Ford’s subway plan involves redirecting Transit City funding to completion of the original Sheppard Subway plan from Downsview to Scarborough Town Centre, and extension of the Danforth subway to STC via the SRT alignment.  The Eglinton line has completely disappeared even though the money scooped to build Sheppard would have paid for the first stages of Eglinton’s construction.

As the Smitherman campaign has already pointed out, $790-million of the provincial $3.7-billion Ford counts on is earmarked for the Viva system in York Region.  (See page 25 of the Metrolinx funding summary.)  It is unclear why Queen’s Park would agree to such a massive shift in transit priorities, effectively turning the clock back to the 1990 transit network announcement rather than building the more extensive network already agreed to.

Notable by its absence from the Ford plan is any rapid transit service to northeastern Scarborough, the UTSC Campus or anywhere in Etobicoke, Ford’s home turf.  Presumably everyone west of the Humber river won’t need transit.  Nothing about downtown or the waterfront.  Nothing about addressing priority neighbourhoods.  Nothing about regional integration.

That SRT conversion has appeared in other candidates’ platforms, and it suffers from problems with assumptions about recycling the existing infrastructure and route.  Kennedy Station faces east, and an alignment up the SRT corridor would require a new subway station.  Although the Transit City LRT lines will result in construction at Kennedy, they wrap new LRT platforms around the existing structure while leaving the subway itself intact.  Further north on the SRT there are narrow sections, a tight curve at Ellesmere, and stations that were not designed for full subway service.

Yes, this could all be rebuilt, but the line would never go further because the cost versus demand numbers simply wouldn’t work out.  That’s the whole reason for using LRT, but Ford’s folks don’t seem to understand this.

Ford really doesn’t like streetcars in any form, and trots out the expected complaints about how construction fouls up businesses, how streetcars delay traffic and thereby create more pollution.  Indeed, he would shut down our streetcar network and sell our new cars elsewhere to recoup whatever money could be had.  The platform material says Ford would remove “some streetcars”, but according to a media source, Ford wants to get rid of all streetcars in 10 years.

Oddly enough, they would be replaced by even more buses that would sit in the same traffic jams behind delivery trucks, illegally parked cars, taxis, J-walking pedestrians, and a whole range of problems common to congested 4-lane roads that cannot simultaneously be speedy arterials and local streets.  Buses pulling into stops on narrow streets with parking regularly block through traffic because they can’t properly reach the curb.  Bus bays are not an option because there are usually buildings right at the sidewalk.

The larger omission from Ford’s plan is any discussion of fares, service quality or what transit should be as part of the city’s fabric.  He condemns much of the city to buses running in mixed traffic, and says nothing about how he would address the $70-million in additional funding just needed to operate the TTC in 2011.  Will he raise fares?  Will he cut service?  How much filthier will stations and vehicles get?  Will escalators and elevators stop, never to run again?  Will he simply starve the TTC and place the blame for whatever happens on their inability to make hard choices?

Ford’s financing plans simply don’t add up, nor do his construction schedules.  He claims that the Sheppard and BD extensions could be completed by 2015.  That’s a real stretch considering that we have not even been through a project assessment and approval, detailed design and tendering.  The SRT is 6.4km long, the Sheppard West connection is about 4km, and the Sheppard East extension would be about 7.5km from Don Mills to McCowan.  The total is 17.9km.

The Spadina extension to Vaughan is only 8.6km, has fewer stations, and will cost $2.6-billion including inflation.  This brings the pricetag of Ford’s subways to somewhere over $5-billion, not the $4-billion he claims, and assumes we could build them in the same timeframe, with the same inflation factors, as Spadina.  That’s simply not realistic.

Ford also hopes for $1-billion in private sector contributions through development fees.  As we have seen in many locations — the Bloor-Danforth subway, the Spadina line — development does not follow immediately after subway construction and may be decades, if ever, in the future.  Indeed, some neighbourhoods won’t take kindly to someone drawing subway lines through them if the tradeoff is the destruction of what’s there today.  There are ways to earmark lands for future higher taxes once a rapid transit line is built, but no guarantee that we will see the money in the short term.

Seeing a platform like this, not to mention similar proposals from other candidates, makes me wonder if anyone has been paying attention to transit history in Toronto and other cities.  We seemed doomed to turn the clock back 25 years, at least, to an era when making life better for cars trumped all other concerns, when a few subway proposals were a substitute for real transit planning.

Updated at 10:00 am, September 7: The section on funding of Transit City lines has been clarified to distinguish between announced and suspected funding strategies.

Updated at 10:40 pm, September 4: A small section has been added near the end about the problem of creative project descriptions and their effect on capital planning.

Politicians love to claim that other people don’t know what they’re talking about.  Even transit commentators and activists like me say this sort of thing, but the pols tend to be more aggressive in their tone as they play for media and public attention.  Reading the source material helps, but it can be a long slog.

As a service to my readers and would-be transit financial analysts, here is a review of how TTC subsidies work.  The primary source material for this article is the draft audited financial statements of the TTC for 2009 which were published in May.  They are “draft” only in that, when published, they had not received formal Commission approval which has subsequently been given.

A journalist whose bluster is greater than his accuracy recently implied that the TTC was hiding its financial results when in fact they have been available for months.  This sort of thing passes for penetrating analysis in some quarters.

Operating Subsidies

The real meat of this report is the long series of footnotes to the financial statements.  On page 16 of the linked report, note 12 discusses operating subsidies.

In 2008 and 2009, a portion of the provincial gas tax was directed to the operating budget ($91.6-million in each year).  For the record, on 2010, all of the gas tax is going to the capital budget.

In 2008, Queen’s Park made a special $100-million contribution over and above the gas tax, but this was not repeated in 2009 nor is any planned for 2010.

The total subsidy paid by the City of Toronto was $196.7m in 2008, rising to $427.8m in 2009.  Note that this includes the full cost of Wheel-Trans which receives no provincial operating subsidy.

Subsidy requirements for 2010 are reported in the Chief General Manager’s Report which I cited in my previous article about fare revenue.  For 2010, the probable subsidy for the regular TTC system will be $411.2m and for Wheel-Trans will be $85.4m giving a total of $496.6m.

Some TTC critics claim that costs are rising uncontrollably, but they don’t look at the breakdowns or the change in the accounting or subsidy rates for provincial contributions.  Also, critics compare only the rise in subsidy dollars, not the overall budget.

Total TTC costs rose from $1,289m in 2008 to $1,415m in 2009, an increase of 9.8% (see expense summary on page 5 of the financial statements).  However, the percentage changes were different for each component of the total.  For example, wages and benefits went up 7.7% reflecting both the arbitration-imposed 3% contract award, plus overall increase in the amount of service operated.

Total vehicle kilometres operated (see TTC operating statistics summary) rose by 5% in 2009, but most of this was on the bus network where mileage rose by almost 8.3%.  However, some costs are not affected by changes in ridership or mileage, at least not at the comparatively small scale of year-to-year deltas, because they are more closely related to the overall size of the system.

Note 12 continues with a reconciliation of the subsidy as seen by the TTC (first line of table on page 17) and by the City.  This shows the effect of deferred subsidy payments that I discussed in my previous article.

Capital Subsidies

Overview

Capital projects are subsidized from a bewildering array of sources.  There is much chest-beating by politicians at all levels about how much they pay, but attention to details is important.  Note 13 contains these details, and note 14 summarizes the state of various City reserve accounts.

(For another view of the TTC capital budget, see the TTC report from September 2009 in which the 2010 budget was introduced.  Some of the information in this report is now out of date.)

In the budget context, although the TTC and City have multi-year capital projections, they agonize each year over current numbers.  Promises from Queen’s Park and Ottawa to fund future vehicle replacements and system expansion are welcome, but they don’t pay the bills in the current year.  Indeed, some projects already committed by the TTC such as new subway cars, streetcars and maintenance yards, are not funded to the degree hoped in original TTC projections.  This shortfall threatens to drive up City funding costs in coming years and/or to crowd out other projects.

In 2009, the TTC’s capital requirements were $742-million, up from $638-million in 2008.  Toronto is on the leading edge of a steep rise in yearly capital spending as many new projects kick in after a long dry spell.  Year-to-year comparisons in spending are meaningless without knowing the detailed lists of funded projects or where they are in their life cycles (design, construction, commissioning, close-out).  Indeed, part of the dance involved in fine-tuning the capital budget includes shifting projects so that their peak spending periods to not co-incide.  Because much has been deferred, and the system is now in a period of growth, this fine-tuning has become difficult.

In 2009, the proportion of capital subsidy received from various sources was 32% City of Toronto, 26% Queen’s Park, 28% Ottawa, and 1% other (mainly Waterfront Toronto).  A further 13% comes from the Spadina extension project which is administered by the City as banker, but funded jointly by Ottawa, Queen’s Park, Toronto and York Region (the details are not broken out in the statements).

Provincial and Federal Subsidy Programs

Ontario funds vehicles through separate programs.  Originally, the Ontario Bus Replacement Program (OBRP) contributed substantially in 2008, and to a lesser extent in 2009.  This program was cancelled in the March 2010 budget.  Queen’s Park now plans to fund bus purchases on a life-cycle basis with the City carrying the purchase cost as debt, and the Province reimbursing the City with capital subsidies against that debt (and interest).  Although in the short term this pushes some payments out to future years for Queen’s Park, in the long term when all buses are funded this way, the effect will be to flatten out the Provincial cash flow and lessen the effect of bulges in the size of bus orders from year to year.

Another vehicle fund was set up as a reserve from a one-time payment from Queen’s Park in 2007.  This $150m reserve had, by the end of 2009, been drawn to the amount of $127.8m.  At the current rate, it will be exhausted in 2010 or 2011 at the latest.  This fund was intended to deal with Toronto-specific funding needs (subway cars), although it does not address long-term funding for the Toronto Rockets including the add-on order which will replace the H-6 subway fleet.

The Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund provides money from Ottawa and from Queen’s Park (the City is also required to pay a matching 1/3 for CSIF projects).  Part of this was intended to pay for a GTA farecard (“Presto”, a topic of discussion elsewhere), and this amount is still on hold.  Queen’s Park discharged its obligations under CSIF in 2007 by paying $275.6m to the City of Toronto where the funds are in a reserve account.  Of this, $219.2m has already been spent, and this reserve will probably run dry in 2011.  The federal portion of CSIF funding is claimed from Ottawa.  This program will end in 2012.

Provincial Gas Tax generated $164.1m in 2009, of which over half went to the operating budget.  In 2010, all of the gas tax revenue is applied to capital.

Federal Gas Tax generated $162.9m in 2009, and all of this goes to capital.

The Transit Technology Infrastructure Program is another closed funding channel.  In 2007, Queen’s Park paid the City $31.1m and most of this had been spent by the end of 2009.

In 2006, Ottawa announced the Public Transit Capital Trust of which Toronto’s share was $222.6m.  This was paid into a City reserve fund to cover various capital projects, and the reserve is now exhausted.

Also in 2006, Ottawa announced the Transit Secure program from which Toronto received $8.8m.  About 2/3 of this has been spent.

The Federal Infrastructure Stimulus has generated $60.4m in funding for Toronto.  Most of this will be spent in 2010 and early 2011.

Finally, Queen’s Park has agreed to pay 1/3 of the cost of the new streetcars for the “legacy” network.  Although this is a large contract, the spending in 2009 was small, and the provincial share was only $11.7m.

What is striking about this long list is that:

• Only the gas tax from Ottawa and Queen’s Park are ongoing programs.  There is no guarantee of the bus funding scheme remaining as a long term commitment for future purchases.  Funding for rail vehicles is uncertain, and tends to occur on a project basis rather than as an ongoing revenue stream.
• Many subsidy programs are closed, and funds in many reserve accounts will be exhausted over the next few years.  Indeed, Queen’s Park paid its way out of programs a few years ago (when they had surpluses to burn up), and as a result there is no base budget line at the Provincial level on which to build.

Update added at 10:40 pm September 4:

A side-effect of the various subsidy arrangements is that the TTC has, on occasion, attempted to turn routine maintenance into a special project to attract separate funding.  The Yonge Subway Capacity Improvement project consists of the resignalling of the YUS with a new system capable of automatic train control.  The claim is that this will allow for closer headways and greater capacity.  (The signalling replacement is overdue with the original equipment dating from the early 1950s.)

This is true to a point, but it ignores the fact that if trains will run at shorter headways, the number of trains will rise.  This could be offset by a move to “high rate” operation with faster acceleration and better performance on hills, but I doubt this will completely offset the requirement for more trains.

The TTC has no budget plans for more trains nor for the carhouse needed to store them, although this might be buried in the Richmond Hill subway extension budget.

It is imperative that the full cost of projects and claimed benefits be understood so that “surprise” subsidy requirements don’t elbow aside planned improvements.

The Role of Metrolinx

Through Metrolinx, Queen’s Park has funded some transit projects, although not at the level originally expected.  Broadly speaking, the funding falls into two blocks.

• The “Quick Wins” program was intended for projects that could get underway without long planning lead times.  The lion’s share of the $452.5-million funding is reserved for the Yonge Subway Capacity Improvement project (that is to say, the new signal system) in the amount of $386m.  A good deal of this will not be spent until 2010 and future years.
• The “Transit City” projects have gone through changes over the past year, but in brief their funding status is:
  • Sheppard:  Funded roughly 2/3 by Ontario, 1/3 by Ottawa
  • Eglinton:  Funded 100% by Ontario
  • SRT replacement and extension to Sheppard:  Funded 100% by Ontario (*)
  • Finch West from Spadina subway to Humber College:  Funded 100% by Ontario (*)
  • Vehicles for Transit City Lines:  Included in funding for their respective projects.
  • (*) These projects are in the latter years of “Phase I” of the Metrolinx “5-in-10″ program.  They are announced as being funded by Ontario, although I would not be surprised to see the first monies from the Investment Strategy used to pay for them.  Queen’s Park needs to make a definitive statement in that regard so that we do not find future spending constrained by further cutbacks in announced funding from general revenue.

It is Ontario’s intent that the Metrolinx projects will be owned by that provincial agency, not by the local transit system.  Operation will likely fall to the TTC, but the infrastructure and vehicles will be owned by Queen’s Park.  This allows the Province to show a capital asset on its books balancing the debt incurred to build the projects.

At some point, a book transfer will be needed to shift Transit City assets that might be sitting on the TTC or City books to Metrolinx.  From that point onward, any revenues and expenses on the capital accounts would not include provincially owned assets.  As this is now handled by the City/TTC on a pass through basis, there should be no net outlay related to this transfer.

What will remain, however, is the large number of capital projects for which there is no dedicated provincial funding.

The Provincial “solution” to everything will be the Metrolinx investment strategy, but at this point we have no idea of what this will actually be, how soon money will flow from it and what level of funding will be available.  Metrolinx’ “Big Move” raised a lot of expectations, and their network plans must compete for funding with many local transit system needs for which the gas tax does not begin to cover the cost.

Politicians now or recently at Queen’s Park would do well to recognize how deep the hole in transit funding really is.  It’s easy to say that Toronto isn’t minding its business properly, but that’s hard to credit from a government that raised its own expectations for better transit service without a solid funding plan.  Provincial contributions to transit have been falling, not rising, except for project-specific announcements that depend on the whims of the current government and the state of the provincial budget.

A Few Parting Words

If you are still reading, congratulations.  Transit funding is a big shell game where funding partners like us to think they are generosity itself.  That generosity is selective.  It is announced, and re-announced to anyone who will listen, without regard for the larger picture.

Meanwhile, funding for the basics, for keeping the system in good repair, is far below the level needed and this creates pressure for the City’s capital planning.  Much needed capital works are simply ignored, pushed off into future years when more funding might be available.

This is not a sustainable future for transit capital spending.

Anna Mehler Paperny of the Globe and Mail writes about the difficulties of getting around on a bus network where service leaves much to be desired.

The better way? Don’t get Janet Fitzimmons started.

The East Scarborough resident lives less than five kilometres from her work in the Kingston Road-Galloway Road area. But the bus ride takes a good 40 minutes – once the Lawrence Avenue bus comes, if it isn’t full. If the weather’s nice, her commute is faster by foot.

“But I’m lucky: I’m able-bodied and healthy.” And, she adds, “my commute isn’t bad for Scarborough.” A colleague of hers takes three buses to traverse what’s barely a seven-kilometre direct trek.

Meanwhile, Tyler Hamilton of The Star tells of the travails of attempting to use service on Kingston Road in The Beach.

Last Tuesday I needed to head downtown – Bay St. and King St. – for an event. [...] It was rush hour. I seemed to have plenty of time, so I decided to take the 503 Kingston Rd. streetcar route. Checked the schedule. Walked to my stop and arrived what I thought was 10 minutes early.

No streetcar. Twenty minutes later, no streetcar.

This is rush hour, remember. Finally a bus that would take me along Queen St. arrived and the driver encouraged me to get on. “The 503 won’t be coming. Take Queen St.,” he says. “It will get you close. Hop on.”

I hop on. A man sitting across from me leans over and says, “TTC, eh… it means take the car.” I offer a forced chuckle. The bus drives along Kingston Rd. for five minutes and then reaches Queen St. “Time to get off,” the driver says. Huh? I join a herd of passengers exiting the bus. Apparently I should have known about transferring onto a Queen St. streetcar.

Confused, I wait. I wait. I don’t see a streetcar. I see a cab. Hail it. It will be worth the $20 at this point – enough money, mind you, to drive half a month in my Honda Civic.

I share my frustration with the cab driver. “The TTC is good for the cab business,” he replies with a smile.

Of course, a regular rider would know that there is no such thing as a 503 car, at least not until September 7 when streetcar service returns to Kingston Road.  The scheduled bus service is every 12 minutes on the 502 and 503 providing a supposedly blended 6 minute headway.  Take the first thing that comes along if you’re going downtown.  If it’s a 502, change to the King car at Broadview if you want King rather than Queen Street.  This is the sort of survival tip a regular will know, but a novice won’t.

By the way, the streetcar services will run every 15 minutes, with an allegedly combined service of 7’30″.  Don’t hold your breath.  A big problem with both of these routes is that they are short-turned and wind up missing the very customers they are intended to serve.

Add to this the appalling off-peak service and you have a recipe for driving away customers.  The 502 bus or streetcar is scheduled every 20 minutes, but only a few days ago I waited 36 minutes for one to show up.  I had not just missed one, and so the gap was easily over 40 minutes.  By the time we reached Queen Street westbound, we had a light standing load even on that wide headway, and we had also passed two eastbound 502s.  That’s right:  3 of the 4 buses on the route were east of Coxwell.  This is called “line management”.

The real irony is that the 12 Kingston Road bus comes and goes at Bingham Loop every 10 minutes.  There is better service east of Victoria Park than west of it on weekdays.  Evening and weekend service on the 22A Coxwell is better than on the 502.  This is one of the few places in the TTC where weekday service is worse than at any other time, and that’s assuming the weekday service is vaguely on schedule.

An important part of improving bus services generally is that the TTC must stop thinking of the outer parts of lines as places where short turns and unpredictable, infrequent service are acceptable.

Original Article from September 2 at 12:26 pm:

Two interviews on today’s Metro Morning discussed the question of transit for “service workers” and for suburban travellers in general.  The jumping off point for this was a new research paper from the Martin Prosperity Institute and the Cities Centre at UofT: “The Geography of Toronto’s Service Class and What It Means For the City of Toronto”.

The Institute uses a breakdown of jobs into three broad classes (I make no apologies for the political correctness, or not, of these terms, nor for the makeup of each group):

• The “creative class” includes managers, professionals (doctors, teachers) and computer programmers.
• The “service class” includes many job types whose principal characteristic is that they have less scope for independent action (cashiers, food preparers, administrative assistants).
• The “working class” includes those jobs which build things (manufacturing and construction) as well as truckers who move equipment and goods around in support of this class.

This breakdown is plotted by census tract to show the concentration of jobs by place of work (not by residence) for each class and to map this against the location of the transit system’s core routes (the subways).  Although GO is not mentioned, it principally serves Union Station which is already within “subway” territory.

The report argues that more could be done to improve transit with better bus services as these could easily be implemented and would cover a much broader territory.  However, the report is silent on the subject of travel patterns and of demand for cross-boundary 905-416 trips.

Without question, better bus service would improve the lot of suburban riders.  Indeed, the TTC Transit City Bus Plan intends to do just that, but City Council refused to approve implementation of this plan due to budget constraints.  The plan isn’t perfect, but it is a starting point for discussions about how the surface network can be improved.  If this doesn’t show up as part of the 2011 TTC budget materials, at least as a proposal, I will be very disappointed.

In some quarters, advocacy of buses (like advocacy of subways) is treated as an either-or debate relative to LRT.  This is a fundamental flaw.  The question for any debate turns on projected demand, road capacity, operational constraints and financial viability.

Many corridors will never have sufficient demand to justify LRT, but they could support intensive bus service.  Is the real debate one of giving up road space for LRT?  Bus services running in mixed traffic have their problems, and BRT could address these, but at a substantial cost in lost road space.  So-called “BRT Lite” is a sham involving mixed traffic operation with selected use of queue jump or reserved lanes where they can be fitted in without upsetting motorists too much.

If we are going to give over road space to transit, then the questions become which mode is appropriate for the route and whether specific technologies impose constraints or provide unique options.  An example of the latter is LRT’s ability to operate underground and in trains.  Many transit studies have been compromised by looking at all modes for an identical alignment and implementation.  This effectively rules out options that could not reasonably be built with one of the modes and limits the alternatives under discussion.

I welcome the report’s focus on the capabilities of surface transit, but warn readers, especially those who would use the conclusions to downplay LRT alternatives, that the real issue here is the lack of transit to large sections of the 416 (not to mention the 905) and its implications for people working in jobs that are located in poorly-served areas.

TTC subsidies are a branch of higher mathematics.  Indeed, there are many philosophical discussions about them and competing claims for which governments pay more, or less, or nothing at all.  This article is intended to present the information in one convenient place.

You will have to take it on faith that I have not garbled the information here, and you really don’t want the underlying spreadsheet, trust me.  It took hours to get all of the year-to-year information to balance.  That’s my problem, not yours.

Everyone loves pictures, and so we begin with a set of charts.  You may want to open these concurrently with the discussion so that you can follow along.

2000-2009 Operating & Capital Subsidy Summaries

In each of these charts I have used colours appropriate to the political stripe of the source for funds.  Toronto is environmentally green, Ontario is Liberal Red, Ottawa is Tory Blue, and the small contribution from others (mainly Waterfront Toronto and York Region) is gray.  Gas tax subsidies are shown separately to identify this ongoing program by contrast with one-time, project-oriented funding.

Operating Subsidies

This is the simplest of the charts, and it tracks the gradual rise in operating subsidies paid to the TTC, most of which is borne by the City of Toronto.  For 2010, the bar will be higher, and will be entirely green.  The sections in red are one-time Ontario contributions to the operating budget.  Those in pink are the gas tax revenue diverted to operations from capital.  This practice ended in 2009.

Note that this subsidy includes the cost of Wheel-Trans which receives no special subsidy from Queen’s Park.  By 2009, this amounted to $77-million.

Looking at this chart, it is important to remember that this is the subsidy, not the total budget, and the percentage change in the budget is different from the change in the subsidy depending on the relative contribution of fares in each year.

Capital Subsidies (As Spent)

The Capital Subsidy chart shows current year spending for capital projects in each year.  As we will see below, this is completely different from payments received from Queen’s Park and Ottawa.

In the early years, the City capital spending is high because the last stage of the Sheppard Subway project was paid for with City funds.

Federal and Provincial contributions kick in starting in 2002.  As we will see on the next chart, much of this was in the form of announcements, and the money did not actually flow for a few years until the agreements were signed.  The City carried these costs on its books and eventually was reimbursed.  I have allocated the moneys to the years in which they were spent, not to when they were received, to give a proper historical view.

In 2005, gas taxes came into play.  There was a base allocation, and in 2005, a special allocation from Ottawa.  The amounts settle down in 2006-2009 (note that Federal contribution outweighs the Provincial one in 2009 because some Ontario money goes to the Operating budget).

What is important in this chart is that the gas taxes come nowhere near the level needed to fund TTC capital spending at a time when the big-ticket projects are only in the early stages.  Any move to shift the funding source away from general revenue or reserves to the gas tax will require a large increase in that tax.

A note about the Spadina Subway extension:  This project is managed by the TTC and funded by four governments.  The proportions of the funding are (roughly):

• 20% City of Toronto
• 13% York Region
• 40% Ontario
• 27% Ottawa

Ontario’s contribution as well as $75-million from Ottawa sits in a reserve called the “Move Ontario Trust” which is administered by the Province.  The total project revenue includes an estimated $189.1-million in interest earnings on this fund, and I have pro-rated the interest to the two governments.

For 2008 and 2009, spending on the Spadina project has been credited to each of the four governments in proportion to their share of the entire project.  Whether this is how they actually paid, I don’t know as the financial statements treat the project as a single expense. Total spending on Spadina for the two years was only $107.5m as the project did not enter its main construction phase until 2010.

Capital Subsidies (As Received)

The Capital Payments chart shows a very different picture from the “as spent” chart.  The amounts for the City of Toronto and for “Other” are identical because these are both “pay as you play” contributions.  However, from 2001 to 2006, governments promised more than they delivered because the paperwork took precedence.

In 2007, Ontario made settlement payments to the City for many of its then-outstanding subsidy programs.  This included payments for costs incurred in previous years.

Also in 2007, Ottawa made a large contribution via the “Public Transit Capital Trust”.

Both the Ontario and Ottawa funds have earned interest while the reserves created with them were spent.  By the end of 2009, the Ottawa funding was exhausted, and much of the Ontario funding was spent or earmarked for the near future.

In 2008, Ontario made a large contribution under the MoveOntario2020 program that pays a bit toward the Transit City projects, but mainly is intended for the Yonge Subway signal project.  Much of this was unspent at yearend 2009, and it is unclear how the accounting will be handled in future years now that Transit City projects are to be owned by the Province.

The two large red bars for 2007-8 on the “as received” chart show how Ontario shovelled money to transit projects and reserves when they had cash to spare, but not as an organized, predictable funding source.  By 2009, Provincial spending consisted almost entirely of Gas Tax revenue.

With the move to Ontario ownership of the Transit City lines, it will become more difficult to track all of the funding because payments will not show up on the TTC accounts.  For example, Ottawa is paying 1/3 of the Sheppard East LRT, but this transaction is entirely at a Provincial level.  TTC work on the project will be billed to Metrolinx, but this will not represent the full cost.  For this we will have to depend on the openness, such as it might be, of the Metrolinx financial statements.

Receivables and Reserves

The final chart shows the buildup of subsidies that had been booked by the TTC but not paid by Ontario and Ottawa up to 2006.

In 2007 and 2008, large payments by both governments established reserves against which the TTC will draw.

Note that this does not include the Spadina Subway extension funds because these are held by the Province, not by the City.  Moreover, any funding promises that are not accompanied by actual cash are omitted as they do not form part of the TTC’s financial statements.  In any event, such promises represent future spending and would have no effect on the proportions or amounts in past years.

The TTC publishes a statement, as part of the Chief General Manager’s more-or-less monthly report, showing a breakdown of revenues and costs.  The report linked here takes us to the end of May 2010.  (There are separate accounts for Wheel-Trans which is not part of this discussion.)

There are three sets of figures:  data for the current 5-week period (this interval is used to avoid variations due to lengths of months), year-to-date data, and full-year data.  These are further subdivided by actual and budget values.

On the income side, the total 2010 revenue is projected at $957.515-million against expenses of $1,412.034-million.  However, within the revenue, only $905.200m comes from the farebox, while $52.315m comes from other sources.  Charters and services operated under contract for transit systems in the 905 are on at least a break-even basis.  Although the expense of running them appears as part of the system’s total, this expense is completely offset by revenue (projected at $17.675m for 2010).

On the expense side, the total cost for subsidy purposes is reduced by two deferred items:  post-retirement expenses and accident claims.  These do not require cash outlays in the current year because they not be paid until future years.  This gets us to a net cost for operations of $1,368.684m and a projected shortfall of $411.169m.

The City has actually budgeted for a shortfall of $429.805m, but the TTC’s ridership and fare revenue held up better than expected in 2010, and the City’s full subsidy provision will not be required.  Any leftovers remain under the City’s control for year-end budgetary adjustments.

The deferred costs noted above are an accounting mechanism first introduced in 2006 for post-retirement benefits, and in 2009 for accident claims to ensure that the City transfers to the TTC only the cash that it actually needs to pay for current expenses.  Previously, deferred costs were included in the subsidy payment for the year they were accrued by the TTC.

This change reduces the City’s cash outlay in the short term, but creates a long-term payable for the City that will come due as and when the deferred costs must actually be paid.  The City hopes, of course, that the actual expense will be lower than projected and that they will pay in future, inflated dollars.

In future years, from the City’s point of view, there will be TTC-related cash outlays that are not part of the current TTC budget, but leftovers from previous deferrals.  Any discussion of a “rider’s fair share” must first determine whether the current TTC budget base will be used or the City’s version including the deferrals.  At some point, the deferred costs will start to come due, and this will offset cashflow savings from new deferrals in the current year.  Meanwhile, the accountants will have lots to mull over, and the politicians will be even more confused about TTC budgets than ever.

Using the full $1,412m projected TTC expenses for 2010, the breakdown of the cost shares is:

• Fares: 64.1%
• Contract services and charters:  1.3%
• Advertising:  1.1%
• Rent:  0.7%
• Commuter Parking:  0.6%
• Other Income:  .1%
  • Subtotal:  67.8%
  • Subsidy:  29.1%
  • Deferred:  3.1%

We hear a lot about getting the rider’s share down to 2/3 of the TTC costs, but this has already happened and, in fact, there has been a slight overshoot — riders now pay only 64.1% of total costs.  Meanwhile, the subsidy (current and deferred) is 32.2% coming, in 2010, entirely from the City.

A higher rider share has been suggested in some quarters, but the first question is “a higher share of what”.  Should riders contribute to the cost of contract services and parking lots, both of which have their own revenue sources?

If riders were expected to pay 75% of the total current expenses, this would require that fare revenue go up from 64.1% by 17%.  Miscellaneous revenue would bring in 3.7% leaving only 21.3% of the system’s costs to be recovered from subsidies.  This would take us back, more or less, to the Harris era of transit funding cutbacks.

A further complication with deferred expenses relates to pensions.  Like many organizations, the TTC’s pension liability is not “fully funded”.  This means that if the TTC were to go out of business tomorrow, there would not be enough money in the pot to pay out all existing pension claims.  However, the TTC argues that as a public entity, it is not going out of business, and should not be required to maintain a huge reserve to fully fund costs that would be paid out in future decades.  This matter is still under negotiation with the Ontario government.

If the ruling goes against the TTC, a very large infusion of cash from fares and/or subsidies will be required over coming years fully fund the pensions, but this will contribute nothing to service.  This liability would also apply to any agency that took over the TTC unless it was left behind as a “stranded debt”.

Vital in any of these discussions is the question of how big the TTC operating budget should be.  In many years past, growth in the dollar total was constrained to match available subsidies while keeping the percentages more-or-less at the target level.  This preserved the political fiction of good support for transit.  Service declines were obvious, but maintenance less so, at least in the short term.

The first question to answer is this:  what type and quality of service should the transit system provide?  What should transit look like?  We may not be able to reach that target in one budget year, but at least we would know how severe the shortfall is, and what tradeoffs are required.  Are we serious about providing greater mobility by transit?

Total system costs are affected by many pressures:

• Increases in the scale of operations.  More riders and service generate a requirement for more subsidy unless all new riders can be carried at zero marginal cost relative to the revenue they generate.
• Implementation of major new system components.
  • Opening the Spadina subway extension will add at least $10-million to TTC costs net of benefits to revenue.  At least in the short term, the majority of subway riders will simply shift from existing bus services, but they will receive a higher service quality for the same fare.
  • It is likely that the marginal costs for Transit City lines will be higher than current bus costs, if only because a superior service will be delivered both in capacity and frequency.  Metrolinx may pick up the tab, but this is not yet certain, and this only moves the cost from one pocket to another.
• Increase in materials costs, notably fuel and energy.  These factors go up (and sometimes down) beyond the TTC’s control.
• Increase in labour and benefit costs.
  • The last round of labour increases was imposed on the TTC by arbitration at 3% annually.
  • Some costs are driven up by changes in labour standards such as the maximum length of a work day.
  • Benefit costs are affected both by the terms of labour agreements, and by changes in costs from benefit providers.
  • It is possible that proposed legislation at Queen’s Park will freeze public sector wages for a few years, but this will not last forever.

Stirring all of this into a pot suggests that keeping the growth in TTC budgets to strictly inflationary levels will be difficult, let alone doing so while continuing to expand the system and provide improved service.

I have deliberately left out various forms of privatization.  Even assuming there would be a saving, that is only a short-term benefit.  Future transit costs will rise, just starting from a lower base, and we will have the same debate about fares and goals for transit service all over again.  It is important that we know what those goals are.  I’m not saying we should ignore the privatization debate, but we need to know whether the purpose is to reduce subsidy costs, temporarily freeze fares, or provide equivalent or better service for the same outlay.

Many groups call for fare concessions.  Just this year, student fares have been extended to adults although many are excluded because they are in short-term or non-degree programs.  Mayoral candidate George Smitherman proposes free travel for seniors between 1000 and 1400.  Some groups call for reduced fares for those receiving social assistance.  Some advocate a move to fare-by-distance or fare-by-time, as well as integration or co-fare arrangements with neighbouring transit systems.  At the most extreme, some even call for free transit.

Fares will almost certainly rise, and this should happen on a regular basis, not every two or three years when budgetary crises force the issue.  Creating a new concession fare will isolate some riders from the effect, for a time, but a lowered fare is not a frozen one.

All of these proposals deserve debate so that we can understand the benefits, costs, and relative merits compared with other service-related changes.

In the next article, I will turn to the mysteries of TTC subsidies and the competing claims about how the TTC is funded by various governments.

This is one of the older style of maps, back when the TTC actually put connecting surface routes on them.  If you look closely, you will see that Spadina south of Bloor is served by route 77.  The date on the map is “03/96″.

The “You Are Here” pointer gives away the location — the Walmer Road exit from Spadina Station.  This was built as part of the reconfiguration of Spadina Station to accommodate the LRT line.  Oddly enough, the route map right beside it is recent enough to include the Spadina car.

Another version of this legacy map at the bottom of the stairs from the west side of Spadina has been replaced with the new version.

Elsewhere in Spadina Station, a poster still advertises the August subway diversions for construction at St. George.

On Roncesvalles, the excavation and track installation continues south toward Howard Park.  Construction south of Howard Park has reached Constance Ave., two blocks away from the junction with the 506 Carlton route, and track is in place to Grenadier.  At this rate, all track will be finished north and south of the intersection by mid-September.  No date for the intersection reconstruction has been announced yet.

Looking south on Roncesvalles at Dundas.

Looking northwest on Dundas to Roncesvalles.

Severe traffic congestion and transit delays occur eastbound on Howard Park because the traffic signals have not been re-timed to reflect this street’s temporary role as a major route through the area.  In particular, only a small amount of time is available for left turns east to north at Dundas even though the normal through flow on Dundas is cut off by the construction.  This is an example of a lack of attention to details in the management of construction diversions that makes the effect worse than might otherwise occur.

Meanwhile on Parliament Street, track construction occupies the stretch from Shuter north to Dundas Street.  This will continue to September 3, and work will then shift to the King & Parliament area.  Parliament will be completed south to King Street over the Labour Day weekend, and in following weeks, King (including the special work at Parliament) will be rebuilt from Power (east of Parliament) to Berkeley (the curve west of Parliament).  Streetcar service on King will divert bothways via Church and Queen.

The TTC’s website contains two pages detailing this project, one on their “Construction” sub-site, and one under “Diversions”.  This is an example of a structural problem with the site where overlapping and conflicting information appears under two separate branches.

Updated August 23, 2010: Work starts today on reconstruction of the section of Roncesvalles south from Dundas to Howard Park.  Work begins at the Dundas & Roncesvalles intersection and will close both streetcar lanes and the southbound traffic lane.  By August 30, the southbound lane will re-open, but traffic will be unable to cross the streetcar tracks to turn east on Dundas.

On September 7, the intersection work will be completed and Dundas Street will re-open.

Construction diversions in effect until September 7:

• The 505 Dundas and 306 Carlton Night services will divert to High Park Loop.
• The 504 King shuttle bus now has a meandering route diverting from Dundas and Bloor west to Parkside, south to Howard Park and east to Dundas (thence via its “regular” diversion down Lansdowne).  Northbound, the buses will turn east on Howard Park from Roncesvalles to Dundas, then northwest to Dundas West Station.
• A separate 505 Dundas shuttle bus will operate between Dundas West and Lansdowne over the same diversion routing southbound as the 504 King shuttle.
• The 313 Jane Night service will follow the same routing as the 504 King Shuttle bus and will loop at Sunnyside Loop.

During track construction on Roncesvalles north of Howard Park, only the northbound road lane will remain open using the same configuration as with the work south of Howard Park.  No date has been announced yet for the reconstruction of the Howard Park & Roncesvalles intersection.

Meanwhile, sidewalk and curb lane reconstruction has started on the west side of Roncesvalles north from Queen.  Work will begin at a later date on the east side.

Updated August 9, 2010: This morning, Roncesvalles was closed northbound at Fermanagh due to partial collapse of the roadway.  Buses were unable to use the street until this was shored up.  The concrete under the road surface is particularly thin at this location, and the soil underneath is sand.  Service resumed about 10:50 am.

Updated August 7, 2010: Photos of Roncesvalles Avenue showing various stages of track construction have been added at the end of this article.  Also added are photos of the reconstruction of the intersection at Queen & Parliament.

Updated July 25, 2010: Construction is proceeding quickly north on Roncesvalles from Marion.  It appears that for this project, track assembly will follow soon behind pouring of the foundation slab in the road.  This allows the foundation to cure even while track is put together, but not yet set in pavement.  Finishing the centre lanes is important so that traffic can shift to them allowing reconstruction and reconfiguration of curb lanes and sidewalks.  The new overhead poles will be installed as part of the sidewalk work because their location will change to suit the new street layout.

Updated July 24, 2010: The overall timelines for the Parliament Street project are:

• Starting July 26:  Construction begins south from Shuter
• July 30 to August 16:  Intersection of Queen & Parliament
• August 20 to 23:  Intersection of Richmond & Parliament
• September 4 to 7:  Intersection of Adelaide & Parliament
• TBA in September:  A 10-day (two weekend) closing for the reconstruction of King & Parliament
• TBA in September:  A 4-day weekend closing of King & Berkeley
• TBA:  Construction north from Shuter to Gerrard, skipping the intersection at Dundas

Details including route diversions are on the project web page.  The work is expected to end in December.

Construction of new track on Roncesvalles is planned to start north of the carhouse exit on Monday, July 12.  This will be built to the “new Roncesvalles” design including sidewalk bump-outs at stops to permit direct boarding of streetcars from the curb.  The work is expected to take until November.

The King shuttle bus will divert southbound via Dundas and Lansdowne to Queen, then operate west to Sunnyside Loop, and east via King to its terminus at Shaw Street.  Westbound/northbound service will run via Roncesvalles where the east curb lane will be kept open for traffic.

No date has been announced yet for track replacement on King between Roncesvalles and Close.  Watermain replacement is now in progress in this part of the street, and the south curb lane east of Roncesvalles is used for track storage.

Photos of Roncesvalles Avenue (August 7, 2010)

The construction on Roncesvalles has proceded very quickly northward, and I hope that this will become an example of the TTC and City doing a project quickly and with minimum disruption (allowing for the fact that the entire road and sidewalks are being replaced).

We have heard far too much about St. Clair, and it’s time we saw a counter-example.  Work began northward from Harvard Ave. (two blocks north of Queen Street) on July 12.  Three weeks later, the excavation is not quite half way to Dundas Street, and track installation is well underway.

Looking south across Howard Park Avenue, we can see the remnants of the intersection with the 506 Carlton route which continues to operate to High Park Loop.  This intersection will be rebuilt, including the west-to-north curve (the survey marks for it are in place already), one of the few remnants of Dundas Carhouse.

Looking south at Grenadier Road.  The rather uneven condition of the pavement is left over from the watermain work done in 2009 which required removal of the streetcar tracks.

Looking north at Westminster Avenue.  This is the north end of the excavation as of August 7, 2010.  Note the depth of the excavation.  As you will see in photos below, a completely new track foundation will be constructed, quite likely much better than what was removed.

Looking south from High Park Boulevard / Fermanagh Avenue.  The 504 King shuttle buses must pick their way carefully between the construction pylons, the excavation, the hydro poles and the existing sidewalk.  This is not a high-speed operation.  Meanwhile, this stretch of the excavation shows the base in various stages of being packed down and levelled in preparation for the concrete slab.

This view looks north to Fermanagh (the previous shot was taken from the pedestrian bridge visible here) again showing the depth of the excavation and the tightness of the single northbound lane.

Looking south toward Garden Avenue.  Here you can see track that has been laid in place but not yet assembled with ties while only a few blocks to the south, construction has progressed to laying the surface concrete slab holding the track.

Looking north across Garden Avenue.  This shows the second layer of concrete that goes from the base slab up to the top of the steel ties.  Future trackwork will only require the removal of the top layer concrete, the one holding the rails, while the tie and foundation structure remain untouched.

Also visible here in the completed track is the rubber sleeve which isolates the track from the ties and the concrete slabs to reduce vibration and to increase roadbed life.  All of the joints between the rails are welded (arc welding to make the track strings visible in the previous photo, thermite welding at the joints between the strings).

Looking south to Pearson Avenue.  The top layer of concrete is in various stages of completion here.

Looking north from Harvard Avenue.  The track structure is finished here, and temporary fill is being poured into the gap between the new and the old parts of the road.  Once the trackwork is complete, the curb lanes and sidewalks will be rebuilt.  This will include the portion of Roncesvalles from Harvard to the North Gate of Roncesvalles Carhouse.

Plans for reconfiguration of The Queensway including the roadway lane rearrangement at Roncesvalles (not the tracks) are on hold.

Photos of Queen & Parliament

This is a complex intersection which is 3/4 of a “grand union” having six of the possible eight curves plus the central diamonds.

Work began on July 26 with excavation of Parliament Street south from Shuter to Queen including the special work on the north side of the intersection.

Each of the eight track sections (four quadrants, two directions each) leading into the intersection was pre-assembled and delivered to the site on a trailer.  These were positioned for pickup by the TTC’s track panel moving system.  This arrangement is much simpler and faster than the older scheme whereby an intersection would be completely put together in a works yard, then disassembled, trucked in pieces to the site, and then re-assembled in the street.

This also allows much of the welding to be done in advance rather than during the street closure as only the joins between sections must be welded on site.

The view above looks north on Parliament to Richmond.

Starting on July 30, the main tracks on Queen Street were removed.  For the next two weeks, all streetcars service on Queen will divert via King and Church.  This view looks west on Queen to Parliament.  And, yes, power has been cut to all of the overhead wiring.

By August 3, the foundation slab has been poured, and much of the intersection has been assembled in the street.  This view looks to the southeast across the work-in-progress.  The yellow tent on the far corner is a combination sunshade and refreshment stand for workers on the very hot days while this work was underway.

This is a closeup view of the track on the north side of the intersection.  The rail with the orange paint is the south-to-west curve.  Note the rubber sleeves around both the rails and specialwork castings.  This isolates the intersection from the street, reduces noise from wheels crossing the diamonds, and makes the concrete last much longer.  An example of this construction technique, completed in 2009, is at Queen & Church.

The sharp-eyed will notice that all six of the facing point switches in the new intersection include provision for electrification.  The TTC has a large number of manual switches at intersections and the gradual electrification of all of them will be useful both to speed operations during diversions and short turns, and to avoid the operators’ need to manually set and reset switches.

Here is another closeup view showing the east-to-north curve crossing the westbound rail.

By August 6, enough of the intersection was in place to pour the track in concrete for the main-line Queen Street trackage.  This will cure over the next week and service should return on Monday, August 16.

With the cooler weather, the tent moved away from the intersection and provided an unusual frame for a view of the new track on Queen east of Parliament.

The function of a Transit Visitor Centre really needs to be understood.  A “museum” and a “visitor centre” are not the same thing.  The recent Customer Service report suggests that the TTC place information kiosks in major subway stations.  Putting info where there are actually people may be a radical concept, but it is clearly the approach needed to make “information” broadly available.  A tourist should not have to travel to Yonge & York Mills for info about how to get around the city.

There is a parallel desire for a “Museum of Toronto”.  While that project, too, may be hobbled by a lack of funding and political interest, that’s the place any exhibits looking at the TTC’s history and role in city development should go.

A major concern with the museum is the availability of space.  However, the proposed design consumes a considerable amount with static vehicle displays (although one of these is used for a theatre) and creates design problems for the new Head Office due to structural loads.  An alternative location was rejected as having insufficient space (not to mention higher cost), but the new design promptly eats up space for vehicles that might otherwise not be needed.

When Council approved exploration of this project, it approved less than $100K to finance the work.  However, the TTC actually spent about four times as much, and is now shuffling money between accounts to cover the shortfall.  This is an example of the kind of budgetary sleight-of-hand that a proposal now before Council seeks to end.

The museum as a project needs to stand on its own merits and be seen in the context of a wider museum of Toronto.  It is unclear why this project should be entirely financed by donations when other City museums receive municipal support.  That’s only a ruse to allow this project to continue without attracting attention to funding needs.

My original post on this issue from August 23 follows the break.

Today there was an extensive, almost too-extensive, presentation on the proposed TTC Visitor Centre to be built as part of the proposed new Head Office space at Yonge & York Mills.  Unfortunately, none of the presentation materials are online.

There is a covering report, but this only takes events up to the point where a non-profit corporation might be established to actually run with this project.  It is noteworth that the date on this report is July 27 although it was on the August 23 agenda.

For the record, I am a member of the “Steering Committee”, a group of people invited to advise on this project.  You can read the full list in the report.

The presentation today given by Lord Cultural Resources included an extensive section on the layout and design of the proposed Visitor Centre.  The Steering Committee has never seen this material, and I was appalled that it was not placed before us, at the very least as a courtesy, before it was shown to the Commission.  Clearly, our input is not particularly valued and this is a TTC project, for all the talk of an arm’s-length museum.

The huge irony here is that the TTC Customer Service Panel also reported today, and communication was a big issue for this panel (I will comment at length on their recommendations separately).  With the Visitor Centre, the TTC shows its true colours once again.

I am deeply concerned that this proposal has been gerrymandered to be a showpiece for the new Head Office, and that it will be swept up in the political wrangling that already besets that project.  This is a scheme that should be held over for the new Council and the new Commission.  In any event, the time required to recruit a board for the museum corporation and raise funding, let alone the construction lead time for the new head office, make this a project for future years.

There is no rush, and the current regime should abandon these plans immediately.

The next time they want a “steering committee”, they might have the courtesy to let the panel do its job.

Please note that some comments submitted to previous articles that dealt with primarily these issues have been moved to this thread.

Fare Media and Payment Systems

The advisory panel’s report begins by noting that the current fare system is “both inconsistent and inconvenient”, but they also observe that “many, if not all, of these issues will disappear when a new payment system is implemented”.  This may be true, but it should be remembered that the biggest problems usually stem from bad policies rather than from technology.

For example, some systems (even the TTC on the 512 St. Clair route) use a time-based fare rather than depending on arcane transfer rules.  If a transfer (which could be either the existing paper form or an electronic equilavent) is valid for two hours, then any consideration about stopovers, doubling back and other no-no’s of the current policy would disappear.  The panel recommends that transfers be simplified so that their validity is easily apparent, but does not explain what scheme might be used to achieve this.

TTC management created a needless crisis during the last fare increase by failing to recognize the problems that token hoarding would create.  Their response that people would just have to pay full cash fare showed a wanton disregard for good customer relations.

Why did they go down this path?  The new Metropasses (complete with new preprinted prices) would not be available until a month after the fare increase was approved.  Therefore no fares could go up until the new media were available.  The idea that Metropass users might get one month at the cheaper rate while token fares went up immediately was not considered, even though there have been staggered increases like this in the past.

There will be at least one more fare increase before the system fully converts to smart card technology where these issues won’t apply, and TTC management need to provide a transition scheme that does not penalize riders for their own poor planning.

The panel recommends that passengers be able to pay with alternate media and give examples such as credit/debit cards.  The larger question of fare policy is not touched.

The Day Pass come in for criticism because of its scratch coating, but with no recommendation about how it would actually work.

TTC “Spaces”, Volunteers and Communities

This is the weakest part of the report, by far.  The advisory panel suggests that communities need to feel ownership of their stations with local artwork, maps with details of local points of interest, and participation in station audits.

One short paragraph is devoted to the issue of maintenance standards for stations, “healthy food options” and water fountains.  The TTC, of course, already has a station cleaning blitz in progress, longer-term plans for additional, sustained maintenance efforts, and reconstruction projects to address the deterioration of station structures and finishes.  The cleaning of trains is not mentioned.

Finally, there are suggestions about embracing the community including “Friends of the TTC” and using interested members of the community as TTC ambassadors.  As someone who has spent decades on transit advocacy, I can only say that the best ad for the TTC is reliable service, politely delivered in vehicles and stations that look as if the system cares about itself.

Responsibilities of the TTC and its Customers

The panel proposes a service charter for TTC staff including 12 separate items, the last of which is actually an expectation that customers will behave appropriately onboard and let the TTC know how it can improve services.  That leaves 11 items actually as TTC goals.

Nothing here is unusual, but also nothing addresses the need to look inward and find those organizational practices that are barriers to good customer service.  TTC staff will smile a lot, and the many goals outlined in previous sections are recognized as an integral part of providing good service.

Customers, on the other hand have no fewer than 26 responsibilities listed, not including the 1 that was included under the staff’s list above.  Right away, this tells me that “blaming the customer” has not vanished from TTC culture.  It has even infected the advisory committee.

Most points address the occupancy of space by riders, and they are all common sense.  Two points talk about food and drink asking riders not to use open containers or cans, nor to eat cooked or prepared foods.  This issue came up years ago when the TTC attempted to ban “food” from the subway only shortly after opening a MacDonalds in Dundas West Station.  Anyone who actually rode the TTC would know that there are many food vendors in the system who sell drinks in tins, and various forms of prepared food.  If the TTC is really serious about banning this sort of item, they should stop trying to make money by leasing space to those who sell them.

Customers are warned not to run for buses or streetcars.  Possibly if service were more reliable, people would not treat every vehicle as if it were the last one of the day.

Far too much of the list assumes that we are all hopeless dolts.  This is rather like putting up a sign over the 401 saying “please don’t speed, and make lane changes with care”.  Just as most drivers play “by the rules”, so most customers, most of the time, are well-behaved.  We do not need a lecture in TTC behaviour, especially one that is over twice the length of the one for the TTC itself.

This entire section is insulting to passengers, and coming at the very end of the advisory committee’s report, shows just how out of touch that committee really is, or how badly their mandate might have been compromised by TTC management’s spin.

Amusingly, the panel hopes to find a way “to encourage … customers to read through and better comply with By-law No. 1.”  They might start by ensuring that all copies of the by-law are current, and that staff are familiar with the contents.  For example, despite two separate web pages on the TTC’s site that clearly state (as does the by-law) that photography for personal use is permitted, TTC staff routinely harass members of the public who try to use cameras on the system.

3.17 No person shall operate any camera, video recording device, movie camera or any similar device for commercial purposes upon the transit system without authorization.

An excellent example of problems with customer service arises when TTC staff (or, worse, supervisors or Special Constables) approach a patron who is taking pictures and, already ignorant of the by-law, start the conversation in an aggressive, negative way saying “You can’t take pictures here”.  Some TTC staff claim that taking photos violates their privacy rights even though there is widespread legal precedent for situations where people appear in photos taken by others as “part of the scenery”.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse for intemperate, hostile behaviour.

By-law No. 1 broadly covers the following areas:

1. Definitions, all 20 of them.  There will be test at the end.
2. Fares.  You have to pay.  You must use fare media as intended.  Did I mention you have to pay?
3. No person shall do just about anything other than ride and behave.  This goes on for 34 paragraphs and many sub-paragraphs.  If you pass the test on definitions, we will move on to this section.
4. Penalties.  You will behave, or you will pay, and we will take away your Metropass even though you already bought it.

Possibly the TTC can install video screens with this information in a scrolling text, or a short instructional video (possibly with John Cleese) explaining how to behave on the TTC.

This report starts out with some good ideas and at least a recognition, if not a focus, that there are severe problems with the organization and with its inability to convey information to customers or to staff.  Internal isolation begets turf wars and “it’s not my job” attitudes that have as much, if not more, to do with managerial inertia and ego than with any bars to improved practices by unionized staff (which is not even an issue for many items).  However, the report peters out into a classic TTC pose of blaming external issues, in this case the very customers for whom service improvements are intended.

Yes, there are stupid, ignorant, boorish customers, but they are far from the majority.  I should not be treated with disrespect or lectured on my behaviour for the sins of others.  Every customer is a unique chance for the TTC to win over and improve its image with a rider, a concept basic to good service.  An organization improves itself, shows it cares, and does not blame its clientele for the stale bread in the window, the unmade bed in the hotel.

In this second part, I will review the three sections dealing with communications:  TTC to customers, customers to TTC and within the TTC itself.

Communicating With Customers

This section includes many recommendations given that the absence of good information flow is a fundamental problem between the TTC and its riders.  Of particular note in this section (pp 19-30) is the random order in which the recommendations are placed.  Some are duplicates, related items are separated from each other, and generally one gets the feeling of some very hasty editing.  The practicality of some proposals has not been thought through.  Coupled with the chaotic editing, this gives the impression that the Advisory Panel fell victim to some of the same “communication” problems that they highlight at the TTC.

First up is a proposal for information kiosks at busy stations where “staff and volunteers” could answer questions and provide basic travelling assistance.  This is a great idea, although the idea of volunteers will guarantee that just when you most need someone, nobody will be available.  Has the transit system come to the point where it needs volunteer help?

In an attempt to get away from the isolating nature of collectors’ booths, the report recommends that the kiosks be open with no glass barrier.  The panel should try hanging out in some of the draftier stations in mid-February or the scorching heat of July to see just how foolish that proposal is.

Screens, signs and wayfinding need many improvements.  Definitely no surprise to anyone who actually rides the system.  The recommendations include a consistent, system-wide wayfinding process, improved signage throughout stations, overrides on platform screens to ensure major announcements get the prominence they deserve, screens at station entrances and collectors’ booths to avoid problems with people entering the subway and then finding it’s not operating.

I was surprised at what the panel missed in this shopping list.  First off, the single biggest problem with platform screens is that there are not enough of them.  When they were installed, they were 1:1 replacements of the old “Metron” text-based signs.  However, for clear visibility on platforms, at least two and possibly three separate screens per platform are needed.  Screens at street level would be nice, but complaints that those in the subway enter, pay, and then get no service ignore the fact that the TTC once issued “subway emergency transfers”.  Of course if the collectors don’t know there is an emergency … well, you can see where that leads.

There is a suggestion that surface routes have a mechanism for notifications of major disruptions including on connecting services.  While technically possible, this could lead to information overload and a “crawl” of text that takes forever to make one cycle through its messages.  What we do not need, but which I wouldn’t be surprised someone in TTC will suggest, is full-size video screens scattered through surface vehicles ostensibly as informative displays but actually filled with advertising.

Operators might deal with a rider whose questions they could not answer with a customer service “contact card”.  The panel seems to miss their own point, articulated elsewhere, that operators have more to do than hand out info, and in any event a contact card may only send a customer to the information line (which is only staffed during business hours).  Operators on the new streetcars will not interact with the passengers, for the most part.

A new display “Bus Full” is proposed for the destination sign to explain to riders why the bus is not stopping for them.  This is a nice touch, but it does not address cases where the real problem is with service bunching and uneven vehicle loads.

“How to use the system” posters are proposed to assist with newcomers, but there is no mention of how many languages this might be done in.  In vehicle ads for the same purpose are also suggested, although the new streetcars will not have any advertising frames.

The report recommends that the vicinity maps, recently updated be reviewed for accuracy and completeness.  I cannot help wondering why the new maps omit locations of special interest to tourists, but tell us where all of the schools are.  Some of the info is just plain wrong having been copied, without real understanding of the neighbourhood, from Google Maps judging by spot comparisons.  This was a good example of the TTC persisting in producing in house a product that should have been contracted to professional map makers who have all of the base data needed for complete and accurate maps.

On the subway, the general route map , which has severe problems with scale in the north-south direction, may be “iconic”, but the report recommends that individual line maps be created such as in other cities.  These could include info about connecting surface routes.  Similar maps are proposed for streetcar routes, although this ignores the fact that streetcars don’t stay on one route from day to day, or even within one day (for example, some 510 Spadina cars at midday were 504 King cars in the AM peak).  Also, as mentioned before, there is no place to put such a map within the new streetcars.

Other recommendations include exhorting customers to not block subway doorways and to respect the priority seating.  This touches on the more general premise that customers are part of the problem.  You can put up all the signs you like, but some people will just get in the way be it those who stand or sit inappropriately, those with backpacks, strollers and shopping carts.  The people who block movement in vehicles like this are not going to react to yet another sign.

Short turns are a perennial complaint, and the panel suggests that operators make ongoing announcements advising that a short turn will occur, why and how soon the next vehicle/train will show up.  This is a nice idea in theory, but in practice, many short turns are ordered only moments before they occur.  The panel suggests that if passengers know why they are being kicked off a bus, streetcar or train, they will understand what is going on better.  No, they will be annoyed that once again they have boarded a vehicle that advertised one destination, but didn’t actually go there.

People always complain about the public address system, but the TTC seems to forget that the “new” system installed in a previous  burst of customer service activity was supposed to fix all of the then-existing problems.  When it works, the system is quite adequate, but a common problem is that the volume is set too low and announcements are inaudible, or that the amplifier in a car or station distorts the signal.  This is a maintenance issue, not a question of a wholesale replacement (again).

A number of proposals touch on information technology (IT) issues.  We have already seen the glacial pace at which the TTC incorporates functionality in its website (they even got an “award of distinction” for it this week!), and there is no reason to believe that the organization will improve in its exploitation of IT generally.  Of equal importance, however, is that old IT maxim “garbage in, garbage out”.  You can have the most elegant systems to convey information to passengers, but if the information is not provided on a timely basis, all of the technology is useless.  It is not uncommon, for example, for major delays not to be announced on weekends via existing channels.  This speaks to a staffing and procedure problem, not one of technology.

Finally, the panel suggests that the TTC conduct a marketing campaign to explain “why they do what they do”.  This relates to a concept, shown in full flower later in the report, that if only customers “understood” the TTC, they would not criticize it.  That is self-serving junk akin to a florist expecting me to buy a wilted bouquet while hearing about the problems of keeping fresh stock.

Customers Communicating With The TTC

The advisory panel suggests regular “town hall” meetings where people could come to learn what’s new at the TTC, and to speak about their concerns.  A useful idea, but one that like so many others will only work if there is ongoing review of complaints, suggestions and management actions to address them.

Several recommendations relate to the complaints process including the difficulty of use for the existing system, the prioritization and routing of comments/complaints, and the lack of thorough tracking and response.

The customer service centre is only open during business hours, a change made several years ago as a money-saving tactic.  The panel notes that Toronto’s 311 service already operates 7×24, the same as the TTC network.  From my own view, TTC information should be provided through the 311 centre, but I understand that such an amalgamation would overload the 311 operators.  This suggests that there is a very large, and probably unmet demand for TTC phone information.

Despite attempts (some more successful than others) to shift requests to other media such as web and text message interfaces, many riders either do not know they exist (despite advertising), cannot use them, or find them difficult.  The TTC has still not advertised the NextBus web interface which is vastly superior to the text message service because one does not need to know a stop’s index number to query service at the location.

TTC Employees

A large group of recommendations involve training proposals for TTC staff.  What is totally missing here is the sense that an organization responsibility exists to provide a supportive workplace.  If operators don’t have access to up-to-date information, if their suggestions go into a black hole, if the best information they can give riders is “I don’t know what’s going on”, then there is a problem that no training exercise can repair.  Indeed “staff development” programs that are out of sync with the day-to-day experience of employees will be mocked and ignored, seen, at best, as a chance for a few paid days without having to drive.

The panel recommends that the Station Collector position be revised so that competencies for it will ensure staffing with strongly customer-focussed staff.  The problem here is that there are few actual qualifications required for admission to this group (compared to drivers), and it is also used as a place for staff who are unable due to short or long term disabilities to drive.  The TTC itself fought against an upgrading of the pay category  for collectors at arbitration (they lost) based on the duties and responsibilities defined for this job.  It is not a place simply to “park” employees.  Moreover, the role of “collector” will in time vanish or be severely curtailed as the system moves to self-service fares with smart cards, and the new Station Agents take on monitoring duties for stations.  Any move to rethink a collector’s role and qualifications needs to occur in the context of future station operating strategies, not the current model.

More front-line supervision is recommended for TTC routes.  Of course, years ago, the magic of IT was going to make the need for on-street monitoring obsolete, but this didn’t actually pan out.  The big problem is finding supervisors who actually understand what they are doing and will actively manage the line.  In that regard, I have yet to see any supervisor with a hand-held display showing the location of vehicles based on GPS data, even though this information is already available.  Supervisors need to manage headways, not just scramble to keep cars on a schedule that is impractical under certain conditions.

Once again we see a recommendation for even more running time.  This has been going on for years, and there are routes and operating periods where the length of terminal layovers is quite substantial.  This is not a catch-all repair.  Indeed, the biggest issue facing the TTC (and its operators’ union) is the development of headway-based rather than schedule-based line management.  This has big implications for how operator shifts would be managed, and yet the provision of regularly spaced service is the single best way to get more even loading and better effective capacity out of the fleet.

Coming in Part III

In the last part of this series (coming later this week), I will turn to issues with Fare Systems, the TTC’s role in the community, and responsibilities for TTC staff and customers.

Much work has been done to restore a safety culture at the TTC, to the point where other important aspects of the operation were eclipsed.

The TTC hasn’t had the best of times.  Although last year’s civic workers strike was not a TTC affair, any municipal strike reminds voters of past job actions by transit workers.  By late 2009. the media were in a feeding frenzy looking for any stories to discredit the Miller/Giambrone administration.  The “sleeping collector” fell right into their laps, and became the lighting rod for a host of complaints about the TTC, its employees and its service.

In March 2010, the TTC created an independent “Customer Service Advisory Panel” to examine a range of issues, and that panel reported yesterday, August 23.  The full report is available online.

Reading through it, I was struck by many quite reasonable items, but also by a sense that parts of the document were an attempt at face saving.  Too many recommendations place the responsibility for change at the front line employee or even at the customer without acknowledging that the best employee cannot do a good job without proper support from the organization.  Management must not regard good service (in many senses of that word) as something they can’t afford.  Departments must not assume that “it’s someone else’s job” to deal with problems, or defend their turf against others while failing to provide good service.

To give TTC management credit, statements by Chief General Manager Gary Webster at the press conference, the Commission meeting and on an interview with CBC Radio were open in accepting the need for organizational change.  Yes, there are some proposals with significant costs attached, but many structural and procedural problems require only the will to change how the TTC does business.

Early in the report, the panel tells us:

[W]e were pleasantly surprised to learn that all of the TTC stakeholders are passionate about their transit system. Everyone, from employees to management to customers, truly wants a TTC of which they can be proud.  [p 2]

This should not be a surprise.  The TTC was once (as they so often told us) the envy of transit systems world-wide, a system of which the city could justifiably be proud.  But that was a long time ago.  Years of mutual back-patting among the TTC brotherhood coupled with declining financial support from governments of all parties were a poisonous combination.

If you’re perfect, it’s hard to admit that some of the lights are burned out, that the stations are getting dirty, that the trains are not maintained to quite the standards of “the old days”.  If you’re perfect, then your customer service must be ideal, a sterling example for others to follow.  Pride in the system was replaced with self-congratulation, with a view bounded by the mirror on the wall.

That desire for pride is worth remembering through the entire process.  We want to believe in the TTC, we want to show our friends (even those who think that the only way to get around is in a car) how good transit can be, we want people to say “have you heard what Toronto is doing”.  We don’t want excuses.

Another surprise for the panel was the rider expectations for TTC frontline staff:

Operators are expected to act as a tour guide, policy enforcer, fare collector, and custodian, while providing information, directions, and special assistance. All of this and much more is expected while, at the same time, they are to operate the vehicle in a safe manner – Paying attention to the road at all times, adhere to the speed limit despite a tight schedule, and practice defensive driving. And, above all, they must ensure that passengers arrive at their final destination safe, and on time. [pp 2-3]

This is a surprise? The next paragraph gives a troubling clue about the underlying thoughts:

[I]t is apparent that customers do not often consider the complexity of the huge system that operates in the background, day in and day out, to keep the TTC running. [p 3]

Yes, the TTC is large and complex, but it is by no means the largest system on the planet.  Many of them recognize the importance of good customer service despite their huge size.  They don’t depend on customers cutting them slack because the transit system is so large.  If anything, a big system should have a benefit of scale, of experience with complexity and change, that a small system might not encounter often.

Unfortunately, all the customers see is that the bus is late, or the operator did not effectively answer their questions. [p 3]

Exactly.  It is the view from the customer that’s important.  A guest in a hotel does not want to hear about the problems of repairing centuries-old plumbing, or of cooking huge dinner banquets, or of co-ordinating the unseen army of staff who keep the place running.  They want a clean, well-maintained room, elevators that work and service that is almost magically there without being asked for.

The report’s 78 recommendations are divided into eight groups.  A review of each of the 78 is not required to establish patterns, to see the underlying philosophy.

A Renewed Focus on Customer Service

This section includes the creation of a “Chief Customer Service Officer” position, a business plan and an advisory group.  Alas, the advisory group is top heavy with management and a few outside customer service specialists.  It “could” include TTC employees and members of the public.

The word “advisory” implies a function that is at least partly at arm’s length.  If the TTC wants an internal co-ordinating committee to track progress on its initiatives, fine, but don’t call this an “advisory” committee.  If employee and public input is sought, it must be meaningful, recommendations must be respected, not laundered to fit the corporate expectations, they should be published regularly and their status should be tracked.  Management may not agree with a proposal, but they should say so and defend their position publicly.

The report asks whether the TTC’s structure prevents high quality service with departmental barriers blocking co-ordinated delivery of initiatives.  Customers do not care which department carries responsibility for each facet of their experience, nor do they give gold stars to the department managers.  They care about their rides on the TTC system, and bad experiences reflect on the whole organization.

I am disappointed in the proposal for an “Image/Brand Improvement Plan”.  Parts of this are puff, while others are meaningful changes.  If the TTC participates in or sponsors community events, this gives TTC a presence, but the Queen car will still short turn if it shows up at all.  Public forums are useful only if the TTC listens rather than preaching about customer responsibilities.

The best public relations establishing the TTC system’s worthiness of public support is the provision of good service.  When the horror stories among friends end, then the TTC will have a successful campaign.  The TTC cannot be a bakery with spiffy, focus-group-tested graphics and menus, but mouldy day-old bread in the window.  Don’t tell people how good you are.  Just be good.  No, be excellent.

Customer service techniques coupled with regular surveys of customer attitudes are worthwhile, but again these must feed into published recommendations for change.  Just as there is a more-or-less annual “service plan” for route changes in which proposals are vetted against each other, any changes in the organization’s approach need to be seen together as a package, not as individual initiatives that could even work at cross-purpose.  Another system may have a great idea, but don’t just start changing Toronto processes because someone went on a busman’s holiday or read a laudatory article in the trade press.

Day-to-day station operations require the co-ordination of many factors — cleanliness, security, accuracy and condition of any signage (especially temporary signs for events or diversions), escalator and elevator reliability, structural wear and damage.  That’s just the facilities side of things, but also we have the riders who may ask questions, or simply appear lost.  The proposed “Station Managers” are a good first step, but they must be supported by visible improvements in stations when they report issues and request changes.

For emergencies, the report suggests that the TTC maintain lists of nearby managers for both workday and off-hours assistance in stations.  This will require a significant amount of training as many aspects of operations and emergency response procedures are not known to all management staff.  Managers taking this role will need sensitivity to customers in the difficult situations where things go wrong, and good communication to those providing supervisory support so that they can intelligently work with situations as they evolve.  This begs the question of whether qualifications for managers will now include the ability to support emergencies in the subway, and whether this could run counter to acquiring staff with skills needed for their official jobs.

Children and students are two special groups among TTC customers in that they represent the future riders of the transit system.  The report suggests that child-specific initiatives could be used to make the system more attractive such as special transfers with additional information about using the transit system.  Oddly enough, there is no reference here to either the overburdened operators who would issue such transfers, nor to the fact that transfers as we know them will disappear with self-service fare collection.

For students, the report suggests an advisory committee to give voice to special needs of students much as the advisory committee (ACAT) does for disabled riders.  I’m all for public input, but it is odd to see a student committee but no formal role for regular adult riders.  Moreover, with too many committees, they may not all speak with one voice, and a clearinghouse will be needed to co-ordinate their work.

This first set of recommendations has a scattershot nature.  Many are well-meaning, but could fail in the details of the implementation.

In the next part of this series, I will turn to the broad subject of communications.  How should the TTC talk to its customers?  How should customers communicate with the TTC?  How should the TTC staff and departments talk to each other?

A combination of factors including a comparative dearth of news, the heat, a few short vacations and family issues have kept me from working as hard and regularly on this site as I prefer to.

In the pipeline are:

• A review of plans for waterfront transit from the Don to the Western Waterfront.
• A review (yes, finally) of Metrolinx’ Benefits Case Analsis methodology.  With the pending rework of “The Big Move” and the likelihood that many will seek justification for building or ignoring various transit proposals, any so-called methodology needs to be rigourous, defensible and well-understood.  The BCAs fail on at least two of these counts.
• A review of the Customer Service Panel’s recommendations.
• A recap of the TTC meeting scheduled for August 24.
• A review of streetcar operations on Spadina for February, and for the full-length St. Clair route for July.  Both of these routes use reserved lanes, and the GPS-based data make detailed analysis much easier and revealing.
• Later this fall, I will turn to the Carlton and Dundas routes, the only two for which I have not published operational reviews.

There is also, of course, the small matter of the coming election.

In 2010, the operating subsidy will be paid entirely by the City with no contribution from Queen’s Park.  This subsidy will be about $420-million, and in the absence of a fare increase, this will rise to $500-million in 2011.  The final 2010 figure will not be known until the year-long effects of ridership growth and the 2010 fare increase are clear.  Notwithstanding repeated statements from Queen’s Park and various mayoral candidates, no operating subsidy flows to the TTC from the Province.

The capital budget is complex because there are many sources of subsidy.  Some of these are project-specific such as the contributions by Ottawa, Queen’s Park and York Region to the Spadina Subway Extension.  Others are intended to support a specific class of project such as security upgrades or vehicle replacements.  Still others are not earmarked, and these sources fund projects as needed.

In 2009, the capital subsidies totalled $742-million.  Of this, $333-million came from the City, $195-million from Queen’s Park and $208-million from Ottawa.  The remaining $6-million came from other sources such as Waterfront Toronto.  Gas tax revenues from Ottawa and Queen’s Park amounted to about $320-million in 2009, and of this, slightly more than half of the Provincial money was used as an operating subsidy.  In 2010, all of the gas taxes are going to the Capital Budget.  (For details on subsidy arrangements, please refer to the TTC Financial Statements for 2009.)

Whatever is left over after all of the external subsidies is funded by the City.  These monies are raised partly from debt and partly as “capital from current” in the City’s operating budget.

A critical problem going forward in capital planning for the City is that various funding programs at both senior levels are drying up, and Toronto will be left with only gas taxes and the cost sharing on Metrolinx projects.  This leaves the City open to a greater call for TTC capital in future years, a problem compounded by the growth in planned capital spending.  Recent announcements of Provincial funding for transit network expansion contribute nothing to ongoing capital requirements for system renewal.

In this context, proper control and oversight by the City over TTC budgeting is essential.  However, the TTC has a long history of operating as an independent agency managing its own accounts.  This may have been acceptable before the City was the TTC’s primary funder, but not today, especially considering the effect of unexpected changes in TTC financial results and requirements on the City’s books.

Toronto’s Executive Committee will consider a report on August 16 to formalize the protocols for relations between the TTC, City Council and their respective staffs on budgetary matters.  Authority for City oversight and control already exists in the City of Toronto Act.  A telling paragraph from the report gives a hint of problems that exist between the two bodies:

It is important that the City and the TTC, as a city board, clearly understand their respective roles (including authority and accountability) in financial planning and budget management and that the financial management relationship be clearly and publicly documented. Consequently, it is necessary to codify the responsibilities of the TTC in relation to budgetary matters in a City by-law. [Page 4]

Among the protocols to be implemented are:

Council approves a 10-year capital plan including current and future planned spending on approved projects, identification of changes in scope, planned funding sources for each project and debt requirements for each year.

The TTC is not allowed to pay for overruns in, say, a Provincially funded project with savings in a City funded one.  Any changes to the budget and plan from items listed below must be funded by reallocation from projects with a similar funding structure.

• over-expenditures,
• accelerated or deferred work,
• scope changes greater than 10% or $500k,
• new projects, or
• unplanned allocations of funding including reserves.

The TTC will report capital projects that are closed so that unspent balances can be released.

Council approves the operating budget including total cost of services, service levels and staff complement, total revenue (including external subsidy, if any) and the net expenditure to be funded by the City.

Any changes to the budget that would affect the City’s financial position must be approved by Council.  These include:

• projected gross expenses or revenue
• net expenses (City subsidy required)
• overall staff complement including proposed changes to services or service levels

The TTC will file a quarterly variance report for both of its budgets.

Any surplus in the operating budget will be retained by the City, and Council will decide what to do with the funds.

[See Attachment 1, pp. 9-10.  The operation of these protocols is set out in more detail in Attachment 2, pp. 11-15.]

The TTC’s capital budget contains a great deal of information already, but the reasons for and effects of scope creep are hard to dig out of the background material.  Of particular concern is the budgetary shell game involved when unexpected cost growth in project “A” requires an offsetting saving or deferral in projects “B” and “C”.  The trade-offs involved are not always clear.  Indeed, the TTC now talks of a backlog of capital projects that have been pushed into future years, but has not documented this problem so the Council can assess its severity.

Another subtle problem with large projects can occur when elements that were expected to be part of the base project become future upgrades (in effect, new unbudgeted projects).  The most flagrant of these, a quarter-century ago, was the SRT whose cost ballooned from just under $100-million to about $240-million, not to mention an endless series of fixup projects.  More recently, careful watchers have noticed many unexpected cost increases on the Spadina Subway Extension.  Although these are officially funded from “contingencies”, there is word that some elements have been deleted.  Whether these re-appear as add-ons after the line opens remains to be seen.  The problem is that such design changes have been made without any public review.

Some projects seen from the outside as one entity are actually sub-projects of many capital plans.  For example, a station renewal may draw on half a dozen separate internal plans including accessibility, fire prevention, structural repair, communications systems, etc.  This approach is useful in tracking the cost associated with each type of upgrade, and on occasion this can affect funding (e.g. accessibility may be funded differently from security).

When a project is scheduled, it may not retain all of its components, or they may be stretched out in time, to resolve overall cash flow planning.  The project at Broadview Station is a good example of this effect.

Open-ended projects create their own budgetary problems in two ways.  A still-open project may continue to draw on a previous capital approval for work that might be difficult to describe as part of the original project.  At some point, a project has to be declared “finished” and any additional work approved and budgeted on its own merits.

Another problem arises with projects whose scope is repeatedly modified by the addition of new phases.  This muddies the tracking of costs for the original components and those added later.

Council (and City staff) will have their work cut out to understand the inner workings of the TTC’s capital accounts.

Council’s approval of the operating budget and service is not intended to micro-manage TTC operations.  For example, if riding growth triggers the need for more service, the TTC is free to add this service provided that the marginal cost is offset by additional fare revenue.  Only if additional subsidy is needed would this come to Council for approval.

Changes in overall service quality such as those that would come from the Ridership Growth Strategy or the Transit City Bus Plan must be approved as part of an annual operating budget so that Council explicitly authorizes the new service policy.

An important part of the operating budget will be a 3-year strategic plan.  This is the place where future changes in policies should appear so that the overall direction of transit service provision can be debated and approved by Council.  A vital part of this plan will be projections of future subsidy requirements, service initiatives and fares.

The TTC and City do medium-to-long range planning for the big capital projects and system expansion, but rarely have comparable debates about operations even though this is transit’s bread-and-butter.  Rather than overall discussion of what the transit system might be, what services it could offer, how much it would charge, who should benefit from special fare subsidies, we have the annual “squeaky wheel” debates where line item changes are approved in the heat of the budget sessions.

If Council agrees to implement the new protocols, they will take effect for the 2011 budget year.  The new Commission (and its management) will have to adapt to a Council exercising closer budgetary oversight.  Conversely, Council will have to take more responsibility for transit decisions, and blaming the TTC for every problem won’t be as easy.

How well this actually works will depend on the new Mayor, Council and TTC.  Advocacy for better transit will shift, in part, to Council as part of the budget debates and any work on a strategic plan.  A slash-and-burn administration could undo much that is worthwhile in the TTC looking on this only as a Miller legacy.  More responsibly, the new Mayor and Council can build on what is good and make the TTC even better.

John Lorinc reports in the Globe that a system to be developed for Vancouver will use similar technology to that proposed by the TTC for its own smart card system, and come in at a fraction of the expected price for Presto.

Updated: Royson James weighs in on smart cards in the Star, and John Lorinc has an article on spacing.

In the case of the NDP request, the scope should look more widely than just Accenture which provides system development and operation.  However, some of the capital and ongoing staffing costs for the Presto project are carried in other budgets.  Any review needs to look at the whole picture, not just one contract.

Comparisons with Vancouver will be intriguing, but it will likewise be necessary to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison.  For example, the new system is to be implemented as part of a conversion of the Skytrain rapid transit stations from their current barrier-free design to use turnstiles.  This is intended to reduce fare evasion.  One big cost in Toronto is  for providing existing turnstiles with power and network links to handle Presto.  It is entirely possible that some components of the Toronto smart card budget will be covered by Vancouver’s turnstile retrofit budget.  (Similar burying of costs in multiple accounts occurs quite commonly in TTC budgets, notably for subway station renovations.)

Presto needs to be held to account for what it has produced and the expected cost of system expansion.  The fog of “commercial confidentiality” used, for example, to prevent revelation of the cost of a new city’s rollout (Ottawa) means that we have no way predict long term spending requirements, or to compare these with projects in other cities.

Ontario has just, thankfully, ended its relationship with SNC Lavalin for the Air Rail Link to Pearson Airport, and with this change we should have greater transparency and accountability for the project.

The same openness must apply to Presto.  If it is a demonstrably good and competitive system, then show us.

Subsequently, as an attendee, I was asked to respond to these questions online.  Why write something for such limited distribution, I thought.  Here are the eight questions and my answers, updated a bit from the “official” version I left of the consultant’s website.

1. Should the Investment Strategy focus solely on The Big Move’s $50 billion capital plan or should it also encompass operating costs – both regional and local?

Most definitely, the strategy must look at all aspects of transit funding. It is pointless to go through all of the upheaval and political grief that will accompany any move for new revenue streams, only to find that what we ask for funds only half of what we need. The current gas tax, about which we hear every time Queen’s Park wants to say how pro-transit they are, does not come close to paying for local transit operations or capital, especially in Toronto, let alone the expansion that will be needed to provide the local counterpart to a future regional rail rapid transit network.

Aim high, and be sure to explain all of the benefits. In fact, if you are able to provide massive support for transit throughout the GTAH, this will probably get more traction, sooner, than waiting 15 years for a handful of rapid transit lines to open.

2. Are we principally raising revenue to pay for what we need to build or are we principally shaping behaviour with incentives to reduce congestion and create a greener environment? If we are to do both, what is the relative importance of the two goals?

This isn’t an either/or question. There is backlog of unbuilt transit to address current shortfalls, but there is also the demand that will come inevitably from population growth. Both the backlog and the growing demand will make it hard just to stay in the same place, let alone get ahead of congestion and pollution issues. Also, because of the development patterns (residential and commercial/industrial), there are areas of congestion that are not easily addressed with transit. We could wind up making central Toronto even more attractive with better GO/TTC services, but still having big problems in the 905.

Metrolinx claims for the future benefits of lines must be recalibrated to allow for backfilling effects. Yes, a new line may avoid x-million new trips and all they entail, but that doesn’t mean that existing volumes will decline. There will be more improvement in emissions through pollution controls and downsizing of cars due to pricing than there will be through reduction in existing traffic volumes.

Don’t overplay the “green card” or give the idea that motorists will speed to work by driving.

If there are congestion problems for commercial traffic, the real problem is to decide which type of traffic is more important on the roads. We provide “high occupancy” lanes for cars, but force trucks to jockey for space with everything else. If trucking is so important, why doesn’t it get priority somehow?

3. How wide should the Investment Strategy net be cast? Are the proceeds just for transit or for transit and roads?

Spend mostly for transit on the simple basis that there is limited capacity for more road space, and even where it is physically possible, you may only shift the bottleneck somewhere else. Widening an expressway won’t improve capacities on local streets.

An attempt at “balanced” spending will result in far too little transit, and road schemes beyond the highway lobbyists’ greatest fantasies.  There are not enough cabinet ministers after whom you could name all of the new roads.

As I asked above, which type of traffic is most important in the competition for road space?

There is an analogy here to the urban problem of making room for pedestrians, cyclists, parking, autos, trucks, deliveries, transit, etc etc. Only when you decide the relative priority of each type of road use (and how this will vary from place to place) can you decide how to allocate road space, and by extension what you should spend your money on.

4. Are we better off to focus on a single tool to produce the required revenue total or should we anticipate a package of multiple tools to produce the total? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each approach?

The amount required lies somewhere between $1-billion and $4b annually, and this will be a big bite to take out of any one revenue stream. Moreover, if only one stream is used, there is a possibility that the affected group will claim inequity in the financing and the benefits (for example, gas taxes going mainly to transit).

Multiple streams spread the take around. Few will be happy until they can see specific benefits, but if the money comes from more than just “those bad motorists” (via a regional sales tax, for example), at least no one group can claim it was unfairly targeted.

There will be the inevitable “no new taxes” brigade who claim we must first look to “efficiency” and, maybe, “the private sector” as a source of funds.

The latter (PPP) has to be exposed for the limitations it presents (we wind up paying one way or another in current spending or future lease/operational payments). As for “efficiency”, the specific cases of spending cock-ups need to be documented and put to bed.

I am tired of hearing about the St. Clair car and a few other projects without a proper accounting that would show which elements of the cost overrun were actually due to bad project management, and which to scope creep.

Infrastructure Ontario likes to crow about its success with “no change order” projects. This is total crap because no project goes forward without the need for changes. The issue is whether all of the requirements are captured up front, how you control scope changes during construction, and how you deal with the overhang of “enhancements” at the end. As long as there is a war of words between Queen’s Park and Toronto, the public perception will be that all transit spending is wasteful.

You need to establish how transit spending will benefit the region, and how projects will be managed to stay reasonably within budget targets. Creative accounting (pushing costs into separate future projects) may make you look good in the short term, but it will bite you later when people see you are not really controlling costs, or when the “as delivered” form of projects don’t meet expectations.

This argument continues in the next question …

5. How do we engage the public in a real conversation about the costs and benefits of congestion and investments in transit? How do we effectively connect a better quality of life and a more prosperous region to investment in mobility solutions?

First, you need to be honest about what you cannot achieve. Some congestion is a fact of life and won’t go away. At best, you can prevent it from getting worse even while demand grows.

Next, you need to identify how you will address those trips where transit can make a difference. Those who can use transit and do so with reasonable travel times will gain the benefit of not sitting in congested traffic (e.g. GO riders who read, chat, Blackberry, etc rather than fighting their way through traffic).

We should not be trying to replace congested auto trips with uncongested auto trips for all current travellers. A major fallacy of much promotional material is the idea that we will get rid of congestion. This allows those who drive today to think of transit as “something for everyone else”. If the same attitude had been applied to the QEW, we would never have built GO Transit, and would have a 32-lane highway today (with no place downtown for all of the cars).

The improved quality of life comes from providing good transit service — not just for commute trips but for a “transit lifestyle” — so that transit is a trusted and reliable alternative to driving, the cost of maintaining a family’s fleet of vehicles is reduced, travel options increase, and the intensification needed to provide sustainable communities is possible without overloading the road network.

Prosperity comes from ease of movement, access to shopping and entertainment, capacity for goods movement (possibly at the expense of other road users as discussed above), and mobility for the region’s workforce.

Central to all of this is that the current model simply will not work. We are not going to spend tens of billions so that everyone can still drive just as they do today. Some may choose this, and some may require it, but the absolute need to drive for want of an alternative must vanish.

6. How do we make it safer or more attractive for candidates for provincial or municipal office to raise the issue of citizens paying for better mobility solutions? Put differently, how do we remove “the third rail” from this debate?

Bluntly, show that transit can actually be successful. Build stuff. Get it operating. Recognize that there is a mix of projects, and that local transit is as important as the multi-billion projects.

For example, we will spend a few billion to bring a subway to York U and Vaughan Centre, but this only addresses a small part of regional demand. People still need to get to the subway. People have trips that the subway won’t serve — it may get them closer to their destination, but the “last mile” is still on a surface route.

People must see a qualitative improvement in transit throughout the region, and it shouldn’t be hamstrung by local budget constraints. How can we convince people to use transit when the regions cut back on their services (which are nothing to be proud of anyhow), and Queen’s Park begs poor?

Stop treating local transit as if it has nothing to do with regional plans.

7. How do we create a positive coalition of drivers and riders to support the Investment Strategy instead of the debate being drivers versus riders? Is it enough to argue that drivers benefit by getting more riders on transit and off the roads?

Don’t treat drivers as the root of all evil and the only potential source of revenue. My arguments above make clear that the benefit to drivers is not to get people out of their way, but to provide an alternative so that they don’t have to drive in the first place.

Use broadly-based tools such as a sales tax so that it’s not an us-and-them argument.

8. In a political environment that makes tax increases and user fees very difficult, if not impossible, should any new revenue tool require a referendum prior to its adoption to legitimize it? Could a referendum ever be won?

Absolutely not. Governments should lead. Holding a referendum implies that even the government doesn’t believe in what it is doing, and wants the voters to save it from the hard decision of killing transit expansion.

Do we have referenda when we increase spending on health care or education? No, we have a press conference.

A referendum will be divisive and could very well lose, especially if the benefits are perceived to be inequitable both for classes of voters and different parts of the region.

Challenge the “no new taxes” brigade to explain what they would do and how they would meet the demand for transit funding. The last time they were in power, they walked away from that portfolio.

That’s my 25 cents’ worth.

The study’s purpose is:

1. Assess the need for additional rapid transit capacity to serve the downtown core given the capacity improvements already planned by TTC and GO and recognizing forecast land use and ridership scenarios;

2. Assess alternative strategies to accommodate the forecast demand including the costs and benefits associated with various scenarios composed of the following elements:

(a) The construction of new rapid transit lines such as the previously-proposed Downtown Rapid Transit (DRT) line;

(b) Expanded GO Rail capacity (including additional GO stations in the City of Toronto);

(c) Improvements in streetcar services to enhance shorter-distance transit accessibility in the downtown; and

(d) Fare, service and other policy initiatives to increase downtown transit ridership that may be appropriate.

3. If necessary, undertake the appropriate functional design and environmental assessment studies required to obtain approval for the construction of the recommended facilities.

Information about public consultation will appear when available.

This study is important by comparison with many past efforts by both TTC and Metrolinx in its review of transit as an integration of long, medium and short distance trips, each of which has its own requirement for service.  Too many studies look at only one aspect of this larger problem.

Metrolinx will build, own and operate the service through its GO Transit division.

While the province and the Union Pearson Air-Link Group (UPAG), a subsidiary of SNC-Lavalin, were able to make significant progress negotiating, financial market conditions prevented acceptable terms. The government will continue to work with UPAG to build on the design and development work that has been completed to date.

This long-overdue change in the ARL scheme should bring the project into public view where all aspects of its design, financing and operation will be subject to the same scrutiny and openness as other Metrolinx projects.  Issues such as service levels, equipment provisioning and, most importantly, electrification will no longer hide behind the veil of “commercial confidentiality”.

Fares will be part of the overall Metrolinx/GO network scheme, and the amount of any “premium” surcharge over comparable GO fares will be a matter of public record.  The current one-way GO fare to the airport from downtown is $5.55, far below the $22 figure touted as a possible charge for the SNC-Lavalin operation.  As a matter of public policy, Metrolinx should decide whether the ARL should operate on a full cost recovery basis, or like other transit services, be subsidized for the larger benefits of moving travellers without autos.

This change will affect the design of infrastructure and operational planning.  If the ARL is priced and operates more like a GO service, it will attract riders such as commuting airport workers, and integration with through Kitchener-Waterloo line will be much simpler.  However, the size of facilities now proposed for the ARL may be inadequate to a role as a major airport link.  There may even be an option to rethink the technology choice for this corridor and the details of its connection at Union Station.

Today all we have is a press release, but Metrolinx must truly integrate the ARL planning into The Big Move.  The ARL will not be a separate, privately-owned service whose business might cloud planning and implementation of “competing” routes.  There should be one plan for the airport with regional bus and LRT services including the Eglinton, Finch West and Hurontario/Brampton lines.

The airport is a vital regional hub in The Big Move, and transit service to it must be more than a few lines sketched on a map.  Metrolinx should launch planning — including public participation — for its airport services immediately.

McCuaig is a career bureaucrat at Queen’s Park with 26 years’ experience in various posts in the Ministries of Municipal Affairs & Housing, and then Transportation.  From his government bio page:

[Before becoming Deputy-Minister] Mr. McCuaig was Assistant Deputy Minister of Provincial Highways Management Division in MTO. He has also held the position of Assistant Deputy Minister of the ministry’s Policy, Planning and Standards Division, as well as a variety of other positions at MTO and at the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.

Mr. McCuaig has a Bachelor of Applied Arts degree in Urban and Regional Planning from Ryerson University in Toronto, Ontario and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario.

Media reports in the Star and Globe suggest that McCuaig will use and build on his relationships with transit agencies and managers, notably Gary Webster at the TTC.

Rob Prichard’s move to the Chair’s role and Rob MacIsaac’s departure complete a changing of the guard that began with “Metrolinx II”, the new politician-free Metrolinx Board created in early 2009.  Prichard is better at glad-handing and advocating for transit than MacIsaac who tended to be distrustful of public input although that is a fundamental part of this high-profile agency’s work.

Both Prichard and McCuaig have big challenges.  The first will be to determine “who’s on top” in setting policy and overall direction.  Major policy announcements and funding come from Cabinet and the Ministry, and this puts a former Deputy Minister in a leading role.  However, the Metrolinx Board, especially with the supposed benefit of private-sector input, should, like any Board, give overall direction and ensure that management is doing its job.  That has a potential for conflict, if not outright abdication of the Board’s role.

Board members need to ask difficult questions, to challenge Metrolinx staff, to conduct a real debate about how the GTA’s transportation network will grow and be financed.  Metrolinx makes recommendations to the Minister, but the Board should not be a rubber stamp for whatever the staff proposes.

The early days of Metrolinx were comparatively easy ones.  Everybody loves to draw lines on maps, and The Big Move, the end product of that period, speaks of a bright transit future for the region.  Reality is not quite so simple.  Changes in funding schemes and land use, not to mention the vital role of local transit systems, require hard work, not simply the publication of a glossy plan.

The Big Move 2.0, an update process launched recently, will be driven mainly by staff, but a new plan must acknowledge and address shortcomings in the 1.0 version.  These include:

• dubious projections that overstate demands and available capacities in some major corridors, notably commuter rail;
• a focus on the end-state of a network after 25 years’ construction rather than intermediate stages;
• a project evaluation methodology that considers each line in isolation rather than as part of a network; and
• a failure to acknowledge the scope and cost of changes required in local transit operations to support the ridership hopes for regional services.

If the Board is to earn its keep, it must ensure that TBM 2.0 isn’t simply a warmed-over-lightly repackaging of TBM 1.0.

Metrolinx is no longer just a planning agency, and the move into construction and operations changes its role from one of a talking shop to front line delivery of facilities and services.  Although the recently merged GO Transit division has this background, The Big Move dwarfs current operations and will fundamentally change GO Transit itself.  Old models won’t work any more.

Getting all of this financed and built requires long term commitment, a notoriously absent character in the political scene.  Metrolinx must assume the role of advocate for transit and transportation expansion, but must do so with a credible base of plans and demonstrable benefits.  Billions in new funding will come only if the public, and by extension the politicians, trust what Metrolinx tells them.

Bruce McCuaig and Rob Prichard have much work to do.  I wish them well, but won’t hesitate to demand openness, quality and credibility from Metrolinx.

On July 26, I visited the folks at Presto and talked with Ernie Wallace, Executive Project Director, about the system and its plans.  Subsequently, I did some digging of my own, primarily on the Ontario government website.  The information below is organized to keep topics and the logical flow intact rather than to represent the sequence of the conversation.

How does the PRESTO System Project fit with various local and provincial agencies?

Presto started off as a project within the Ministry of Transportation, and a line item for the project still appears within the Ministry’s Budget Estimates.  The contract with Accenture is administered by Metrolinx as an agent of the Ministry.  Wallace himself, and other senior Presto staff, appear on the Metrolinx portion of the “Sunshine List” for highly-paid employees of Crown agencies.

Update: The PRESTO team is made up of seconded Provincial staff, GO employees, hired contract employees and contractors through vendors of record.

Metrolinx does not set policy or general direction for the Presto project.  This function remains at the Ministry.

The contract with Accenture covers the implementation and operation of Presto for a 10-year period for the eight transit agencies who signed on as the original members.  Any expansion of scope such as the now-in-progress Ottawa implementation would be subject to an add-on agreement between the Ministry and Accenture and, of course, an additional payment.

Fare policies remain with each of the local systems for which Presto provides services.  The electronic model (“fare topology”) for each system is built into Presto, including any “co-fare” agreements between operators.  The best-known of these are between GO Transit and some of the local carriers whose bus systems feed GO where the combined Presto fare is lower than the individual fares for each leg of the journey.  Similar schemes can be set up for any of the member transit systems.

The important point here is that a decision to give a combined fare (for example, to Mississauga Transit users who transferred to the TTC subway) is up to the local systems involved (and presumably their Councils for whom any change in fare revenue is of some interest).  Presto does not impose a co-fare on any cross-border travel, and would participate in decisions to implement one only to the point of technical feasibility.

The Metrolinx Board does not set fare policies except for GO Transit which is a division of Metrolinx.

What is the nature of the Accenture contract?

According to Ernie Wallace, this contract is in the public domain except, possibly, for some commercial terms.  If so, I believe that the Ministry could settle some debates about Accenture’s role simply by releasing the main contract and any subsequent amendments or additions.

Most importantly, Wallace challenged statements claiming that Presto’s and Accenture’s business model depends on expanding the reach of the system, particularly to the TTC, to ensure high transaction volumes.  Wallace states that Accenture is providing a specified service (implementation, rollout and support for 10 years on 8 systems) for a fixed price.

Today’s Star reports the scope of the contract this way:

The Ontario government says it has a $250 million contract with Accenture to develop and operate Presto by 2016. That includes the design and the software, the testing, the manufacturing and testing of devices.

This does not include the provisioning of devices for individual transit system stations or vehicles.

Although this may be a fixed price contract, what we don’t know is whether Accenture invested in staff and infrastructure based on a presumed expansion to other, larger systems.  Their pricing for add-ons of smaller increments could be affected by their expectations of future growth and recapture of the investment.

Update:  The following information was provided by Presto to explain the contract and budget arrangements.  In the quote below, “Estimates” refers to the Ontario government estimates, the formal process by which spending is approved by the legislature.  Presto and Metrolinx fall within the Ministry of Transportation.  “RBP” refers to Results Based Planning, and reports for all Ministries are available.  These include information about the previous year’s results and spending.

The contract is a public contract and the overall costs, terms and conditions including deliverable descriptions can be made available but the specific commercial terms and pricing is competitive information and cannot be released.  The planned budget for Ottawa is known but contract amendments have only been executed for initial planning and requirements gathering and specific service provider $ for change cannot be released by PRESTO.

The $14,368,000 is the total all in Operating budget for 10/11 including all operating contracts, program costs both people and administration/facilities etc.

[...] each year a capital allocation is provided (ie $50M) to cover all existing contract commitments, approved changes and capital investment of PRESTO, GO and Service Providers.

Accenture and their sub-contractors do all the software development engineering, manufacturing and maintenance. They operate the backend datacentres, call centre and provide the networks and network management

Both [the downtown Presto System Project office] and GO PRESTO offices are funded by MTO and one third of the SP teams costs as well and are in the estimates.

The annual RBP plans and allocations are all in for PRESTO as it relates to the PRESTO Program and all the related contracts and the GO PRESTO team.

And in a separate note:

I [Ernie Wallace] can discuss and show all the deliverables and total roll ups. We intend to put these up on the web but it will take about a week [...] .

The Accenture contract includes all the device costs for stations buses etc. along with infrastructure costs like networks.

Accenture’s contract is based on payment for deliverables and has no transaction fees or payments based on transit revenues or number of cards or volume devices or traffic etc. Added work is handled through a rigorous change process and is usually fixed price again by deliverable.

What are some of the technical details of Presto’s operation?

Two important components of Presto are the concept of an “electronic purse”, the value of pre-paid fares already in a user’s account, and preloaded “products” on the Presto card.  Each of these products represents one transit system.

This arrangement allows for some decentralization of processing in that a Presto reader on a bus can have a “conversation” with a card used on that bus system without “calling home” to complete the transaction.  This saves on real-time communication delays, and the challenges in some areas of getting reliable, fast cell coverage for the equipment on buses to communicate with the central network.

The trade-off is that this approach doesn’t work if the payment card isn’t “owned” by the system and used to store data.  Credit cards, for example, are “read only” and customer tracking all has to be done in the back office system for co-fare arrangements (or even transfers within one system) to be properly handled.

Presto can support flat fares, zone fares, distance-based and time-based fares and, as mentioned earlier, co-payment arrangements where trips across boundaries between operators trigger a discount fare arrangement.  All fares require that users “tap on” when they board a vehicle to begin their journey, and when they cross into a new transit system.  Zone and distance-based fares require users to “tap out” when they leave that leg of their journey.

Typically, users who fail to tap out are charged a large penalty fare as an incentive to formally complete their journey.  This can be confusing in a multi-carrier system such as we have in the GTA where each trip segment has its own fare rules.

A special arrangement exists for GO customers who can define their “default” trip so that it is deducted as a standard charge when they travel.  This avoids the need to tap out at their destination, but also causes problems for any non-standard trip where a user must indicate a “non default” fare is requested by pressing a button on the Presto reader.

User confusion is inevitable, and this scheme only works because GO Transit is, today, primarily a commuter service rather than an all-day, two-way provider of regional transit where trips will have a much greater variety of origins and destinations.  (See Toronto Star articles here, here and here.)

I can’t help feeling that Presto was build for an age where technical constraints (or budgets) forced choices on system designers that are no longer appropriate, and that the “elephant in the room” of GO and its then-current self view as a commuter system have driven much of the overall design.

Update:  The following information was provided by Presto.

PRESTO was built largely on the latest card technology and security technology and using Microsoft operating systems and COTS software and utilizing a proprietary fare and device management system from Europe, future developments including those proposed for Ottawa and TTC will adhere to open architecture principles and standards and core systems will not be based on proprietary software.

What is the problem with co-payments beyond 35 trips a month?

Presto cannot currently handle co-payments in situations where a rider takes more than 35 trips in one month.  The reason for this lies in the underlying design of the fare calculation and charging mechanism.

In a co-fare situation, when you take a local bus and then a GO train, there are actually three parts to the fare calculation:

• You board a local bus.  At this point the system does not know you are planning to switch to a train, and it charges the full local fare.
• You transfer to the train.  At this point, the need for a partial refund of your local fare is evident.
• The system calculates your train fare and deducts the credit for your local co-fare.  However, if you are on the 36th trip or more in one month, the result of this value is negative.

This possibility was not contemplated when the system was designed, but Presto is working on it.  If the local transit system used the same scheme for fare calculations (free after 35 fares), there would be no problem.  However, the situation is complicated by the possibility that one could take local trips that did not involve GO, and these would be subject to local rules that could involve volume discounts or pass-type fares.  The interaction of co-fares and each local set of fare rules is a challenge for any cross-system fare card regardless of the technology.

What are Presto’s plans for open payment systems?

The Presto readers now in use cannot interact with standard media such as credit and debit cards.  The processes and rules for this are complex, and are the subject of international standards in the payment industry.  Presto is a very small fish in a very big pond, and must adapt its system to meet world standards.  However, Presto plans to install readers capable of handling standard media for its Ottawa rollout in 2012 and will retrofit the existing system.

Note that this only gets us to the point where a credit card is recognized by the reader.  What is still needed is the back-end system to track users, calculate their fares, and bill either a locally-maintained ePurse, or send a bill to the user’s credit card company.  Those who argue for a open payments system design claim that money would be saved on some components of the system both through standardization and by offloading some functionality to the payment system.

One obvious issue is the question of service charges.  If each fare is billed as a separate transaction, one would pay dearly in service charges (and interest if you run a balance on your credit card) for the “convenience” of using your credit card.  This could be avoided if the payment industry adopted a new scheme for “micro payments”, but this requires negotiations between the banks and the providers such as Presto or an independent TTC system.  Large transaction volumes are an important component here.

Presto plans to have open payment capability in the 2014-5 time frame.  Like so many other projects, this is driven by the Pan Am games.  Riders on the Air Rail link should be able to pay for their journey with a credit card directly rather than having to acquire a Presto card for this purpose.

With open payments, Presto hopes to support a “library” of cards that could include a province-wide university student card, a city services card, or any other type of card identifying a large group of travellers.  This could be done strictly as a means of convenience (students could register their cards for transit services wherever Presto operated), or Presto could become a service provider to agencies and institutions outside of the transit field.  My own view is that they should stick to transit and get that working before trying to turn themselves into a bank.

Related to open payments technology is the ability to use a mobile device.  In the simplest implementation, the device’s own identity is registered against “your” Presto account.  Billing would likely be against your ePurse.  However, mobile apps will eventually be commonplace allowing your “phone” to act as a surrogate for a physical account card, and your mobile device could itself become a library replacing physical credit cards.  That’s a future well beyond what is needed for a Presto open payments rollout.

Where does the TTC fit?

It is no secret that the TTC has been dragging its feet on implementation of smart card technology, although the subject has been under discussion for 10 years.  The original TTC estimate of $140-million (2000$) has bloomed to $416-million (2010$ plus escalation) based in part on a better understanding of the needed infrastructure changes.  This amount does not include planned system expansions (which bring the total to the $489-million figure reported by me and others), but it probably does include costs for some system aspects like wiring within stations that could be replaced by wireless communications.  The TTC has quoted Presto a 7-year implementation period which is probably excessive for connection to an existing system where the foundations have already been provisioned.

From the Star:

Presto officials have estimated those costs for the TTC would be about $320 million, including devices, upgrades to infrastructure, wiring, project management, devices and central system changes.

That’s $320m versus $416m, a tidy sum regardless of whose estimate one believes, and this must be funded somehow.

Update:  The following information was provided by Presto.

PRESTO was built largely on the latest card technology and security technology and using Microsoft operating systems and COTS software and utilizing a proprietary fare and device management system from Europe. Future developments including those proposed for Ottawa and TTC will adhere to open architecture principles and standards and core systems will not be based on proprietary software.

The original TTC estimate from a decade ago was only for hard and directly related TTC assets (devices etc) .  No PRESTO systems development was included. TTC’ s scope, business requirements, infrastructure needs and device requirements have increased dramatically.

Presto says that it is prepared to be ready both for the startup of Transit City (the Sheppard line) and for one line (likely Queen 501) on the TTC in time for the new streetcars which will use all-door loading.  However, the time for a commitment one way or another is now given the lead times to finalize the fare structure and build a TTC rollout into Presto’s plans.  This collides with the TTC’s own scheme for an open payments trial rollout in the 2010-1 period.

The TTC claims that banks are prepared to fund a trial installation of an open payment system on the streetcar network, or some subset of it.  That claim needs to be nailed down both as to scope and technology.  Whatever is installed must be the basis for expansion, not a throwaway, and future costs must be clearly understood up front (the banks may be less generous when it comes to a full system rollout) .

John Lorinc has an article in today’s Globe on the current state of affairs in various cities in the USA.

I am not convinced that a trial on only one TTC route will be workable because, unlike riders of GO and a few regional feeder systems, TTC riders have complex trip patterns of which the Queen car is only one part.  The impetus for some form of smart card is driven by the need to shift token users (and later ticket and even cash users) to a fare medium that can be used for travel through the system, including automatic entrances.  A workable transition plan for co-existence of smart cards and existing payment systems must be in place and well-understood when any trial begins.

The Question of Transfers

The TTC must also address its current complex fare structure regarding transfers.  The present rules are just about impossible to define in a way that an automated system can interpret because the topology of the system is so complex.  Defining the point at which one trip ends and another begins for fare purposes requires detailed knowledge of the network, of what a “reasonable” trip might be and extenuating circumstances.  What looks like an out-of-the-way route may simply be a matter of convenience, even an accessibility requirement to avoid using the subway.  A lengthy stopover could be a quick bit of shopping, a longer-than-expected lineup at Starbucks, or the perennial half-hour gap in Queen service.

A pre-requisite for any new payment system will be a change in TTC fares to a time-based system.  Such a move is more important even than the technology debate as it will be the basis of a new fare “topology”.  This will require fundamental changes in TTC operating practices such as how paper transfers will be issued and used during a transitional period, and this should occur well before a smart card rollout.

One could equally argue for a move to a zone or distance based system, but the political upheaval of such a move — the effect on fares for long-haul riders — would be a major barrier to the implementation.  By contrast, a time-based fare would greatly simplify travel, and would reduce costs for some who don’t buy a Metropass but would receive the convenience of, in effect, a short-term pass.

Some at TTC will say “we can’t afford to change fares”, but the simple fact is that the fare structure must change to one that is easy to understand, monitor (electronically) and enforce.  A fare must be based on something easy to calculate — the passage of time and/or distance — not on arcane rules almost unchanged since the 1920s.  A decision on a new fare structure cannot wait until the day before a smart card system goes live because the new rules must be embedded in the new system.

(For the historically minded, here are two rather elderly transfers that have long passed their allowed time of use.  On the left of each pair of images, we have a Winchester car transfer from the Toronto Railway Company on April 1, 1895.  On the right, we have a Bay car Toronto Transportation Company transfer from Nov. 19, 1924.  Parts of the text setting out the transfer rules will sound rather familiar.

(Collectors please note that the words “First day issued” were already on this transfer when I received it.)

The Reality of the Political Calendar

The TTC began to look at open payments as an option for its fare cards in 2009, and this interest escalated in 2010 when a contract was let for a detailed review and implementation plan.  A draft Request for Proposals (RFP) will likely come to the TTC’s August board meeting for approval, and with the lead time for such things, responses are not likely to be back before the current Commission whose last meeting is on September 30, 2010.

Where the proposal will go from there depends on the outcome of the October municipal election, the winner of the mayoralty race, and the makeup of the new Council and Commission.  Many of the initiatives started by the current regime will be suspect, if not outright ridiculed and discarded, for purely political reasons as the new administration beats its chest and sets off in a new, if vague, direction.  This will not be the time for continuing what the Miller/Giambrone regime started, especially a project that won’t yet be launched.

Although the “banking industry” is said to be eager to fund a trial implementation (just as MasterCard has money in the New York City trial), the details of such an arrangement will not be known until the TTC receives and publishes the responses to its RFP.

There are many questions to be asked about any smart card rollout whether it be Presto, a separate TTC system, or some hybrid.  However, we are unlikely to see a strong advocate for a TTC-based implementation, and technically savvy Commissioners/Councillors are hard to find.  Couple this to the TTC, a notoriously technology-averse organization with a reputation for bungling projects, and we don’t have a recipe for success.

That said, Presto has yet to show that it can handle a really big rollout either.  In its early days, the project itself went through upheavals in management and direction.  Any rollout in Toronto will require committed buy-in and participation by the TTC, and this will not come from a contentious us-vs-them relationship.

Presto still only serves a small subset of GTA riders and trip complexities.  We have already heard complaints about usability and customer service, and whether the model will scale up to be a truly GTA-wide medium remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, Transportation Minister Kathleen Wynne darkly hints that funding of other Toronto projects is threatened if TTC goes its own way on a farecard system.  Queen’s Park really needs to put its money on the table.  After delaying half of the already-announced spending on Transit City, Queen’s Park should think twice about forcing Toronto to pay substantially for an imposed fare collection system.  I don’t want to hear about all that gas tax — it would take three years of gas tax revenue to pay for a Presto rollout in Toronto, and that money is already earmarked for other transit improvements.  If this is an important regional strategy, then it needs to be funded as a regional service through Metrolinx and its long-awaited “Investment Strategy”.

Metrolinx and Queen’s Park must address local transit funding, fare structures and service.  Local operations, including fare collection, are a vital part of the regional network, and must be well-funded.  Any move to reduce fares for cross-border travel will require changes to subsidies, assuming Ontario will pay any.  Ontario talks about getting people out of cars and reducing congestion, but prefers to cherry-pick the projects it will support and fund, while leaving the rest to local municipal agencies and tax revenues.

Toronto and the TTC must set the stage for a move to smart cards with a fare structure review, preferably as early as the 2011 budget cycle, certainly no later than the beginning of 2012.  If we are moving to a time-based fare, this decision must be taken soon so that it can be implemented before smart cards are rolled out on the TTC regardless of the technology.

Too many candidates waste their time drawing lines on maps when there are operational issues like this facing the TTC and the City.  Fare structures are not just a technology debate for transit and IT geeks, they are basic to transit policy and service.  This issue, together with the need to fund a projected half-billion dollar operating deficit in 2011, is the challenge for the incoming Council and for Queen’s Park.

In What Does Transit Do About Traffic Congestion, he argues that the last claim that should be made for transit is that it will reduce congestion.  Instead, the benefits of a transit-oriented city show up in economic activity, mobility and other benefits.

There is, however, a caveat lurking here.  Dense cities with good transit (or even cities with a good potential for better transit) don’t appear out of thin air.  Once we build sprawl, then the benefits and effects of transit seen in the older, denser cities will not appear overnight even if we run the most intensive BRT, LRT or subway network through auto-oriented suburbs.  Transit can make things better, but it will not reverse the damage and inevitable congestion of decades of bad planning.

By the way, be sure to read the comments.  If you think the threads on this site get out of hand, just try Walker’s blog.  You will see some very intelligent point-counterpoint discussion in some threads.

In If On-Time Performance is 96%, Why Am I Always Late?, Walker discusses the conundrum that transit agencies talk a great line for being on time, but the actual experience of users is much, much, much worse.  Both GO Transit and TTC have a love for patting themselves on the back (although rarely each other’s), and talking about their improvements in on-time performance.

So much of this is relative to the metrics used (how late can a train or streetcar be and still be “on time”) and the lack of weighting of the results to reflect the number of passengers affected by on time (or not) service.  Even in the off-peak, gaps of two scheduled headways or more are common on downtown routes and this drives riders away.  At least with NextBus, it is now possible to know with certainty that there is no car just around the bend out of sight, and if there is, it’s going in the opposite direction.

GO Transit now has schedules that reflect the real world in which they operate, but persists in reporting all-day on-time figures rather than breaking these out to show service quality when most people ride the system.

Finally, in Strasbourg:  You Can’t Take It Home With You, we get a loving overview of both the city and its tram system, part of the renaissance of LRT in France.  The real issues come at the end where we learn about the major changes in street space usage and restrictions on cars that accompanied the installation of tram lines in this very old city.  The moral, applicable to anyone comparing transit systems, is to look beyond just the technology and the scenery, and understand how and why the city streets work (or don’t) as they do.

Any moves to improve “congestion” in Toronto must start with a fundamental debate about what the streets are for, and which existing uses must be reduced (and how) in order to make room for what’s left over.  Ironically, we focus these debates on the heart of downtown, a comparatively small area, when the real problems of transit’s competitiveness and congestion lie out in the suburbs.

Mark Dowling, in a comment later in this thread, has pointed out that a TTC report last November cited a provincial requirement for participation in Presto as a condition for funding through various programs.  (See 4th paragraph on page 7)

This report must be read in the context of the amended recommendations approved by the Commission as reported in the Minutes:

Chair Giambrone moved that recommendation no. 1 contained in the report, be amended as follows:

“It is recommended that the commission:

1. Conditionally approve the adoption of the Presto Fare Collection System subject to satisfactory resolution of the issues outlined in attachment a, subject to:

* TTC and City staff discussions with representatives of the Federal Government, Provincial Government, Metrolinx and the City of Toronto to develop operating and financial agreements necessary to resolve the issues outlined in attachment a;

* TTC staff reporting back to the commission for approval of the operating and financial agreements that have been developed;

* TTC staff developing detailed business requirements for adopting the Presto System at the TTC to the satisfaction of the commission;

* TTC staff undertaking the engineering and design work necessary for future subway infrastructure modifications to provide power and communications to support smartcards”.

The motion by Chair Giambrone carried.

Chair Giambrone moved that the final bullet in attachment ‘a’, be amended as follows:

* “TTC and the City must not be bound to fare payment exclusivity that would preclude implementation of advances in fare payment approaches and technologies, such as and including open payments, mobile phone media, etc”.

The motion by Chair Giambrone carried.

Commissioner Milczyn moved that attachment ‘a’ be amended to include the following:

* “TTC and the City expect the presto system to be designed to support open architecture;

* TTC and the city remain cognizant of our own fare policies and the system must be designed with flexibility to allow for different fare policies”.

The motion by Commissioner Milczyn carried.

Chair Giambrone moved that the commission approve the report, as amended.

The motion by chair Giambrone carried.

Therefore, when I originally reported that the link between Presto and programs other than Transit City had never been brought to the Commission, I erred.  The main article below has been updated accordingly.

In turn, this begs the question of why this issue was not raised when the Commission approved a study of a separate system from Presto, and the degree to which the conditions for acceptance of Presto, as set out in the November 2009 motion, have or have not been met.

I have also corrected the expiry date of the current Presto contract to 2016.  The original date cited, 2011, appeared in another report that I was using as reference material.

The original post from July 23, with amendments, follows below.

The battle between the Presto and TTC Open Payment factions heated up earlier today with statements by various would-be mayors, the Board of Trade, Minister of Transportation Kathleen Wynne, and TTC Chair Adam Giambrone.

The following article appears on the Ministry’s website:

Minister Kathleen Wynne Stands By PRESTO

July 23, 2010 3:36 PM

The TTC’s recent focus on a duplicate fare system is troubling and a complete waste of precious taxpayer dollars.

The PRESTO card allows transit riders around the GTA to transfer seamlessly with one card from GO Train to bus or streetcar or subway, anywhere in the GTA. And best of all, the PRESTO system is also being developed to accept other cards — like debit or credit cards.

It’s a smart system that connects us and makes the daily commute just a little easier. Already 7,600 commuters are using their PRESTO cards, and 500 more are joining every week.

The city and TTC made a commitment to PRESTO many times.

Gas Tax funding was provided to GTA Municipalities, including the City of Toronto, with the requirement that they participate in the PRESTO fare card system, provincial funding towards the cost of the City of Toronto’s replacement streetcars is also conditional upon the City’s full participation in PRESTO and we’ve communicated to the City that the 182 light rail vehicles for the four Transit City projects in Toronto must be PRESTO ready.

There are a lot of investments to make in public transit, and a lot of improvements to be made at the TTC. To waste money on a duplicate fare system makes no sense.

That’s a fascinating statement for a few reasons.

Updated July 24:  The link between Presto and other programs was reported to the Commission in a report from November 2009.  For some reason, this was not mentioned during Commission discussions of a study for a separate system based on open payments.  However, judging by the long list of conditions, many of which deal with technical and functionality issues with Presto, a related question to Queen’s Park is the degree to which this list has or will been addressed, and the implications for fares in Toronto if it is not.

Second, claims of a duplicate system bear closer examination.  There are 7,600 Presto cards in circulation with 500 more per week.   That’s going to get us up to something over 20,000 by the end of 2010.  The TTC sells over 450,000 Metropasses every month, and has many, many more regular users who pay token fares.  That’s a bit of a jump for the scale of Presto implementation.  Duplication?  Duplicating what?

Third, I believe that the only reason Presto moved on open payment capability was the competition from the TTC’s proposal.  Without that pressure, we could have sailed through a region-wide rollout unable to deal with credit cards or smart phones for fare payment.

Presto isn’t even planning to roll out in Toronto in a big way for a few years, by which time it will also support open payment technology.  Where is the wasted money?  Meanwhile, the TTC needs a new fare system by 2012 when new streetcars will start rolling down the streets of Toronto and use all-door loading.

TTC Chair Giambrone responded with this letter which also appears on his Facebook page.

TTC Chair Giambrone Clarifies PRESTO position

July 23, 7:00 pm

Recent media reports have made it clear that there is confusion about the relationship between PRESTO and the TTC’s proposed Open Standards electronic fare system.

The TTC has been a full participant in PRESTO since 2004 and confirmed its participation as recently as last November. It simply imposed conditions such as open and transparent procurement and an ability to adapt to new technology.

The fact is that funding has not been committed to implement PRESTO on the TTC. In 2004, $140 million was committed, divided evenly between the City, Queen’s Park and Ottawa, based on incomplete estimates that did not account for necessary capital work. The most recent estimate puts the cost of implementation at $490 million – leaving a $350 million shortfall.

The City needs increased funding just to operate the TTC, and to keep it safe and reliable. With its recent cuts to the Transit City light rail plan the Province has made it clear that they also cannot afford new spending on transit projects.

Given that no money is available to bring PRESTO to the TTC, the Commission prudently chose to explore partnerships with the financial sector to find a more cost effective, off-the-shelf solution. I am confident that a public-private partnership to deliver electronic fare collection to the TTC will be achieved in 2010.

Adopting an Open Standard system instead of custom-built, proprietary smart card such as PRESTO is the right thing to do. Even PRESTO staff have indicated that they intend to move towards accepting Open Standard fare payment as early as 2011. The two fare systems will be totally compatible and allow riders to move seamlessly between TTC and other regional transit operators.

PRESTO staff have reportedly expressed concerns that moving to Open payments may affect their business case. The project is governed by a contract between the Province and Accenture. Given that this contract has not been made public or shared with TTC staff I cannot comment on its specifics. This contract needs to be made public before an informed public debate can take place.

Should anyone question the TTC’s cost of Presto implementation, it should be remembered that Ontario already has a $250-million contract with Accenture for the trivial amount of use that Presto gets compared to the size of the TTC’s network.  What has that quarter-billion paid for?

In a separate Facebook post, Giambrone reviewed media coverage including this comment.

From the Star:

“Metrolinx said its next generation of readers – expected to be available in 2011 – should accommodate open payment options. But there are questions about how Presto’s revenue model would be affected if its card has to compete with others for transactions.”

The facts: A regional farecard was promised by the McGuinty Liberals in the 2003 election. Seven years later a phased rollout is just beginning, and Presto staff expect it to reach the TTC by 2015 at the earliest. TTC riders can no longer afford to wait. If we can skip a generation of technology we should, especially when we have good reason to believe an open payments system will be much more cost effective.

Media coverage of this is in The Star.

Mayoral candidates (and others) choose to portray Toronto and especially the TTC as a barrier to the transit improvements Presto may bring.  Without getting into the various statements, I can’t help feeling that if Presto were a TTC scheme, the candidates would all hate it as a reminder of the Miller era.  They need to focus on what various fare systems can do, how much they will cost, and when they will be implemented.

Will the first act of a new Mayor be commit Toronto, sight unseen, to a system that needs to scale up massively to handle TTC requirements, may lack flexibility and may cost more than an alternative?  Wouldn’t they demand that we review whether Presto is actually a good deal?  Or would a new Mayor be so keen to curry favour at Queen’s Park that he would sign first, and hope that any problems afflicted someone else later.

I have a few questions for Minister Wynne:

1. It has been no secret since late 2009 that the TTC was examining an alternative to Presto to obtain better functionality at lower cost, and that the only money Queen’s Park has on the table to date is 1/3 of $140-million, or less than 10% of the estimated rollout cost of Presto for the TTC.  With the links of Provincial funding being contingent on accepting Presto, why has this not been raised sooner, and why has Queen’s Park not addressed the substantial implementation costs for the project?
2. What are the terms of the Accenture contract?  As reported by the TTC quite some time ago, this is a 10-year contract expiring in 2016.  How much more will Queen’s Park pay to extend this contract and expand it to the scale of TTC operations, or is this included in the base price?
3. What are Presto’s technical capabilities for handling fares with the complexity of travel on the TTC?  Will TTC riders be forced into a less attractive or more expensive fare model to fit within the constraints of the regional system?
4. Why has there been no public discussion about fare policy and the implications for operating subsidies of consolidated fares across boundaries between the TTC and other systems?  That’s the “big win” so many riders are waiting for, but it’s the one nobody who funds transit wants to talk about.

I will be meeting with Presto staff on Monday, July 26 to learn about their capabilities and plans in detail, to the degree that they choose to share the information.

The Star reports that the TTC will proceed with a tender for an Open Payment system later this year with the intent of a 2011 rollout.  Mayoral hopeful Rocco Rossi has his own scheme called “Presto Plus”.  Can the TTC actually commit to a new system with the current regime still in office?  Rossi’s campaign confirms that he would cancel the TTC’s scheme if he were to become mayor.

Metrolinx would love to see the TTC sign on to Presto, but many questions remain about just what Presto can do for a truly integrated transit system.

Smart Cards are yet another example of the way that transit technology wars in the GTA get in the way of solving fundamental transit problems.  The technology choice becomes more important than the service it provides.  Here are a few questions anyone with “the answer” should consider.

What Will It Cost and Who Will Pay for the Technology?

Estimates of the Presto implementation for the TTC have ranged well over $400-million, and we don’t have a reliable figure for comparative purposes.  The scheme was originally expected to come in at about a third of that price.  We need a credible implementation cost with no hidden add-ons or scope creep.

The cost estimate has grown over time:

• November 2000 Fare Collection Study:  $140-million
• March 2004 Canada Strategic Infrastructure Funding announced:  $140-million shared between Ottawa, Queen’s Park and Toronto
• June 2007 Business Case Report:  $260-million (2006$) [Full report]
• 2010 Capital Budget:  $416-million plus costs related to Transit City and the two YUS subway extensions totalling $489-million

It is unclear how long the CSIF money will remain on the table, or if it was ever “real” funding.

Queen’s Park wants to pay 1/3 of the cost.  Bully for them.  The last time I looked, Queen’s Park hasn’t got two pennies to rub together and hopes that advisory panels of businessmen, civic luminaries and activists will carry the can for hard decisions on transit funding.  Who will pay the other 2/3?  Depending on the total cost, that’s a lot of money to spend on fare collection technology.

Over at the TTC, advocates of Open Payment systems claim that the implementation will be paid for by the banking system.  I would like to see that in writing, and whether there’s an upper limit to what the banks will invest in this rollout.  Of course, we won’t know this until after a Request For Proposals has made its way through the mill, and the details may still be considered as confidential commercial information.

What Can The Technology Do?

Presto is a stored value system, in the sense that you load money onto your card’s account, and as you travel around the network, Presto deducts the appropriate fare.  Open payment systems track your riding, and bundle this together in a bill periodically charging you (say via credit card or bank withdrawal) for usage.  That leaves a nice “float” in Presto’s hands of all the unspent fares, similar to the value of unused tickets and tokens for which the TTC has already been paid.

Presto has an automatic reload feature, but this presumes that you have an account that can be billed for that reload.  If reloads using cash are to be supported, then the whole infrastructure of add-value machines and cash handling must be added to implementation and operating costs.

Presto operates by deducting the value of “one fare” (whatever that may be locally) from the stored value of the card.  In the case of GO trips, it also calculates the fare appropriate to the distance travelled, and riders can have a “default trip” programmed on their account.  That default allows riders to avoid having to “tap out” at their destination.  It’s a nice idea, but it shows how much Presto is oriented to people making standard commutes, rather than a more complex pattern of travel through the network.

Open Payment systems work on the premise that people already have something that they routinely use, or can use, to identify themselves.  The obvious examples are credit and debit cards which can interact with contactless readers using RFID technology (Radio Frequency Identification).  However, this is also available using cell phones.  Regardless of the medium, a customer registers with the system to permit transit fares to be billed based on their identification.

Fare Policy is Not a Technology

Far more fundamentally, the question we should ask is this:  what types of fare arrangements would each system offer?

A vital question for proponents of either scheme is the menu of fare options that their systems can support.  Already, we know from the FAQ on Metrolinx site that there are some constraints in the fare combinations that Presto can handle.  Are there more?

Presto does not address the fundamental issue of fare policy.  All it does is to duplicate the existing fare systems.  Is this a system constraint, or does the capability of alternate fare models exist waiting only for policy direction to be implemented?

Everyone who crosses the 905/416 boundary complains about multiple fares.  Indeed, one big attraction of subway expansion north of Steeles Avenue is the disappearance of the fare boundary.  This is not a technology issue, it is a policy issue.  How much should we charge people to ride, and should crossing an invisible line incur a completely new fare?

If we give cross-border riders a discount, what will make up the difference in total revenue?  If we change to a zone system or a time based fare, what are the implications for riders elsewhere in the network?

If we attempt to duplicate the TTC’s transfer regulations, the system must track passengers as they move from route to route, and determine when a “new” trip begins.  That’s a lot of effort and infrastructure we could replace simply by moving to a time based fare.

Why is GO Transit a special fare zone?  How does this fit into The Big Move where GO’s rail lines are treated as if they were a regional rapid transit network?  How far out will we push the subway system so that riders can avoid a higher GO fare?

As part of its review of the Open Payment concept, the TTC has asked its staff to report on a variety of fare options so that we can have an informed debate on a future fare structure.  I have yet to hear a word on the issue from Metrolinx even though this is central to fare policy.

These questions are independent of whichever technology is chosen, but they must be answered.  Some aspects of the system implementation cost are directly linked to the fare structure.  A scheme for fare-by-distance, for example, will require that riders “tap out”.  This changes the passenger flow on vehicles and in stations.  Indeed, the “default trip” scheme on Presto was implemented specifically to avoid “tapping out” for the most common trips.

The Fine Print

The Presto system depends on back-end services provided to Metrolinx by Accenture who, as I understand things, bases their fees on transaction counts.  Without the TTC on the system, the potential fees are much lower, and the business model falls apart.

According to the 2007 TTC report, Queen’s Park has already paid $250-million to Accenture for the development of a GTA farecard system, not including any implementation on the TTC, and that contract goes back nearly a decade.  Is there a contractual arrangement requiring Queen’s Park to make up a minimum payment to operate Presto?  How much have we already invested in that system?  Will this be competitive with an Open Payment system?  Is Queen’s Park locked into a high-cost, proprietary technology?

Beyond Fares

If the transit smart card’s use extends to other services, this moves into an area where the banking industry is already well established.

An important difference between Presto and Open Payments is that the latter does not require reinvention of the banking system.  Banks already exist, and they know how to handle payments through a wide variety of outlets.  If Presto is to become a payment standard, then every store, every agency, must support Presto in addition to the standard bank payment systems, or alternately Presto must adhere to payment industry standards.

This is a case of the tail wagging the dog.

A related issue is “the unbanked”, those who operate only with cash on a day-to-day basis.  The banking industry views these people as a large untapped market.  Moving them to a smart card lifestyle is challenging, but it should be solved by the banking industry as a whole, not as a special function of the transit system.

Where Do We Go From Here?

It’s easy for mayoral candidates and provincial Pooh-Bahs to slag the TTC for its foot-dragging on smart card implementation.  [Yes, I know, "Pooh-Bah" almost by definition cannot be made plural.]  However, the question of “who will pay” has never really been answered, and on that basis the TTC has demurred at each opportunity.

Now with the experience of other systems, notably New York City, in moving to Open Payment technology, the TTC is starting to budge, encouraged by the possibility that they won’t have to pay for or operate a goodly chunk of the system.  I hope that we will see a reworked “business case” soon to substantiate this claim.

Our new streetcars, due to appear in only a few years, will force the TTC to shift away from pay-as-you-enter fare collection.  These cars will load at all doors, and passengers will generally not use a farebox or transfers.  This sets the TTC on a path to a complete revolution in its fare collection, and this will involve some flavour of smart card regardless of which technology is chosen.

Meanwhile, Queen’s Park has insisted that Presto be implemented on the Transit City lines.  The first of these, Sheppard, won’t be in operation until after new LFLRVs hit the city streets, and we will see which fare technology is actually implemented on Sheppard and other Transit City routes.

The TTC and Metrolinx must sort out a viable, common fare collection scheme, but more importantly the entire region must sort out an integrated fare policy.  This brings us directly to the question of operating subsidies from local governments and Queen’s Park, an issue nobody wants to touch.

Battling it out with razor-edged smart cards at dawn is so much simpler, but so much less productive.

The round table added nothing to what we already know on this subject, but did provide insight into public policy debate here in the GTA.  Although this was officially a TCSA event, it was clearly at the service of Metrolinx who had a strong presence.  Rob Prichard, Metrolinx CEO, gave opening remarks.  As I have already noted, John Brodhead, Metrolinx VP of Strategy & Communications, co-chaired the working group behind the TCSA paper.  Other Metrolinx staff were scattered through the crowd, some as facilitators at tables.

Invited participants included activists of varied backgrounds, a few politicians, professionals from government and industry, representatives from various business groups, a few from the media, and others from the collection of “usual suspects” one sees at this type of gathering.  The idea, the hope, was that the collected wisdom of this group might inform future debate and recommendations about how to proceed.

Rob Prichard’s Eight Questions

In his opening remarks, Prichard posed a series of questions that showed the difficulties Metrolinx must wrestle with in developing a funding policy.  Ooops, no, it’s not a policy, it will be a proposed policy, and it won’t be ready for three years because Queen’s Park doesn’t want to talk about new revenue tools while fallout from the HST, the eco-fee and who knows what other schemes and scandals still glows radioactively.

Here, in a paraphrase from my notes, are Prichard’s questions:

1. Should funding just look after capital costs, or also operations?  Should only regional costs and systems be included, or also local ones?
2. Should we build what we need to make up for decades of inaction, or build to shape future travel behaviour?
3. Should new revenues be used to build only transit, or should road projects be included?
4. Should a single revenue source pay for everything, and a marketing campaign focus on getting approval for that source, or should a package of revenue tools be used?
5. How can we engage the public to support paying for additional spending?
6. How can we eliminate the “third rail effect” of any new revenue proposals for politicians?
7. How can the debate be framed as a benefit to both drivers and transit riders, rather than as a competition between the two groups?
8. Should any new revenue stream be subject to a referendum, and, if so, could we win?

This is a very good set of questions, but sadly, like so much “public participation”, the meeting had already been structured to discuss things a different way, and we never really got to most of the hard issues.

Missing in Action

Discussion of the role of the private sector, of outside investment, of possible ownership roles beyond government agencies, has completely vanished.  Our mission was only to debate how to pay for things, not how to finance them.

This is an important distinction.  When Metrolinx first talked about an “Investment Strategy”, the very name of that project clearly implied that money would, possibly by magic, appear to fund massive expansion of transit in the GTA.  A few things quickly got in the way of this something-for-nothing approach to transit.

• The bottom fell out of the financing market, and the house of cards on which so much planning was based collapsed.
• Public sector accounting rules changed, and the idea that one could hide debt in external agencies or private “partners” no longer was acceptable.  If the government has an iron-clad agreement to pay down debt directly or through a leasing arrangement, that’s public debt and must be booked as such.
• The private sector is not quite so awash with cash as it once was, and wants a guaranteed return for anything it might build.  The relatively limited exposure of a design-build contract has advantages over the unknowns of a long-term operating and maintenance contract.
• PPP debacles elsewhere, notably the London fiasco, have alerted the public and governments (at least those who are not ideologically blind) to the concept of risk.  Private companies can and do make business decisions that may not be in the public interest up to and including walking away from their commitments.  The cost and complexity of protecting the public’s need for continuity and quality of service transfers much risk away from the private sector.
• Pay-as-you-play has the attraction of avoiding debt and its long-term costs.  We could build up a mountain of debt, but would then be paying interest on that debt rather than building and operating new transit lines.  The flip side, however, is that we can only build what we can afford from current revenue.  Where is the balance point between how much voters will bear in new fees and taxes versus the frequency of ribbon-cutting ceremonies for politicians?

That we are still talking about an “investment strategy” at this point is almost comic, and only makes sense in a context where politicians recognize that the “investment” is by the public, one way or another.  We are going to build and operate billions’ worth of new transit systems and services, and this must be seen as an investment in the health and prosperity of the region, not as an expense to be deeply buried as far away from public view as possible.

Comments and Contemplation

Each of the many tables held about ten participants.  We listened dutifully as groups of speakers outlined the issues from their various points of view.  The most entertaining of these, and the last, was Peter MacLeod who gave an hilarious talk about how not to conduct public participation.  Sadly, those who designed the event had not been exposed to his wisdom.

The speakers were divided in two groups, and after each of these, we turned to questions that had been set in advance.  The first pair of questions was:

1. What is the best case for investment in transit and transportation infrastructure?
2. What is the best way to communicate it to the various audiences concerned?

It didn’t take long for our table (and others, as I heard later) to veer away from the set questions.  Both the Toronto Board of Trade and the TCSA, itself composed of many business and government and academic notables, have raised the call for more investment in transportation as an essential tool for regional growth.  Transit is no longer something we do for “everyone else”.

Therefore, the “case” for investment and the political message won’t appeal to altruism, to concern for the poor families who have only two cars and are transit dependent for occasional trips, but to fundamental business interests in the future of the GTA.

The implications of accepting that there are limits to car-oriented travel are profound, and yet a critical issue, land use, was not even on the table.  In many ways, we have given up on hoping that land use will ever be directly controlled because too many politicians (and their constituents) depend on a never-ending supply of vacant land for new construction.  We have built the suburbs, and there is as-of-right zoning for lots more of the same.  The challenge now is to provide the means of travelling through this sparsely populated region.

I say “sparse” because, compared to other metropolitan areas with populations over 10-million, the GTA is smeared out over a vast area of southern Ontario.  We like to think of ourselves as a “big” city, but that’s an artificial construct compared with places like New York or Paris.  Toronto could tout a population of 20-million if only its reach extended from the prairies to the Atlantic, but the hubris of such a claim would be obvious even to those who live here.

The case for investment is actually rather simple:  there is no room for more cars in many parts of the GTA, and expansion of road capacity is unlikely.  Those cars are getting in the way of commercial traffic, and congestion is no longer just something we hear about in traffic reports.  It hurts the bottom line.

Moreover, the cost of private vehicle ownership is prohibitive for a large and growing population who cannot depend on high-paying jobs to sustain a late-2oth century boom lifestyle.  We can abandon the city, the region, to its fate, or we can try to improve transportation where this is feasible.

How do we communicate the worth of transit?  For starters, we might actually follow the scheme set out in MoveOntario2020.  Queen’s Park would bravely invest in new transit lines to show people what could be done, and with that solid base of support, we would turn to the question of revenue generation.  Show people that you can build projects they want and need, on time and on budget, and the rest follows easily.  That was the plan.

Queen’s Park got cold feet.  First they discovered that the cost estimates were a tad low, and their seed money wouldn’t go as far, literally, as they had hoped.  Then the bottom dropped out of the financial market, and the idea of new debt as a stimulus, a lure to future spending, was elbowed aside to deal with a recession and widespread concern about Ontario’s ability to pay its bills.  Of course, one reason we can’t pay our bills is that we have told voters they don’t have to pay taxes, and this leaves large-scale new levies for transit projects in a difficult place.

We won’t have anything to show for Ontario’s seed money until about 2014 when the Sheppard LRT opens.  The Spadina extension, not strictly a new project in the MoveOntario context, opens in 2015.  We won’t see Eglinton until 2020.  GO will introduce some new services, such as the St. Catharines extension, but these are comparatively small change in a regional context.  How, meanwhile, are we supposed to drum up public support for new transit funding streams?

Population and auto growth will continue, traffic congestion will grow much worse, and many of the projects now underway will do nothing to relieve this.  Indeed, even if we build transit in the 905, this will at best keep up with growth, and congestion won’t get any better.

The second pair of questions was:

1. Which revenue tools have the greatest potential for funding regional transportation plans AND gaining support of decision makers and the public?
2. What steps need to be taken to engage decision makers and the public in serious and productive discussion of the potential funding sources?

Positions varied at my table, but there was general agreement that we should not waste our efforts on schemes that would bring in small amounts.  We need anywhere from $2- to $4-billion every year more or less forever.  One time revenue sources, and those that generate only tens of millions simply are not going to provide the funds we require.

The arguments needed to engage anyone in this discussion turn on the problem, literally, of the road not taken.  What happens if we spend the next decades hoping that the Tooth Fairy will fix everything?  We certainly know what the past decades of inaction have cost us, and this will only worsen as the surplus capacity, such as it is, of existing networks is consumed while travel demands continue to rise.

The question, then, is which revenue tools are the most suitable and the most acceptable to the task.  Now we bump into philosophical problems.  Some would use a variety of taxes on motorists, highways, cars and parking lots.  This is an odd way to build a transit system — ask your competition to pay for it and expect them to quietly hand over their cash.  This approach is justified by some as a way to influence driving behaviour and shift motorists onto transit.  Hmmm.  What transit?  Transit cutbacks are the news of the day, not transit expansion, and what new lines we have don’t address a fraction of the GTA’s auto demand.

We speak of “investment” in transit as a benefit to the region, and this argues for a broadly-based revenue source, either general revenues (as today) or an expansion of sales taxes.  Something tells me that the 2011 provincial election will not be fought on a pledge to raise taxes, and this discussion will stay in the realm of hand-wringing activists and non-governmental organizations for some time.

(I was unable to stay to hear what, if any, consensus the meeting reached as the TTC’s regular board meeting began early in the afternoon.  I missed the concluding speeches and the sandwiches which, I am told, were rather good.)

Where is the Leadership?

Politicians love programs and schemes that fit neatly into one electoral cycle.  Run for election, get a few promises rolling at least to the point of having a ribbon cutting or two, announce a bunch more plans, and repeat the process.

Transit only works like that when you have many projects in the pipeline and you spend at a rate guaranteed to bring something to completion every year or so.  That costs a lot of money, unless your political ambition is no higher than an endless series of parking lot dedication ceremonies.

Ontario, going right back to Bill Davis, loves to claim that it has wonderful pro-transit policies for the GTA.  From time to time this is even true, but the dedication to transit is uneven and unpredictable.  Funding for local operations has been drying up for years, and our cities are expected to provide service to get riders to and from whatever regional lines Queen’s Park deigns to operate.

Many complain of the Spadina extension to Vaughan (and a complementary plan for the Yonge line to Richmond Hill).  However, the Spadina proposal has been around for a long time, and dates back to an era when GO Transit had no love for vastly improved service.  GO has not exactly rushed to provide frequent, all-day service to Barrie or Richmond Hill, although this is finally part of Metrolinx long-term plans.  If GO won’t rise to demands, then it’s no surprise that people north of Steeles demand subway extensions.

Before this sets off a firestorm of subway vs commuter rail debate, yes, I know that there are different markets.  The problem with GO is that it preferred to operate a network where losses were few, and passengers were already queued up waiting for the first train to arrive.  This skewed political demands to seek alternatives.  Imagine how differently the regional network would have evolved had GO been properly funded and pursued an aggressive campaign to build the network we only glimpse now in “The Big Move”.  Ontario talked a good line, but starved the very system it built and put its name on for expansion and operating funds.  Transit followed development rather than leading and shaping it.

Now the business community awakes to the importance of a transportation network both to move their employees around the region, but even more critically to move their products.  If roads are full of commuters, the trucks (and the factories they represent) don’t work productively.  This brings us to a basic problem — claims that transit will remove congestion from roads are hard to prove, and the time frames are so long that other factors such as population growth and economic cycles will cloud the statistics.

The GTA is growing quickly, and unlike less robust regions, is unlikely to see an immediate effect whenever a new service begins to operate.  The cumulative effect of more transit will be, at best, to keep congestion from getting any worse, and to provide some alternatives for travel within the region.  I say “some” because the current modal share for transit is trivial.  Getting it up even to the level the TTC now achieves in the outer 416 will require a huge shift in transit quality, let alone pushing to the heights achieved in mid-town Toronto.

Many, no most trips will continue to be made by drivers in cars, many with no passengers.  All that transit investment won’t mean much to them, and there’s the difficulty in selling drivers on the concept that they should pay billions to expand the transit riders’ network.

Will Queen’s Park champion spending on transit?  Will they work to convince voters that more spending, and, yes, more taxes or fees, are essential to the economic future of the GTA?  Or will they spend just enough to limp from election to election, the transit equivalent of filling potholes?

Advocacy and real belief in transit is a hard road.  Local transit gets by with whatever funding local councils choose to provide, and only Toronto has expanded service aggressively even as funding dried up.  Voters want lower taxes, and too many see transit as a waste, not an essential part of urban life.  Some voters know they want something better and, thanks to travel and immigration, many have seen what good transit can look like.  A few shiny new trains scattered through the rush hour don’t impress quite the way they did back in 1967.

Ontario must reverse its attitude to transit spending and expansion as something we can only afford when times are good, and then only to the degree needed to polish our pro-transit reputation.  Queen’s Park must actually lead, challenging and difficult though this may be, to inspire voters that large-scale transit spending is essential to the GTA.

Workshops by well-meaning business and community groups may be testing grounds, but they are no substitute for commitment and advocacy in the government itself.

Please refer to my article on the June 2010 schedule changes for a list of the summer service cuts that will end in September.

Service Improvements

The service improvements are listed in a table in the usual manner on this site, and these are stated relative to the winter schedules.

2010.09.05 Service Changes

Construction Projects

• Work on the Yonge Subway north of Eglinton with late-night tunnel repairs is expected to continue until late 2011.
• Work at Pape Station requiring the 72 Pape bus diversion to Donlands will continue to the end of 2010.
• Track work on The Queensway will result in replacement of streetcar service west of Sunnyside Loop on weekends until the end of the October schedule period (November 20).  The replacement service will operate to Dundas West Station as a merged service with the 504 King shuttle on Roncesvalles.
• Construction on Roncesvalles and on King (to about Close Avenue in Parkdale) will continue through late 2010, and the 504/508 streetcar services will remain on diversion via Shaw and Queen as at present.  The 504 shuttle bus will revert to a short route from Queen to Dundas West operating southbound via Dundas and Lansdowne because service to Shaw via King will not be possible once track construction begins.
• Roadway repairs at Runnymede Station will require changes to the 71 Runnymede, 77 Swansea and 79 Scarlett Road services through to the end of the October schedule period.  79 Scarlett Road will operate to High Park Station at all times.  Weekday peak and midday periods will see the 77 interline with all 71 services bypassing Runnymede Station.  At other times, the 71B Industry branch will run to High Park Station.  These changes take effect on Tuesday, September 7.
• Reconstruction of Bingham Loop will complete this summer, and streetcars will return to the 502/503 routes on Kingston Road.
• Fire prevention work at York Mills Station will complete and all routes now using a temporary terminal will move back into the station.
• Construction projects affecting the 88 South Leaside route on Moore, and the 505 Dundas car west of Ossignton will be completed.

No More New Looks on Bay

Effective in September, the 6 Bay route will operate with accessible, bike-rack equipped vehicles.  Fans of GMC New Looks will have to search further afield to ride these vehicles.

Seasonal Services

Many seasonal services will end their operation after Labour Day.

Rapid Transit Service Changes

One “gap train” will be removed from the schedule of the Yonge-University line in each peak period, and it will be redeployed as regular service on the Bloor-Danforth line.  This will reduce peak headways by a few seconds, equivalent to .5 more trips through the peak point per hour .  This change is over and above the restitution of winter service levels.

Midday service on Bloor-Danforth will be improved by adding two trains and reducing headways from 4’39″ to 4’16″.

On the Scarborough RT, step-back crewing, already in use during the AM peak, will be extended to the PM peak at Kennedy Station.  This will eliminate the need for operators to fight their way through crowds of passengers as they change ends.

511 Bathurst Cars Get Even Longer Layovers

It is claimed that running times on the 511 are too short and that time must be added to the schedules.  Anyone who was watched the extended layovers taken by 511 cars at the Exhibition Loop might question this claim, but riders on the 511 will have headways widened from 30 to 60 seconds at all hours to provide for this.

The introduction at page 4 shows the overall process and also reveals a major flaw.  We have reached the point of selecting a “preferred alternative” on which all future detailed design and discussion will be based, but I am not convinced that only a single option should be carried forward.  I am quite certain that feedback from many regular users of this area — pedestrians, businesses, transportation service operators, cyclists, even a few motorists — will suggest that more than one option has its advantages.  At this point, we don’t have enough information to pick one, and doing so risks compromising the project’s credibility when it comes before the new, 2011 Council for further approvals.

The objectives listed on page 6 include:

• Accommodate increased development and passenger growth associated with Union Station, and …
• Prioritize the role of pedestrian activity.

However, as we will see later, much analysis reflects the need to accommodate auto traffic even though pedestrian volumes will more than double in coming decades.  The premise should be turned on its head — what design is needed to handle the pedestrians, and what, if anything, is left over for other uses.  Some quite attractive pedestrian areas from other cities are shown on page 7, but these are notably devoid of traffic on anywhere near the level now on Front Street.

The urban design template shows the general layout common to many of the design proposals.  Access at the York/Front and Bay/Front intersections is limited to a pair of lanes, and the pedestrian areas are greatly expanded.  A large mid-block crossing is added in front of Union Station, and this area is, similarly, narrowed to a pair of lanes.

The design alternatives explore many combinations of changes and their implications for the street.  Among the variations between them are:

• Whether the existing median, which is impassible in parts, is retained in whole, in part or removed.
• Whether there will be a median at all, and how it would function including the option of it being a taxi lay-by or a pedestrian refuge.
• How much space will be allocated for taxi stands.
• Whether cab/pickup space will share road lanes, or be intended into the pedestrian space.
• Whether and by how much the pedestrian spaces at intersections will be expanded.
• How wide the mid-block crossing will be in front of Union Station (2 or 4 lanes) and how pedestrians will be funnelled through this crossing.
• Whether the street will operate effectively as a two-lane road and, if so, whether it will handle through or only local traffic, and whether it should be one-way or two-way.  A one-lane, one-way version is also presented for comparison.
• Whether the space should be converted to a pedestrian plaza with only local access at either end.
• Whether and how bike lanes would be included.

A mind-numbingly dense comparison of alternatives appears on page 17 of the presentation (page 6 of this set of images).  What is quite striking about this is the degree to which “traffic operations” are an important determinant.  Completely missing in the discussion is the question of whether it will be possible to operate the street for anything other than pickup/dropoff traffic at Union Station once pedestrian volumes double (or more) current values.  This is not a question of engineering “green time”, but of having such an overwhelming volume of pedestrians in an area already rampant with J-walking that traffic would be effectively blocked during peak periods.

One issue in the overall design that is not mentioned is that the Union Station project foresees an additional cabstand on the south side of the station at Union Plaza.  This area is open now, but the access from Union Station is well-hidden by the Via Panorama Lounge which has not yet relocated to the West Wing.  You can reach Union Plaza by going through what appears to be the “paid area” to GO Transit’s southern-most platforms.  This will bring you out behind the Air Canada Centre and the new Telus building at the east end of Bremner Boulevard.

The preferred alternative 2B is a two-way design with a centre median smaller than what is now present, and with taxi lay-bys in the eastern and western thirds of the block.  The mid-block pedestrian crossings would be arranged (and barricaded) so that they occurred directly opposite the main doors of the Great Hall.  Functionally, the eastern one would get the greater traffic as this lines up with a heavily used walking path between the Royal York Hotel and the Royal Bank tower.  Sidewalk space is almost doubled.

A review of technical issues includes observations of current behaviour of pedestrain and road traffic on Front Street, and projections of changes in traffic over time.  As I said before, no allowance is made in these projections for the effect of doubling the pedestrian traffic that will interfere with vehicles.

Pedestrian issues are mentioned in a review of midblock crossings on Bay and York Streets.  Most regular users of Union Station will know that there is a strong demand to cross Bay directly at the eastern exit of the station from the GO concourse to reach the bus terminal across the street, or simply to get to the east sidewalk.  The Front Street study will look at options for providing formal crossings on Bay and York south of the existing signalled crossings at Front.

Next steps include refinement of the preferred option, another public information centre in December and a report to Council in mid-2011.  The project team is soliciting comments by July 27, 2010, and contact details appear on the Next Steps page.

Related projects in the downtown area include the Union Station reconstruction and “dig down”, the TTC Union Station expansion, the Northwest PATH link from Union up to Wellington Street, and other changes to Bay, York and John Streets.

As I said at the beginning, I believe that selection of a single preferred alternative at this time is premature especially because the interactions of pedestrians and other road users, allowing for future GO Transit and TTC ridership projections, have not been considered properly.  Some options can fairly easily be taken off of the table now, but I doubt that everyone will be particularly happy with only one design going forward.

Improve the traffic modelling, cut down the options to a digestible number, and then repeat the review.  Yes, this will delay the project, but in the end we could have something that is better understood and accepted.  The worst outcome would be to have a new Council breathing fire about the “war on the car” trying to ignore that some parts of downtown will be taken over by pedestrians no matter what they do.

If the whole project stops because of such short-sighted behaviour, encouraged by unhappy residents and businesses (see St. Clair project for a comparison), we will have wasted more time than we “saved” by pushing ahead.

The original post from July 2 follows below:

One of the lesser-known aspects of the City of Toronto’s Union Station project is the plan to redesign Front Street between Bay and York.  Preliminary work on this scheme has been underway for some time, and there will be a Public Information Centre on Monday, July 5.  Here is the City’s notice:

The City of Toronto is doing a study of potential changes to Front Street West at Union Station, and we would like to hear from you.

The City is hosting the first Public Information Centre (PIC) event for this project:

• Date: Monday, July 5, 2010
• Time: 3 p.m. to 7 p.m.
• Location: Union Station, Main Floor, West Side (towards the Skywalk)

At this event you can see draft drawings of a new design for Front Street at Union Station (known as a “Preliminary Preferred Alternative” within the Environmental Assessment study process).

Changes being considered for Front Street at Union Station include:

• designing a grand civic plaza
• creating a mid-block pedestrian crossing
• improving the intersections and widening sidewalks
• considering changes to traffic lanes and the layout of taxi stands and pick-up/drop-off areas

At the July 5 PIC you can view information panels, speak with members of the project team and provide your input in to the study.

You can download a PDF of the public notice and background information here.

Further details about the study are available on the project web page.

We also invite you to join the discussion on the project Facebook group.

Materials from the PIC will be posted on the project web page shortly following the event.

We look forward to hearing from you!