some of our busiest bus routes”, there is no suggestion of whether the artics will be a net addition to system capacity, or will merely replace existing vehicles.  During the 2012 budget planning, the TTC downgraded its Service Standards to allow a greater degree of crowding.  This also eliminated the need for one order of new buses and for a garage to hold them.  If all that the new artics accomplish is a reduction in TTC costs by raising the ratio of riders to operators, their value relative to “ridership demand” will be limited.

Suggestion:

• TTC’s surface vehicle fleet plans need to be reviewed, updated and published to show the requirements of serving expected growth.
• Service plans should be reviewed for the benefit of express services and of the creation of a frequent service network as proposed in the Transit City Bus Plan.
• Streetcar service plans should be reviewed so that the rollout of new cars enhances the capacity and quality of existing services.
• Service Standards should be reviewed to reflect the cost of overcrowding on service reliability and attractiveness, and the benefit of increased capacity to attract riders to the system.
• Subway fleet plans should be reviewed to establish the requirements for additional trains needed to increase capacity once the new signal system is completed in 2016-17.

Infrastructure renewal is also part of the Charter including work on accessibility at some subway stations.  The TTC commits to completing the long-running project at Pape Station by the end of 2013.  Although site conditions delayed the project, there was no ongoing update on project status beyond occasional changes to the target date.  This is an example of how the new online status pages for major projects will improve information.  Actual performance of such projects will depend on good up-front planning and design, and attention to keeping projects moving quickly.

System accessibility remains a burning issue for affected riders.  This is a question not just of elevator installations (which will stretch out to the mandated 2025 completion date) but of the availability of accessibility devices on a day-to-day basis.  The TTC recognizes that accessibility is vital to many:

The accessibility of our service is the difference between being able to travel or not for many of our customers. We will ensure that the ramps and stop announcements on our vehicles are functional, accurate and fit for purpose.

That’s fine as far as it goes, but there is also the question of elevators and escalators that are out of service more often than TTC statistics report.

Suggestion:

• Information on elevator and escalator availability should include partial-day shutdowns, not just a once-a-day snapshot of the system. 
• Scheduled outages should be included in the counts of “unavailable” machines.  100% availability is never possible because of routine maintenance.  This basic part of riders’ experience should be reflected in the statistics.
  

Station cleanliness will get substantial attention in 2013 with deep cleans of all stations, renewal of terrazzo floors, and cleaning/replacement of lighting.  The TTC has been tracking station condition for a few years now, and the index of cleanliness was stubbornly stuck at a good-but-not-great level.  Getting past this requires more than improved work plans for existing day-to-day maintenance, and the “blitz” planned for 2013 should raise the  bar for the condition riders and TTC management should expect to see all of the time.

The Need for Political Commitment

There is only so much that can be done by redeploying existing budgets and improving work processes to provide a better transit system.  At some point, the politicians who direct and fund the TTC must come to the table.

With great irony, both the City of Toronto and the Province of Ontario (through Metrolinx) are conducting outreach on how the GTHA might fund massive improvements to transit throughout the region.  Billions of dollars slosh around the room, at least on paper, to build a 25-year plan of transit expansion.  However, when riders ask for better service, they are told to make do, that cuts are for “the greater good” even when that “good” serves only the bankrupt fiscal policies of a discredited mayor.

Service is something we provide to “other people”, not as a basic function of a strong, working city.  Service is something we “can’t afford” while we trumpet the benefits of lower taxes in making our city attractive.

Real change, real improvement in transit will only come with a recognition that public transit is an essential part of the city that must be provided because we believe in its worth, not because we feel a need to support those who cannot drive due to personal circumstances, or those borderline loonies who actually choose not to own a car.

We cannot plan transit capacity on the basis that if only we were more “efficient”, there’s room for more on the roof.

We cannot plan for accessibility by flat-lining the budget for Wheel Trans and hoping that miraculously the population will stop aging.

We cannot build a true transit network by building a few subway lines and leaving the rest of Toronto and the GTHA to make do with the occasional bus or GO train.

This is a local and a regional issue.  Toronto especially must not expect that all its funding problems will be solved by a new pot of gold at Queen’s Park or Ottawa.  Most critically, Toronto politicians must not wriggle out of funding transit by abdication, by saying “if only someone else would pay”, while riders wait in the cold for their bus to show up.

A real Customer Charter will dedicate the city to rebuilding and improving its transit system and to obtaining the revenue, however this may be done, to accomplish that goal.

Service on the 29 Dufferin bus has been a burning issue for decades.  Buses run in packs, they arrive full of passengers, and the advertised service bears little resemblance to what riders see  on the street.

Recently, this was the subject of an article in The Grid by David Topping.  In it, the TTC’s Brad Ross trots out many of the usual explanations of why service is unreliable.  In deference to Brad (who is really a nice guy), I don’t want to spend an article eviscerating his comments line by line.  I will leave readers to contemplate information in this and following articles and make up their minds.

What riders see is “headways”, the time between vehicles, as well as the degree of variation in that time.  If the TTC says a bus will appear every 5 minutes, and the service manages to achieve this, more or less, most of the time, then a rider will consider this “reliable”.  Even on a wider advertised headway, if buses appear at roughly the expected interval, riders know what to expect.

However, if the headways vary widely from the scheduled value, this makes a service unreliable and riders must, at a minimum, build in additional travel time to account for the possibility of a long wait.  Moreover, at the end of the wait, they may be faced with a jammed bus they cannot board.  There might be another one (or two) right behind, but that makes no difference to the length of the wait, and those buses might not be going to the rider’s destination.  Providing frequent service “on average” is not what riders want to see.

In this article, I will review the actual headways provided by the Dufferin bus at various locations during the month of March 2012.  Although this is technically “winter” (most of it), 2012 was a balmy year and the route operated without the kind of severe weather delays we have seen in 2013.

In future articles I will turn to running times and the effects of congestion on the route’s ability to maintain regular service.  I will also look at a few days’ operation in detail to see exactly what was going on.

The information used for this analysis comes from the TTC’s GPS-based vehicle tracking system which reports the position of every vehicle every 20 seconds allowing fine-grained resolution of movements at any location.

Service Levels

When looking at the actual service, it is important to know what the schedule claimed the service should be.  Route 29 Dufferin was among the routes whose service was cut in February 2012 as a budgetary measure.  The loading standards were changed to allow more riders per bus, on average, during various periods of operation.

The following table shows the pre- and post-cut headways, and also includes notes about service improvements since March 2012.

29_201203_Service

Observed Headways

In the charts linked below, each set contains eight pages with a similar layout.  In all cases, time reads across the X-axis and length of headway reads up the Y-axis.

The first five contain data for the weekdays subdivided by weeks within the month.  March 2012 had no statutory holidays (Easter fell in April in 2012) and so the only variation comes in the first short week which has only two days.  Weeks 2-to-5 have five days each.

The sixth chart contains all of the weekday data on one page to show a “cloud” of points and the general distribution of data for all of the weekdays in the month.

The seventh and eighth charts contain data for Saturdays and Sundays respectively.  These days are broken out because of their different traffic and service patterns.

Trend lines on all charts (except the sixth) show the best fit of each day’s data.  These generally lie at about the value of the scheduled headway except when service is erratic and infrequent.

Summaries of Observed Headways

The first set of charts show all of the data with one point plotted for each bus passing a location.  Another way of looking at the same information is to summarize it by time period and by the value of the headway.

In the summary charts, the number of buses at each headway (1 minute, 2 minutes, etc.) for a period such as the AM peak are summed, and these values are displayed as percentages.  The TTC aims to have 65% of its bus service within 3 minutes of the scheduled headway.  If this actually happens, a chart will have a peak at the scheduled value and will quickly drop off on either side.  However, in some cases, the values are spread out over a wider range.  In others, the most common values seen are 1-2 minutes (bunched service) with a wide range of other values some of which are far from the scheduled headway.

Northbound Service

29_201203_NB_King_Headways
29_201203_NB_Bloor_Headways
29_201203_NB_Lawrence_Headways

Although the Dufferin bus has a branch that runs through Exhibition Place during certain hours from Dufferin east to the Princes Gates, the main service originates at Dufferin Loop at the Exhibition’s western gate.  King Street is a few blocks north and is the first major cross-street.  Service at this point should be fairly well-spaced because most buses have just left the terminal.

Many of the data points are clustered around the trend lines, at least within a value of ±3 minutes which is the TTC’s goal for service punctuality.  Because of the low scheduled headways, this means that many “punctual” vehicles are running very close to the one in front.  In other words, they left the terminal in a bunch.

By the time we get to Bloor and the connection to the subway (2.4 km north of King), the weekday data points are roughly in the same pattern as at King.

At Lawrence (a further 6km north), part of the peak service has short turned at Tycos (half-way between Eglinton and Lawrence).  The data points are more widely spread especially in the PM peak.  The wider scheduled peak headway on the northern section of the route simply compounds the general unevenness of peak period values, well beyond the TTC’s 6-minute target band.  This is an example of how a metric that looked only at certain parts of the route (say, at Bloor), or which averaged various points together, may mask problems on selected parts of a route.

On weekends, especially in the evenings, the scheduled headways are longer, but the distribution of actual headways is very wide, much beyond the six-minute range.  The situation is bad at both King and Bloor, but by Lawrence headways bear little resemblance to the advertised service.

The headway summaries tell the same story but present the data in a different manner.

29_201203_NB_King_Headway_Summary

Northbound at King, the weekday service headways lie mainly in the ±3 minute band, but the data spread out as the day wears on, especially in the evening.

Saturday mornings fit the target pattern, but by Saturday afternoon service is running with headways below the scheduled value (1 or 2 minutes) being the most common, and the rest of the service spread out over a range up to 10 minutes.  Saturday early evenings continue this problem.  By late evening, the headways range fairly evenly over a range from 0 to 15 minutes when the schedule calls for 11’00″.

Sunday early mornings should be a period when it is easy to maintain a scheduled headway, but even then, there is a wide range of headway values.  The range tightens up a bit in the late morning, but there are still many buses running close together on a scheduled 5’00″ headway.  Sunday evenings show headways over a wide range of values.

The common factor here is that even near the route’s southern terminus, the service is not operating on a reliable headway much of the time.  The only possible explanation is that buses are not leaving on time because they have only travelled a few uncongested blocks when they reach King Street.

29_201203_NB_Bloor_Headway_Summary

By the time the service reaches Bloor, some of the unevenness seen at King has worsened.  One minute headways are the most common value seen for most of the time on weekdays, and this shows that service has become even more bunched as it travelled north from King.  In the late evening, service is spread out more than the six-minute range around the scheduled 7’15″ headway.

On Saturdays, as at King, the service moves further away from the target headway as the day goes on.  By the afternoon, over 25% of the buses arriving northbound are on headways of 1 minute (this bar actually represents values from 0’30″ to 1’30″), and service is badly bunched.  This continues into the early evening.  By late evening, as at King, the headways range widely with much of the service outside of the target six-minute band.

Sundays continue the pattern seen at King Street with a wide variation in headways especially in the evening.  It is very difficult to believe that this is the result of traffic congestion, but rather the complete absence of any attempt to dispatch service at headways resembling those on the timetable.

Southbound Service

29_201203_SB_Transit_Road_Headways
29_201203_SB_Eglinton_Headways
29_201203_SB_Bloor_Headways

Southbound headways are shown first at Transit Road and Wilson, just outside of the line’s northern terminal.  The next point is Eglinton, 4km to the south, and then Bloor, another 4km down the line.

At Transit Road, weekday service shows a similar pattern to that at King Street northbound with most vehicles clustering around the trend line.  As at King, the scheduled headway is short enough that “punctual” service can actually be operating closely behind its leader.  A greater scatter of headway values shows up here in the PM peak just as it did northbound at King.

By the time we reach Eglinton southbound, the service is a bit more spread out (compare the width of the weekday “clouds”) than it was at Transit Road, but some of the longer headways seen in the PM peak at the north end of the line have vanished.

At Bloor, the values have spread out further, and headways above 10 minutes are common throughout the day with no real indication of a peak period effect at all.

Weekend values show a lower service quality with a greater spread of values and bunching is still common.

29_201203_SB_Transit_Road_Headway_Summary

As with the northbound service, what we see at Transit Road southbound is fairly well-behaved headways until the PM peak, but then the values spread out.  However, there is not the same degree of bunching as the service leaves its northern terminus.

Weekends show the same pattern of spread out headway values in the evening as we saw northbound.

29_201203_SB_Bloor_Headway_Summary

At Bloor southbound, buses are near the end of their inbound trips.  During the AM peak, very short headways are most common showing the bunching that has occurred enroute from Wilson Station.  This continues through the day and even into late evening when a considerable amount of service is running close together on a nominally 7’15″ headway.

Saturday service is fairly well-behaved until the afternoon when short headways dominate showing badly bunched service.  This continues into the evening when headways well beyond the six minute band are common.

Sunday service starts off with widely scattered headways and never reaches a point where values lie mainly in the target band.  By Sunday afternoon, bunching is common, and in the evening headways are over a wide range of values as on Saturday.

Summary

Headway reliability on the Dufferin bus is very poor and this occurs even at times when there should be little interference in service from traffic conditions.  On weekends evenings, service is unpredictable because the headways lie over so wide a range and many buses are running in groups of two or three.

The observed data suggest that for some operating periods, nobody is “minding the store” and no attempt is made to hold vehicles to the target headways.

TTC’s Chris Upfold presented the new designs at the February 25th Commission meeting using a short PowerPoint which I have excerpted here.

The rationale for the new design is that existing stop poles are inconsistent in their display of information and format.  This is no surprise given the evolution of stop treatment over the years, and the application of overlay stickers as needed to reflect changing services.

Maps in shelters give the entire system view, but with a lot of extra detail that clutters the map.  However, these maps also suffer from the scale at which they are displayed and the absence of “You Are Here” indications.

Much supplementary information is crowded onto the map that may be of little interest to the casual traveller who just wants to get from “A” to “B”.  TTC research finds that these maps are not heavily used.

For the new stop poles, the design principles used by the TTC were [from the presentation at page 5]:

• Focus on critical information
• Focus on the service rather than the stop
• Focus on the intuitive hierarchy of information
• Stick with the current infrastructure

These principles lead to updated stop poles looking like this:

The pole shows the mode(s) serving the stop, whether the vehicles are accessible, the route numbers of all services, and the stop number for NextBus text messages.  The overall legend is:

Notable by its absence is any redesign of the schedule information posted at many bus stops.

The system maps are to be replaced with a hybrid local area map that includes, in diagrammatic format, selected information about routes beyond the local map.

Here is a view of a full map for one stop:

(A high resolution view of one such map has been posted by blogTO on Flickr.)

The centre of the new map is a local area street map overlaid by routes and showing the location of the stops. Except for the subway lines and the “You Are Here” pointer, there is no colour coding within this box.

In the lower right is a subway map to which is added the routes passing through the local box. This is a very strange way to show routing information because it is far from geographically accurate, and gives no sense of the wider system of which these routes are a part.

Finally, in the lower left, there is a legend which is supposed to show the periods of service during which each of the various routes and sub-routes operates.

These maps fail on many criteria, not least of which is that they completely replace a city-wide view of the system. Moreover, one of the more important components, the local area map, occupies so small a space that it does not have room to add notations or graphics for major points of interest. At the TTC meeting, there was a request from one Commissioner for Bixi locations, and obvious additions would be hospitals and other major public buildings. The local map will get very crowded very quickly.

By giving so much real estate over to the outlying parts of routes that happen to pass nearby, a vast amount of space is precluded from use for information people might actually want. This layout will become extraordinarily complex at places like Finch and Yonge where “nearby routes” stretch across the entire city and reach down to the waterfront, not to mention the effect if York Region services are added.

The hours of service legend is meaningful to someone like me, but it will definitely confuse a casual browser. What is completely missing is any sense of service frequency. Indeed, one might get the impression that the Davenport and Dupont buses are just as important as the three streetcar lines (Carlton, Bathurst and Spadina) that are also shown, but in fact they run infrequently. The white fine line along the routes is intended to show “limited hours of service”, and one can refer to the legend to see exactly when the routes do not operate. However, both of these routes are infrequent.

This brings me to Jarrett Walker’s concept of “frequent service maps” that show the network from a point of view of major and minor routes based on frequency. There may be many roads to Rome, but only one of them will get you there without a tedious series of transfers and waits. See Walker’s articles here, here, here and here.

The TTC, in abandoning its system map, has missed the opportunity to show people the hierarchy of its routes, which will provide fairly reliable, frequent service, and which require a timetable and NextBus to improve one’s odds of actually finding a vehicle.

For more commentary on this issue, please see Sean Marshall’s article on Spacing Toronto and Chris Bateman’s on blogTO.  There are additional views of the maps in Steve Kupferman’s article on Torontoist.

The TTC will be seeking feedback on the new designs, and I am sure they will get an earful.

For long-time aficionados of TTC signage, we can start placing our bets on how long it will take for this detailed level of information to go out of date if the TTC makes no provision for ongoing maintenance, or relegates this to a “maybe next year” status.

Additional information from presentations and debates at the Commission meeting has be added to this article.

The Toronto Transit Commission will meet on Monday February 25, 2013.  This month’s agenda is a tad on the thin side, but there are some reports of interest.

• CEO’s Report (updated)
• Status Report on TTC Accessible Services
• Second exit planning & consultation / Response to Ombusman’s report
• Leslie Barns connection to Queen Street
• Accommodating strollers
• Purchase of 126 articulated buses (updated)
• Amending the Automatic Train Control System contract to include Spadina/Vaughan extension (updated)
• Update on Bus Servicing and Cleaning Contract (new)
• Deputation by Merit OpenShop Contractors Association of Ontario (new)

There was also a presentation on new shelter maps and stop poles.  This item is likely to generate a strong response in the comment thread, and I will create a separate article for it.

CEO’s Report

The February 2013 CEO’s report contains little 2013 data because the TTC is still closing out 2012.  Of particular note there is no reference to problems with winter operations, although this has severely affected TTC service reliability.

Subway service reliability on the Yonge-University-Spadina line has been affected both by reliability problems with TR train doors (expected to be corrected by the end of February 2013) and by the number of maintenance crews working at track level (probably due to work on the new signal system).

SRT “reliability” ratings have improved because the schedule in operation now matches the actual capabilities of the trains and crews.

Reliability on the streetcar system suffered in December 2012, and was noted in a comment (page 9):

Streetcar Transportation is pursuing additional strategies on under-performing streetcar routes.

Ongoing analysis/identification of times and locations where running time and crewing issues are driving up the number of short turns is being conducted to identify potential areas for improvement.

The last two weeks of Period 12 (December Board) saw high levels of insufficient workforce due to vacation, resulting in numerous cancellations due to no Operator. The resulting cancelled service contributed to delays, longer trip times, and ragged headways. In addition, customer levels were higher in midday and lower in peak periods, so we experienced a mismatch in service levels vs. customer loading. This is completely unacceptable and will not happen again next year.

I reported on problems with running times for the 501 Queen car in a recent series of articles.  The 506 Carlton route already has new schedules with longer running times that are reported by some riders (in comments on this site) to have improved service reliability.

A related issue shows up in the attendance chart (page 13) where the absence rate spiked upward in December 2013 by over 1%.

The comments about the mismatch between demand, service and manpower planning are intriguing because they beg the issue of how something completely within the TTC’s control could have happened in the first place.  The service budget for December 2013 includes considerable drop (3.5%) in daily service hours, and it will be interesting to see whether this is amended as the year goes on.

Updated Feb. 26: Andy Byford noted that the TTC has been reviewing its snow procedures in the wake of a recent storm including protocols for towing of parked cars that block transit operations and preferential clearing of streets where snow accumulation can impede or block transit service (major hills such as the one at Hogg’s Hollow).  The TTC expects to put its improved responses to the test for a storm expected overnight February 26-27.

Status Report on TTC Accessible Services

This report gives the 2012 year-end status of accessibility initiatives and a view forward for the system.  A notable failing is that past achievements are mixed together with current activities so that the actual pace of recent progress is masked.  “[T]he development and expansion of extensive door-to-door service operated by TTC’s Wheel-Trans division” is listed as an “achievement” even though Wheel-Trans has been in place for many years, and the TTC’s avowed intent is to reduce, not expand, the level of service it provides.

A major issue for the TTC and other transit operations lies in provincial regulations that will impose accessibility rules on transit systems and public spaces generally without providing any funding to support this work.  Moreover, Toronto gets no operating funds from Queen’s Park to support whatever services Wheel-Trans might provide.  This is an area completely missed by recent announcements of “local” funding from the “Next Wave” of Metrolinx funding.

The report (at page 11) contains a chart of planned station retrofits for accessibility.  For reasons best known to the TTC, this includes stations on the SRT that will be completely rebuilt as part of the Metrolinx LRT conversion project (Lawrence East in 2016, McCowan in 2019, Midland and Ellesmere in 2021).  Possibly someone at the TTC has not been reading the papers much lately.  Removing the SRT stations from the plan will free up planned capital spending and allow advancement of some work to earlier years, notably two major bus terminals at Islington and Warden where accessibility depends on reconstruction of the bus bays to common island platforms.

These projects would likely be coordinated with second exit work where needed (see below).

Second Exit Planning & Consultation / Response to the Ombudsman’s Report

Following on to previous reports and debates about public consultation and the design of subway station second exit facilities, the TTC proposes a new three-phase process.

In Phase 1, an external expert panel will be convened to develop evaluation criteria and weighting for possible designs.  This panel will be chosen to bring expertise in “community safety, urban design, architecture, urban affairs and transit station design”.  A publicity campaign will explain the need for the additional exits and seek public input on the panel’s work.

At this point (fall 2013), the Commission will be asked to endorse the Phase 1 results.

In Phase 2, work will begin on the designs for eight stations that require second exits and which are not part of construction already planned or in progress:  Donlands, Greenwood, Chester, College, Museum, Summerhill, Dundas and Dundas West.  Community groups will be struck for each location, and they will develop the options for second exits with expert assistance from the TTC.  The recommendations will be reviewed by the external panel (from Phase 1) to check that their framework for evaluation has been followed.

At this point, the Commission will be asked to approve design and property acquisition for the new exits.  The design work will proceed in Phase 3 with continued community consultation.

This involves a change in procedure because design work and property acquisition will occur much earlier in the process than for past projects:

This new approach involves planning the location of the second exits for all the stations in the next 2 years, acquiring the necessary properties at the end of the process accompanied by broad communication about the plans at each station. The actual construction of the second exits is dependent on the TTC Capital budget and funding availability. In some cases the planning for the second exit and acquisition of property may occur several years in advance of the actual construction start. However, the locations will be known, lifting the shadow from other properties near the station.

Throughout the process, the local Councillors will be involved so that there are no surprises from projects sprung on a community as part of an overall project or budget approval (as happened with Donlands/Greenwood).

The response to the Ombudsman contains a compendium of previous documents, but no information beyond what has already been reported.  (The file is quite large because much of it comes from scanned pages, not from original text converted to pdf format.)

Leslie Barns Connection to Queen Street

In the continuing saga of the Leslie Barns project, the bid for construction of the connecting track to Queen Street and associated utility work under Leslie Street has come in well over budget.  The TTC is attempting to negotiate this downward, but may be forced to retender the work.

One cannot help wondering how work that should be the bread-and-butter of many Toronto contractors found only one “qualified” bidder and now faces significant delay because of a high bid.

Accommodating Strollers on TTC Vehicles

In January, the Commission asked staff to report on the question of whether strollers should be limited in some way on TTC vehicles.  Staff replied that a review of other systems, including an industry paper, showed that there is no consistent way this is dealt with or a “best practice”.  The report then turns to the more general issue of large objects brought on board by passengers, and the human rights issues of children.

Although some congestion issues do arise on some routes during particular times due to strollers, the impact of their use does not appear to have an effect that is any greater than that of other items that customers carry. Since, in practice, it would be impossible, if not counterproductive, to more closely regulate and restrict items that our customers already carry, the same logic must hold true for strollers.

Indeed, given that strollers are occupied by children (ie people) who have either paid a fare (over the age of two) or are exempt from paying a fare under TTC fare policy (under the age of two) it would seem that the case for carrying strollers, and their occupants, unfettered is even stronger than for general items such as luggage or backpacks.

Furthermore, quite separate from the capacity and congestion debate, there is a strong societal imperative in not further restricting access to public transit to customers accompanied by young children. Quite simply, public transit must widen its reach to the broadest range of society to ensure that it fulfils its fundamental purpose – to move people. Staff, as well, reject any notion of charging a premium for using strollers – or any other item not restricted by current policy.

Additionally, the new vehicles being introduced to the TTC, including articulated buses and new streetcars, will all provide increased, and improved, space for customers using strollers. Improvements such as more dedicated multi-purpose areas and flip-down seats (as opposed to flip-up) will all help to improve capacity for customers using strollers and thus other customers as well.

The opening paragraph suggests that strollers are no greater problem than other objects brought on board by passengers, but this ignores the very real problem that arises when multiple strollers converge on one vehicle.  That said, the approach of making vehicles more accommodating of what passengers actually have through the use of open vestibules (e.g. new streetcars) and flip-down seats is more productive than creating yet another “policy” where “operator discretion” dictates who and what can board TTC vehicles.

The report is silent on the question of retrofitting flip-down seats in the area reserved for scooters and similar devices.  We cannot wait a few decades for the bus fleet to cycle through to a new design, and the TTC should address internal layouts for its fleet to relieve the problems posed by strollers now.  A related question is whether the new articulated buses now on order (see below) provide for better circulation through flip-down seats and rear doors that will easily accommodate all-door loading into vestibule space.

As an historical footnote, this is not a new problem for the TTC.  In his book The Toronto Trolley Car Story, Lou Pursley tells of the transition from the Toronto Railway Company fleet to the new Peter Witt streetcars on the TTC:

During the TRC franchise baby carriages had been carried free on a hook on the rear of the car.  With the adoption of Witt cars no provision was made for the carrying of baby carriages.  During periods of light traffic baby carriages were permitted inside of the cars which resulted in a number of accidents when passengers tripped over the carriages.  On July 10th, 1923, it was announced that in future collapsible carriages only would be permitted in the newer type cars, while the larger carriages would be carried outside on cars not yet converted to TTC standards.  [Page 26]

There is no word on whether children, dressed in Snoopy’s finest “Red Baron” scarf and goggles, will fly down the streets of Toronto hanging from the bike racks.

Purchase of 126 Articulated Buses

In August 2012, the TTC awarded a contract to Nova Bus for 27 sixty-foot articulated buses with an option for a follow-on order.  Now that Toronto Council has approved the TTC’s 2013 Capital Budget, this option will be exercised to order an additional 126 buses.  The first group of buses will be delivered in 2013 with the remainder to follow into 2014 (no end date is given in the report).

The total cost of the order for 153 buses is $144.5-million.

The TTC plans to use the larger buses on routes such as 29 Dufferin, 36 Finch West and 25 Don Mills where it is hoped the larger vehicles (and associated headways) will reduce bunching.  I am not convinced of this premise, but we will have to wait for actual operations to verify this.

Another problem not addressed in the plans is the additional stop service time required to load larger vehicles through one door.  There has not yet been any discussion of a shift to all-door loading and proof-of-payment (or smartcard) operations on the affected routes.

Finally, as riders of the Queen car know all too well, there is no guarantee that a run that is scheduled to run with a larger vehicle will actually have one assigned to it.  The capacity actually operated can be less than advertised.

After the TTC cuts over to schedules based on articulated bus operation, I will publish before-and-after analyses of route operations to see the actual effect of the new buses on service reliability.

Updated Feb. 26:

As the report explains, this purchase was contemplated when the original order for 27 buses was approved in 2012, and the additional purchase was approved as part of the 2013 capital budget.  Exercise of the purchase option had to wait until City Council had completed its budgetary debates.

A few Commissioners raised a question about how a $120-million purchase could come before them “at the last minute” on the supplementary agenda with no explanation or warning.  One Commissioner, who was Vice-Chair when the 2013 budget was drafted and approved by the Commission, claimed ignorance of this impending purchase.  This shows either ingenuous indignation or a failure to understand a major component of the budget which he approved.  As for the recently-added “public” Commissioners, their lack of depth on current TTC affairs is starting to show, and this begs the question of how well-briefed they are for their roles.

That said, there is a refreshing evolution of the Commission to a body that asks more questions about the details, especially financial, of material put before it.  Over past years, a “dumbing down” of Commission reports prevailed so that long explanations were removed to background papers, if they existed at all.

This change will bring two challenges.

First, management will have to write clear reports that provide the essential information in a clear, well-structured manner, so that a “first read” will convey the main issues separately from detailed background.  Second, Commissioners will have to actually read their agendas and make themselves more knowledgeable about TTC affairs.

Automatic Train Control for the Spadina/Vaughan Extension

When the original Spadina Extension project (TYSSE) was approved, the budget did not include funding for automatic train control (ATC) and the line was designed with a convention block signal system.  The TTC now proposes to expand the scope of the ATC contract to include the extension so that the entire line will be ATC-capable.

Two scheduling options for this work were proposed:

• Implement and commission ATC as part of the current construction plan.
  • Supplier (Alsthom) quotation $14.3-million
  • TTC costs $36.0m
  • Total $50.3m
  • Major cost and schedule impacts on the project (which is already delayed to late 2016 due to other circumstances)
• Implement ATC during construction, but perform commissioning after the line is in revenue service.
  • Supplier quotation $18.4m
  • TTC costs $29.8
  • Total $48.2m
  • Negligible effect on the TYSSE project schedule
  • Will affect TYSSE operations due to commissioning under active revenue service

The second option was selected by project’s Executive Task Force which includes representatives from affected agencies and municipalities.  Funding must now be sought from the various partners (Toronto, York Region, Queen’s Park, Ottawa) who are paying for the base project.

One issue which the TTC has still failed to address is fleet planning for the extension and for the shorter headways that ATC will allow.  There will be a fleet of 70 “Toronto Rocket” trains by the time the order is completed in 2014.  The current peak requirement is 49 trains (PM peak) which includes 2 standby/gap trains on a scheduled headway of 2’31″ with no short turns.  (The St. Clair West short turn operates only in the AM peak when the 2’21″ with a fleet requiredment of 28 trains including 4 gap trains.)

The TYSSE adds 8.6km to the one-way trip of 30.2km from Finch to Downsview, or about 25% to the length of the line.  If all of the PM peak service runs through to Vaughan (as it does now to Downsview) this will add about 12 trains to the peak requirement at the current headway bringing the peak fleet needs to 61 not including maintenance spares.  This number may be lowered if:

• A short turn operation is implemented (as proposed in the Environmental Assessment report) so that not all service runs through to Vaughan.  Depending on the location of the turnback, this could save up to 6 trains.
• The average speed over the extension is higher than the speed over the existing YUS (just under 31km/h) to the degree that one or more headways worth of running time can be saved.
• The YUS using TR trains converts to “high rate” operation to provide faster acceleration and shorter running times on the line overall.

Without some or all of the tactics listed here, the TTC will not be able to reduce headways on the YUS once the Spadina extension opens using the planned TR fleet.  Supplementing the fleet with T-1 trains (which are not ATC-capable) would limit any headway reductions to those allowed by the conventional signal system.

Moreover, the TTC has not addressed the issue of the minimum feasible headway that can be operated through the crossovers at terminal stations, notably Finch to which all trains will operate under any scenario, even with ATC in place.

We have not seen the last of additional costs that will be incurred to achieve all of the claims made for the TYSSE and the new signal system.

Updated Feb. 26:

The debate on this issue revealed another example of misunderstood cost comparisons.

One Commissioners asked about the justification for choosing an option that was $4-million higher ($18m vs 14m) for the signals contract.  The answer lies in the report itself, but it appears separately in the text, not in the tabular presentation of cost changes.  The Alsthom contract represents only about one third of the total costs to TTC of the two options, and the one chosen has both the lower overall price and avoids further delay to opening of the subway extension.

The extra cost to the signal contractor is more than offset by avoidance of extra cost to the rest of the project through delays needed to give the signals sub-project clear access to the line for installation and commissioning.  A simplified, consolidated comparison of the options appears above in this article.

Gateway News Stands

Updated February 25, 2013 at 7:30 am: 

At previous meetings, the question of a contract extension for the Gateway Newsstands has been a matter of some concern.  On Sunday evening, local media reported that, based on an external review, TTC Chair Karen Stintz will recommend that the Commission rescind its approval of this extension in favour of a tender call.

Of particular interest in the coverage is the revelation that contrary to the original report from TTC staff, the proposal by Tobmar Investments International was solicited by the TTC rather than arriving out of the blue.  This puts the previous attempt to keep the process as a sole source deal in a very different light.

Toronto Star Tess Kalinowski

Stintz has called the Tobmar agreement an “unsolicited proposal.” But on Sunday she said the TTC actually approached the company first to ask it to upgrade its stores before the Pan Am Games in 2015.

(My presence in the photo accompanying this article has nothing to do with the subject.  The photo was taken at a dinner hosted by food writer Corey Mintz.)

The Globe and Mail Kirk Makin

The National Post Natalie Alcoba & Armina Ligaya

The TTC meets on Monday, but Ms. Stintz said it’s too late to add the item to the agenda. So, she will bring forward a motion at next month’s meeting “to stop negotiations with Gateway and prepare an RFP for the operations of the newsstands.”

Updated Feb. 26:

Chair Karen Stintz gave notice of a motion to reopen the matter of the Gateway News Stand concession contract with Tobmar Investments International.  The procedures in TTC bylaws (which mirror those of Council) are designed to prevent “surprise” changes to decisions that are already in place by ensuring that only in true emergencies can matters be placed on the agenda for debate with little notice.  The current contracts do not begin to expire until mid-2014, and this certainly does not present an emergency situation.

Notice of Motion simply places the proposed motion on the March agenda.  Because this reopens a previous decision, the Commission must vote to do this by a 2/3 majority, and even then the matter would not actually be debated until the April meeting.  That extra month’s delay can be waived by a 2/3 vote of the Commission, the likely outcome given the general desire to settle the matter.  This will allow the Commission to formally rescind its earlier decision in March and launch a competitive Request for Proposals (RFP).

Bus Servicing and Cleaning (Added Feb. 26)

In September 2012, the TTC awarded a contract for bus servicing and cleaning at Mount Dennis and Malvern garages to two private companies.  The total value of the contracts was expected to be $7.25-million for a two year period plus a three month “ramp up” time.

The savings over doing all bus cleaning, not just at these two garages, were projected to be $4.29m annually.  However, TTC management have discovered that they made an error in calculating the effect of HST, and the saving will only be $2.93m.

It is important to note that the contract costs at only two of the TTC’s seven garages over two years are being compared to projected savings over the entire system for one year.  This distorts the relative costs and savings.

Contract cost for two garages :  $7.250m / two years
                                  3.625m / one year (pro-rata)

Annual savings projeced:          2.930m / seven garages
                                   .837m / two garages (pro-rata)

Discussion of this report revealed that the TTC had been negotiating with its in-house staff to reduce costs and improve quality of bus cleaning, but that this process failed as staff could not come up with sufficient savings to be competitive with contract cleaners.

Andy Byford reported that the average amount of time spent per bus has gone from 12 to 25 minutes, but with no underlying explanation of whether this figure represents one worker’s time, or a crew.  He also noted that the quality of the cleaning has been much improved over in house performance.  The contract cleaners are, according to statements at the meeting, paid at a rate about two-thirds that of the in house staff, and there is likely a further spread due to differences in benefits.

Leaving aside the whole debate about contracting out, this report raises a number of questions:

• Why was inaccurate information about the relative cost of contracted work used in the evaluation process?
• What labour and management practices caused in house cleaning to provide so much lower a quality of work?
• Why are financial comparisons reported to the Commission on an apples-and-oranges basis with costs and savings cited for different scopes and time periods?

Contracting out will continue to be an issue at the TTC and elsewhere in the public service.  Accurate comparisons are essential so that Commissioners, politicians and the public can evaluate the options fairly without over or understatement of the benefits and implications.

Poor work practices and management should be corrected in house, and if this is not possible, the TTC needs to explain why rather than simply pushing work out the door as a cost-cutting measure.

Deputation:  Merit OpenShop Contractors of Ontario

Representatives of an industry group representing the non-union and open shop companies in the construction industry gave a presentation advocating that their members be allowed to bid for TTC contracts.  In brief, they claim that if the TTC abandons its union shop policy for construction contracts, large savings in major capital projects would be possible.  The current TTC policy matches the one used by the City of Toronto.

The deputation and its supporting report are not available on the group’s website as I write this, and I cannot comment on the merits of their claims.  However, among them was a statement that Metrolinx allows for “open shop” contractors to bid on work, and that they have already achieved a saving of $60m on a $360m tunnelling contract.  The details of this claim were not given.

The Commission referred the presentation to staff for a report at the March meeting.

During the debate, Commissioner Milczyn, with the apparently tacit support of Chair Karen Stintz, proposed a motion that staff report on implementation of this policy change.  From a procedural point of view, this violated the basic premise that proper notice be given, and would have left the Commission making a major policy decision on the basis of an uncontested deputation.

Regardless of one’s position on this matter generally, this was an attempt to slide through a decision at a meeting when almost everyone else in City Hall was pre-occupied with the Mayor’s campaign audit.  At best, this was ill-considered.  At worst, this was subterfuge that throws the motives of some Commissioners into question.

Most troubling are comments by the TTC:

TTC’s Manager of Planning Mitch Stambler talked to the residents about plans to change the Queen Street route. With the new streetcars being introduced next year, two or three of the stops will be eliminated, said Stambler. This is a result of the length of the new streetcars.

Stambler also admitted that less streetcars will run along Queen Street because of its increased capacity. Cost of operation and studies related to ridership will dictate how many and how often the new streetcars will run.

One resident who lives at the east end of Queen Street expressed concerns with streetcars stopping idle near the Neville loop. Stambler said he hopes that with the decreased frequency of the bigger streetcars the issue will be eased.

The TTC has been inconsistent in statements about how the new cars would affect service.  Initially, the idea was that larger cars would provide more capacity, badly needed on many routes including Queen.  A few years later, thanks to the penny-pinching budgets of Mayor Ford and TTC Chair Stintz, the idea of actually improving service capacity vanished.  Indeed, the TTC has already relaxed its off-peak loading standards for streetcars to allow more standees in a bid to save on operations.

Add to this the highly irregular headways on Queen and other routes, any proposal to run fewer streetcars can only mean one thing: service, which declined substantially when headways were widened for the 75-foot long articulated light rail vehicles (ALRVs), will get even worse with the new larger low floor cars (LFLRVs).

The TTC likes to talk about how running fewer cars will improve service by reducing the bunching inherent when cars are scheduled more frequently than traffic signal cycles.  This does not, and has not, applied to Queen Street for many decades.  Indeed, the TTC tries to make virtue out of wider headways by generalizing an hypothesis originally developed for a simulation of operations on the busy King streetcar downtown during peak periods.  There is no comparison to the Queen car in The Beach.

As for stop spacing, there have been many comments on this site about the excessive number of stops on Queen and other routes.  Among the most likely to vanish are the Sunday stops especially if any special sidewalk treatment or fare machine installations would be required.  (All of the Sunday stops on Roncesvalles came out as part of that street’s redesign.)  Some other stops are simply too close together, and these are often leftovers of historical traffic patterns dating back to the 50s and beyond.

With all its emphasis on “Customer Service”, the TTC owes streetcar riders in Toronto a clear statement on its intentions for service with the new cars.  Moreover, as a long series of service analyses here have demonstrated, the TTC must aggressively improve its line management to ensure that the headways it advertises are actually delivered to customers.  No more excuses.  No more “mixed traffic, congestion and TTC culture”.  No more bogus stats that use averages to hide the widespread TTC failure to deliver reliable service.

[Thanks to James J. for sending me the link to this article.]

The TTC has a target for headway “punctuality” of ±3 minutes of the scheduled value, and a target that this should be met 70% of the time.  In practice, the space between many vehicles exceeds this target, sometimes quite substantially, but much is hidden by averaging of values over multiple locations, times and days.  Riders, however, experience service at specific times and locations, and averages are cold comfort when they find themselves in the 30% of service that does not meet the target.

In the analysis of running times, it was clear that at certain times of certain days, the amount of time allocated for trips on the Queen route are somewhat less than the time a car actually needs to get from Neville to Humber or to Long Branch.  This leads to spates of short-turning in an attempt to get cars back on time.  Although the TTC’s target may be headway-based, its management tactics focus on preservation of schedules.

Readers of previous analyses will be familiar with plots of headway patterns, or rather the lack of pattern in many cases, shown as scatter diagrams of time of day versus headway for various locations.  This is a bit abstract for some readers, and I have attempted to produce a simpler measure giving roughly the same information.

The amount of service, defined as capacity, can be simply expressed as the number of vehicles per  hour that reach a point on a route.  Ten cars an hour is twice the service of five cars an hour.  What this measure loses is any sense of the regularity of service (something the article on headways addresses) because there is no definition of when those ten cars actually showed up.  They could all come in a pack followed by a gap over 45 minutes long, but they would still be “10 cars per hour”.  Such are the dangers of averaging data even at a more finely-grained level than is done in published statistics by the TTC.

However, for the purpose of this discussion, cars/hour does well enough to illustrate what riders on the line must put up with.

Service in The Beach

The following two sets of charts show the number of cars per hour for each direction on the east end of the route.  There are separate pages with the data broken out by week of the month, and by day of the week.  (It is possible to have fractional values because over one week, the number of cars in a given one-hour period may not be a multiple of the number of days in the week.  This would only occur if the service were identical on each day included in a group.)

501_201111_East Queen Cars Per Hour Westbound
501_201111_East Queen Cars Per Hour Eastbound

Each chart is broken down by hour, and within each hour there are three bars showing the number of cars/hour at:

• Queen & Woodbine (cars originating at / bound for at Neville)
• Queen east of Coxwell (includes cars originating/turning at Woodbine Loop)
• Queen & Greenwood (includes cars originating/turning at Russell Carhouse)

In general, the number of cars/hour originating at Neville is lower than the values further west as more cars join the route.  Differences arise from various factors:

• Cars that are short-turned only appear in the counts for locations west of the turnback point.
• Observations are at each location, the number of cars per hour at each location may differ slightly even without short turns.  A car crossing Woodbine Avenue at 6:59 westbound will count in the 7:00 to 8:00 total at locations further west.

On weekdays westbound, the service east of Woodbine Loop is only slightly worse than the service to the west indicating that there are few short turns.  However, immediately after the AM peak, in the 9:00 to 10:00 range on most days, the cars/hour value for Neville (blue bar) drops relative to Woodbine (purple bar) showing the effect of short-turns to straighten out the service following the peak.  This pattern continues through the mid-day.

One notable exception is Week 4 when new schedules with added running time for a construction diversion were in place, but the diversion had not actually started.  During this period, the number of short turns dropped quite noticeably compared with other weeks.

The charts by day of the week show some differences for weekdays, but the real change comes on Saturdays.  From the running time analysis, it was clear that schedules on Saturday afternoons did not provide enough time for cars to make their round trips.  Although more frequent service is scheduled, the actual level of service at Neville falls off beginning at 2:00 pm and never really recovers even into the evening.

Sunday afternoons show a similar pattern, but it is correct by about 8:00 pm.  (Note that this data include the Santa Clause parade’s effect on Sunday, November 20, but this does not explain all of the short-turning if one examines the data day-by-day.)

The eastbound chart shows similar information, but for eastbound service which is of particular interest to PM peak and evening riders.

Again, I must caution that the numbers here are averages over one-hour periods with data from 3-to-5 days included on each chart.  This can mask a worse distribution of actual data for individual days and times.

Service to Humber and Long Branch

The following charts show comparable data for the west end of the Queen route.

501_201111_West Queen Cars Per Hour Westbound
501_201111_West Queen Cars Per Hour Eastbound

Each chart is broken down by hour, and within each hour there are four bars showing the number of cars/hour at:

• Lake Shore east of Long Branch Loop (cars originating at / bound for Long Branch)
• Lake Shore & Royal York (includes cars originating at / bound for Kipling Loop)
• The Queensway east of Humber Loop (includes cars originating at / bound for Humber)
• Queen at Triller Avenue (just east of Roncesvalles; includes cars originating at / bound for Roncesvalles Carhouse or Sunnyside Loop)

Unlike the east end of the line, the west end has a scheduled service that ends at Humber Loop.  It is supposed to be 50% of the service with alternate cars running through to Long Branch.  The infrequent 508 Lake Shore cars which operate to/from downtown via King in the peak periods are  not included here.

In Weeks 1-3, the amount of short turning east of Humber is evident from the differences in cars/hour values for Triller (east of Roncesvalles) and Humber Loop.  Counts for Long Branch are generally close to those for Royal York (with the wide and irregular headways on this part of the route, a one-hour window at one location will not “count” the same cars as at another some distance away).

In Week 4, as in the east end, the severity of short-turning drops somewhat.  In Week 5, there is no data shown for Triller because all of the service was diverting via King.

On weekend afternoons, short-turning at Kipling reduces the level of service operating through to Long Branch.

On Tuesdays, the charts shows an anomaly with more service at Long Branch than at Royal York.  This was caused by data from Tuesday, November 1 when a bus shuttle operated on the outer end of the route providing a regular, fairly frequent service that persisted for several hours after streetcar service was restored.  This caused the vehicles/hour count at Long Branch to be higher than would normally be seen, especially when both services were operating.  (I left this in as an example of the danger of looking at “standard” analyses without trying to understand factors that could produce distortion in the “average” results.)

As with east end data, there is a caveat that these are averages that mask the effects of individual days and of uneven headways within each hour.

The Regularity of Blended Services

Some readers have commented about the unevenness of headways that supposedly blend at Humber Loop eastbound.  More generally, it is fairly common to see cars from short turns “blend” into the service unevenly spaced within the gap they supposedly are filling.

To get a sense of this, I took the data from Saturday, November 7 westbound at Greenwood and eastbound at Roncesvalles and separated it by the origin point of each trip.  If, for example, cars from Humber Loop consistently showed a short headway, this would indicate that they were always pulling out right behind a through car from Long Branch.  A similar consideration would apply to short turn cars leaving Woodbine Loop.

For the purpose of measuring the headways, I used points where, if someone were actually managing the service, there was an opportunity to space the cars directly in front of the carhouses they pass.  (At Russell Carhouse (Connaught westbound) traffic is light, and a car holding for time could easily be passed by traffic.  At Roncesvalles Carhouse, an eastbound streetcar does not block through traffic on The Queensway.)  No such effort is visible in the data.

501_20111107_Westbound Origins Headways
501_20111107_Eastbound Origins Headways

In these plots, the vertical position of each dot represents the headway of one car, and the horizontal position is the time.  The colour/shape of the dot indicates the origin of the trip.

There is no real pattern to any of these data except for the onset of short-turning in the afternoon when running times are shorter than required.  The headways of cars, regardless of their origin, are scattered over a wide range.  Sometimes people will see a Humber car carrying a short headway, other times a Long Branch car.  Fairly large gaps compared to scheduled service are not unusual as are pairs of cars entering the most congested part of the route together.

Westbound from Neville and Woodbine, there is no pattern to the spacing between vehicles.

This shows quite clearly that the primary effect of short-turning is to get cars back on time, not to fill gaps in service and provide regularly spaced vehicles for riders.  The width of the “cloud” of data points also shows quite clearly how badly the TTC misses keeping all of its service within a three-minute band of a target headway.

I will return to these metrics in future articles looking at more recent time periods.

Updated February 14, 2013 at 6:40 pm:  Graphs showing the average values of trip times in hourly blocks have been added to this article.  This consolidates information from the scatter diagrams showing values for individual trips, and simplifies comparison of averages to the scheduled times.

Recently, I wrote about the reliability of headways on the Queen route during the month of November 2011.  That article was intended both to confirm the erratic nature of service well-known to riders of the line, and to put in context the TTC’s own “punctuality” claims and targets.

A common rejoinder from the TTC is that services operated in mixed traffic are subject to unpredictable delays causing not only bunching, but also such a variation in running times that short turns are an inevitable result.  Operators, on the other hand, complain that scheduled running times are less than what is needed for a car to actually traverse the city, and late running is built into the timetable.

This article reviews data from the service operated during November 2011.

Before I consider the route as a whole, it’s worth looking at four major segments:

• Neville Loop to Yonge Street
• Yonge Street to Roncesvalles Avenue
• Roncesvalles Avenue to Humber Loop
• Humber Loop to Long Branch Loop

The following sets of charts show the time taken for streetcars between each pair of points.  These are plotted by time of day, and grouped by week and type of day (Saturdays and Sundays are separate).

During November 2011, there was a scheduled diversion between Shaw and Roncesvalles via King Street due to Metrolinx bridge construction at Dufferin.  New schedules went into effect on November 20, but the diversion did not actually begin until the evening of Friday, November 25.

The “time” of each measurement is taken at the beginning of the segment for each set of charts.  A 90 minute trip from Neville to Long Branch that appears as a data point at “1500″ represents a car that did not actually reach Humber Loop until after 1600.

Neville Loop to Yonge Street

Westbound Eastbound

In each chart set, the first five pages correspond to the five calendar weeks in November.  Each day has its own colour for the data plots and trend lines.

For the westbound service between Neville and Yonge, all of the weekday data lie within a band about 10 minutes wide, although the centre of this band moves throughout the day.  The week-to-week consistency is shown on the sixth page where all of the weekday data are consolidated.  With only a few exceptions, the running time for this segment is predictable within that range.

Eastbound from Yonge to Neville is similarly well-behaved and, if anything, the band holding most of the data is a bit narrower than on the westbound chart.  What is quite noticeable, however, is that the pattern of values eastbound has only one peak — in the afternoon — while the westbound data show distinct AM and PM peaks.

On Saturdays (page 7 of the charts), the peak is at about 1500 (3:00 pm) and it is more pronounced eastbound than westbound.  On Sundays (page 8), the peak westbound comes slightly earlier than eastbound.  Generally speaking, the data points stay within a 10-minute band although a greater amount of scatter is visible on some days.

Yonge Street to Roncesvalles

Westbound Eastbound

For the purpose of this pair of charts, Triller Avenue stands in for Roncesvalles.  Triller is a short distance east of Roncesvalles on Queen, and using this point filters out trips that divert via King Street.  There are no data points for this segment after the PM peak on November 25 when service began diverting via King.

Weeks 1 and 2 have consistent values in both directions, but by week 3, the congestion caused by some construction activities is evident.

Week 4, just before the diversion begins, is fairly well-behaved.

Weekends are a different story, with running times on Queen West almost doubling during the peak period mid-afternoon in both directions on Saturdays.

Sundays do not have as pronounced a peak except on November 20, the Santa Claus Parade, which looks more like a Saturday.  Higher-than-average Sunday values appears east of Yonge as well on this date.

What is quite striking in both sets of charts here is the absence of congestion caused by fair weather traffic and events both in The Beach and on Queen West.  Any additional activity that adds to traffic (auto or pedestrian) and transit demand will produce longer running times and, probably, less reliable service over the day.  A schedule that may be adequate for “off season” operation will fail under the additional load of summer traffic.

Roncesvalles Avenue to Humber Loop

Westbound Eastbound

The segment covered here extends from Triller Ave. (east of Roncesvalles) to Lake Shore Blvd. at Humber Loop.  Running times in both directions are quite consistent showing no sign of peak period effects, but despite the short distance they spread out over a band 5-6 minutes wide.  Looking at the details, much of this variation occurs around the Roncesvalles & Queen intersection which has a long cycle time, and which is the west end crew change point.

Because this is a short segment and the trip from Roncesvalles west to Long Branch is rarely obstructed, any time lost here is not made up enroute and this contributes to widening the range of running times over the full route to Long Branch (see below).

As in the previous “Yonge to Roncesvalles” section, no data are shown after the PM peak on November 20 when service began to divert via King Street as no cars operated through the Triller & Queen reference point.

Humber Loop to Long Branch Loop

Westbound Eastbound

In these charts, “Humber Loop” is actually a point on the Lake Shore Blvd. just outside of the loop, and “Long Branch Loop” is at the loop’s entrance.  These locations filter out any variation caused by layovers within the loops.

Westbound values on all days are consistently within a band of under 10 minutes with only slightly longer running times on weekdays as compared to weekends.  The effects of the AM and PM peaks are quite small.  Weekends show a slight peak in the afternoons.

Eastbound values are similar to westbound, although the effect of the peak periods is more visible for inbound trips where loading delays will have an effect.

There are a few anomalies in the trend lines notably on the morning of November 1 when streetcar service west of Kipling Loop was replaced by a bus shuttle and, therefore, there is no data for a “Humber to Long Branch” trip.  This shuttle actually remained in operation until after the PM peak intermixed with streetcar service to downtown.

Full Route Westbound

Neville to Humber Neville To Long Branch

Note that the charts in this section have a different scale to accommodate the larger values involved, and that the bottom of the charts is not at zero.

Although the Queen East and Queen West charts above both showed data over a band of roughly 10 minutes, these values did not combine to produce, generally speaking, a wider band when trips over the the full route from Neville to Humber (actually a point on the Queensway just before the loop) are considered.  Much of the data stays within the 10 minute band, although week 3, more affected by construction than the others, shows more scatter and a higher peak value.  Oddly enough, week 5, when the service was on diversion via Shaw and King, has lower off-peak running times than other weeks probably due to the lower level of congestion and busy, signalled intersections, on King than on Queen.

Running times from Neville to Long Branch do exhibit a wider range of values with the band smearing out to roughly 15 minutes, varying depending on which week’s data one looks at.  As discussed above, delays at Queen and Roncesvalles add to the variation in trip times westbound from Neville to Humber or Long Branch.

Full Route Eastbound

Humber To Neville Long Branch To Neville

Eastbound trips from either Long Branch or from Humber to Neville show a narrower range of running time values and stay roughly in a 10-minute band.

Scheduled Running Times

501_201111_RunningTimes

The values shown in this table give the scheduled running times and headways for the Queen route in November 2011.  One set of values covers the first three weeks before running time was added for the diversion around the Dufferin bridge construction, and the other covers the last two weeks.

For each set, there are four values:

• RTT (Round Trip Time):  This is the time allocated for a round trip between terminals, but not including “recovery time”.
• Rcvry (Recovery Time):  The name implies that this is intended to give operators a break after a long drive across the city, but in fact the amount of time is dictated by whatever is needed to even out the trip to a multiple of the scheduled headway.  There is no relationship between the length of recovery time and the time of day, day of week or length of trip.
• Total:  The sum of the two values above.
• Hdway (Headway):  The scheduled time between cars.  As discussed in a previous article, TTC standards consider service operating within 3 minutes of this value to be “punctual”.

Scheduled running times to Long Branch on weekdays range from 90 to 95 minutes one-way, dipping to 80 minutes for late evening service.  Weekend times are a bit shorter although Saturday afternoons have almost as much time allocated as the PM Peak period.

On the Humber branch, scheduled one-way times range from 65 to 69 minutes during weekday peak, daytime and early evenings, dropping to 58 late evenings.  Weekend times are slightly lower as with the Long Branch trips.

Updated:  The following graphs show the averages, by hour, of actual running time data.  The degree of scatter in values can be seen in earlier plots showing individual points, while the graphs of averages show the mean of all values for each hour.  The following text has been amended to refer to the averages.

Each set of graphs contain two pages.  The first groups data for weekdays in each calendar week to show the variation, if any, over the course of the month.  The second groups data for each day of the week to show differences between average trip times through the course of the week and on weekends.

Neville to Long Branch  Neville to Humber
Long Branch to Neville  Humber to Neville

Actual running times from Neville to Long Branch on weekdays lie above the scheduled times except in the late evening period.  Averages between 1400 and 1800 (2:00 to 6:00 pm departures from Neville) are over 100 minutes when the scheduled running time is only 95 plus 7 minutes of recovery time.  There is little variation between the data on a week to week basis except for a small increase in peak direction, peak period times for week 5 when the route diverted via Shaw and King.

Weekday averages stay close to each other except on Friday when running times are slightly longer midday and in the evening.  This pushes them even higher than the scheduled times and leads to more ragged service and short turns.

A peak over 110 minutes occurs from 1400 to 1600 on Saturdays when the total scheduled time is 100 minutes.  Sundays peak above the scheduled total time of 93 minutes, and this is not simply due to one day with the Santa Claus parade.  Eastbound running times show a similar pattern, although some peaks do not last as long.

In these comparisons it is important to note that the times charted here are measured from outside of the loops at each end of the line, and so they slightly understate the total travel times.

The running times allocated to trips on the Queen route are shorter than the cars actually require during many operating periods.  However, one challenge is that the “peaks”, especially on weekends, can be shorter than the scheduled period that includes them (such as “afternoon”).  What might be adequate at noon or at 5:00 pm is too short during the height of Saturday traffic at 3:00 pm.  As mentioned earlier, these data are from a month where most seasonal effects are not present such as tourism, shopping and street fair activity.  Only the Santa Claus parade introduced a visible effect taking data values out of their ordinary range.

All of this suggests that a more finely-grained approach to allocating running times is required to bring scheduled provisions for service into line with actual conditions.  This cannot simply be done by scheduling very large “recovery” times at terminals where there may not be capacity (as at Neville) to store cars taking long layovers.  This also raises the issue of relief time for operators separate from time for their vehicles and of operating strategies that can preserve service quality.

I will turn to the issue of service management and short turns in the next article in this series.

Updated February 15, 2013 at 9:10 am:  Notes from discussions at and after the Board meeting have been added to this article.

Update 2 at 12:45 pm:  The date for Board approval of the Investment Strategy has been clarified.

GO Transit Update

This report is largely a rehash of 2012 changes and improvements with no indication of plans for the coming year.  Metrolinx is hamstrung in part by the change in government at Queen’s Park and the impending budget.  Until they know how much additional subsidy they will receive for the fiscal year starting April 1, they will not be able to commit to service improvements.  Moreover, this sort of announcement often involves someone at the Ministerial level.

Although the GO 2020 plan provides some indication of where the system would like to be, this document is getting a bit dogeared as it originates from late 2008 in the era before GO/Metrolinx amalgamation.  A later item on the agenda formally brings GO 2020 and The Big Move into alignment, but it also pushes some projects out into the longer timelines (15 and 25 years counting from today) of the regional plan.  There is no real sense of which services, beyond a few for which construction is underway, will actually materialize.  In turn, that is tied up in the Metrolinx Investment Strategy and new ongoing revenues that may or may not be implemented, and the degree to which these fund operating rather than capital costs.

The current year-by-year arrangement is an inevitable result of the way Queen’s Park operates, but this stifles advocacy and leaves current and would-be riders with no sense of when the system will improve.  Always transit tomorrow, not transit today.

With a six percent growth rate, GO obviously has a market.  Packed conditions on some trains indicate that latent demand could push this rate higher if only more service were operated.  As GO grows, its ability to achieve a high farebox recovery ratio will decline especially when services expand on a policy basis – e.g. all-day two-way service or opening/expansion of routes – rather than simply the addition of trains in already busy peak periods.  This requires a financial plan and the will to increase operating subsidies completely separate from capital construction projects and their ribbon-cutting opportunities.

Metrolinx has not published any projections of what its future might look like or the scale of spending required under various scenarios.  The new Minister of Transportation, Glen Murray, could do worse than encouraging a more activist role from Metrolinx and a frank discussion not just of lines on a map, but of what services will be provided and how we will pay for them.

Updated:  During his presentation of the report, GO President Gary McNeil observed that as long as the region continues to grow, GO will never have enough capacity.  Expansion of service beyond the peak period is essential to handle this challenge by shifting some demand to the shoulders and allowing commuters to change their work hours.  However, new train capacity is generally consumed within 6 months.

I spoke with McNeil after the meeting, and he confirmed that the constraint on capacity expansion is track time both on the corridors and at Union Station.

Train operations during the snow storm on February 8 achieved 85% “on time” performance.  GO’s storm plan was used and this includes the conversion of all express trains to local service.  Because trains do not need to pass each other, the amount of switching is reduced and the possibility of delays due to frozen switches is reduced.

In reply to a question about the gap in capacity and the degree of service integration with local transit systems,  McNeil replied that local systems are not at capacity, but are trying to increase service to GO.  At Oakville Station, 35% of passengers arrive by transit, but service design is complicated by the “wave” nature of demand meeting trains.

During a later discussion of updates to The Big Move, a question arose about charging for parking at GO lots.  A tax on commercial parking spaces around the GTHA has been proposed as one of the future “revenue tools”, but this discussion turns onto the lots GO already owns.  Metrolinx is open to the idea, but CEO Bruce McCuaig cautioned that motorists will expect better service in return for their payments.

“Service” requires a combination of capital and operating funding to expand track capacity, buy more trains and pay the net cost of carrying more passengers.  These improvements won’t happen overnight, and might not specifically benefit locations where large parking lots exist.

To put this idea into context, assuming that all spaces are occupied on every business day, the 65,000 spaces represent 16.25-million space-days per year.  Every dollar of parking fee would generate about $16m annually, not a large amount on the scale of Metrolinx spending plans.

PRESTO Update

The farecard uptake by riders of GO and local systems in the GTHA continues with January 2013 totals of 470-thousand active cards in January 2013, 58-million “taps” and $238m in fare revenue collected.  These figures are reported at every Board Meeting, but they would be more meaningful if expressed as a percentage of market with trending information to show where and why the growth happens.

Today, the growth rate is high with the “tap count” rising from about 10m to nearly 60m in less than a year.  However, that is mainly caused by the conversion of GO riders from legacy fare media, a “bump” that cannot be replicated on the GO system next year.  Similarly, as new transit systems like Ottawa and Toronto come online, they will contribute large increases to PRESTO activity, but this will mask information at the detailed level with one-time growth numbers.  What proportion of fare revenue, for example, is collected with PRESTO on the GTHA local systems, how fast is this growing, and what barriers exist to greater market penetration?

PRESTO’s next major step will be the rollout of its “Next Generation” technology in Ottawa.  This is beginning to ramp up with a full rollout planned for April.  After a failed attempt in 2012, this is a crucial test for PRESTO’s credibility going into much larger markets than its home system, GO, notably a planned TTC implementation in 2014-15.

For its part, the TTC has been silent on changes to its fare system, and this discussion needs to come out into the open as soon as possible.  Implementation of the TTC’s byzantine transfer rules is impractical with a new fare payment system, but there is no sense of what alternative might be used such as distance or time-based fares.

A related policy discussion at Metrolinx and Queen’s Park must focus on truly regional fare integration.  This is more than simply having one card a rider can use on multiple systems, but a real integration of revenue streams across multiple operations including GO Transit.  PRESTO is only a tool, but there has been little public discussion of revenue and cost sharing models, fare structures, and the goal of providing a “seamless, integrated” structure that does not penalize riders and distort travel patterns with fare boundaries.

Updated:  Ottawa is in the early stages of their PRESTO rollout with 17k “taps” per day on a base of 13k issued cards, a ratio suggesting that more people have cards than use them for round trips by transit on a daily basis.  There are “no problems” with the rollout (press reports from Ottawa may tell a different story), and 98% of transactions are successful on a “first tap” basis according to the newly appointed VP of the PRESTO division, Robert Hollis.

Plans are underway to improve the card registration process, an area of annoyance to new users, and to simplify operation of the PRESTO website.

PRESTO has achieved an 80% market share for GO riders, and the number is up to 50% in Brampton.  Figures for other systems using PRESTO were not cited.

In Toronto, PRESTO plans to begin rolling out on the surface system when the new streetcars begin revenue operation in April 2014.  (I have been advised by the TTC that a report on fare policies will come to the Commission sometime in spring 2013.)  Detailed planning for the TTC rollout is in progress with the first phase targeted at the streetcar lines and intersecting subway stations.  Pan Am Games support will focus on routes serving venues for that event.  (Whether this is actually practical given the integrated  nature of the TTC network and its fares remains to be seen.)

Customer Service Update

GO continues to have strong support among its riders with an “overall satisfaction” rating of 78%, and 80% of riders would recommend the service to friends.  While these are good numbers, like so much else at Metrolinx they need context.  What level of service quality will be needed to sustain this level of satisfaction?  What challenges will GO face as its corridors bump into capacity limitations, and the drive-park-ride model runs out of room for more commuters?

Parking is becoming a problem at GO stations, and this is flagged by the Customer Service report.  Schemes to increase utilization now underway include reserved parking for car pools, shuttle services to remote lots and support for car sharing.  What is missing here is the local transit component, an issue flagged by participants in the Big Move consultations.

On January 6, there was a two-hour power outage at Union Station that uncovered shortcomings in emergency power distribution notably to fare machines and elevators.  The station is under construction raising problems of ad hoc changes, but these things must be planned for.  GO is working to ensure reliable power for operations at this critical station in the future.

The Big Move Update

This report requests that the Metrolinx Board formally approve changes to the Big Move plan proposed in December 2012.  Some of these are intended to bring GO 2020 and TBM into alignment while others recognize shifting priorities and/or implementation constraints for various routes and services.

Feedback from affected municipalities has been mixed but generally positive.  Of particular note is the discussion of constraints to service expansion in some corridors, an item notably absent in the line-drawing exercises of some planning.  Some of the requested changes fall outside the review now underway, but will be incorporated in the mandatory 2016 update of TBM on which work will start in 2014.

Milton Corridor

Originally, provision of all-day service to Milton was in the Metrolinx 15-year plan, but the updates propose shifting this to the 25-year timeframe.

For the Milton corridor there are significant infrastructure and operational challenges that mean it will not be possible to deliver two-way, all-day service all the way to Milton in the 15-year time horizon.

Additional tracks and potentially numerous grade separations are necessary are a pre-requisite to the expansion of service to Milton. The construction is especially challenging through built-up areas. This rail corridor is largely owned by CPR, a private third party operating freight rail. Their approval is required for any service and infrastructure expansion. Metrolinx continues to assess impacts, and negotiate with CPR, on ways to build the required infrastructure, recognizing the need to protect the natural and urban environment.

Two-way, all-day service can be delivered to Meadowvale in the 15-year timeframe, but the full extension to Milton can only be delivered over the 25-year horizon.

If the issue is corridor improvements, any physical constraints now in place will still exist regardless of the timelines, and care will be required to avoid encroachment that could impede future expansion.  An obvious question is whether this is a matter of construction difficulties or of the project’s cost and its effect on the overall financial plans.

Deferred Implementation of Other Corridor Services

The proposed services to Bolton and Havelock have been shifted to the 25-year plan as has two-way all-day service for the outer portions of the Kitchener and Barrie corridors.

Both would require infrastructure upgrades, especially the Havelock service where, despite political support from Ottawa, we are unlikely to see trains in the near future.  Track time is constrained on the inner part of this line between the CPR yard and downtown.

A more detailed review of the Havelock corridor will be included in the 2016 update.

Subway Changes

A major change in priorities is the shift of the Downtown Relief Line from the 25-year plan to the 15-year plan.  This project is also part of the “Next Wave” of projects competing for funding through any new revenue tools.

The City of Vaughan has asked that Metrolinx consider a further extension of the Spadina subway north to Major Mackenzie.  This will be reviewed in the 2016 update.

Financing and Construction Industry Constraints

Buried in a proposed TBM describing the Investment Strategy is the following text:

The RTP capital and operating program is one of the most ambitious transportation programs in Canadian history. To see this program through, construction costs must be spread out using responsible long-term debt. Metrolinx will use debt appropriately and responsibly. Like a mortgage on a house, using long-term debt to finance major infrastructure enables the financial burden of that project to be paid by present and future beneficiaries, meaning people can benefit from the facility sooner. Additional revenues required will increase over time to better match the improved service people will experience.

Capital expenditures are also subject to the capacity of construction contractors and engineering firms to meet the labour and expertise needs entailed by the different projects. Labour and equipment shortages or the lack of enough engineering and design firms can raise construction costs and delay project completion dates, ultimately pushing the full realization of the RTP further down the road. Market readiness and the availability of skilled labour will therefore be an important consideration in the investment profile and system expansion will have to be scheduled accordingly. Metrolinx is already working closely with Infrastructure Ontario, in particular, to manage the capacity of the market to deliver this historic infrastructure build program. Metrolinx will continue to plan for and advance all projects, taking into consideration that implementation timelines for some projects are significantly longer than others.

Aside from upfront capital expenditures, the Investment Strategy will be implemented taking into consideration the need to support the ongoing operations, maintenance and rehabilitation costs of new and existing infrastructure. Furthermore, the benefits and costs of infrastructure and service improvements will be traded off to maximize efficiency in getting the best transportation system for each dollar invested.

This text raises important issues and deserves more prominence in ongoing debates.

First off we have a recognition that debt will be required to finance some of Metrolinx’ projects.  This may always have been the intent, but the explicit statement gives a different context for new revenue tools and a $2-billion per year income stream.  Pay-as-you-play is not the intent for the capital program, a quite reasonable position given the lifespan of the assets to be built.  The question, then, is the scale of upfront construction so that services can be provided in the medium rather than the long term.

This brings us to the question of whether the plan is too big to build and the concerns about industry capabilities raised above.  When the Transit City LRT plan was put on the back burner by the McGuinty government, one stated reason was that the industry couldn’t absorb all of the work.  For the comparatively simple Finch West and Sheppard East projects, that is a troubling argument – if we can’t get $1-billion LRT lines built for want of industry capacity, how can we possibly undertake a 25-year plan of multi-billion dollar projects?  The real goal, of course, was to defer the spending on these lines into the latter part of the decade.

Metrolinx needs to review the rationale for its project timelines in light of new revenue streams and of a government that may be more supportive of building sooner rather than later.  Indeed, that is another question for the new Minister and a chance to undo some of the damage to the credibility of transit plans brought on by the McGuinty regime.

The Big Conversation Update

Consultation about The Big Move is underway across the region under the rubric of The Big Conversation.  These sessions will end on February 19, 2013.  A download is available of the kit used for these sessions.  It includes brief descriptions of technologies, projects in the first and second waves of TBM, and an overview of funding tools used in other major cities.  The purpose of the kit is to allow “home brew” discussions among interested groups outside of the formally facilitated workshops.  The information is similar to the content of the main site for TBM, but it is organized to support specific discussions.

Metrolinx has a big problem going into a year where voters will be asked to support new revenue tools that will generate at least $2b annually for new and improved transit.  As an agency, Metrolinx and its plans are almost unknown.  Many projects have been announced, but few have actually been launched, let alone completed for revenue service.  The danger of being ignored as background noise must give Metrolinx execs sleepless nights.

The feedback from participants has been supportive, but with a sense of urgency, of getting on with improvements people can see and use.  Local transit and system integration are important issues, as is off-peak, weekend, two-way service so that GO is supporting a transit lifestyle, not just commuters.  A telling quote was:

”The lack of integration has created a system that is not worth my time to use.”

The “integration” talked of here is much more than having one green card with which to pay fares.  It is full service integration so that local and regional services operate as one system regardless of the colour of the buses or who drives them.  The key word is “time”, a commodity motorists prize, something badly co-ordinated transit services can waste with infrequent service and ineffective transfer connections.

Update 2:  The date for Board approval of the Investment Strategy has been clarified.

Feedback from these session will be summarized in a report to be posted online, and Metrolinx will continue to seek input from various groups across the GTHA.  In April, a final report will be presented to the Board with the intent of going to a public session on May 27 for formal approval before the June 1, 2013, legislated deadline.   (although the next public meeting is not scheduled until May 27).

By that time, the Investment Strategy should be substantially completed in draft aiming at publication for the June 27 Board Meeting.

Updated:  Various issues came up during the press scrum after the meeting including:

• Does Metrolinx have plans to take over the TTC, or at least its rapid transit system?  CEO Bruce McCuaig replied that Metrolinx has an obligation to integrate regional transit, but that this refers to service and fares.  A takeover is only one way to achieve integration, and this can also be one through collaboration among multiple system operators.  McCuaig noted that the travelling public wants outcomes and they are not concerned with governance structures or political boundaries.  Chair Rob Prichard stated that any discussion about system amalgamation lies elsewhere in government.  Metrolinx needs to be able to respond if asked about the implications, but they are  not “advocates” for such changes.
• Will Metrolinx ensure “efficiency” in its current spending as part of its plan to seek new funding?  Bruce McCuaig spoke of the cost recovery ratio for GO mistakenly equating high fare revenues with efficiency.  He then turned to the procurement process for capital projects, and cited Alternative Financing and Procurement through Infrastructure Ontario as an example of how Metrolinx would seek good value.  Rob Prichard observed that the scale of investment required for The Big Move is much larger than the level of savings that could be achieved by trimming existing spending.
• What will be the effect of new revenue tools on non-users of the transit network?  Bruce McCuaig replied with the commonly cited benefits of redirecting travel flow off of the road network, increasing land values, and better capacity for goods movement.  (My own feeling about this question is that those answers are becoming shopworn, especially considering that Metrolinx itself has argued that The Big Move will only prevent congestion from getting worse, on average, not that it will actually improve conditions.)
• What are the least popular of proposed new revenue sources?  McCuaig dodged this question saying that feedback varies among different groups and he did not want to prejudge the outcome of the consultations now underway.  He noted that there was a lot of support for the general principles, but that Metrolinx needs to publish more information about how the tools are used elsewhere and how they might be implemented in the GTHA.
• What will be the fare for the Union Pearson Express?  Discussions are underway, and there will be a firm proposal on this in late 2014.  (That’s quite a non-answer considering the provincial Auditor General’s less-than-complimentary remarks on the UPX project.)

Almost all of the current round of improvements are in off-peak periods because of the limited number of spare vehicles for better peak service.

2013.03.31 Service Changes

The 192 Airport Rocket will be rerouted northbound to use Highway 427 rather than Highway 27, and buses on this route now have luggage racks opposite the rear doors.  For more information on the background to these changes, see TransitToronto’s article.

The schedule for 38 Highland Creek will be revised to minimize layovers at the loop at UTSC and resulting conflicts in bus traffic.

The schedule for 41 Keele will be revised to remove some of the additional running time provided for construction delays at Finch West Station.

The 123 Shorncliffe route’s crew break and relief point will be moved from Sherway Gardens to Kipling Station to reduce time lost by these changeovers.

The schedule for 90 Vaughan will be revised to shift some layover time from the north to the south end of the route to avoid having buses blocking traffic at the north loop.

The following routes have running time adjustments.  These consist of changing layover times into driving time with no alteration in scheduled service:

• 49 Bloor West
• 54 Lawrence East
• 168 Symington

The following routes have time point adjustments that are meaningful only in the sense of measuring whether a bus is “on time” at intermediate locations along the routes.

• 25 Don Mills
• 26 Dupont
• 34 Eglinton East
• 100 Flemingdon Park
• 30 Lambton
• 56 Leaside
• 51 Leslie
• 67 Pharmacy
• 53 Steeles East
• 112 West Mall
• 95 York Mills

Service improvements are planned for many routes effective March 31, 2013.  These will be covered in a separate article.

Updated February 7, 2013 at 1:20 pm:  The presentation materials from the February 6, 2013 Board Meeting are now available online.

Background

When a transit line to the eastern waterfront was first proposed, the cost estimate was considerably lower than today.  Waterfront Toronto has only $90-million left in the account for this project because some of the originally intended funds have been redirected to the Queens Quay West project now underway.

Coming into 2012, the project estimate had grown to $335m broken down as:

• $112m for changes to the Union Station loop
• $156 for the tunnel on Queens Quay from Bay east to Freeland
• $66m for the surface portion from Freeland to Parliament

This number is now felt to be low because, somehow, the TTC has acquired a new “mandate” to relocate all utilities under its rights-of-way and this will push up the cost of the surface segment.  (As an aside, I cannot help wondering how much of this is gold-bricking by utilities who seek to renew/replace their existing plant at the transit project’s expense.)

Because Waterfront Toronto does not have full funding available for this project, they are looking for an interim solution that would improve transit in the area for the next 5-15 years.  The criteria fall into four groups:

• quality and capacity,
• ability to be implemnted,
• costs and benefits, and
• operations and neighbourhood impacts including traffic.

The options under study are not screened out just because they exceed $90m as it could be worth finding additional funds for a better solution.  Broadly speaking, the options fall in three groups: under $90m, about $150m and about $250m.

“Operational” evaluation will include consideration for effects on both the Ferry Docks and on the proposed new bus terminal (tentatively planned by Metrolinx as part of a development northeast of Bay & Lake Shore).

Alternative Options for Serving Queens Quay East

During the process of considering “solutions”, Waterfront Toronto has boiled down many possible routes over just about every street in the vicinity into a few that are worth looking at, and has grouped the technology options into four categories.  The TTC’s view of the situation is that whatever is done should be better than the existing 6 Bay bus to justify the investment and effects of any road changes.

Category 1: Replace the streetcar tunnel with a walkway or people mover

During various discussions, some people have advocated simply running an east-west streetcar/LRT along Queens Quay and repurposing the Bay Street tunnel between Union and Queens Quay stations.  This would involve a pedestrian pathway, a moving walkway or some sort of people-mover technology.  These variants have all been rejected for a number of reasons including:

• A walkway or moving sidewalk (necessary for accessibility reasons if nothing else) would be 500m long.  This would be a significant downgrade for current users of the 509/510 streetcar services who would be forced to transfer at Bay & Queens Quay in addition to new users of an eastern waterfront service.
• Reliability of a moving walkway would be dubious given the TTC’s experience with the much shorter (200m) installation at Spadina Station, and the fact that this installation would be in a harsher climate.
• This would not present an appetizing gateway to the renewed waterfront.
• The range of costs is $165-195m and construction could take 2-3 years.

Category 2:  Streetcar services

Two options were studied:

1. A surface loop from Queens Quay via north on Yonge, west on Wellington and south on Bay.
2. From the existing Bay Street tunnel via west on Queens Quay (the existing track), north on York, east on Harbour, south on Yonge.

The range of costs is estimated at $150-250m, and these options are thought to have no benefit over buses running in reserved lanes.

A surface streetcar option presents issues with pedestrian volumes especially at the major transfer point, Union Station.

Category 3: Bus options

1. Using HOV lanes, buses would loop in the same manner as the first streetcar proposal via north on Yonge, west on Wellington and south on Bay.
2. Using HOV lanes, buses would loop north on Bay, east on Front, north on Yonge, west on Wellington and south on Bay.

Both of these require only the investment needed to stripe the roadways and erect signage, but they are strongly dependent on enforcement which is unlikely in Toronto.  Moreover, the probability of getting HOV lanes both ways on Bay is remote given competing demands for road capacity.  The TTC prefers dedicated lanes if anything is going to be done to ensure predictability in service.

Although these options have short implementation times, they would provide little benefit in travel times over the existing bus service.

Category 4:  Bus Rapid Transit

All of these schemes involve partial or complete dedication of lanes over the entire route including on Queens Quay from Bay to Parliament.

1. North via Yonge and south via Bay as in schemes described above.
2. Both ways on Bay using curb lanes as exclusive transit lanes.
3. Use the two west lanes of Bay as a bus right-of-way and shift all other traffic to the east side of Bay.  Buses would loop via west on Richmond, south on Sheppard, east on Adelaide.

The cost of these options ranges from $27-36m, but an Environmental Assessment may be required to review the effects of a major change in road space allocation.  It was reported that City of Toronto staff think that this could be on a par with a “decent” streetcar system, but it depends on the traffic working in the new configuration.  Although Bay Street has been restricted to one lane each way by construction at Front, this is not necessarily a long-term option, and certainly not a low-impact one.

For the projected population who could be dependent on transit in the East Bayfront (12k initially ramping up to 20-30k over a longer period), a simple surface operation is not considered viable for the long term.

A preliminary review of these options has the simplest one — dedicated lanes on Bay Street for the existing bus service — come out on top.  There is little cost to implement it, but it is subject to an evaluation of traffic effects.  Travel time to the East Bayfront would not improve substantially over the current arrangement once the effects of construction at Front & Bay are removed.  Without a faster trip from East Bayfront into the core, the contribution of this scheme to better mobility for future residents is low.

Stakeholder Advisory Committee Option

At the recent Stakeholder meeting (as reported by Waterfront Toronto), the reaction to the proposals was not supportive.

• Category 1 options were rejected by people living to the west of Bay who now depend on the direct connection of their transit service to Union Station.  The debate on this option was described as “acrimonious”.
• Category 2 options were seen as having a high “throwaway cost” for streetcar infrastructure for an “interim” solution.
• Bus options might be a short-term approach, but would the effort of getting the required transit lanes be worth the benefits in better service.

A new option arising from the meeting received general support:  build the Queens Quay east streetscape, including streetcar tracks for future use, and run the Bay bus over the new right-of-way until demand and funding make conversion to an LRT into the Bay Street tunnel possible.  This would continue the redesign of Queens Quay into the East Bayfront and would build permanent, not temporary infrastructure in that neighbourhood.

The estimated cost of this option is $100m including road improvements, although Waterfront Toronto hopes to reduce this through a value engineering review.  This option will be added to the mix in the study.

Support for this option was strong among Waterfront Toronto Board members.  Comments included:

• Disruption of “corporate Canada” by taking road space on Bay in the heart of the financial district is probably a non-starter.
• This would be a first step in advance of extension of transit into the Port Lands.
• The difference between LRT and BRT is shrinking, and whether streetcar tracks should be included at all needs discussion.
• Consultation should include people from a wider range of neighbourhoods out to the western waterfront (e.g. Palace Pier).

The comment about BRT vs LRT shows that some members of the Board are unaware of the basic constraint already faced in this study that buses cannot run through the Bay Street tunnel and there is no surplus road capacity for a surface connection.  The general idea of starting with a lower order of transit (buses with some lane reservation) and working up to higher orders as demand requires was well-received.

The comment about Palace Pier begs the question of the Waterfront West LRT line (originally part of Transit City) and the related Bremner route between the CNE and Bay Street.  There was no mention of the effect any potential new uses of the lands at Ontario Place or Exhibition Place might have on the transit and road network.

It was clear that some of the Board members are unfamiliar with existing and proposed transit services for the waterfront in general, and the discussion reflected this (including one member who did not know there was a tunnel under Bay Street that has been in operation since 1990).  A refresher for the Board is definitely in order.

Next Steps

The “stakeholder” option will be added to the study.  Waterfront Toronto will develop a preferred option from those available, and will take this to the public for comment.

My sense of the meeting is that there is strong support for the “stakeholder” option using the available money on Queens Quay East to match the west section now under construction.  This will integrate the two parts of the waterfront and show how new developments and a transformed public realm can work together.

The debate about a future LRT line will depend both on the desire to make funding available and on the speed with which new developments are planned east of Parliament and into the Port Lands.

Disclosure:  I am a member of a Stakeholder Advisory Committee for this project, and participated in a discussion of various options a few weeks ago along with about 30 other representatives of neighbourhood groups, businesses and other activists on central waterfront projects.  Now that the options under study, including the results of that meeting, are now public, I can report on them here.

Brampton-Queen BRT     $  600 million
Dundas BRT                600
Durham BRT                500
GO Expansion            4,900
GO Lakeshore Express    1,700
GO KW Electrification     900
Hamilton RT             1,000
Hurontario LRT          1,600
Downtown Relief Line    7,400
Yonge North Subway      3,400
Total                 $22,600 million

A big chunk of the difference between these two numbers can be explained by a factor which is new in the “Next Wave”, a provision of 25% of whatever funding is available for local transit, regional highways and other smaller projects.  This would eat up $8.5b out of the total leaving $25.5b for the next wave of “Big Move” projects.

I wrote to Metrolinx asking for an explanation of the remaining $2.9b, and this is their response.

Transforming the transportation network in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area is similar to any renovation project, and $50 billion was a planning number that was developed in 2008 for the Regional Transportation Plan, also known as The Big Move. As we move through assessments and delivery, we will have harder numbers, so that figure will change.

However, prior to the assessments and delivery, we’ve built a contingency into the $34 billion cost of the Next Wave projects, which accounts for a difference in numbers.

It should be noted that more than $16 billion from all three levels of government has been allocated to the “first wave” of projects drawn from The Big Moves list of top priorities. This is the largest financial commitment to transit expansion in Canadian history. [Email from Metrolinx February 5, 2013]

I will take at face value the statement that the $2.9b is “contingency”, but note that this was not mentioned in any of the presentation materials nor on the website.  To me it looks more like an “oops”.

This is not simply a question of catching Metrolinx out on an incomplete or inaccurate presentation.  We are now engaged in a debate about regional transportation and funding, and it is vital that this take place in a fully informed context.  An amount of $2b/year is commonly used as a reference point for the amount of funding that must be delivered by any new revenue tools.  This was in the original “Big Move” budget of $50b delivered over 25 years, and shows up most recently in the City of Toronto’s “Feeling Congested” outreach program.

That original number was in 2008$ and it included some provision for future operating costs.  However, it did not include inflation, nor did it include the recently added provision for local transit and road projects which would take 25% off the top of any new revenue stream.

The $50b was supposed to finance 52 separate projects listed in The Big Move, but between the “first wave” and “next wave” list, many still remain outside of funding plans.

If the Investment Strategy report expected from Metrolinx late this spring is to have any relevance to the discussion, it must include current estimates of capital and operating costs to be funded from new revenues, and must provide for inflation.  Either the capital provisions must be escalated to future dollars, or the future revenue from new tools must be discounted to present day.  We cannot discuss our long-term funding needs with a mixture of dollar values spanning decades.

Public transit projects have a long history of coming in over budget for various reasons.  Some of this is bad planning and some is scope creep, although it could be argued that these are often related.  There is always the issue of unexpected circumstances, not to mention the treatment of large public transit projects as an opportunity for every nearby utility to have their plant upgraded at the project’s expense.  Past funding for Metrolinx projects has always been announced as $x-billion plus inflation so that a $16b or $34b “commitment” may actually be much larger in as-spent dollars.

A further wrinkle is the use of private sector financing, construction and operation through “AFP” (Alternate Finance and Procurement), a methodology now in favour both in Ottawa and at Queen’s Park.  In this scheme, part of the capital cost of a project is assumed by a private partner, and this can reduce the capital outlay required during construction by the public sector.  However, that money has to be paid someday, and the payments show up on the operating budgets through mechanisms such as leases and revenue guarantees.  That will be a future call on the new revenue streams, and it must be built into the long range Investment Strategy.

Finally, some transit costs have been borne through non-Metrolinx budgets including various transfers to municipalities (now mainly the gas tax, although the infrastructure fund may be revived in a future budget) and a clawback to GO transit via a tithe to help pay for its capital program ($20m from Toronto this year).  All of these funding streams need to be sorted out and presented in one place so that a rational view of what is needed going forward is available for everyone to see.

Metrolinx should take greater care with its announcements and fiscal plans so that its credibility is not undermined by simple questions about arithmetic, and so that the funding they seek will actually match the funding they will need.

Toronto seeks the opinion of its residents on the purpose and priorities of a transportation network, and on how we might pay for this in coming years.  The City’s heart is in the right place, but the planned consultation has its problems.

Updated February 3, 2013 at 8:00 am:

Toronto City Planning’s website seeking feedback on priorities and revenue tools has been live for a few days now.  It operates in a somewhat different fashion than I had assumed from the presentation by Jennifer Keesmaat at a recent Planning & Growth Management Committee meeting.

The site allows participants to select among a set of priorities, choose their favourite revenue tools and build a budget showing how each tool would contribute to a $2b/year target.

The priorities are a bit wooly and don’t necessarily reflect the linkage between the options and the type of spending that might occur.  For example, the “affordable” priority is described as relating to the cost of using transit, not to the cost of building it.

On the budgetary side, the potential revenue from various sources is given (this was missing from the PGM presentation), but there is no discussion of the ease with which any of the tools could be implemented nor of issues such as fairness in who would pay the new revenue.  A few examples:

• Congestion charges are aimed at downtown where, ironically, the level of road traffic relative to total travel is very small.
• A payroll tax charges businesses based on the size and cost of their labour force, not on the level of economic activity they represent.
• Charges assigned per unit (e.g. utility levies) fall disproportionately on those with the smallest units and low usage (typically poorer family units).
• Charges related to property value are keyed to notional value (CVA) rather than ability to pay.  Value capture schemes, like CVA, would tax an asset that the owner could not monetize unless the property were sold.  The effect is completely different for residential and commercial uses.

I will examine the various revenue tools in a separate article consolidating the discussion with the recent proposals from the RCCAO (Residential & Commercial Construction Association of Ontario).

Finally, there is no discussion of how the money would be used.  From the Metrolinx “Next Wave” proposal, we know that 25% ($500m/yr) would come to the municipal sector, roads and active transportation options.  This is actually small change beside the ongoing needs for local transportation funding and the backlog of infrastructure repairs.

The consultation does not include any discussion of what, at a local level, the new revenue might fund although this could affect the selection of tools.  Responses do include the selection of where broadly speaking money should go (transit, roads, etc) but with no examples of the implications or needs for each sector.

As I write this, the ranking of responses so far places highway tolls, congestion levies and development charges at the top of the list although even the first ranked gets a score of only 2.46 suggesting that many respondents ranked it in 3rd place or lower.  Some scores are tightly clustered indicating that responses are picking a variety of options.  It is unclear whether the ranking system assigns a value to “not selected” and is assigning scores only to the five items which each participant selected.  No value of “n”, the number of people selecting an item, is given.

How useful this survey will prove in the next stage of the consultation remains to be seen.